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Abstract
After a period of relatively low international food price volatility since the 1970s, prices
spiked in 2007/2008 and 2011. These international price changes transmitted to domestic
markets where they generate extra volatility. This volatility adversely impacts on welfare
of consumers and producers, while price spikes are a major threat to national food security.
This study examines drivers of grain price instability in developing countries and discusses
the role of stocks and trade to stabilize prices and consumption levels.
Multiple determinants of food price volatility are identified in this work using a panel of
more than 70 developing countries. The econometric approach chosen accounts for volatil-
ity clusters and potential endogeneity of explanatory variables. The estimation shows a
large spill-over of international price volatility into domestic food markets, in particular for
importing countries, with a short-run elasticity between 0.26 and 0.44. In relative terms,
stocks and regional trade integration contribute most to price stabilization. In numbers,
an increase in the stock-to-use ratio or the share of regional trade by one percentage point
diminishes variability by 2.5 percent and 0.8 percent, respectively. Export restrictions, so
called insulation policies, significantly reduce volatility for non-importers by about four per-
cent when export quantities are 10 percentage points lower. In contrast, markets in countries
that run extensive public price stabilization programs are not found to be associated with
lower price instability.
In Ghana, food prices of locally produced staples exhibit strong seasonality, up to an intra-
annual price spread of 60 percent, owed to limited storage. Primary data collected from
wholesale traders reveals seasonal fluctuations in stock levels and suggests that traders hold
a significant share of total stocks, especially towards the end of the marketing year. In
addition to that, traders are found to have distinct storage strategies. Some traders only
store to resell in bulk or carry working stocks to supply costumers, while a group of traders
speculates for seasonal price increases.
Finally, based on a theoretical model to define stocking norms, costs and benefits from
storage cooperation are assessed. The empirical application to West Africa reveals great
potentials of cooperation emerging from the imperfect correlation of production quantities
among these countries. Accordingly, regional stocks under cooperation in an emergency
reserve can be up to 60 percent less than without cooperation. Limited intra-regional
trade reduces the need for stock releases significantly. Full trade integration would dimin-
ish regional consumption variability to 3.4 percent without storage, but is not effective in
dampening severe supply shortfalls. Cooperation in a stabilization reserve has only limited
impact on consumption stability, and thus storage cooperation should be restricted to an
emergency reserve.
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Zusammenfassung
Nahrungsmittelpreisvolatilität: die Rolle von Lagerhaltung und Handel
Im Anschluss an eine Phase relativ geringer Volatilität internationaler Nahrungsmittelpreise
seit den 1970er Jahren, kam es 2007/2008 und 2011 zu Preisspitzen. Diese internationalen
Preisschwankungen übertrugen sich auf nationale Märkte auf denen sie zusätzliche Insta-
bilität verursachen. Preisinstabilität beeinträchtigt die Wohlfahrt von Konsumenten und
Produzenten und Preisspitzen stellen eine große Gefahr für die nationale Ernährungssicher-
heit dar. Diese Studie untersucht die Ursachen von Preisinstabilität in Getreidemärkten in
Entwicklungsländern und diskutiert die Rolle von Lagerhaltung und Handel um Preise und
das Konsumniveau zu stabilisieren.
Die vielfältigen Gründe von Preisinstabilität werden mit Hilfe eines Panels, das mehr als
70 Entwicklungsländer umfasst, identifiziert und voneinander abgegrenzt. Der gewählte
ökonometrische Ansatz berücksichtigt Volatilitätshäufungen und eine mögliche Endogen-
ität der erklärenden Variablen. Die Schätzung zeigt einen starken Übersprungseffekt in-
ternationaler Preisvariabilität auf nationale Märkte in Entwicklungsländern, insbesondere
für Nahrungsmittelimportländer, mit einer kurzfristigen Elastizität zwischen 0,26 und 0,44.
Relativ gesehen tragen Lagerhaltung und Integration in regionalen Handel am stärksten zur
Preisstabilisierung bei. In Zahlen bedeutet das: Ein Anstieg im Verhältnis Lagerbestände
zu Verbrauch oder des Anteils an regionalem Handel von einem Prozentpunkt reduziert
die Preisvolatilität kurzfristig um ca. 2,5 bzw. 0,8 Prozent. Exportrestriktionen von Nicht-
Importländern, sogenannte Isolationspolitiken, reduzieren Preisvolatilität signifikant. Dage-
gen kann nicht festgestellt werden, dass Märkte in Ländern mit weitgehenden öffentlichen
Preisstabilisierungsprogrammen weniger Instabilität aufweisen.
Preise im Inland produzierter Grundnahrungsmittel in Ghana sind von starken saisonalen
Schwankungen, um bis zu 60 Prozent geprägt, die unzureichender Lagerhaltung geschuldet
sind. Die Erhebung von Primärdaten unter Getreidegroßhändlern offenbart saisonale Muster
und legt nahe, dass Händler einen signifikanten Anteil an der Gesamtlagermenge halten,
besonders zum Ausgang des Agrarjahres. Zudem verfügen Händler über unterschiedliche
Lagerhaltungsstrategien. Einige Händler lagern ausschließlich um in größeren Mengen weit-
erverkaufen zu können oder um Lieferverpflichtungen nachzukommen, während eine Gruppe
von Händlern auf einen saisonalen Anstieg der Preise spekuliert.
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Zuletzt werden Kosten und Nutzen einer regionalen Lagerhaltungskooperation an Hand
eines theoretischen Modells, das optimale Lagerhaltungsmengen festlegt, abgeschätzt. Die
empirische Anwendung auf Westafrika zeigt ein großes Potential von Kooperation zu profi-
tieren, das sich aus der unvollständigen Korrelation der Erntemengen der einzelnen Länder
ergibt. Demzufolge könnten regionale Lagermengen im Kooperationsfall einer Notfallre-
serve um bis zu 60 Prozent geringer ausfallen. Geringer intra-regionaler Handel würde
die Notwendigkeit der Ausgabe von Lagerbeständen signifikant reduzieren. Vollständige
Marktintegration würde die Variation des regionalen Konsums ohne weitere Lagerhaltung
auf 3,4 Prozent reduzieren, ist allerdings weniger effektiv um massive Angebotsengpässe
auszugleichen. Kooperation bei einer Stabilisierungsreserve zusätzlich zu regionaler Han-
delsintegration hat nur wenig Einfluss auf die Stabilität des Konsums, deshalb sollte die
Lagerhaltungskooperation auf eine Notfallreserve beschränkt werden.
vi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background and motivation
Naturally, agricultural commodities are exposed to substantial price instability due to the
seasonality of production. After a period of relatively low international volatility since
the 1970s, food prices spiked in 2007/2008 and 2011. In a globalized world, international
price changes transmit to domestic markets where they generate extra volatility. This
volatility adversely impacts on consumers and producers by increasing uncertainty about
future market prices. Price spikes are a major threat to national food security and have led
to hunger crises in a number of developing countries. Although levels of malnutrition have
been successfully reduced over the past decades, food insecurity remains a major concern
for policy makers in low income countries [von Braun and Tadesse, 2012].
The international food price surge in 2007/2008 brought the issues of price volatility and
food security back on the table. So, food price volatility was discussed at the G20 meetings
in Toronto and Cannes in 2010 and 2011 yielding into a special report by a myriad of interna-
tional institutions [FAO et al., 2011]. A number of developing and emerging economies with
India leading the way requested for exemptions from World Trade Organization (WTO)
trade and intervention discipline to guarantee national food security at their 2013 meeting
in Bali. The topic is expected to continue to influence the international policy agenda.
Traditionally, the literature has acknowledged price instability and its implications for food
security and welfare with great attention [Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Sahn, 1989; Timmer,
1989]. With the recent international food crises, research has concentrated on qualitative
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and quantitative assessment of international price spikes and volatility [Abbott et al., 2011;
Tadesse et al., 2013]. However, price instability is a major concern especially for developing
countries where consumers spend a large share of their income on food and agriculture
represents a substantial part of economic activity.
The theoretical and empirical literature on prices of storable and tradeable goods has ac-
cepted the theory of storage and its extension with regard to international trade. However,
poor data availability has restricted analyses to country level studies often without an ex-
plicit integration of the level of stocks into the model. On the contrary, simulation models
successfully quantify the impact of stocks and trade on price volatility [Miranda and Helm-
berger, 1988; Gouel and Jean, 2015]. Yet they are based on restrictive assumptions regarding
the functional form of demand and supply curves.
An empirical quantification of the drivers of price volatility is of great importance to policy
makers. In the wake of the global food crisis, a great number of developing and emerging
economies were forced to take action to dampen the impact of high international volatility
and to enhance coping strategies of the vulnerable. Subsidized food distribution and trade
regulations are among the most commonly used instruments. In view of the fear for the
political economy of food prices and driven by the adverse health impacts of transitory food
insecurity, the implementation of public storage systems is a popular choice [Demeke et al.,
2009].
Public storage has also been suggested by scholars and policy advisors as a possible tool to
reduce volatility and guarantee sufficient supply [Galthier, 2009]. However, this intervention
comes at high economic and fiscal costs. Among others, India runs a large public distribution
system that demands great shares of the public budget and has pushed private traders out
of the system [Kozicka et al., 2015]. The experience with buffer stocks in Africa is also
not promising [Deuss, 2014]. Therefore, government interventions should be grounded on
evidence based research and comprehensive understanding of the nature of food marketing
in the country. In particular storage patterns in developing countries are not well understood
due to the large informality of trade. However, this is necessary in order to conclude that
an intervention is required to accomplish amended market outcomes.
Apart from traditional intervention tools, it is worth to consider innovative approaches to
food security, such as virtual or regional reserves and import facilitation schemes [von Braun
and Torero, 2009; Sarris et al., 2011; Wright, 2012]. In particular, regional reserves are
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considered as a viable means to reduce costs of operation and enhance commitment to
regional trade agreements [Wright and Cafiero, 2011].
1.2 Research questions
Given the gap in the literature, this dissertation aims at providing empirical evidence on
the causes of commodity price variability, storage behavior, and the possible impact of
price stabilizing policy measures in developing countries. More precisely, the objective is to
assess what factors can contribute to stabilize domestic prices. This is of great significance
to policy makers who target national food security. Specifically, the following questions are
be addressed in the course of the thesis:
1. What are the drivers of domestic grain price volatility in developing countries?
2. What storage strategies pursue private players in Ghana and what are the implications
for policy design?
3. To what extent can regional storage cooperation reduce the costs of public interven-
tion, and what are the specific benefits for West Africa?
The research has no general geographical focus. The country case study on private storage
behavior was conducted in Ghana which is considered as a typical country in many respects.
The methodology to analyze costs and benefits from cooperation is also general and applied
to West Africa on the account that regional cooperation is intensively discussed in this
region.
1.3 Approach and methods
There are multiple ways to model price volatility. In the aftermaths of the global food
crisis, several studies appeared using different methods, namely coefficient of variation,
standard deviation of returns, and conditional volatility measures [Huchet-Bourdon, 2011;
Piot-Lepetit and M‘Barek, 2011]. Therefore, this work starts by critically reviewing the con-
temporaneous literature on volatility modeling with the purpose to identify the appropriate
model which can answer the first research question.
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Data availability is not an issue in most high income countries. In large contrast, long and
frequent price series are often not obtainable in developing countries. For this reason, a
similar approach to volatility modeling, as it is applied to international volatility, is not
feasible. Inspired by a less frequently cited work by Lee and Park [2013], a cross-country
panel model is identified as the model of choice to satisfy the requirements of the first
research objective without extensive data needs. Eventually, it even appeared that the
panel approach features advantage over conventional models to capture transmission effects
of international price volatility. Simultaneously, the quality of annual stock data that is
used as a main explanatory variable was challenging. The difficulty in their estimation
and the differences between available sources is discussed in chapter three. Luckily, the
Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) Commodity Balance Sheet (CBS) data was
finally provided by FAO’s Global Information and Early Warning System (GIEWS) for the
analysis, which improved the results considerably.
The cross-country panel allows the inclusion of a wide range of explanatory variables that
capture national supply and demand factors, macroeconomic factors, institutional quality
of markets, and trade policies. The latter are measured in an innovative way by looking at
export shocks to circumvent a subjective and qualitative assessment and to allow policies
to vary over time. The dynamic version of the panel is capable of controlling for oft-cited
volatility clusters [Serra and Gil, 2012]. Lastly, the large data set also permits the estimation
for sub-samples of the whole data set in order to consider the heterogeneity across different
types of countries.
The main advantage of cross-country studies is the great scope and relevance of the work.
From an empirical point of view, multiple countries are also required to increase the number
of observations. On the other hand, there are well known shortcomings of this type of studies
[Levine and Renelt, 1991]. Most notably, the specific characteristics of a country are not
well acknowledged and coefficient estimates represent sample averages that may strongly
vary across countries. Therefore, the results from chapter four must not be misused to give
specific recommendations. In order not to fall into suspicion of being too broad and general,
the subsequent chapters concentrate on a specific country and region, respectively.
Given the high volatility of prices, national governments attempt to enlarge storage to
stabilize food prices and to overcome supply shortages. Economists justify public storage
by the combination of risk aversion of consumers as well as producers and the imperfection
of insurance markets in developing countries [Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Gouel, 2013b].
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On the other hand, public storage induces reactions by market participants and can lead
to a crowding-out of private storage [Sarris, 1992; Headey, 2014]. In chapter five, market
behavior of private stockholders is examined. The research method combines qualitative
and quantitative elements. So, the narratives of traders, experts, and stakeholders are
linked to primary and secondary data. As a result, the study is more of descriptive than
inferential nature. Nevertheless, the insides gained are valuable for further market and price
analysis and contribute to the understanding of inter-seasonal price behavior. A better
understanding of trade and storage is essential for effective policy design to reduce price
volatility and mitigate price spikes.
In the last analytical chapter, regional storage cooperation is discussed as an option to reduce
the cost of operation of public stockholding. The idea of international risk sharing became
prominent in the 1970s after the international food crisis at the time. As an alternative to
the idea of an international insurance system financed by industrialized countries [Johnson,
1976; Konandreas et al., 1978], developing countries could also cooperate among themselves.
Cooperation is beneficial when supply shocks are imperfectly correlated. Earlier studies
emphasized the potential of regional trade cooperation to stabilize fluctuations in supply
[Koester, 1984; Badiane, 1988]. On the other hand, the experiences from the recent global
food crisis have shown that reliance on imports may be insufficient when trading partners
regulate exports to protect domestic markets. In this case, storage is required to bridge
temporary supply shortage in international markets. Storage can be understood as an
insurance against supply shortfalls. The model used in chapter six builds on the existing
literature and conceptualizes the link to storage. In doing so, storage cooperation is analyzed
under two possible reserve schemes. First, an emergency reserve that releases stocks when
supply falls short of a predetermined level and second, a stabilization reserve that smoothes
both positive and negative deviations from supply trend values.
Overall, the approach and methods of the dissertation are cross-cutting. Drivers of food price
volatility and possible instruments to stabilize prices are discussed on a general account, at
the regional level, and within the context of a single country. Similarly, the methods applied
in this dissertation are diverse and reach from recently developed econometric techniques
(dynamic panel estimation with system General Method of Moments (GMM)) over mod-
eling to an innovative trader survey. Approaches and methods should be considered to be
complementary and contribute equally to the overall research findings.
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1.4 Organization of the thesis
The study is separated into seven chapters. The sequential order of the chapters is purposive.
The precedent part aims at making the reader familiar with the topic of food price volatility
and creates a link to storage and trade of agricultural commodities. The research background
and relevance of the topic is also emphasized in this section. Welfare impacts of price
volatility and uncertainty on consumers, producers, and other market participants will be
discussed in the remaining part of the introductory chapter.
After the introduction, chapter two outlines the methodology to measure and model food
price volatility. On this basis, volatility of staple food prices is computed and estimated
for a large number of markets in developing and emerging economies. Furthermore, the
performance of the different methods to evaluate volatility is analyzed. Lastly, volatility
is compared across commodities, geographical location, and over time. Chapter three fol-
lows with the theoretical model on how storage and trade affect prices. The same chapter
contains a discussion on the validity of stock data and compares the most prominent data
sources. Both chapter two and three are included with the purpose to introduce the reader
to modeling of price volatility and the theoretical literature used in this work. In doing so,
both chapters set the stage for the further course of the work.
In chapter four, causes of price volatility are discussed theoretically and empirically in a
cross-country framework. A particular focus is laid on the heterogeneity of countries as
importers, exporters, and trade-switchers. In addition to this, the distinct impacts of public
storage and trade policies are addressed. Then, storage behavior of private traders in Ghana
is analyzed in chapter five. Findings from primary data collection and policy implications
are discussed. In the last analytical chapter, regional storage cooperation as an approach
towards food security is reviewed. The chapter contains the description of a methodology
to evaluate costs and benefits of cooperation. Then, the methodology is applied to the West
African region.
Each chapter appears with its own introduction and conclusion and can generally stand on
its own. The respective introduction embeds the chapter in the context of the whole work.
Nevertheless, the dissertation closes with a general conclusion including the most important
policy messages to take away.
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1.5 Why volatility matters
It is of great importance to note that the subject-matter of this dissertation is general price
volatility, which is the magnitude and frequency of price movements in both directions. This
certainly includes price spikes as they appeared during the global food crisis in 2007/2008,
but their appearance alone is not sufficient for volatility. A constant price increase (decrease)
is not associated with price volatility. Welfare impacts of high price levels are ambiguous.
Farmers benefit, while consumers lose [Ivanic et al., 2011; von Braun and Tadesse, 2012;
Headey, 2014]. A reduction in prices has the opposite effect. Conversely, price variability
makes future prices less predictable, and thus creates risk for all market participants. The
subsequent section addresses the various effects for price volatility and uncertainty.
1.5.1 Microeconomic effects
1.5.1.1 Welfare impacts
Standard welfare theory assumes consumers and producers to be fully rational and to max-
imize their utility by satisfying a resource constraint. For consumers, changes in prices
influence utility by the choice of the optimal consumption bundle. The Slutsky equation
describes the variation in demand for good i for price changes of good j. On the one hand,
demand changes induced by variation in relative prices (pi/pj). On the other hand, variation
in prices changes relative income, and thus alters demand. Whether substitution or income
effect dominate is not clear a priori. For instance, a change in the relative price of one good
may result in increasing demand for a second good. However, the subsequent reduction of
relative income can offset this effect and reduce the demand of the second good.
The most common measures to evaluate a change in utility in welfare economics are con-
sumer surplus, compensating variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV), while the first is
an approximation of the latter two. Compensating variation can be understood as the mon-
etary amount that is necessary in order to bring a consumer to his/her initial utility level
after the price has changed. In contrast, the equivalent variation is the monetary amount
at which households become indifferent to accept the price change [Mas-Colell et al., 1995].
Both can be expressed in the following way:
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CV (p0, p1) = e(p1, u1)− e(p1, u0) (1.1)
EV (p0, p1) = e(p0, u1)− e(p0, u0) (1.2)
where e() is the money metric indirect utility function evaluated at price p and a given level of wealth. It
gives the wealth required to achieve a given utility V (p, w) (indirect utility function).
In an uncertain world with stochastic commodity prices consumers maximize their expected
utility E[U ] based on expected price changes. Turnovsky et al. [1980] derive the benefits
from price stabilization by comparing utility under certainty vis-à-vis uncertainty. Their
approximation of ex-ante compensating and equivalent variation has the form:
∂2V
∂p2i
= ∆V = [si(ηi − ρ)− ξi]si
∆σ2p
2
(1.3)
where ∂
2V
∂p2i
is the change of welfare V by changes in price stability σ2p. si is the budget share for commodity
i, ρ the risk aversion parameter, and ξ and η price elasticity of demand and income, respectively.
Accordingly, welfare under uncertainty increases in the level of risk aversion (ρ), but de-
creases in the magnitude of income elasticity (η) and price elasticity (ξ) of demand. In
fact, the effect is very small if the budget share of commodity i is sufficiently low. Gouel
[2013a] provides welfare impacts for a wide range of reasonable parameter values and con-
cludes that effects are comparably small. However, literature subsequent to Turnovsky et al.
[1980] queries these findings and argues benefits from price stabilization are largely underes-
timated [Helms, 1985; Wright and Williams, 1988]. Wright and Williams [1988] emphasize
the importance of the demand curvature parameter and expect errors in the assessment of
benefits from price stabilization to be particularly large for staple foods of poor consumers.
As opposed to the consumer case, welfare impacts of producers are more straightforward.
Uncertainty about output prices unambiguously impacts on the utility of risk averse in-
dividuals or firms [Sandmo, 1971; Chavas and Holt, 1990; Coyle, 1992]. A typical utility
function that allows for risk is the mean-variance approach:
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E[U ] = E[pi]− (ρ/2)σ2pi (1.4)
where the expected utility E[U ] arises from a producer’s expected profits E[pi] and its variance σ2pi. ρ
describes a producer’s risk aversion being zero for risk neutral producers.
The variance of profits (σ2pi) depends on variances and co-variances of the output prices.
Utility is decreasing in all elements of the co-variance matrix σ2P of the vector of output
prices p [Coyle, 1992]. In words, if producers are risk averse (ρ > 0), their utility reduces
for higher levels of volatility and stronger cross-price correlation. There is convincing em-
pirical evidence that producers in developing countries are indeed risk averse [Rosenzweig,
1988; Townsend, 1995]. While consumers are concerned with prices at all times, producers
are interested in harvest prices only. Therefore, in this instance, volatility should be the
deviation of the expected price from its actual realization at harvest time rather than from
the sample mean. Thus, it is only irregular unpredictable price shocks that reduce producer
welfare [Chavas and Holt, 1990].
In the evaluation of consumer welfare above, income is assumed to be exogenous. The
separation between consumers and producers may not be appropriate in the context of
developing countries. It may only apply for urban households without the possibility of
own food production. For this reason, Deaton [1989] proposes to examine price changes
with respect to a proportional ratio that considers to what extent households are net buyers
or net sellers.1 Few attempts have been made to quantify heterogeneity in welfare effects
between net buyers and net sellers. Simulation results by Myers [2006] yield significantly
greater impacts on producers than on consumers. Second, well-off producers benefit stronger
than poor households from price stabilization. For low levels of risk aversion, the effects are
negligible. Similarly, Bellemare et al. [2013] estimate price risk aversion coefficients for rural
Ethiopian households and calculate the willingness to pay for price stabilization for different
income groups. Findings suggest willingness to pay to simultaneously stabilize commodity
prices to be on average 17 percent of the household income. Overall, willingness to pay is
positive throughout all income groups and increasing in income. The authors hypothesize
that wealthier households in the sample are likely to be producers.
1Net buyers are purchasing more than they sell and net sellers sell more than they buy.
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Figure 1.1: Link between consumption and price distribution.
Source: Author’s illustration.
Conventional welfare analysis based on the expected utility framework neglects a few im-
portant issues. First, dynamic effects of food price volatility and unanticipated price hikes
are neglected [Bellemare et al., 2013]. Second, households tend to cut expenses for health
and education when facing a price (income) shock, if adequate savings or risk management
tools are not available. This can lead to irreversible disinvestment with severe negative
consequences in the long-term, for instance school dropouts [Carter and Barrett, 2006].
The theoretical link between consumption shifts and volatility is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
h denotes a price threshold for a staple food, whenever p > h, households are forced to
reduce expenditures of non-staples, health or educational expenditures due to the income
effect. The gray-shaded area on the right captures the probability of price spikes. Both price
distributions in Figure 1.1 share the same mean, but exhibit different standard deviations.
The gray-shaded area is larger for the wider distribution. It follows that price spikes and
subsequent consumption adjustments are less likely with lower volatility; to be exact by the
area between the curves. In this way, higher volatility induces irreversible disinvestment by
greater probability.
To assure basic consumption needs, households may also reduce expenditures on other
micro-nutrients-dense food items [Jensen and Miller, 2008; D’Souza and Jolliffe, 2012] which
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can result in micronutrient deficiencies. Literature on nutrition and labor underlines the
indirect effects from undernutrition on household productivity. The relationship between
temporary food insecurity and health is also well researched [Barrett, 2002]. Empirical
evidence suggests that only short periods of underweight and malnutrition can lead to severe
health related problems in the future, but also to immediate infant mortality [Chavas, 2000].
Last, poor consumers will suffer from transactions costs of frequent reallocation of budgetary
resources [Timmer, 1989].
For this reasoning, it makes no difference whether volatility is predictable or unexpected.
In a recent contribution, Kaminski et al. [2014] find strong evidence for the negative rela-
tionship between seasonal price movements and intra-annual fluctuations in consumption
of food and non-food items due to a limited ability to smooth consumption over the year.
Ziegelhöfer [2014] analyzes the impact of international food price volatility on household
welfare using Demographic Health Survey (DHS) data for a comprehensive set of countries.
The results show strong impacts of the food price surge in 2007/2008 on child health status,
the effect of volatility alone is not conclusively examined.
1.5.1.2 Inefficient resource allocation
Risk aversion is not a necessary condition for negative welfare effects of uncertainty. Eco-
nomic agents use their full set of information to make decisions about investments. Yet
future market conditions are uncertain at the time of investment. Unwillingness or inability
to hedge against risks, for instance in the absence of futures markets, increase non-optimal
resource allocation [Arrow, 1962]. The larger deviations from expected market outcomes,
the higher the welfare losses. A basic reduced form to model this issue is described by
Martins-Filho [2011]. The cost function of a producer is given by c(y, w), with w as input
prices and y as output. Profit maximization requires c′(y, w) equal to E[p]. Whenever
markets are competitive, and thus producers cannot influence market prices, suboptimal
allocation generates losses since producers cannot instantaneously adjust their production.
For a particular functional form of the cost function, expected losses can be represented by:
E(L) =
1
4c(w)
σ2P (1.5)
where E(L) is the expected loss, σ2P price volatility, and c(w) the cost function.
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The model is developed for producers, but can be transferred to commodity stockholders and
traders, as well as food vendors. Producers and traders are well informed about predictable
seasonal variation in prices. Hence, their concern are unexpected and irregular price changes
and market risk at time of their investment.
Apart from immediate individual welfare losses for producers, stockholders, and traders,
their behavior has consequences on the whole economy. Uncertainty disincentivizes produc-
tion of food crops [Haile et al., 2014]. Furthermore, it is reasonable to assume a number of
investors, who consider engagement in storage and trade, is discouraged by the uncertainty
about future returns. On the same account, small-scale traders select between a variety of
consumer goods what to sell, and surely select the products with less volatility given the
expected return is the same. In this way, higher uncertainty reduces investment in commod-
ity markets if other areas assure more certainty of returns. This in turn inhibits necessary
investment in marketing infrastructure and industrial firms may withdraw investments with
consequences for employment and wages [Timmer, 1989].
1.5.2 Macroeconomic effects
Apart from negative microeconomic consequences, volatility involves adverse effects on the
whole economy. Generally, and not specific to commodity markets, there is strong evidence
on the impact of volatility and uncertainty on economic growth and welfare [Ramey and
Ramey, 1995; Jacks et al., 2011]. Myers [2006] formalizes a model to account for positive
spill-over effects of price stability to other sectors of the economy. Timmer [2002] esti-
mates these spill-overs have contributed around one percent to overall economic growth in
Indonesia.
Exporting countries generate revenue from food production and rely on exports to earn
foreign exchange. As the volatility in world prices reduce the predictability of income
[Dehn, 2000; Dawe, 2001]. In this way, price instability affects public budgets and monetary
stability. In a similar manner, importing countries face uncertainty of required foreign
exchange resources to guarantee sufficient supply.
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1.5.3 Political distortions
Food price spikes and price volatility also induce governmental responses. Food prices are
a major concern for policy makers in developing countries since they affect a large propor-
tion of the population either as source of income or by altering real incomes. Traditionally,
governments seek to enhance national production and self-sufficiency by subsidizing agri-
cultural inputs. Conversely, policy responses to food crises usually address short-term price
dynamics and have to take distinct forms of intervention. The reason is that the political
opinion in many developing countries is shaped by urban consumers who are only concerned
with a timely price-reduction of food [Bates, 1981].
Demeke et al. [2009] elaborate on the numerous policies implemented in developing coun-
tries during in the wake of the 2007/2008 food crisis. These government actions come at
high fiscal costs and take away financial resources for public investment in other sectors.
Many economists also criticize state involvement in storage and trade and show that free
markets achieve the social optimum. Public intervention distorts market prices and thereby
creates wrong incentives for private market actors in the long-term [Newbery and Stiglitz,
1981; Williams and Wright, 1991]. Puetz and von Braun [1991] report on the occurrence of
parallel markets in response to market intervention, whenever official markets fail to equate
supply and demand at the desired price level. Acting in parallel markets often involves
additional costs and risks for traders and farmers. Other than the aforementioned indirect
consequences, there are also direct effects of volatility on national food security. For exam-
ple, the global food crisis in 2007/2008 has undermined progress in the reduction of child
malnutrition by a significant margin [von Braun and Tadesse, 2012].
Furthermore, governments in developing countries are usually made accountable for failures
in the food system, possibly owned to the long tradition of public market intervention. In
an instance of a negative transitory shock, costs of rebellion against the political system
are comparably low for the population [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2001; Collier and Hoeffler,
2004]. Empirical evidence establishes a strong link between food crises and social unrests
as well as food riots in developing countries [Lagi et al., 2011; Bellamere, 2014]. Political
instability in turn can slow down economic growth and reduces welfare [Alesina et al., 1996].
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Chapter 2
Recent trends in food price volatility
in developing countries
2.1 Introduction
In the wake of the global food crisis, research on price volatility has noticeably risen. Earlier
studies engage with the question whether international prices and volatility have really
increased beyond historically high levels. This literature suggests that volatility has indeed
risen at the end of the last decade calming down within the past three years. But, it also
appears that both volatility and levels are high, while not historically exceptional.1
At the same time, discussions started how to correctly measure, calculate, or estimate price
volatility [e.g. Huchet-Bourdon, 2011]. Most commonly used are the coefficient of variation
and the variance of price returns (log returns), which are both easy to compute. Both mea-
sure unconditional rather than conditional volatility. However, there is also criticism against
the use of realized volatility measures. Thus, Gilbert and Morgan [2010b] propose to use
conditional volatility estimated by Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedastic-
ity (GARCH) models in order to account for the persistence of price volatility.
With few exemptions, the research focus is much on international markets instead of devel-
oping countries. In an analysis very close to the one at hand, Minot [2014] analyzes market
level volatility in Africa. His findings are mixed. On the one hand, maize volatility seems
to be higher after 2007. On the other hand, for the majority of markets, volatility has
1See Gilbert [2006] for a review of price trends and volatility.
15
Chapter 2. Recent trends in food price volatility in developing countries
decreased. In contrast to the excellent review of Minot [2014], country level studies mainly
use conditional volatility models. So far, the literature has been given little attention to the
difference between predictable and irregular price volatility [Kaminski et al., 2014].
The objective of this part of this dissertation is twofold. Firstly, an overview of available
methods to compute and estimate volatility is provided in section two, while their practical
benefits are also discussed. Secondly, using a large set of price data, volatility is calculated
by using different measures, namely standard deviation of returns, decomposed volatility,
symmetric and asymmetric GARCH. The purpose of this exercise is to test whether measures
of volatility substantially differ. Furthermore, this enables testing several hypotheses. For
instance, whether differences between commodities and regions exist and whether volatility
in developing countries has increased after 2007. In doing so, the chapter provides an
overview on methods and literature on volatility modeling. In addition, recent trends in
food price volatility in developing countries, which are of relevance for the whole dissertation,
are discussed.
2.2 Measuring and modeling volatility
Volatility measures the rate and magnitude of price changes around a trend. In other
words, it captures the deviation of the actual observed price from its normal or expected
value [Coppock, 1977]. The computation and estimation of price volatility is not unique to
agricultural commodities and is heavily discussed in a wide range of economic fields.
In principle, measures of volatility can be classified into two broad categories [Matthews,
2010]. First, realized historical volatility that measures the volatility of observed past prices.
And second, stochastic volatility which captures volatility at a given point in time also
considering past realization of volatility.
2.2.1 Realized volatility
The most common measures of realized volatility are variance and standard deviation. Both
measure the directionless difference of observed prices from their mean. However, they are
not unit free. Consequently, commodities with higher price levels show larger levels of
volatility. One way to circumvent this shortcoming is to normalize the value by its sample
mean which is known as coefficient of variation:
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Coefficient of variation =
σ
µ
(2.1)
where σ is the sample standard deviation and µ the sample mean over the same observation period.
The coefficient of variation is easy to compute, however, does entail two major disadvantages.
On the one hand, price trends affect the coefficient of variation even if prices increase or
decrease constantly [Gilbert and Morgan, 2010a]. Second, variance and standard deviation
of random walk variables rise with the number of observations. Thus, volatility will be
subject to the length of the price series [Minot, 2014].
Alternatively, the literature on financial markets analyzes returns instead of prices. Returns
are the relative price change from one period to the next. They are approximately equal
to the difference of logarithmized prices. Then, price volatility is the standard deviation or
variance of the returns:
σpT =
√√√√ 1
T
T∑
t=1
(rt − rT )2 (2.2)
where σpt is the price volatility over T time periods, rt =
pt−pt−1
pt−1 ≈ ln (pt)− ln (pt−1) is the return of p in
t, and rT the mean value in T .
However, volatility changes over time since prices of agricultural commodities exhibit peri-
ods of low (high) volatility that follow low (high) volatility periods [Serra and Gil, 2012].
Therefore, it may be advisable to consider structural breaks in time series data and compute
volatility for shorter time periods [Jin and Kim, 2012]. Without further analysis and tests
for structural breaks, it may reasonable to look at volatility by agricultural marketing year
which is defined as the time from the harvest of a commodity to the respective harvest in
the next calendar year. In doing so, (2.2) changes to:
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σpT =
1
Y
Y∑
y=1
σpy (2.3)
σpy =
√√√√ 1
12
12∑
m=1
(rm,y − ry)2 (2.4)
where m is a month within a marketing year y and ry is the marketing year average return. Y is the total
number of marketing years considered.
In summary, realized volatility is easy to calculate. The standard deviation of return (SD log
r) has been widely applied to compare volatility across commodities and countries [Minot,
2014; Huchet-Bourdon, 2011]. Yet the usage of realized volatility as dependent variable in
regression models seems relatively new. Notable applications are: Balcombe [2009], Algieri
[2012], Lee and Park [2013], and Ott [2014a].
2.2.2 Stochastic volatility
It is generally recognized that price volatility is a stochastic process and highly variable
over time [Gilbert and Morgan, 2010a]. The main difference of conditional forecasts is that
they take into account known realizations of the prices series and other exogenous deter-
minants. In this way, the variance of the forecasting error varies over time conditional on
explanatory variables. Time varying and conditional volatility is estimated by Autoregres-
sive Conditional Heteroscedasticity (ARCH) models developed by Engle [1982] and extended
by Bollerslev [1986]. A uni-variate (G)ARCH (p,q) specification can be represented by:
rt = β0 + β1t−1 + β2rt−1 + β3Zt + t with Et−12t = ht (2.5)
ht = γ0 + γ1
2
1,t−1 + γ2ht−1 + γ3Zt (2.6)
where logarithmic price changes (rt) follow a ARMA(1,1) process and the volatility ht depends on past
squared errors 21,t−1 and past conditional volatility ht−1. Zt can be a vector of explanatory variables.
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The parameters p and q represent the number of ARCH and GARCH terms in the con-
ditional volatility equation (2.6). If q = 0, the model reduces to an ARCH specification.
Equations (2.5) and (2.6) can be estimated subsequently using ordinary least squares (OLS).
This estimation is consistent but not efficient. An efficient estimation can be achieved using
the maximum likelihood estimator. In general, it is possible to include all types of exoge-
nous variables in both mean and conditional variance equation. In addition to that, the
combination of autoregressive (AR) and moving-average (MA) terms is as inexhaustible as
in ordinary ARMA models. Similarly, information criteria (Akaike, Schwarz) can be used
to identify the best fitting model.
AR terms and/or monthly dummy variables can also be included in the mean equation
to increase forecasting efficiency and to correct for seasonal price fluctuations. For the
purpose of this analysis, conditional volatility across countries and commodities should be
comparable. Therefore, a generic and analogous model should be chosen. Otherwise, the
number of AR and MA terms may influence the magnitude of conditional volatility. Gilbert
and Morgan [2010b] argue that most often a simple GARCH (1,1) yields sufficient estimates.
In general, GARCH models require a sufficiently large sample period that is not always
available for monthly food prices in developing countries. A possible approach is to estimate
different types of GARCH models and select the "best" model according to the information
criterion. In order to compare volatility between countries and crops, the mean or median
of equation (2.6) can be computed. The advantage of the median is that volatility outliers
do not carry significant weight in the volatility measure.
There are several extensions to classical conditional heteroscedasticity models. Most no-
tably, it is possible to estimate a system of equations where two variables can endogenously
affect each other. These models are referred to as Multivariate(M)GARCH. Furthermore,
asymmetric models allow volatility to respond differently to good and bad news.2 The ‘lever-
age’ effect occurs when bad news generate more price volatility than good news [Zheng et al.,
2008; Braun et al., 1995]. Nelson’s Exponential(E)GARCH is a logharitmized transforma-
tion of the conditional volatility model:
ln ht = γ0 +
q∑
i=1
γig(zt) +
q∑
j=1
ξj ln σt−j (2.7)
2Positive returns are referred to as good news, negative returns respectively as bad news.
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with g(zt) = θ[| t−i
σt−j
| − E(| t−i
σt−j
|)] + η t−i
σt−j
(2.8)
where η t−i
σt−j determines the asymmetric effect. If −1 < η < 0, then negative shocks have greater influence
on volatility than positive shocks and vice versa. The magnitude of the effects is determined by the term
θ[| t−i
σt−j | − E(|
t−i
σt−j |)].
In addition to that, Engle et al. [1987] derive how the relative risk premium of holding an
asset can be estimated within the framework of conditional heteroscedasticity models. This
is achieved by including the squared root of the conditional variance in the mean equation.
So (2.5) changes to:
rt = β0 + β1t−1 + β2rt−1 + β3h1/2 + t (2.9)
RP =
β3h
1/2
rt
(2.10)
where h1/2 is the standard deviation of the conditional volatility. RP is the relative risk premium.
The model is termed (G)ARCH-in-mean and (2.10) yields the time varying relative risk
premium. So to say, the markup risk averse traders charge to be compensated for possible
losses.
The variety of possible specifications is ample and empirical applications are too numerous to
list. In the developing country context, most notably are Shively [1996] and Barrett [1997]
who examine effects of market liberalization on volatility. More recently, Rapsomanikis
[2011] analyze volatility spill-overs from international to domestic agricultural markets.
However, conditional volatility measures were developed for financial models that are based
on the efficient market hypothesis. Markets in developing countries may suffer from infor-
mation constraints and could deviate significantly from rational expectation frameworks.
Moreover, the estimation of conditional volatility models is demanding in terms of comput-
ing capacity and requires high frequency data that may not always be available for staple
food prices.
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The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) employs a dynamic fully non-
parametric model of daily returns.3 By extreme value theory, high returns are classified as
extremely high or not and periods of high volatility are identified by the number of extreme
values within a predefined time window (e.g. 60 days) [Martins-Filho et al., 2012]. The
model is very precise in measuring and detecting volatility and is used for early warning
purposes. On the other hand, it is not of practical relevance to analyze volatility of retail
and wholesale prices in developing countries.
2.2.3 Decomposed volatility
Both realized volatility and stochastic volatility measures neglect the different components of
a time series. On this account, Dehn [2000] proposes to distinguish between predictable and
unpredictable volatility. The latter being a better measure for uncertainty. Hence, volatility
can be deterministic as the result of seasonal and cyclical price changes or subject to a
general trend, but also the consequence of unexpected irregular price changes resulting from
extreme market conditions. Specifically, a time series can be decomposed in its components:
trend-cycle, seasonality, and irregular.
The approach of Dehn [2000] contains the estimation of an ARMAmodel of the random walk
or differenced price series that is estimated by OLS. The model includes a trend variable, a
number of AR terms, and monthly dummies to account for seasonality:
∆ln pt = rt = α(+βt) + γ2∆pt−1 +
∑
θiMi + t (2.11)
where the time trend t is only included for random walk models; Mi are monthly dummy variables that
capture seasonal price movements; ∆pt−1 is the past realization of the return.
From the regression, predicted values for ∆ln pt can be obtained. It is assumed that market
participants can successfully accomplish price forecasting by using the variables included in
(2.11). Thus, the unpredictable component of the time series is just the difference between
fitted values and actual price realizations. In less technical words, the left-over which cannot
3Nonparametric Extreme Quantile Model(NEXQ) available at www.foodsecurityportal.org/excessive
-food-price-variability-early-warning-system-launched .
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be explained by simple forecasting. This yields irregular volatility as the standard deviation
or variance of the forecasting errors.
However, this method involves two major shortcomings. First, the time trend is assumed
to be linear or log-linear. This could lead to severe misspecifications whenever trends are
quadratic or stochastic. Second, the seasonal component is fixed and cannot change over
time. The latter is only of relevance for longer time series.
Alternatively, seasonal moving average models allow both trend and seasonal cycles to alter
over time. The idea is to evaluate each price with respect to the average over the n-month
period centered on that month. This yields a series of seasonally adjusted prices. Similar
to (2.11), irregular price changes can be understood as the difference between seasonally
adjusted prices and actual observed price realizations. A description of the procedure in-
cluding a calculus example is available at the website of IFPRI’s Food Security Portal.4 The
most popular procedure for moving average models is the X-12-ARIMA method that was
developed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. It is widely applied by statistical agencies and
central banks to make economic indicators, such as unemployment rate, comparable over
time. The program is freely available at the webpage of the Census, but is also included in
statistical software packages as Stata and OxMetrics that allow some modification of the
program code.5 The X-12 method rests upon an iterative estimation of the components
of the time series.6 First, a moving average model is used to remove the trend-cycle com-
ponent. Then, the ratio between actual price and adjusted price brings the first estimate
of the seasonal-irregular component. Smoothing these monthly prices yields the seasonal
factor [Findley et al., 1998]. The repetition of the procedures minimizes irregularities in
trend-cycle and seasonal component.7 Now, volatility can be easily obtained by computing
the variance of the irregular price component. Existence of a stable seasonality can also be
tested. The methodology has limitations if trend-cycles or seasonality exhibit a structural
break and if extreme outliers exist.
An alternative to seasonal moving averages are unobserved component models (UCM) [Har-
vey, 2006]. In contrast, to deterministic autoregressive models like (2.11), UCMs allow to
4http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/seasonality-tool.
5https://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/x12downv03_pc.html.
6The decomposition of the time series in its components can be of multiplicative, additive, log-additive,
or pseudo-additive nature.
7See Ladiray and Quenneville [2001] and Time Series Analysis Branch [2007] for a more detailed descrip-
tion of the methodology.
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treat all components of a time series as stochastic processes that are estimated simultane-
ously. The full model can be depicted as follows:
pt = µt + γt + rt +
∑
φpt−1 + t (2.12)
µt = µt−1 + βt−1 + ηt (2.13)
with βt−1 = βt−2 + ξt
rt = rt−1 + rt−2 + κt (2.14)∑
γt−i = ωt (2.15)
where (2.12) depicts the full model with its components. µt represents the trend or level component, while
γt and rt are seasonal and cyclical components. The irregular leftover is part of the stochastic error term
t. µt can be stochastic if ηt is different from zero and can include a stochastic or deterministic slope βt.
Similarly, cycles and seasonality can be both stochastic or fixed. Alternatively to dummies (for seasonality)
and auto-regressive terms (for cycles), they can be modeled by trigonometric functions. All white noise
processes (t, ηt, ξt, κt, ωt) are assumed to be random. For more information see Koopman [2013].
In general (2.13)-(2.15) can be all stochastic. The stochasticity of each component can be
statistically tested. Results are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation and subsequent
utilization of the Kalman filter. In this way, prediction errors and variances are computed
and used to evaluate the likelihood function for a given set of parameters. For the sake of
sound comparison, it is advisable to refrain from statistical testing of the correct specifi-
cation and to apply a generic model specification [Gilbert and Morgan, 2010a]. By taking
logarithmized prices, the decomposition is of multiplicative nature which seems more ap-
propriate to allow higher price fluctuations at higher price levels. UCMs can be found in
common software applications and an example is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
UCM models are widely applied to de-seasonalize national core inflation. Only few studies
decompose volatility of agricultural commodities to analyze predictability of price changes
[Rezitis and Sassi, 2013; Labys et al., 2000]. Generally, it is also possible to include ex-
planatory variables in (2.12), but model outcomes should be considered to be of descriptive
rather than inferential nature [Gilbert and Morgan, 2010a].
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Figure 2.1: Variance decomposition of wheat price in Dhaka (Bangladesh).
Source: Author’s computation based on [ZEF, 2014].
2.3 Data
In this analysis, price volatility is computed for the three major food commodities: rice,
maize, and wheat. Further, all prices used are monthly retail prices from the ZEF Com-
modity Price Database that uses data from various international and national sources: most
notably, the GIEWS Food Price Data and Analysis Tool, an open source platform from the
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO); secondly, United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID)’s Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS-NET); and
thirdly, the price data bank of the World Food Program (WFP) Vulnerability and Analysis
Mapping (VAM).
Figure 2.2 depicts the wide coverage of the database. Most visible are gaps in northern
Africa and Central Asia. Black dots indicate when market-level data is available. A cou-
ple of markets have several entries from different sources. For the purpose of comparing
performance of various volatility measures this is not of relevance.
The methodology applied is general and can be used for any set of price series available. In
total, 1,377 price series are included, 545 for maize, 525 for rice, and 306 for wheat. Some
of the series are national average prices, others are market specific. National average prices
are likely to exhibit less volatility than market specific prices. This is only of relevance for
comparison across crops and continents.
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Figure 2.2: Coverage of ZEF Commodity Price Database
The analysis employs Stata 13, but uses Structural Time Series Analyser, Modeller and Pre-
dictor (STAMP) of OxMetrics for the decomposition of volatility and PCGive to estimate
conditional volatility models. The latter utilizes the Broyden-Fletcher–Goldfarb-Shanno
(BFGS) method to find the maximum of the likelihood function. GARCH and EGARCH
models are estimated including both one AR and MA term in the level equation and one
ARCH and GARCH term in the volatility equation. Constants are included in both equa-
tions. Conditional volatility is measured as the average estimated volatility over a selected
period.
The selected UCM models the level component by a smoothed trend model that allows the
slope to be stochastic. Furthermore, the fixed dummy approach is employed to account for
seasonality. No cyclical component is included. The choice of the specification is justified by
the observation that both time-varying seasonality and cyclical price behavior are present
for a small number of price series only. All prices are logarithmized in order to achieve
multiplicative decomposition.
2.3.1 Differences between measures
Notably, none of the measures should be considered to be right or utilized as a benchmark
estimator since they indeed differ by definition. Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine
how they perform in relation to each other. More specifically, two subjects should be in
particular interest of the reader. First, how different are realized and conditional volatility,
namely SD log r against GARCH and EGARCH. Second, to what extent is volatility driven
by predictable seasonal price movements (SD Season) versus irregular volatility (SD Irreg).
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics by commodity and measure
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mean 25.7 0.070 0.071 0.140 0.126 0.127
maize median 22.7 0.055 0.057 0.125 0.124 0.126
(N=545) 95th percentile 53.9 0.124 0.125 0.222 0.216 0.215
5th percentile 6.2 0.017 0.017 0.048 0.054 0.058
mean 10.0 0.036 0.064 0.113 0.092 0.087
wheat median 8.3 0.024 0.036 0.069 0.069 0.077
(N=306) 95th percentile 23.3 0.066 0.148 0.236 0.235 0.187
5th percentile 2.5 0.006 0.010 0.024 0.029 0.036
mean 8.4 0.047 0.045 0.075 0.067 0.066
rice median 7.1 0.033 0.028 0.058 0.057 0.062
(N=525) 95th percentile 19.0 0.088 0.077 0.128 0.123 0.119
5th percentile 1.4 0.010 0.010 0.026 0.026 0.032
Table 2.1 presents some descriptive statistics by commodity. Generally, SD log r and both
symmetric and asymmetric GARCH perform very similarly with respect to sample average
volatility and the overall distribution of volatility. However, extreme volatility values are
significantly higher for conditional volatility than for SD log r. This is caused by the fact
that conditional variance is very sensitive to single extreme price changes.
As expected, irregular volatility and seasonal price changes are substantially lower than the
other volatility measures. By comparing the numbers, irregular volatility plus seasonality
seems to make up less than 50 percent of total volatility. This is the result of the inclu-
sion of a stochastic trend in the decomposition analysis that fits better than the log-linear
trend assumed by SD log r. The seasonal price gap is the classical measure to compute
the magnitude of predicted seasonal price changes. Albeit, it cannot tell much about the
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extent of seasonality as compared to irregular price changes.8 For this purpose, it is more
informative to look at overall seasonal variability and at the ratio between seasonal and
irregular variation as depicted in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Seasonality ratio across commodities (SD Season/SD Irreg)
maize rice wheat
mean 1.23 1.66 0.97
median 1.02 1.15 0.64
95th percentile 2.30 4.26 1.75
5th percentile 0.48 0.47 0.34
A ratio greater than one implies that seasonal price variability is higher than unexpected
irregular variability. Thus, the ratio is truncated at zero but can easily attain values greater
than two. In consequence, the distribution median is more conclusive than the distribu-
tion mean. Accordingly, no general difference between predictable seasonal and irregular
variability can be observed. Differences between crops will be discussed in the subsequent
subsection.
Levels of volatility may not matter as such in order to compare the performance of volatility
measures. For this reason, the correlation among measures reveals potential differences.
The standard correlation coefficient is Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient.
Yet it captures correlation assuming linear dependence. Conversely, correlation coefficients
based on ranks are not based on this assumptions. The two most commonly applied are
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient and Kendall’s Tau. The former shows the difference
between rank values in different variables. In contrast, the latter looks at pairs of ranks
and measures correlation as the extent to which variables coincide in the evaluation of the
rank classification of pairs. Kendall’s Tau is usually lower than Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient. In order to compute rank correlation, for each commodity, markets are ordered
according to their level of volatility.
8The reason is that some commodities exhibit more than one seasonal cycle.
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Table 2.3: Correlation in long-run volatility among measures
S
D
S
E
A
S
O
N
S
D
Ir
re
g
S
D
lo
g
∆
E
G
A
R
C
H
G
A
R
C
H
S
D
S
E
A
S
O
N
S
D
Ir
re
g
S
D
lo
g
∆
E
G
A
R
C
H
G
A
R
C
H
Spearman Kendall’s Tau
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SD SEASON 1.000 1.000
SD Irreg 0.653 1.000 0.465 1.000
SD log ∆ 0.868 0.865 1.000 0.691 0.683 1.000
EGARCH 0.783 0.826 0.932 1.000 0.606 0.643 0.845 1.000
GARCH 0.825 0.853 0.991 0.950 1.000 0.634 0.667 0.928 0.865 1.000
ri
ce
SD SEASON 1.000 1.000
SD Irreg 0.483 1.000 0.339 1.000
SD log ∆ 0.652 0.868 1.000 0.473 0.705 1.000
EGARCH 0.555 0.732 0.863 1.000 0.393 0.569 0.756 1.000
GARCH 0.533 0.824 0.986 0.929 1.000 0.377 0.651 0.908 0.822 1.000
w
h
ea
t
SD SEASON 1.000 1.000
SD Irreg 0.827 1.000 0.640 1.000
SD log ∆ 0.909 0.916 1.000 0.737 0.770 1.000
EGARCH 0.714 0.691 0.829 1.000 0.548 0.558 0.708 1.000
GARCH 0.859 0.892 0.991 0.812 1.000 0.659 0.733 0.923 0.690 1.000
Table 2.3 reports the correlation of long-run volatility among measures by commodity. This
means, volatility is computed over the entire period. In general, correlation is very high
among all measures being lowest between seasonal and irregular volatility. However, the
strong positive correlation indicates that neither seasonality nor irregular volatility tell
completely contrasting stories.
There is no visible difference between symmetric and asymmetric GARCH apart from
the fact that convergence of the maximum likelihood function is achieved more often for
EGARCH than for GARCH models. This may indicate the presence of leverage effects in
domestic food prices, however, further investigation is necessary to conclude, which is not
part of this analysis.
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Table 2.4: Correlation in short-term volatility with SD LOG ∆
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maize rice wheat
2004 0.763 0.870 0.870 0.863 0.827 0.833 0.866 0.867 0.938
2005 0.847 0.541 0.564 0.773 0.781 0.724 0.801 0.721 0.652
2006 0.806 0.864 0.873 0.713 0.589 0.709 0.692 0.705 0.726
2007 0.851 0.839 0.871 0.804 0.743 0.771 0.758 0.798 0.902
2008 0.817 0.824 0.891 0.724 0.756 0.857 0.816 0.756 0.842
2009 0.798 0.827 0.874 0.825 0.763 0.792 0.805 0.781 0.840
2010 0.833 0.850 0.859 0.818 0.780 0.824 0.725 0.739 0.780
2011 0.662 0.667 0.756 0.749 0.737 0.745 0.725 0.707 0.791
2012 0.728 0.782 0.746 0.753 0.788 0.748 0.683 0.586 0.709
2013 0.799 0.701 0.792 0.674 0.710 0.628 0.681 0.572 0.599
Table 2.4 shows rank correlation of different measures with the standard realized volatility
measures, SD log r with regard to short-term (annual) volatility. Seasonal volatility is
left out as it does not change over time by definition. It is apparent that strong positive
correlation holds for shorter term periods as well. There are only few individual years
where correlation is below 0.7, while it never falls below 0.5 across all commodities. Lastly,
short term correlation with SD log r is not different between conditional volatility and the
irregular component from volatility decomposition.
Looking at the detailed list of markets in volatility reveals an interesting observation.
GARCH models fail to converge significantly more often for markets that exhibit very high
and very low food price volatility according to SD log r. Furthermore, some price series,
which are characterized by relatively stable prices, exhibit unrealistically high estimates for
their conditional volatility (e.g. rice price in Davoa City, the Philippines). For this rea-
son, and since measures of realized and conditional volatility perform consistently, patterns
of volatility across space and time are discussed by looking at realized volatility and its
components only.
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2.3.2 Differences across crops and regions
In this section, it is discussed to what extent volatility differs across commodities and
between different geographical areas. Table 2.1 from above gives already some indication.
Accordingly, maize price volatility is highest followed by wheat and rice. This holds for
seasonal and irregular price variability in equal manner. Notably, rice exhibits relatively
high seasonal variation with a small seasonal range. This is not surprising as rice is often
harvested multiple times a year, and therefore prices are likely to increase and drop several
times a year. An explanation for the low general volatility of rice and wheat may be the
fact that both are imported at considerable margins [Minot, 2014].
Table 2.5: Domestic vs international volatility (in %)
maize rice wheat
sample mean 14.0 7.5 11.3
sample median 12.5 5.8 6.9
IGC index 7.7 6.6 6.6
CBOT futures 7.7 6.6 6.6
IMF 2001:1-2010:2 5.9 6.1 5.2
In fact, domestic price volatility is significantly higher than international volatility when
looking at the mean volatility of the sample (Table 2.5). For rice and wheat median volatility
of the sample is in the same range of international volatility. Maize price volatility is higher
than volatility of rice and wheat at both international and domestic level. Yet domestic
maize price instability is substantially higher than international price instability.
Volatility also largely differs across continents. Table 2.6 presents statistics about the dis-
tribution of volatility by region for realized volatility and its decomposition into seasonal
range and irregular volatility. Clearly, volatility is highest in Africa across all commodities.
Wheat price volatility is lowest in Latin America, while maize price volatility is lowest in
Asia and both are at similar size for rice. There is no observable difference across different
measures: seasonal range, irregular volatility, and total realized volatility. Among the top
10 countries ranked by their volatility (Table 2.7), the large majority is African.9 Latin
9Tables A.1-A.3 in Appendix A show volatility for all markets in the sample ordered by their mean rank
across all measures.
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America is only represented by El Salvador, the 10th rank in wheat. Several countries ap-
pear multiple times in the top 10, namely Malawi, Zimbabwe, Congo, Dem., Guinea-Bissau,
Togo, Somalia, and foremost Tajikistan.
Table 2.6: Volatility across continents (in %)
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mean 27.3 11.3 16.7 8.9 8.2 6.4 14.2 9.2 7.9
median 24.4 12.7 16.7 7.1 7.5 6.3 13.8 7.9 7.0
5% 8.4 2.6 3.9 2.7 1.8 0.7 2.2 2.7 0.9
10% 10.5 3.0 5.5 3.3 3.0 1.7 3.0 3.4 1.5
90% 50.2 20.1 30.2 16.9 14.3 11.0 24.7 17.3 14.8
95% 22.5 22.8 33.7 20.0 17.0 14.5 26.1 23.2 16.5
S
D
lo
g
r
mean 13.4 10.2 9.1 6.7 6.3 5.9 9.7 9.4 6.1
median 13.1 5.3 8.4 6.1 5.2 5.9 9.9 6.6 6.3
5% 6.0 1.8 2.7 3.0 2.7 1.4 1.6 3.2 1.1
10% 7.0 2.2 4.1 3.3 3.0 2.6 3.1 4.0 1.7
90% 20.0 21.9 13.6 10.6 10.5 9.0 14.7 20.1 11.2
95% 22.6 23.6 16.4 12.7 13.6 9.6 18.7 24.1 12.6
S
D
ir
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r
mean 6.4 5.8 4.1 3.6 3.0 2.8 5.2 5.1 2.7
median 6.1 2.1 3.5 3.1 2.2 2.3 4.9 3.7 2.5
5% 1.9 0.2 0.8 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.3
10% 2.5 0.4 1.6 1.1 0.8 0.7 1.2 1.2 0.6
90% 11.1 14.3 7.8 6.4 6.4 4.1 8.3 13.5 4.4
95% 12.4 14.9 8.6 8.0 7.5 5.9 10.6 15.4 6.4
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Table 2.7: Top 10 volatility countries (SD log r)
maize rice wheat
1st Zimbabwe Tajikistan Zimbabwe
2nd Cote d’Ivoire Yemen Yemen
3rd Tajikistan Chad Congo, Dem.
4th South Sudan Guinea-Bissau Sudan
5th Malawi Tanzania Ethiopia
6th Somalia Malawi Tajikistan
7th Togo Somalia Guinea-Bissau
8th Namibia Togo Gabon
9th Congo, Dem Burundi Afghanistan
10th Gambia, the Mozambique El Salvador
Interestingly, the picture slightly changes looking at the predictable seasonal range. Yemen
and Tajikistan remain the only non-African countries in the top five (Table 2.8). Further-
more, four out of five countries for maize are found in southern Africa. Both Congo, Dem.
and Malawi are part of the top five in two commodities, not reporting prices for the third.
This may indicate that seasonality exhibits some regional pattern, especially for maize.
Table 2.8: Top 5 seasonal range
maize rice wheat
1st Malawi Burundi Zimbabwe
2nd Congo, Dem Guinea-Bissau Yemen
3rd Benin Yemen Ethiopia
4th Mozambique Malawi Sudan
5th Zambia Tajikistan Congo, Dem
Regional patterns in food price volatility can also be observed by looking at market level
data. Figure 2.3 and 2.4 picture markets by maize and rice price volatility quintile. Both
figures support the findings from above. Accordingly, price volatility is highest in eastern
and southern Africa. With regard to rice, markets in Afghanistan and Nepal are also
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Figure 2.3: Volatility of maize price across markets (in quintiles)
Source: Author’s illustration based on [ZEF, 2014].
Figure 2.4: Volatility of rice price across markets (in quintiles).
Source: Author’s illustration based on [ZEF, 2014].
assigned to the higher volatility quintiles. Interestingly, in western Africa markets in Sahel
countries exhibit less volatility than markets in coastal countries for both maize and rice.
2.3.3 Changes in volatility over time
Lastly, this section examines whether changes of volatility can be observed since the world
food crisis in 2007. For this purpose, variance of returns and irregular deviations are
compared using the F-test. The cut is implemented with January 2007 which is an ar-
bitrary structural break, however, it represents what is used by most other empirical stud-
ies [Huchet-Bourdon, 2011; Minot, 2014]. Hence, price volatility is compared between the
period from the beginning of the price series until December 2006 and the period from Jan-
uary 2007 to the end of the price series. This strategy follows Minot [2014] who analyzes
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volatility in African markets and compares 2003-2006 with 2007-2010. The estimation is
conducted for time series that contain prices at least four years prior to and four years after
the structural break.
Tables 2.9-2.11 provide country level results. The last row counts the number of significant
increases and decreases in volatility from the perspective of the 2007-2013 period. So, only
15 prices series exhibit higher return volatility after 2007 and 91 show a decrease in volatility.
The results are similar for wheat, while rises and falls for rice offset each other. In general,
the results for SD log r and irregular volatility correspond strongly.
Table 2.9: Changes in maize price volatility over time
SD log r SD Irreg
Country N N (+) N (-) Conclusion N (+) N (-) Conclusion
Benin 7 0 1 - 0 0 -
Chad 2 0 1 fall 0 0 -
Colombia 2 1 0 rise 2 0 rise
El Salvador 1 0 0 - 0 0 -
Ghana 1 0 0 - 0 0 -
Guatemala 2 0 2 fall 0 2 fall
Guinea 3 0 2 fall 0 1 fall
Honduras 3 1 0 rise 0 0 -
Kenya 7 1 1 - 1 1 -
Mali 45 1 16 fall 1 21 fall
Malawi 1 0 0 - 0 0 -
Mozambique 14 0 6 fall 0 5 fall
Nepal 7 3 1 rise 3 0 rise
Nicaragua 5 0 2 fall 0 2 fall
Niger 16 0 9 fall 0 10 fall
Peru 1 1 0 rise 0 0 -
Philippines 11 3 1 rise 1 0 rise
Senegal 1 1 0 rise 0 0 -
Continued on next page...
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... Table 2.9 continued
SD log r SD Irreg
Country N N (+) N (-) Conclusion N (+) N (-) Conclusion
Somalia 27 12 1 rise 10 2 rise
Tajikistan 8 0 6 fall 0 8 fall
Tanzania 1 0 1 fall 0 1 fall
Togo 6 0 4 fall 0 2 fall
Uganda 1 0 0 - 0 0 -
Zambia 2 0 1 fall 0 0 -
Total 166 15 91 15 94
Source: Author’s computation based on ZEF [2014].
By looking at country level results, three observations are prominent. First, with few
exemptions, there is a clear direction of volatility evolution over time. In other words,
different markets within one country do not provide contrasting results. At the same time,
it is uncommon to find statistically significant results for each market in a country. Third,
the total number of significant rises or falls in volatility (in the last row) is not conclusive.
Some countries are well represented in the sample (e.g. India, Tajikistan). Their weight
skews the results. Following this, the majority of countries experience increasing volatility
in rice. Against this, maize volatility has decreased since 2007 in most countries, while
wheat volatility has increased in two, but decreased in four countries. This shows a great
heterogeneity of volatility trends across countries.
Table 2.10: Changes in rice price volatility over time
SD log r SD Irreg
Country N N (+) N (-) Conclusion N (+) N (-) Conclusion
Benin 4 0 2 fall 0 2 fall
Brazil 1 0 0 - 1 0 rise
Colombia 2 1 0 rise 2 0 rise
Costa Rica 2 0 0 - 1 0 rise
Continued on next page...
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... Table 2.10 continued
SD log r SD Irreg
Country N N (+) N (-) Conclusion N (+) N (-) Conclusion
Guatemala 2 0 0 0 0 0 -
Guinea 10 0 4 fall 0 2 fall
India 21 16 0 rise 13 0 rise
Indonesia 26 0 15 fall 1 15 fall
Laos 2 0 2 fall 0 2 fall
Liberia 3 3 0 rise 3 0 rise
Malawi 1 0 0 - 1 0 rise
Mozambique 9 3 2 - 2 1 -
Nepal 7 3 1 rise 3 0 rise
Nicaragua 3 2 0 rise 1 0 rise
Niger 5 0 0 - 1 0 -
Peru 2 1 0 rise 2 0 rise
Philippines, the 14 5 0 rise 5 0 rise
Senegal 1 1 0 rise 1 0 rise
Somalia 11 7 1 rise 4 0 rise
South Africa 3 2 1 - 0 1 fall
Tajikistan 10 0 10 fall 0 10 fall
Togo 6 0 1 - 0 1 -
Tunisia 1 1 0 rise 1 0 rise
Total 146 45 39 42 34
Source: Author’s computation based on ZEF [2014].
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Table 2.11: Changes in wheat price volatility over time
SD log r SD Irreg
Country N N (+) N (-) Conclusion N (+) N (-) Conclusion
Afghanistan 12 0 5 fall 0 6 fall
Brazil 2 1 0 rise 1 0 rise
Guatemala 2 0 2 fall 0 2 fall
India 15 8 1 rise 8 1 rise
Indonesia 26 6 5 - 5 9 -
Nepal 5 2 1 - 3 2 -
Peru 2 0 0 - 0 1 fall
Tajikistan 38 0 28 fall 0 27 fall
Tunisia 3 0 2 fall 0 0 -
Total 105 17 44 17 48
Source: Author’s computation based on ZEF [2014].
At the first glance, the results contradict with findings from Minot [2014] whose results
suggest increasing volatility of maize and decreasing volatility of rice prices. Yet volatility
of maize has significantly reduced since 2008 as illustrated in Figure 2.5. This effect is not
captured by looking at a period that ends 2010. In contrast, wheat and rice prices returned
to their pre-crisis volatility levels (Figure 2.6 and Figure 2.7). An increase in food price
volatility during 2007/2008 is evident, however, volatility has not remained at this high
levels.
2.4 Summary
This chapter deals with commodity price volatility in developing and emerging countries
and contributes to the intensive current debate on the topic. The aim of the study is to
review possible approaches to measures of food price volatility and their use in the literature.
However, the research is much skewed towards the analysis of international price behavior.
Therefore, the findings provide a better basis for the discussion on price volatility in the
context of developing countries.
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Figure 2.5: Maize price volatility over time (SD log r)
Author’s illustration.
Figure 2.6: Rice price volatility over time (SD log r)
Author’s illustration.
The correlation analysis reveals that conditional and unconditional volatility correspond
greatly for a large set of price series. The correlation remains high, albeit at slightly lower
levels for individual years, when looking at short-term price fluctuations. For this reason, it
is fully legitimate to concentrate on realized volatility instead of conditional volatility when
comparing volatility over time and across commodities and countries. However, conditional
volatility models allow the inclusion of several counterfactuals in both level and volatility
equation. Furthermore, they have advantages to capture market risk at a particular time
and allow the estimation of a relative risk premium.
Calculated volatility for rice, maize, and wheat show substantial differences across com-
modities and regions. First, maize prices are more volatile than rice and wheat prices across
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Figure 2.7: Wheat price volatility over time (SD log r)
Author’s illustration.
all regions. Second, Africa exhibits the highest volatility across all continents included in
the analysis. This high volatility seems to be partly driven by extreme seasonal price fluc-
tuations. The analysis with regard to change in volatility over time reveals two results. On
the one hand, rice volatility has increased for a majority of countries, while maize volatility
has decreased. On the other hand, there is evidence for great heterogeneity across countries,
but barely differences across different markets within one country. In general, the increase
in price volatility is due to the years of the global food crisis in 2007/2008 and volatility
declined afterwards and returned to pre-crisis levels.
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Chapter 3
Stocks: theory and data issues
3.1 Introduction
Commodity stocks occupy a central role in this work. Their role in price formation is
extensively discussed in the course of this and the following chapters. Stocks are currently
a hot topic in the public debate related to food price volatility. On the one hand, low
stock-to-use ratios have been identified as a driver of the price surges in 2007/2008 [Wright,
2012; von Braun and Tadesse, 2012]. Further, they are considered as possible instruments
to regulate price volatility in domestic markets and protect markets from price spikes. Last,
stocks are also increasingly used as early warning indicators for international food price
spikes [Bobenrieth et al., 2013].
The aim of this chapter is to provide information to the reader which are of importance
across all analytical chapters. This relates to the theoretical model to explain commodity
price formation and the data issue with regard to stocks. The competitive storage model is
the theoretical backbone of this dissertation. It describes how storage relates prices between
two periods and how stocks can stabilize prices. Empirical applications of the model are
mostly built on price data since information on stocks is scant and not reliable. The reasons
are discussed in this chapter, while the main data sources are introduced.
The chapter is organized as follows. First, section two introduces the competitive storage
model and its solution with rational expectations. Then, extensions of the classical model are
discussed. Section three and four engage with the way agricultural statistics are generated
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and the problems associated with the estimation of stocks. Additionally, available data
sources are presented and discussed. A summary is provided in section five.
3.2 The storage model
3.2.1 Competitive storage
Two different lines of thought exist to explain commodity price behavior in a formalized
model. On the one hand, the competitive storage model [Williams and Wright, 1991] that
treats supply shocks as exogenous, whereas demand and supply as well as price expectations
simultaneously determine the equilibrium price. On the other hand, cob-web type models,
where supply is endogenously determined and prices follow cyclical fluctuations (e.g. pork
cycle) as a result of under- or oversupply [Mitra and Boussard, 2012]. The former is more
common for storable commodities whose harvest is less controllable. Thus, this work makes
only use of the competitive storage model.
There is a natural imbalance between production and consumption of agricultural com-
modities. More specifically, consumption is primarily stable, while production is highly
volatile, in particular in rain fed agricultural systems which are predominant in many devel-
oping countries. Since market prices are simultaneously determined by supply and demand,
there is a market for commodity storage that transfers excess supply from one year to the
other. Thus, the demand for storage arises from the fact that consumption demand exists
in t, ..., tn. The inverse demand function can be written as:
pt = ft(Ct),
∂ft
∂Ct
< 0 (3.1)
with Ct = St−1 + Zt − St (3.2)
where pt is the current market price and consumption (Ct) comprises of stocks at the end of period t − 1
(St−1), production in t (Zt) minus stocks that are carried out of the period (St).
In a situation where production and stock levels are known, an increment in carryover stocks
from period t to t + 1 yields in an increase of the current price pt and a reduction of the
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future price pt+1. The demand for storage arises from the differences in market prices across
periods and can therefore be expressed as a function of the price difference:
pt+1 − pt = ft+1(Zt+1 + St − St+1)− ft(Zt + St−1 − St) (3.3)
The derivative with respect to St is negative. In consequence, the price spread is a decreasing
function of the stock level [Brennan, 1958]. Since supply is stochastic and prices in t+ 1 are
unknown, there is always a positive demand for storage. In consequence, at any time there
will be firms or individuals possessing stocks to carry it from period to period. Following the
notation of Brennan [1958] anyone who holds stocks is referred to as supplier of storage.1
Similar to producers of goods and services in a competitive setting, risk neutral suppliers of
storage hold stocks at a level where per unit storage costs are equal to the expected price
spread. This is equal to the usual condition: marginal costs = marginal revenue. Formalized
as:
pi′(St) = c′t(St) (3.4)
with ct(St) = kt(St)− cyt(St) (3.5)
where pi′(St) is marginal revenue and c′(St) are marginal costs that arise from the cost function kt(St) −
cyt(St). kt(St) are physical costs of storage such as interest and deterioration and cyt(St) is the convenience
yield which can be understood as negative cost.
In a micro context, where suppliers of storage have individual cost functions, while the sec-
ond derivative of the cost function ( ∂
2ct
∂2St
) should ensure a unique maximum [Brennan, 1958;
Sarris, 1984]. In contrast, when considering the market equilibrium, most contributions as-
sume linear storage costs [Williams and Wright, 1991; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1982; Deaton
and Laroque, 1992]. In the latter case, profit maximization leads to:
1In the course of the work, they will be given several other names whenever the context demands it.
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pt + k = βEt[pt+1] if St > 0
pt + k > βEt[pt+1] if St = 0
(3.6)
where pt is the price of the commodity at time t and k denotes fixed costs of storage. β = 1−δ1+r contains the
interest rate r and deterioration δ, both are conditional on the future market price; Et[·] refers to the price
expectation at time t.
This condition also holds if suppliers of storage prefer not to bear risk and hedge their short
position for delivery in t+1. At organized commodity exchanges Et[pt+1] equals the futures
price Ft+1,t [Williams and Wright, 1991]. In this way, stockholding will be completely
riskless.
(3.6) describes two possible states. In words, if storage is profitable prices will be linked over
periods which explains the high autocorrelation observed from actual price data [Deaton
and Laroque, 1992, 1996]. In contrast, if current storage is zero, prices are a function of
random supply and stocks carried from the previous period. However, in reality stocks never
completely deplete. Supply and demand of storage are depicted in Figure 3.1. Storage in
face of a negative price spread sounds perverse (intersection D′ × c′t(St)). This artefact has
lead to intense discussions in the literature (see Box 1).
St
E[pt+1]− pt
D′′ D′′′D′
c′t(St)
Figure 3.1: Supply and demand of storage.
Source: Adapted from Brennan [1958].
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The completion of the model requires an assumption on how available information are used
by economic agents to form price expectations. Following the seminar papers of Gustafson
[1958] and Muth [1961] rational expectations have been widely employed.
The non-linearity of the supply of storage (non-negativity of stocks) and the endogeneity
of the variables inhibit a closed form solution. Therefore, a numerical approximation of
the price function is required. There are several attempts to apply the model in order to
simulate features of actual observed price data. Most notably, Deaton and Laroque [1992,
1996] use a GMM estimator for the model without convenience yield. In a less famous
work, Miranda and Rui [1999] account for the convenience yield and employ Chebyshev’s
polynomial projection method. These methodological papers are able to generate prices
that fit the original data quite well with respect to mean, variance, skewness, and kurtosis.
However, they fail to explain high autocorrelation of first and second order. Attempts to im-
prove this by incorporating news are equally unsuccessful [Osborne, 2004]. Recent advances
in computer programming allowed the utilization of a finer grid to approximate the price
function [Cafiero et al., 2011]. Consequent estimates imitate high serial correlation observed
in actual price data. An observed feature of storage is the stabilization of commodity prices
[Deaton and Laroque, 1996], while the non-negativity of stocks explains why low prices are
more easily absorbed than price spikes.
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Box 1: Stocks and backwardation:
Backwardation of commodity prices, synonymous to a negative price spread, has led to some
controversy in the literature on storage. The original explanation includes the existence of a
convenience yield that is the intrinsic value of possessing physical stocks instead of having an
option [Working, 1949; Brennan, 1958]. This value comes from relatively constant demand
even if prices surge and “the possibility of making use of them [the stocks] the moment they
are wanted” [Kaldor, 1939, p.6]. In this way, the convenience yield can be interpreted as a
negative cost that explains the price spread’s negativity. The value of the convenience yield
decreases in supply, and is highest for low levels of stocks [Zulauf et al., 2006]. Empirical
findings support the hypothesis by showing positive levels of stocks even if markets are in
backwardation [Carter and Revoredo Giha, 2007; Joseph et al., 2011].
This view has been challenged by Benirschka and Binkley [1995], Brennan et al. [1997],
and Frechette and Fackler [1999]. According to their argumentation, observed stocks under
backwardation are the result of mis-measurement and aggregation across different grades
of the commodity and different locations with distinct market prices. A more convincing
explanation is the heterogeneity among suppliers of storage which goes in hand with diverse
motives of storage [Carter and Revoredo Giha, 2007].
3.2.2 Model extensions
3.2.2.1 Storage and trade
Likewise storage, trade affects commodity prices in an open economy by transferring excess
supply or demand to another country. The price relationship between two spatially sepa-
rated markets is described through the spatial price equilibrium [Enke, 1951; Samuelson,
1952; Takayama and Judge, 1971]:
pi + m = etpj if T > 0
pi + m > etpj if T = 0
(3.7)
where pi and pj are price in country i and j; et is the exchange rate between the countries and m the cost
of transaction; T indicates the quantity traded.
Trade is profitable as long as the price margin between the countries does not exceed the
cost of transportation. Resulting from (3.7), domestic prices also depend on transaction
46
Chapter 3. Stocks: theory and data issues
costs (shipment and trade barriers) and export prices. Incorporation of international trade
in the storage model affects the model in two ways. Firstly, similarly to storage, trade
can reduce price variability [Makki et al., 1996, 2001]. Secondly, storage and trade interact
and equilibrium quantities of storage and trade in country i and i must be determined
simultaneously [Williams and Wright, 1991]. From (3.6) and (3.7) four scenarios can be
derived:
Table 3.1: Market prices under storage and trade
Case 1 no current storage and no trade pt,i = P [Zt + (1− δ)St−1]
Case 2 current storage but no trade pt,i ≥ βE[P (Zt + (1− δ)St−1)]− k
Case 3 no current storage but trade pt,i ≥ etp∗t +m
Case 4 both storage and trade pt,i ≥ max {βE[P (Zt + (1− δ)St−1)]− k, etpt,j +m }
Source: Adapted from Shively [1996].
All four cases in Table 3.1 determine the equilibrium price. Again the model is not analytical
resolvable, while the solution becomes even more tedious due to the additional constraints.
3.2.2.2 Intra-annual storage
A major simplification of the model is the time-constant distribution of Z without a distinc-
tion between harvest and non harvest periods. More realistic, Z is only positive for some
months and zero for others. Peterson and Tomek [2005] present a monthly version of the
competitive storage model where m, n, and o represent harvest months:
Qt =

Zt + St−1 if t = m,n, o
St−1 if t 6= m,n, o
(3.8)
47
Chapter 3. Stocks: theory and data issues
Thus, total available supply in non-harvest months is comprised of inventories only. Rational
expectations yield the same temporal arbitrage conditions as in (3.6). In reality, it is
likely, that the distribution of the harvest across harvesting months is not deterministic but
stochastic. Further, it is also possible to experience variation in the timing of the harvest.
The intra-annual model is capable of accounting for these non-regularities. Accordingly,
Qt becomes a probability function that depends on expectations based on past prices and
weather conditions during planting and growing period.
As a consequence of these non-linearities in supply, prices are naturally volatile throughout
the year. Positive consumption guarantees the impossibility of stock-outs except for the final
month preceding the next harvest [Peterson and Tomek, 2005]. Similar to the annual model,
great significance is given to the costs of storage. Empirical applications from developing
countries, emphasize the strong seasonality in prices predicted by the model [Shively, 1996;
Osborne, 2004; Tadesse and Guttormsen, 2011]. Shively [2001] and Tadesse and Guttormsen
[2011] identify stock-outs induced by speculative storage as the cause of price spikes and
market volatility.
3.2.2.3 Risk averse traders
In an uncertain world, there is always a risk involved in the business of storage. Early
attempts have added a risk premium as additional cost into the classical storage model.
Here, the approach of Sarris [1984] is presented that takes off by representing the utility of
a risk averse supplier of storage by the mean-variance utility function:
U = E[pit|t− 1]− ρ
2
σ2[pit|t−1] (3.9)
with pit = (pt − pt−1)St−1 − c(St−1) (3.10)
where E[pi|t − 1] and σ2[pit|t−1] are conditional expectations for profits and their variance in t − 1 based on
price expectations, while pt and pt−1 are observed prices; c(St−1) is the quadratic cost function of the form
c(St−1) = µ2S
2
t−1, µ > 0; ρ is the parameter of relative risk aversion.
Given the utility function of (3.9) with σ2[pit|t−1] = (Et−1[pt] − pt−1)2S2t−1, maximization
yields:
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St−1 =
Et−1[pt]− pt−1
µ+ ρσ2p
(3.11)
with σ2p = (pt − Et−1[pt])2 (3.12)
For ρ=0, (3.11) illustrates the optimal storage for risk neutral speculators. However, the
important message is the relationship between stocks and price uncertainty for risk averse
suppliers of storage. In the context of a developing country without the possibility to hedge
risk at futures markets, market uncertainty reduces the level of stocks. This can be of
substantial importance, in particular when costs of storage are already large.
3.2.2.4 Heterogeneous traders
The models presented are based on the representative agent hypothesis. In reality, economic
agents are not homogeneous. This fact has been studied extensively in agricultural futures
markets. Most prominently, heterogeneity is attributed to inconsistent expectations about
the formation of market prices [Frechette and Weaver, 2001].
The financial markets literature usually distinguishes between noise traders (also chartists)
and fundamentalist traders. Chartists believe in the stochasticity of stock prices and usually
observe and follow existing market trends, while fundamentalists analyze fundamental data
to predict price returns. These models have been very successful in describing price dynamics
of financial assets and commodity futures. Analyzing the corn futures market after 2005,
Grosche and Heckelei [2014] find that the additional entry of index traders increases return
volatility, but does not alter the average price level. The interaction of different traders
affect the equilibrium price. Such results contain essential information for effective policy
design.
This is not one-to-one transferable to physical commodity markets. So, physical commodity
traders who own warehouses and have gained expertise in their specific market environment
cannot easily switch to markets that exhibit better price prospects at that time. With
respect to physical commodity trade, two types of heterogeneity are subject to examination:
first, the heterogeneity of price expectations [Chavas, 1999; Frechette, 1999]; and second,
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differences in the motive of storage [Carter and Revoredo Giha, 2007]. The latter also
involves the interaction between different types of traders [Lowry, 1988].
At least four types of price expectations are known and discussed in the literature: naive,
adaptive, quasi rational, and rational expectations. They differ by the amount of informa-
tion which is taken into account to predict the future price. Market information is usually
costly and demands capacity to efficiently process it. Thus, heterogeneous expectations are
based on individual specific costs and benefits of information [Chavas, 1999]. A number
of studies find evidence for the existence of multiple expectations in a range of markets
[Frechette and Weaver, 2001]. Frechette [1999] argues that traders with quasi-rational ex-
pectations make losses on average and exit the market in the long run. However, in the
short-run they can make a significant influence on the market and explain abnormalities in
price dynamics.
In contrast, Carter and Revoredo Giha [2007] emphasize the heterogeneity of stockholding
motives. So, millers and processing companies base their decisions on the conditions in
the processed good market and their storage capacity, instead of the inter-temporal price
spread. The interaction between speculative and working stocks has important implications.
In case the inter-temporal price spread is positive, speculators enter the market and drive
profits to zero. In this situation, processors also have interest to increase their stocks, but
they also stay in the market when profits fall below zero [Carter and Revoredo Giha, 2005].
3.3 What is it about stock data?
Agricultural market data is the fundament of empirical research and evidence based policy
advice. A great number of market actors also rely on public statistics to form their expec-
tations on future price developments in order to make economic decisions. This applies to
small scale farmers in Africa, but also to fund managers in Chicago, London, and Paris.
Fundamental data commonly consists of supply, demand, and trade. Supply and demand
comprises of production, consumption, and stocks. The data is usually combined in com-
modity or food balance sheets. Available quantities in balance sheets strictly correspond to
used quantities as the identity equation of supply and demand implies [see FAO, 2001].2
2Zt + St−1 + IMt = Ct + St + EXt; In words, production Zt plus beginning stocks St−1 plus imports
IMt equal final consumption Ct plus endings stocks St plus exports EXt.
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The easiest part should be import and export quantities as long as they pass official chan-
nels through customs offices. This is the case for most industrialized countries and for
international imports and exports to and from developing countries that enter and leave
the country through port facilities. On the contrary, cross-border trade in Africa, Asia, and
Latin America is often informal and not statistically recorded [Josserand, 2013].
Next, production data is obtained by multiplying the yield per hectare for each crop by
the area cultivated. In the United States and other exporting countries information on area
cultivated is collected through field surveys and in recent years also by using satellite images.
Yields can be projected using information on fertilizer usage and rainfall. Naturally, yields
in irrigated agricultural systems vary less than when rainfall is the only source of watering.
In many developing countries, data on yield and area is scant, also because field surveys are
costly and private sector companies do not have much incentive to acquire this information.
What remains are stocks and consumption. Apart from the United States, no country
is equipped with sufficient information to adequately estimate stocks from field surveys.
Therefore, a widely applied approach is to compute stock changes as the residual from the
identity equation. Unfortunately, consumption data is also hardly available.3 However,
it is comparably easier to estimate consumption given the knowledge about previous con-
sumption, the current production, and elasticities of supply and demand. Mistakes in the
estimation of trade, production, and consumption data all reflect in estimated stock figures.
But what makes it so difficult to obtain actual stock data directly? The causes are multiple:
first, stocks are very dispersed among farmers, traders, retailers, industrial companies, and
state owned institutions; second, a large amount of stocks are kept by smallholders farmers
and small to medium sized enterprises which are partly informal and difficult to track [FAO
et al., 2011]; third, stockholders often have good information about the current market
situation, but are not willing to share it. This information represents an important asset
to their company. Therefore, sharing this information, in particular with the public, is
not in their interest. In contrast to private stocks, public stocks by national and regional
governments should be known. However, often the parastatal institutions that operate
the public stock claim that public knowledge about their stocking behavior impedes their
objective to stabilize prices by providing the private sector with this information. All in all,
it is not advisable to have strong confidence in estimates of food stocks.
3Consumption consists of human consumption, feed use, seed use, and waste.
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Thus, it is no surprise that empirical estimations of the competitive storage model employ
price data only. In general, the empirical literature abstains from using stocks in regression
models, especially to explain short-run price dynamics. Albeit, a couple of studies exist
that use data on public stocks.
The trouble of researchers to obtain adequate data is probably less of concern than the
misinformation for private and public actors who take decisions based on the imprecise
estimates. An example for this is how the market reacted to Russia’s wheat export ban
in 2010 in consequence of severe wildfires. Misinformed agents responded by panic-induced
purchases that further drove prices and volatility, although world stocks at that time were
sufficient to offset absent supply from Russia [Immenschuh, 2012].
In their 2011 meeting, the G20 member countries agreed on an action plan to improve
exchange of market information and transparency. An important pillar is the availability
of timely data on stocks in each country based on the assumption that better market
information can stabilize prices more effectively than direct market intervention [Wright,
2009]. Data collection and transparency shall be achieved through the Agricultural Market
Information System (AMIS) which provides data free of charge on its webpage, releases
market indicators, and publishes research findings.4 For a more detailed description of its
tasks refer to AMIS Secretariat [2011] and Brockhaus and Kalkuhl [2014].
3.4 Data sources and comparison
Traditionally, there are three major open sources for agricultural statistics. First, the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) that is interested to provide market information
to the US farmers and the large agricultural industry in the country. Second, FAO’s FAO-
STAT has a great interest in developing countries and a wide country coverage. FAO also
provides technical support to its member countries to generate adequate data. Last, the
International Grains Council (IGC) which concentrates on its member countries, the ma-
jor exporters, and their trading partners and lacks data for small countries and developing
economies.
FAOSTAT has to publish official data from national statistics which are obtained from
a questionnaire that is sent to national statistical agencies or agricultural departments.
4http://www.amis-outlook.org/
52
Chapter 3. Stocks: theory and data issues
Often this data is imprecise. So, FAOSTAT reports only stock changes which are the
residuals of demand and supply. When summing up all stock changes for a particular
crop in one country, we expect the sum to be zero or positive if we assume stocks to
increase with agricultural production. Yet the opposite is the case since most countries
record almost always negative stock changes. Being aware of these problems, FAO also
compiles Commodity Balance Sheets (CBS) based on expert knowledge of focal contacts
in member countries. These balance sheets are not publicly available for most countries,
but data for important exporters and importers is presented at the AMIS webpage. Apart
from these data sources with international coverage, several regional organizations collect
data from their member countries. Most notably are the Permanent Interstate Committee
for Drought Control in the Sahel Zone (CILSS) for West Africa, the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN),
and the Regional Agricultural Trade Intelligence Network (RATIN) for eastern Africa.
Differences in the data are acknowledged by the literature and a discussion on particular
data (stocks, production, trade) can be found in Brockhaus and Kalkuhl [2014]. Here, the
aim is to discuss how differences arise and which data should be used for what type of
analysis. All statistics are generated by the balance sheet approach described above. The
main problem with respect to comparison is a distinct definition of the marketing year which
is specified as the time from the harvest to the same harvest in the subsequent calender
year. Table 3.2 presents this marketing definition for China and India. Some overlap is
recognizably, however, some variation as well. Generally, it is very reasonable to collect
data on a marketing year base. Thus, stocks always represent stocks just before the next
harvest. On the other hand, most trade statistics are collected on a calendar year base (see
UN Comtrade [2014]), and therefore this data will not help to estimate import and export
volumes for the commodity balance sheet.
Table 3.2: Marketing years of selected crops and countries
rice wheat maize
China
USDA Jan-Dec Oct-Sep Oct-Sep
FAO Jan-Dec Jul-Jun Jul-Jun
IGC Jan-Dec Jul-Jun Oct-Sep
India
USDA Oct-Sep Apr-Mar Nov-Oct
Continued on next page...
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... Table 3.2 continued
rice wheat maize
FAO Jan-Dec Apr-Mar Apr-Mar
IGC Oct-Sep Apr-Mar n.a.
Source: USDA [2014], FAO CBS [2014], IGC [2014]
To understand country coverage and differences in estimates of FAO CBS, USDA, and IGC,
it is helpful to consider the purpose of the data collection of the respective institution. USDA
wants to supply American citizens and companies with relevant information. The United
States are the largest grain exporter in the world, being number one in maize, sorghum, and
wheat, number three in soybeans, and number five in rice.5 Naturally, the United States as
exporter are interested in market data from all trading partners of significant size, but also
in data from all important markets in the world regardless of importer, exporter, or trading
partner. This interest reflects in data quality. For instance, stocks of sorghum and millet are
zero for a great number of countries. Similarly, Ghana’s maize stocks were zero during the
1990s, when imports were at relatively low levels, while they jumped from zero to 200,000
tons in 2003, the same time Ghana started to enhance importation again [USDA, 2014].
This makes two issues apparent. On the one hand, USDA has the financial and personnel
resources to provide very precise data estimates for foreign countries. This is achieved by
the work of agricultural attachés at US embassies in the respective countries. On the other
hand, data is provided for current use and against better knowledge ex-post changes are
not carried out.
Similar to USDA, IGC serves its clients. In this case its member countries.6 This makes
it obvious why data for smaller countries is not provided. The assignment by multiple
countries can be advantageous if these countries provide agricultural data. However, this
data is often not better than what USDA, IGC, and FAO CBS have. In contrast to IGC
and USDA, FAO CBS attempts to compile data for food balance sheets no matter how large
the market is and whether the data is of value for a particular exporter. For this reason,
the country coverage is large and with few exemptions data is available. From the point of
5Sorghum contributes the smallest share of total exports among the commodities notes.
6IGC members are: Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Canada, Cote d’Ivoire, Cuba, Egypt, European Union,
India, Iran, Iraq, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (Rep.), Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi
Arabia, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, and Vatican City.
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view of a researcher, it is important to note that FAO CBS attempts to correct estimates
ex-post which yields a consistent data series.
3.5 Summary
This section introduced the competitive storage model to the reader. It explains price
dynamics of storable commodities with stochastic production. Accordingly, prices are largely
driven by current supply, but can be stabilized by storing excess surplus from one period
to the other. The uncertainty of future supply creates an incentive to stockholders as
long as the expected return exceeds the costs of storage. The model can be extended to
include international trade which is also capable of stabilizing prices by transferring excess
supply from one country to another. The seasonality of production explains why prices
largely fluctuate within a year, while constant consumption guarantees positive returns
from storage until the new harvest pushes down prices. When stockholders are risk-averse,
stocks decrease with the uncertainty about future price development.
An empirical estimation of the competitive storage model and the importance of stocks is
usually limited to analyzing price behavior given a probability distribution of the harvest.
This is caused by insufficient data quality for stocks. Stocks are often computed as the
residual between supply and demand in commodity balance sheets. A direct estimation
seems difficult for multiples reasons. Nevertheless, three data sources are available that
publish statistics which approximate stock levels. The estimates of the different data sources
differ sometimes, partly due to a distinct definition of the marketing year. Generally, USDA
and IGC have greater resources, but provide data only for a small number of countries and
crops. Furthermore, they do not correct their data ex-post. Conversely, FAO has less
resources to construct its commodity balance sheets. Its balance sheets are compiled for
every country and commodity and are ex-post corrected. The right source to use depends
on the purpose of the research. With respect to developing countries, FAO CBS data is the
only source with wide coverage and reasonable estimates across all countries. Therefore it
is considered as the best choice for the analyses in this dissertation. Nevertheless, USDA
data is provided whenever it is appropriate.
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Chapter 4
Determinants of food price volatility
in developing countries1
4.1 Introduction
The poor in developing countries spend a large share of their income on food [Banerjee and
Duflo, 2007]. Food price volatility adversely affects their livelihood (see introduction). But
it also endangers macroeconomic stability and growth [Myers and Jayne, 2012] as well as
impedes the achievements of the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) on the eradication
of hunger. Policies to manage food price stability play a prominent role in the current
political debate. However, clear understanding on drivers of price dynamics is necessary to
effectively design food security policies.
A large body of literature examines causes of international food price volatility and con-
centrates on the new drivers of price movements, such as financialization of commodity
markets and the linkage to energy markets. International price spikes are transmitted at a
considerably large extent to domestic food markets [Kalkuhl, 2014]. In response, national
governments imposed export restrictions and founded national food companies to engage in
public storage. These policies come at high fiscal and economic costs.
1An earlier version of this chapter is published as Kornher, L. and M. Kalkuhl [2013]: “Food price
volatility in developing countries and its determinants”. Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture, 52
(4):277-308. Other versions of the chapter are published in the proceedings of the 2014 Nordic Conference on
Development Economics and the 19th Annual Conference of the African Econometric Society on Econometric
Analysis and Policy Challenges in Africa [2014].
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Food price volatility differs significantly across crops and countries and is recently declin-
ing after strong increments at the end of the last decade [Minot, 2014] (see also chapter
two). This analysis looks at determinants of domestic food price volatility in developing
countries and attempts to capture the effects of national stabilization policies. According to
the literature reviewed, there is no comparable cross-country analysis apart from Lee and
Park [2013] and Pierre et al. [2014]. This literature provides evidence on the importance
of prominent supply and demand factors and international price volatility to explain do-
mestic price dynamics. Similarly, country-level evidence supports the theory of competitive
storage [Shively, 2001; Osborne, 2004; Tadesse and Guttormsen, 2011]. Stabilizing effects
of public storage is also found to be evident [Jayne et al., 2008; Mason and Myers, 2013].
However, no other study successfully incorporates restrictive export policies and regional
market integration in an empirical model to explain price volatility. Regional Free Trade
Agreements (RTAs) represent a promising tool to enhance bilateral trade and trade flow
stability [Mujahid and Kalkuhl, 2014]. Furthermore, the number of explanatory variables in
the present analysis is exceptional and the heterogeneity of countries with respect to trade
status is considered.
The analysis in this chapter contributes to the debate on drivers of food price volatility
and the impact of public market intervention. It fills a gap of the existing literature with
respect to developing countries by using a comprehensive data set and innovative approaches
to measure policy involvement. A particular focus of the study is to address non-linearities
with respect to trade status and the impacts of stabilization policies. The empirical analysis
employs a dynamic panel, estimated by system GMM that successfully accounts for changes
in volatility over time [Serra and Gil, 2012]. The remainder of the chapter is organized as
follows. Section two reviews existing empirical literature by distinguishing between internal
and external drivers of domestic price volatility. Section three briefs the reader on public
market interventions, namely public storage and trade policies. Then, section four and five
deal with the empirical strategy and introduce data and variables, followed by the discussion
of the results in section six. Lastly, section seven concludes.
4.2 Literature review
The theory of storage is the underlying theoretical model to explain price dynamics. It is
described and discussed in chapter three of this dissertation. Volatility of prices originate
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from frequency and magnitude of changes in price levels. However, there is a notably
difference between inter and intra-annual volatility [Ott, 2014b]. The former measures
the variation between annual average prices without taking into account the intra-annual
seasonality. The latter emerges precisely from this seasonality and other irregular price
movements within a year.
4.2.1 International volatility
International price volatility has attracted considerable attention by the literature in recent
years. Most of it deals with causes for the global food crisis in 2007/2008. After a period
of relative calmness since the 1970s, price movements were extreme in the second half of
the previous decade and calmed down only after 2011. There is a broad consensus that no
single cause has led to the extreme price spikes [Trostle, 2008; Abbott et al., 2011].
Von Braun and Tadesse [2012] differentiate the effects into root causes, as well as interme-
diate and immediate determinants. Supply and demand factors remain the major source of
instability, while contemporaneous characteristics make agricultural markets prone to these
shocks [von Braun and Tadesse, 2012]. In addition, trade policy responses to high prices
by major food exporting countries fueled international price dynamics in 2007/2008. An
analysis by Martin and Anderson [2012] suggests that 30 percent (for wheat), respectively
45 percent (for rice), of the increase in international prices are linked to these insulation
policies. The matter can be characterized as a classic collective action failure.2
Another explanation for high price volatility can be identified in the linkage between food
and energy markets as a consequence of the usage of cereals in biofuel production [Serra
and Gil, 2012; Tadesse et al., 2013; Algieri, 2014]. Others argue that this additional demand
affects long term price levels, but not short term volatility. In addition to that, the impact
of intensified financialization of commodity markets on price spikes and volatility evolve-
ment is examined without consensus among academics [Irwin et al., 2009; Algieri, 2012;
Tadesse et al., 2013; Grosche and Heckelei, 2014]. The reason for this is the inadequacy
of available empirical methods and the shortcomings co-integration techniques to establish
causality [Grosche, 2014]. A more comprehensive summary and discussion of the literature
on international food prices can be found in Hajkowicz et al. [2012], Ott [2014b], and Serra
and Gil [2012].
2This implies, the higher international prices in consequence of export restrictions, the more exporting
countries follow suit and impose own restrictions to protect their markets [Anderson, 2012].
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4.2.2 Domestic volatility
The nature and causes of price volatility of staple foods in developing countries largely dif-
fers from the international case described. International trade guarantees constant supply
in international markets throughout the whole year. In contrast, many countries are charac-
terized by a single harvest and limited accessibility to international markets. Furthermore,
only few developing and emerging countries have sound risk management institutions (e.g.
commodity exchange) in place and the production of biofuels is undertaken in only few ma-
jor producing countries. In the following, determinants of domestic price volatility classified
into external and internal drivers are discussed accordingly.
External factors
External factors are drivers of domestic volatility that have their origin outside of the coun-
try or the food market. In general, tradeable commodities are largely driven by supply
and demand in export countries and international markets [Minot, 2011]. Therefore, inter-
national price volatility is considered to be a major source of domestic price instability.3
With the notable exemption of a few studies [e.g. Rapsomanikis and Mugera, 2011; Lee and
Park, 2013], the literature looks at spatial transmission of price levels or changes instead of
volatility. Rapsomanikis and Mugera [2011] find significant volatility spillovers when world
markets are extremely volatile for selected countries. Lee and Park [2013] apply a country
panel model using national food price indices (fpi) rather than commodity prices to investi-
gate determinants of volatility, in a similar study to the work at hand, and find a significant
but small impact of international food price volatility.4
The vast majority of spatial price transmission analysis - from international to national mar-
kets - follow Granger-causality models or vector-error-correction approaches to distinguish
between short and long term adjustment [Conforti, 2004; Minot, 2011; Robles, 2011; Greb
et al., 2012]. The evidence for market integration is mixed. In most cases a co-integration
relationship can be established for roughly half of the price series. This fact limits the
comparability of different studies and between countries. Although well accepted in the
analysis of price transmission and market integration, Granger-causality models are subject
to the usual controversy. Estimations based on auto-regressive distributed lag models have
3The study follows the literature and considers futures prices (at major commodity exchanges) and export
prices (at main ports) as international prices since they serve as reference prices for market participants
globally.
4Using FAO’s Food Price Index as international reference price.
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the advantage to reveal transmission elasticities for all price series and country pairs [Ian-
chovichina et al., 2014; Baquedano and Liefert, 2014; Kalkuhl, 2014]. These results show
large discrepancy between countries. However, taking into account large transaction costs,
a transmission elasticity of 20-30 percent can be considered to be substantial. Looking at
co-movement of international and regional price indices, Cachia [2014] finds transmission to
be strongest in Africa due to its high import dependency for rice.
A number of countries are not inter-linked to international commodity markets but trade
extensively within the region. Proximity plays a critical role for the extents of spatial price
adjustments [Aker et al., 2014; Brunelin and Portugal-Perez, 2015; Mengel and von Cramon-
Taubadel, 2014a,b]. In summary, price transmission appears to be far from complete, but
can make a large difference when domestic food prices in developing countries already follow
increasing trends. A lack of price transmission could be explained by a large portion of
transaction costs and agricultural policies [Rapsomanikis, 2011]. Further, asymmetries and
structural breaks in transmission mechanisms are acknowledged, but difficult to quantify
[Greb et al., 2012].
Apart from international and regional price movements, the variability of the USD exchange
rate is regarded to be exogenous to domestic commodity markets. An (de) appreciation of
the local currency has clear impacts on the price of imported commodities. If the USD
price varies strongly, commodity prices will also fluctuate. Conversely, international price
volatility can be offset by exchange rate fluctuations [Cachia, 2014]. Findings from cross-
country analyses provide mixed evidence for the impact of exchange rate volatility [Valera
et al., 2010; Lee and Park, 2013; Pierre et al., 2014]. However, country-level studies usually
include it as an additional explanatory variable [e.g. Shively, 1996; Kilima et al., 2008;
Maitre d’Hotel et al., 2015].
General inflation also affects food prices by putting an upward or downward (less likely)
pressure on suppliers. Usually, inflation impacts only on the price trends and not on volatil-
ity. Due to the great share of food in the aggregated consumption bundle of consumers in
developing countries, general consumer price indices (cpi) often exhibit seasonal patterns of
food price data. This makes the interpretation of a causal relationship difficult and many
of the aforementioned studies use real instead of nominal prices in order to omit inflation in
the regression. Alternatively, Lee and Park [2013] include the growth rate of money supply
in their model which should capture inflation related shocks; yet without seeing a significant
contribution to price volatility.
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Lastly, trade restrictions remain to be the major source of distortion in agricultural markets
[Anderson and Nelgen, 2012]. During the global 2007/2008 food crisis, restrictions of major
exporters severely impacted on import depending countries [Martin and Anderson, 2012].
However, developing countries have often limited capacity to engage in disputes with food
exporting countries [Götz et al., 2010]. On the other hand, exporters like India and Vietnam
successfully isolated and stabilized their domestic markets through export controls [McKay
and Tarp, 2014]. Against this, Porteous [2012] does not find similar positive effects of export
restriction for regional exporters without significant weight in international trade.
Internal factors
The classical theory of storage considers annual production to be stochastic with inde-
pendently distributed shocks. By their annual nature, production shocks primarily cause
inter-annual volatility [Dehn et al., 2005; Ott, 2014b]. Stocks can absorb production short-
falls by increasing available supply, and thus mitigate price instability between and within
marketing years. On the other hand, greater supply at the beginning of the marketing year
guarantees sufficient supply in the course of the whole year and dampens price increases to-
wards the end of the season. Therefore, a higher production level can reduce volatility [Lee
and Park, 2013; Pierre et al., 2014]. Empirical evidence on the competitive storage model
relies on price data only. National grain price dynamics exhibit characteristics as predicted
by the theoretical model [Shively, 2001; Osborne, 2004]. Yet without adequate stock data
stabilizing effects of storage are difficult to quantify, but the literature emphasizes on price
spikes as a result of stock-outs [Tadesse and Guttormsen, 2011].
Likewise storage, imports can overcome a temporary supply shortage. The theoretical link
is clear and simulation models have shown the unambiguous impacts on price stabilization
[Wright and Williams, 1982; Makki et al., 1996, 2001]. To empirically evaluate the effects
of imports on domestic price levels and variability is difficult, since imports decrease with
self-sufficiency. As a result, the positive effects of imports are canceled out by the negative
production shock. Trade regime changes impact on price adjustment mechanisms between
countries as empirical evidence from spatial transmission analysis shows [Myers and Jayne,
2012; Stephens et al., 2012]. Generally, the importance of production, stocks, and imports
depends on the characteristics of a country as closed economy, importer, or exporter. For
importers, the socially optimal composition of stocks and imports is determined by total
domestic supply and world prices. It is to note that, due to the substitutability of imports
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and stocks, great flexibility can be gained through an optimal combination of both storage
and trade [Gouel and Jean, 2015].
As against other markets and sectors, demand side shocks carry less weight in food markets
in developing countries due to the low price elasticity of demand. In other words, consumers
hardly adjust their demand when prices fluctuate. An increment in the price of a staple
food could even lead to an increase in its demand which is referred to as Giffen behavior
[Jensen and Miller, 2008]. Theoretically, this is caused when the substitution effect exceeds
the income effect. More importantly, spill-overs from other food commodities could have
short to medium term effects on commodity prices [Alderman, 1993; Rashid, 2011]. Other
demand shocks as induced by population growth or change in preferences are only long term
drivers of prices and do not affect short term volatility.
Furthermore, transaction costs matter for the price formation of spatially traded commodi-
ties. Changes in transaction costs are passed to market prices until the new price equilibrium
is reached. This applies for internationally traded imports [Barrett and Li, 2002], but also
for intra-regional or national trade [Staatz and Diallo, 2012]. In addition to that, institu-
tional economics emphasizes the importance of transaction costs for the performance and
functioning of markets, in particular in developing countries [e.g. Rujis et al., 2004]. With
regard to food markets, efficiency can be gained in facilitating fast and costless contacts be-
tween buyers and sellers [Overa, 2006; Aker, 2010] as well as enforcing liability of contractors
[Gabre-Madhin, 2001].
Finally, governments are able to influence commodity prices by imposing agricultural.
Firstly, production related policies that have indirect impacts on market prices. Secondly,
trade policies in form of import and export restrictions. Lastly, public price stabilization
programs through government intervention in storage. The latter two are discussed in detail
in the subsequent section.
4.3 Public price stabilization policies
4.3.1 Motivation and history
The motivation for governments to intervene in agricultural markets and to implement
stabilization programs is twofold. First, food price spikes and volatility have diverse mi-
croeconomic consequences. Production and investment decisions of farmers, traders, and
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investors are distorted when uncertainty on price changes is high [Coyle, 1992; Haile et al.,
2014]. Such inefficiencies are mainly due to risk averse behavior, but can also be of rel-
evance for risk neutrality individuals and firms [Martins-Filho, 2011]. Second, standard
welfare economics also predicts negative consequences from volatility for consumers when
the expenditure share of the product, which exhibits strong price variability, is significant
[Turnovsky et al., 1980]. Further, food price shocks can have adverse impacts on nutrition
and human capital investment [Kalkuhl et al., 2013].
If these negative aspects are accepted, intervention is justified when free markets are imper-
fect in insuring market actors against these risks [Timmer, 1989]. Yet in most developing
countries, this is reality [Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Gouel, 2013b].
Apart from negative microeconomic impacts that governments intend to mitigate, price
volatility also involves adverse macroeconomic consequences on the economy. On the one
hand, unpredictability of export earnings and the size of the food import bill [Myers and
Jayne, 2012]. On the other hand, fallout on national food security. The latter causes costly
government actions that take away financial resources for public investment [Timmer, 1989].
There is strong evidence for the impact of volatility and economic unpredictability on growth
and welfare [Ramey and Ramey, 1995; Jacks et al., 2011]. In extreme cases, price changes
can also be a major driver for political unrests and instability [Lagi et al., 2011; Bellamere,
2014]. This in turn is associated with a slow down of economic growth and reduction in
welfare [Alesina et al., 1996].
Traditionally, states have a great interest to control food prices via involvement in agricul-
tural production, marketing, and foreign trade in order to generate sufficient farm incomes
and to ensure affordable prices [Bates, 1981]. Nowadays, grain markets are still not free
in the neoclassical sense. After industrialization, developed countries shifted their policy
focus to producer subsidy schemes in order to maintain self sufficiency or boost exports (e.g.
United States, European Union). In contrast, in developing countries public interventions
particularly target urban consumers [Lynton-Evans, 1997; Kherallah et al., 2002; Anderson
and Nelgen, 2012]. The set of policy instruments is diverse and reaches from input subsidies
to the ban of private trade.
In developing countries, food markets became organized only during the colonial period.
After independence, markets remained under strict government control until market liber-
alization started in response to the structural adjustment programs in the 1980s [Wiggins
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and Keats, 2009]. While governments in some countries (e.g. Benin and Madagascar) en-
tirely liberalized markets, others (e.g. Malawi, Zambia, India) continued to heavily intervene
through public buffer stock schemes and marketing boards.5
In the following, the two of most common agricultural price policies are discussed. First,
public storage in form of buffer stocks and strategic reserves. Second, trade restrictions like
export duties and quotas. The latter are discussed not only with respect to consequences
on national markets but also by looking at negative externalities of trade restrictions.
4.3.2 Buffer stocks and strategic reserves
Public storage is a traditional policy instrument to manage agricultural price levels and
stability. Most commonly, it is distinguished between buffer stocks and strategic reserves.
The former are synonymous to interventions stocks, while the latter are also often referred to
as emergency reserves. The difference between the two is the extent of intervention. Buffer
stocks try to mitigate price movements in both directions by permanently intervening in the
market to affect prices. Unlike buffer schemes, strategic reserves are created to overcome
supply shortage in markets as result of harvest failures or unavailability of international
supply. However, they can also be used to mitigate price spikes [Gérard et al., 2011; Galthier,
2013]. By doing this, the level of interventions is much lower than in the case of a buffer
regime.
Likewise strategic reserves, international food aid is not distributed with the intention to
impact on prices, but to guarantee supply for the vulnerable. Yet a viable food purchase
and distribution system must be in place in order to enable successful activities during times
of crises [Grosh et al., 2011]. In doing so, the World Food Program acts similarly to buffer
stocks in selected countries with the intention not to affect market prices in normal market
situations.6
High costs of capital and transactions cause market inefficiencies and costs of storage are
usually high. In consequence, private stocks carried may not be optimal from the perspective
of a policy maker having a desired level of price stabilization. The idea of buffer stocks
sounds simple. On the one hand, the state creates additional demand when prices are low.
On the other hand, it provides additional supply when prices are high. In this way, the state
5See Fafchamps et al. [2005].
6This information was obtained through expert consultations at the WFP office in Accra, Ghana.
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institution is involved in buying and selling of commodities at any time. Ideally, prices are
only influenced when they exceed or undercut politically determined thresholds (ceiling and
floor price). In such a framework, the bandwidth ultimately determines the level of price
volatility. The narrower the band, the lower the volatility. Yet a smaller bandwidth requires
higher levels of stocks to effectively alter market prices [Newbery and Stiglitz, 1982].
Partial equilibrium analysis shows strong stabilizing effects of public stabilization programs
[Miranda and Helmberger, 1988] that are accompanied by positive overall welfare impacts
[Gouel and Jean, 2015]. The major challenge of a sound empirical assessment of public
interventions is that with-without comparisons are not possible. Minot [2014], for instance,
compares price volatility between low and high intervention African countries. He finds
significant higher volatility in high intervention countries than in low intervention countries
without controlling for counterfactuals. However, high volatility countries are also more
prone to intervene in markets to stabilize prices.
Country level evidence seems to be more solid. An evaluation of Zambia’s Food Reserve
Agency (FRA) by Mason and Myers [2013] reveals that its involvement has both raised
and reduced market prices during different episodes of the study period and dampened
variability significantly. These findings are similar to those of Jayne et al. [2008] assessing
the activities of Kenya’s National Cereals and Produce Board (NCPB). Similarly, market
liberalization are found to have increased market price variability [Barrett, 1997; Yang et al.,
2001; Kilima et al., 2008]. Conversely, Shively [1996] and Chavas and Kim [2006] find lower
volatility after economic liberalization processes in Ghana and the United States. This is
often explained by increasing competition as a result of low market entry barriers [Sitko and
Jayne, 2014]. Overall, the impact seems to be largely context dependent and also depends
on administrative quality and functionality in the design of the reserve [Rashid and Lemma,
2011].
Noteworthy, empirical analysis is aggravated by difficulties to adequately measure public
interventions. Furthermore, theoretically changes in public stock levels imply price stabi-
lization no matter in which direction they go.
4.3.3 Trade policies and liberalization
The effects of trade policies, namely import taxes, export taxes and quotas, and export
subsidies are discussed in many textbooks on international trade. Price impacts are clear and
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straightforward, however, depend on a country’s share in international trade.7 Import taxes
are motivated by revenue generation and protection of producers in importing countries to
increase competitiveness of domestic industries. Similarly, revenue generation is the main
motivation for export taxation. Export quotas and taxes also allow controls of export
quantities and attempt to guarantee target levels for domestic supply. Usually, export
taxation is general for all products, while non-tariff restrictions are applied to single key
commodities [Anania, 2013].
In order to control domestic price levels and stability, trade policies can be used to mitigate
externalities of international price movements on national food security by changing the
status quo trade regime [Diaz-Bonilla and Ron, 2010]. Importers achieve this by reducing
import taxes, a de facto subsidy for consumers. This comes at high fiscal costs. Against
this, exporters and countries that switch between net-importer and net-exporter aim at
reducing exported quantities to increase domestic availability. It is a general observation
that policy responses in developing countries aim at protecting and benefiting consumer,
while developed countries more commonly support its producers [Anderson and Nelgen,
2012]. In addition, revenues from import and export taxation have gained a significant
importance in governments’ budgets across the developing world.
During the last decade, trade policies have appeared to be the most common policy response
to international food price surges [Demeke et al., 2009; Sharma, 2011]. Apart from positive
impacts on domestic food price stability, export restrictions are associated with externalities
for food importers and geographical neighbors [Martin and Anderson, 2012; Porteous, 2012].
Export restrictions of main exporters cause scarcity in supply at international markets, and
thus boost export prices.
International negotiations on market and trade liberalization intensified after the creation of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994. Subsequent meetings attempted to reduce
agricultural subsidies and trade restrictions. However, WTO agreements are not character-
ized by strong discipline and its rules allow export restrictions when countries face domestic
supply shortage, a term not clearly defined [Konandreas, 2012].
Trade liberalization can reduce agricultural price volatility through the intensification of
trade between member countries. But, using standard gravity model techniques, Rose
[2004] finds little evidence that WTO membership effectively enhances bilateral trade. It
7Textbook cases: small country vs. large country.
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also does not stabilize trade flows and predictability by diminishing temporary trade re-
strictions [Rose, 2005]. In a more detailed analysis, Subramanian and Wei [2007] show how
liberalization of both trading partners strongly determines the level of benefits from WTO
membership. In line with this, regional free trade agreements (RTA) effectively enhance
agricultural trade [Sun and Reed, 2010; Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; Mujahid and Kalkuhl,
2014]. Moreover, empirical evidence is given that RTAs significantly reduce trade policy
unpredictability [Mansfield and Reinhardt, 2008; Cadot et al., 2009]. On this account,
amplified regional trade integration stabilizes agricultural commodity price volatility.
4.4 Empirical strategy
4.4.1 Modeling volatility
How to model price volatility is extensively discussed in chapter two of this dissertation. In
brief, price volatility is generally recognized as a stochastic process and as highly variable
over time [Gilbert and Morgan, 2010a]. To account for these characteristics, GARCH mod-
els are widely applied, especially to model financial data. Among agricultural economists
there is some doubt that random walk models can capture the transitory nature of shocks
that are caused by fundamental determinants [Balcombe, 2009; Piot-Lepetit and M‘Barek,
2011]. However, Barrett [1995] emphasizes the importance of structural variables in volatil-
ity models for agricultural commodities that are frequently omitted in GARCH models.
Indeed, with the exception of the spline-GARCH model [Engle and Rangel, 2008; Karali
and Power, 2013] conditional volatility models are incapable of incorporating further ex-
planatory variables of lower data frequency. Furthermore, analysis in Chapter 2 shows little
differences between conditional and realized volatility when ranking countries and markets
according to their volatility.
Therefore, here volatility is estimated as a reduced form equation model which is inspired
by Lee and Park [2013] and extends their analysis by including a larger set of explanatory
variables and expanding the analysis to crop specific estimates. Data availability allows an
estimation on annual base only. Volatility is computed as the standard deviation of log
returns within a particular year, as done by Balcombe [2009] and Ott [2014a]:
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σpt =
√∑12
m=1(∆lnpmt − rt)2
12
(4.1)
where σpt is the marketing year volatility in year t; ∆lnpmt is the difference in logarithmized prices between
two subsequent months m; rt is the mean log return over the same marketing year.
To account for volatility clusters, implying that periods of high volatility follow periods of
high volatility and low volatility periods of low volatility, respectively [Serra and Gil, 2012],
volatility is modeled as a dynamic process. This is accomplished by including the lagged
value of the dependent variables as an explanatory variable.
4.4.2 Model structure
The literature overview shows that price volatility can be attributed to multiple causes and
a clear linkage between market fundamentals as well as macroeconomic variables and price
volatility is established. Apart from these variables, variability is subject to country and
crop specific factors. Some of them are observable or attributable to a broader category.
By their nature, some of these factors are constant over time. In addition to this, data
on public policies, governance, market performance, and transaction costs are difficult to
obtain, particularly for such a large data set. In order to nevertheless include these variables,
indicators need to be used. Some of them are dummies and constant over time. For this
reason, the structure of the empirical model may be written as:
δijt = γX
′
ijt + θI
′
ij + uijt (4.2)
where δijt denotes price volatility of country i and crop j in period t andX ′ and I ′ are vectors of time-varying
and time-invariant but observable regressors; uijt is the error term.
Besides observable time-invariant determinants, variables exist that cannot be observed by
the econometrician. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator suffers from omitted vari-
able bias (OVB) due to unobserved heterogeneity when these unobservables are correlated
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with the observed independent variables [Cameron and Trivedi, 2005].8 The unobserved
heterogeneity is owed to crop characteristics and regional or country specific demand and
supply patterns. Unobserved individual heterogeneity is widely assumed to be present in
cross country samples [Acemoglu et al., 2008; Lee and Park, 2013].
In contrast to the OLS estimator, the within-estimator, or fixed effects estimator, purges
out constant unobserved individual fixed effects αij by subtracting its crop-country averages
from (4.2):
δijt − δij = γ(X ′ijt −X ′ ij) + θ(I
′
ij − I
′
ij) + uijt − uij (4.3)
uijt = αij + ijt (4.4)
where δij , X ′ ij , and I
′
ij denote average values over the entire observation period. The error term reduces
to ijt which is assumed to be i.i.d.; αij is the country-crop fixed effect that is purged out.
Albeit, the procedure also removes the time-invariant variables of interest I ′ij and renders
an estimation of θ impossible.
4.4.3 Dynamic panel bias and estimation of time-invariant regressors
Another source of bias comes from the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable into the
model. Consider the dynamic version of (4.3):
δijt − δij = β(δijt−1 − δij) + γ(X ′ijt −X ′ ij) + θ(I
′
ij − I
′
ij) + uijt − uij (4.5)
The endogeneity comes from the fact that δijt−1 is correlated with uijt−1, but also with
uijt. In consequence, the regressor δijt−1 − δij is correlated with uijt − uij and the within-
estimator becomes inconsistent unless T → ∞ and the weight of uijt−1 in uij is relatively
small [Nickell, 1981]. In addition, δijt−1 may also predetermine other explanatory variables,
8E[X
′
ijt|uijt] 6= 0.
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and hence those regressors are also correlated with uij [Roodman, 2009a]. OLS and the
random effects estimator also yield inconsistent estimates [Cameron and Trivedi, 2005].
An alternative way, in order to purge away unobserved individual effects, is the first differ-
ences estimator that uses lags instead of averages:
δijt − δij = β(δijt−1 − δijt−2) + γ(X ′ijt −X
′
ijt−1) + θ(I
′
ij − I
′
ij) + uijt − uijt−1 (4.6)
In this case δijt−2 can be used as an instrument for δijt−1 − δijt−2 [Anderson and Hsiao,
1981], however, at the cost that one entire period of observations is lost.
So far, it has only been dealt with the consistent and efficient estimation of the dynamic
panel and the inclusion of time-invariant variables was neglected. For the static case, the
instrumental generalized least squares (GLS) estimator by Hausman and Taylor [1981] can
be used. The omitted variable bias is dealt with by instrumenting potentially correlated
regressors with strictly exogenous ones. Yet the estimator may lack efficiency, for not using
all available instruments. Making use of all available moment conditions, Blundell and Bond
[1998] propose to estimate a system of equations including the difference-equation (4.6) and
its corresponding level equation:
δijt = βδijt−1 + γX
′
ijt + θI
′
ij + uijt (4.7)
Hereby, the differences serve as instruments for the level equation, whereas lagged levels
are instrumentalized in the difference equation (4.6). Through additional instruments, the
estimators for β and γ gain efficiency. In addition, time-invariant variables are not purged
out and an estimate for θ can be obtained. However, the estimation is unbiased only if I ′ij
is not correlated with the fixed effect (αij) [Roodman, 2009a].
As a matter of fact, it is very likely that observed time-invariant country characteristics are
correlated with the fixed effect [Hoeffler, 2002]. As a result, the system GMM estimator
is inconsistent. Among others, Cinyabuguma and Putterman [2011] and Kripfganz and
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Schwarz [2013] apply a two stage estimation approach. In this instance, only time-variant
regressors are included in the first stage using either difference or system GMM. Thus, GMM
estimates are not biased through the inclusion of endogenous time-invariant regressors. From
the GMM regression, uijt is obtained containing observed and unobserved time-invariant
effects as well as the normally distributed regression error ijt. In the second stage, the
errors (uijt) are regressed on the time-invariant regressors within a cross sectional regression
framework:
uijt = θ1F
′
ij + θ1f
′
ij + αij + eijt (4.8)
where F
′
ij contains strictly exogenous time-invariant regressors and f
′
ij contains endogenous time-invariant
regressors. Both constitute to I
′
ij from above.
Equation (4.8) can be estimated using two stage least squares (2SLS). The difficulty in the
estimation is to find feasible instruments that are sufficiently correlated with the endogenous
time-invariant variables f ′ij , but not correlated with the fixed effect.
As in any instrumental variable regression, the quality of the first step GMM estimator
depends on the relevance and validity of its instruments. The exclusion restriction can be
tested using Hansen J-Test or the Sargan Test of overidentifying restrictions. Both difference
and the system GMM potentially suffer from inconsistency as a consequence of too many
instruments. Alongside, results on Hansen’s J-Test may be compromised by a large number
of instruments [Roodman, 2009b].
4.5 Description of the data
The data set used in this analysis is unique in three ways. First, the coverage of countries
from all continents is great with a total of more than 70 countries. Then, a large set of
explanatory variables is used, while combining a number of existing cross-country data sets.
Last, innovative approaches are taken to capture the impact of policy variables on food
price volatility. The observations periods is from 2000 to 2013.
72
Chapter 4. Determinants of food price volatility in developing countries
4.5.1 Variables of interest and controls
The empirical analysis is based on a comprehensive data set of agricultural fundamental
data and macroeconomic variables. A contribution of this study is to combine different
existing data sets in order to estimate the effect of several explanatory variables in a single
econometric model.
Research with a similar econometric approach to identify causes of price volatility in the form
of a cross country analysis is scant. Pierre et al. [2014] and Lee and Park [2013] are the only
comparably studies that look at volatility in developing countries. Ott [2014a], Balcombe
[2009], Tadesse et al. [2013], and others analyze international volatility and therefore their
set of explanatory variables used deviates from studies with regard to developing countries
(see discussion in section two). Principally, the model allows to include a large variety of
potential drivers of volatility discussed in the literature review section. Yet the selection
of explanatory variables for the analysis at hand is largely leant on the related literature.
In addition, an attempt is undertaken to account for trade and price stabilization policies
quantitatively. The full set of independent variables is provided in Table 4.1.
The identification of causal effects of time-invariant regressors in cross country data sets, in
particular in a dynamic setting, adds complexity to the model. Therefore, most independent
variables are designed as time variant. Yet data availability and frequency of updates do not
permit to observe all determinants on an annual base. Besides, country characteristics, such
as net trade position, do hardly change over time; others are naturally constant (geography).
Table 4.1: Description of variables
Name Description Source Sign
Dependent variable
vol dom price volatility of domestic commodity prices † ZEF Commodity
L.vol dom price lagged volatility of domestic commodity prices † Price Database +
External factors
vol int price weighted international export prices † IGC +
vol exchange rate LCU/USD exchange rate † IMF +
int exp res. export restrictions by main trading partners UN Comtrade +
M1 average annual growth rate in money supply WDI +
Continued on next page...
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... Table 4.1 continued
Name Description Source Sign
WGI Kaufmann’s World Governance Indicator WGI -
Internal factors
stocks annual stock-to-use ratio FAO GIEWS -
production relative annual production FAO GIEWS -
insulation export restrictions by home country UN Comtrade -
reg trade share of intra-regional trade UN Comtrade -
market institutions measure for market performance
ITU, WDI, Fraser
Institute
-
importer
dummy equals 1 if country i is an importer of
commodity j
FAO GIEWS ?
exporter
dummy equals 1 if country i is an exporter of
commodity j
FAO GIEWS ?
non-importer
dummy equals 1 if country i is not an importer
of commodity j
FAO GIEWS ?
trade switcher
dummy equals 1 if country i is neither importer
nor exporter
FAO GIEWS ?
high intervention
dummy equals 1 if country i runs influential
public stockholding
desk research ?
Note: †calculated using (4.1). The list of countries by trade status and intervention level is provided in
Table B.2 in Appendix B.
The dependent variable in the regression is the standard deviation of price returns across a
calender year. It is preferred to use national retail prices. In some instances, they are not
accessible, then the average is constructed from available market level price data. In some
rare cases, wholesale price data is used. The difference should not be of concern within
the panel framework that is applied. In order to achieve a normal distribution of residuals,
which is required for inferences testing, the standard deviation of returns is logarithmized.9
To assess the transmission of volatility from international to domestic markets, and to
account for spatial price adjustment, international volatility is a main variable of interest. It
is computed over an annual period in the manner of the dependent variable. So, international
volatility is not weighted by national trade activities. Exchange rate volatility represents
9Figure B.1 in Appendix B shows residuals from the preferred specification.
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national currency fluctuations towards the USD. It controls for price adjustment which
does not affect real prices. For exporters, exchange rate volatility also captures their trade
competitiveness. Growth rate of money supply accounts for demand shocks and inflation
pressure. Both lead to an import of volatility into the food sector. The overall score of
Kaufmann’s World Governance Indicator (WGI) is included to control for political stability
and governance effectiveness.
In order to consider the quality of market institutions, a variable is constructed by the
author. The motivation is that existing data sets do not explicitly consider institutional
quality of the agricultural sector. In this study, institutional quality is measured by road
infrastructure, economic freedom, mobile phone penetration rate, and the presence of an
agricultural exchange to hedge price risk and to gain better price information.10 Then, they
are equally weighted evolving into a single index. One main advantage is the time-variant
structure of the index which cannot be achieved for all variables composing the index, but for
the index as a whole. In all, market institutions measure institutional quality, transactions
costs, and infrastructure.
Fundamental supply data is controlled for by the stock-to-use ratio and the relative change
in annual production. They are standard variables in volatility models and signs are un-
ambiguously predicted by the theory. However, existing studies on developing countries
exclude stocks due to the low data quality and measurement errors associated. Here, FAO
CBS stock data from the FAO’s GIEWS is incorporated. To the knowledge of the author it
is the best and most comprehensive data set available with respect to developing countries
(see discussion in chapter three).11 Notably, there is still legitimate doubt on the precision
of the data, as it is also constructed from commodity balance sheets. Yet stocks are the
main determinant of price dynamics in the competitive storage model and the stock-to-use
ratio adds significant value to the information on domestic supply.
Then, trade policies are captured by three different variables. They are constructed from
annual bilateral trade flow data for individual agricultural commodities published by UN
Comtrade.12 Data until 2013 is available only for trade values, but not for quantities. In
10Mobile phone penetration and economic freedom are measured relative to penetration and freedom in
the US. Road infrastructure is measured as the percentage of paved roads. Missing values are linearly
interpolated. If a commodity exchange exists a country gets 100 percent and zero if no commodity exchange
exists. Institutional quality is an equal weighted average.
11FAOSTAT only provides stock changes. USDA provides reliable data for big importers but generally
bad data for sorghum and millet.
12The idea to approximate trade policies through trade flow stability was developed with Irfan Mujahid
who is also a co-author of the latest paper version of this chapter.
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order to make quantities comparable over time, trade values are divided by the annual
international grain price index that is also used to compute international price volatility.
National protectionist behavior (insulation), so called insulation policies, are approximated
by the deviation of actual national export quantities from its HP-filter trend value; the nor-
mal export quantity. As elaborated above, these insulation policies are expected to reduce
domestic volatility. In contrast, export restrictions of large exporters (int exp res) measure
endured protectionism by trade partner. They are captured by shocks in the deflated export
value of a country’s five main trading partners. These shocks are also computed as negative
deviation from their HP-filter trend value. The theory predicts endured trade restrictions
to be positively associated with national commodity price instability. Against this, trade
liberalization and regional market integration are expected to stabilize market prices. Re-
gional integration is measured as the share of total trade with partners in regional trade
agreements as compared to the total trade value.13
Both Pierre et al. [2014] and Lee and Park [2013] also include Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) or GDP growth rate in the empirical model with the intention to capture demand
shocks, inflation pressure, and quality of the market. However, there seems to be no persua-
sive economic argument why income should affect price volatility, but for indirect channels
as quality of market institutions and money supply. Studies on drivers of international
price volatility include measures for financialization of commodity markets, speculation,
and demand shocks from the energy sector [e.g. Tadesse et al., 2013]. Given the context of
developing countries, these variables do not seem to be of relevance.
The classification into external and internal drivers is used by several other authors [Lee and
Park, 2013; Tadesse et al., 2013; Pierre et al., 2014]. Here, internal factors are limited to
the agricultural sector and are considered to be most easily amenable to influence by policy
makers, in order to stabilize commodity prices. The strategy is to estimate the econometric
model for the whole sample, and distinct country groups, namely importers, non-importers,
trade-switchers, and high and low intervention countries.14 Further, the two-step estimation
allows to test for difference in the level of volatility between these groups of countries. The
elaboration of heterogeneity between countries is an innovative approach with no comparable
application in empirical research.
13Data on regional trade agreements is collected by Mujahid and Kalkuhl [2014].
14The number of observations for exporters is relatively small. Therefore, non-importers are exporters
plus trade-switchers. Differences between non-importer and trade-switchers should be carried by exporters;
Exporters are countries that exported throughout the whole period of observation. Importers are defined as
countries that imported in each year of the observation period with a median import-to-consumption ratio
greater than 15 percent.
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4.5.2 Country coverage
Countries and crops that are part of the data set are selected based on availability of price
data from existing commodity price databases and national publicly open sources. Table 4.2
summarizes the number of country-crop groups by continent, country type, and commodity.
Accordingly, the country coverage is particularly comprehensive in Africa where a variety
of grains is consumed. A detailed list of countries is provided in Appendix B. The exact
number of groups varies by specification.
Table 4.2: Number of groups in sample
maize rice sorghum wheat millet Total
Africa 26 29 17 16 11 99
Asia 2 19 - 16 - 37
Latin America 14 14 2 9 - 39
Europe 1 1 - 2 - 4
landlocked 14 17 7 15 6 59
importer 19 38 2 33 0 92
exporter 6 7 3 3 2 21
non-importer 24 25 17 10 11 87
trade switcher 18 18 14 7 9 66
high intervention 7 19 4 13 4 47
All 43 63 19 43 11 179
4.6 Results
4.6.1 Model selection and specification tests
The discussion of the results should start with the selection of the right model and its
validation by common specification tests. All models are run in Stata 13, the dynamic
panel versions with Rodman’s xtabond2 [Roodman, 2009a]. All reported standard errors
are robust. For GMM, the two-step estimators are applied. The two-step estimator is more
efficient than the one-step estimator in system GMM, while they are equivalent in difference
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GMM [Hoeffler, 2002]. However, the standard errors of the two-step estimator are found to
be seriously downward biased. Therefore, Windmeijer’s correction is used.
Time dummies are not included in the model, but used as exogenous instruments in both
GMM regressions. Usually, it is recommended to include time dummies as explanatory
variables as well. In the present case, time effects are unlikely since supply and demand
shocks are correlated across countries only through trade, which is captured by the inclusion
of international price volatility. Correlation across commodities in a particular year arises
from common production shock and is purged away by including commodity specific supply
variables. Furthermore, the dependent variable is stationary and time effects through the
global food crisis are caught by higher values of international price volatility.
In all regressions domestic price volatility is the logarithmized value of the standard devi-
ation of monthly prices across a year. Column one of Table 4.3 presents the results of a
simple OLS regression. Then, the fixed effects estimation is presented in column two. Both
GMM regressions are shown in column three and four. Lastly, column five presents results
of the fixed effect estimator without the inclusion of the lagged dependent variables. The
results and their interpretation are discussed in detail in the next section.
Generally, only few explanatory variables are significant at usual levels of significance, but
those have the expected sign. OLS and fixed effect estimation represent an upper and lower
bound for the coefficient of the lagged dependent variables. So, the GMM estimation lies
well in the expected range. The high significance of the lagged dependent variable across
all models requests for a dynamic version. In consequence, the static model in column
five is obsolete, although coefficient estimates are similar to all other models, but system
GMM. International volatility is also significant across all models with the largest coefficient
in the system GMM estimation. Similarly, institutional quality is found to be significant
consistently. Conversely, for all other variables, deviations between the different models
exist.
Differences may be explained as follows. Only system and difference GMM account for the
dynamic panel bias and endogeneity of explanatory variables. The fixed effect estimator only
deals with OVB by controlling for time-invariant unobservables.15 In both GMM models,
stock-to-use ratio, share of regional trade, and export restrictive policies are considered
as strictly endogenous. Change in relative production is assumed to be predetermined.
15Endogeneity in fixed effect regression in a static model can be handled by an instrumental variables
regression.
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Table 4.3: Model comparison
p.OLS FE sysGMM diffGMM FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
L.vol dom price 0.521∗∗∗ 0.0592∗ 0.263∗∗∗ 0.186∗∗∗
(7.88) (1.86) (5.25) (4.12)
vol int price 0.218∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.302∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗
(4.78) (4.25) (6.23) (4.14) (4.38)
production 0.00468 0.00611 -0.0835 -0.00734 0.00860
(0.08) (0.11) (-1.11) (-0.12) (0.15)
stocks -0.189∗ -0.352∗ -1.218 -0.125 -0.321
(-1.66) (-1.73) (-1.65) (-0.36) (-1.52)
insulation -0.0864 -0.128 -0.400∗∗ -0.0200 -0.119
(-1.21) (-1.31) (-2.01) (-0.10) (-1.21)
int exp res. 0.0780 0.0653 0.0271 -0.194 0.0800
(0.68) (0.53) (0.16) (-1.21) (0.64)
reg trade -0.0537 -0.0960 -0.881∗∗∗ 0.0806 -0.0892
(-0.98) (-1.12) (-4.06) (0.28) (-1.03)
M1 0.484∗∗∗ -0.161 0.343 -0.140 -0.158
(2.98) (-0.94) (1.12) (-0.66) (-0.90)
WGI -0.110∗∗ -0.00610 0.111 0.251 -0.0226
(-2.11) (-0.02) (1.13) (0.76) (-0.09)
market institutions -0.636∗∗∗ -1.19∗∗∗ -0.973∗∗∗ -1.59∗∗∗ -1.17∗∗∗
(-3.88) (-4.08) (-2.73) (-3.77) (-3.86)
vol exchange rate 0.00218 0.0112 0.0122 0.00786 0.00968
(0.14) (0.38) (0.34) (0.22) (0.32)
_cons -0.555∗∗∗
(-2.66)
N 996 996 996 848 1004
N of instruments 67 66
AR(2) 0.397 0.198
Sargan Test 0.171 0.536
Hansen Test 0.664 0.653
Diff.Sargan(gmm) 0.792 0.901
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Note: stocks, reg trade,
and insulation are treated as endogenous, production is considered to be predetermined.
Regressions use orthogonal deviations instead of first differences as instruments. Years are
included as exogenous instruments.
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Therefore, GMM estimators are preferred to obtain unbiased coefficient estimates. Table 4.3
also displays specification tests for dynamic panel models. First, the Arellano-Bond test
for autocorrelation in the idiosyncratic disturbances is used to test the validity of all lags
as instruments [Roodman, 2009a]. For both system and difference GMM, the null of no
autocorrelation of second order cannot be rejected. Second, Sargan and Hansen test for
instrument exogeneity are performed. The first is not robust, whereas the second weakens
with too many instruments. Following the suggestion of Roodman [2009b], the number of
GMM type instruments is collapsed. Both Sargan and Hansen accept the null hypothesis
of instrument validity. The difference-in-Sargan test confirms the validity of GMM type
instruments. Therefore, it is assumed, that the specifications chosen, pass standard testing
procedures.
Difference GMM and system GMM show substantial differences with respect to point es-
timates and standard errors. Most notably, share of regional trade and insulation policies
are significant only in the system GMM regression. On the other hand, in both regressions
the lagged dependent variable, international volatility, and institutional quality are signifi-
cant. Inconsistency between the two estimators may be explained by a greater number of
instruments utilized by system GMM [Hayakawa, 2007]. Blundell and Bond [1998] discuss
biased results of the difference GMM estimator for moderately high coefficients of the au-
toregressive term. In addition, their findings suggest higher efficiency of the system GMM
estimator. Simulation results also detect efficiency gains from system GMM in the estima-
tion of further explanatory variables [Soto, 2009]. Therefore, system GMM is chosen as the
preferred model in this analysis. In doing so, the study follows the empirical literature that
is closest to this analysis [Lee and Park, 2013; Ott, 2014a].
4.6.2 System GMM results
The discussion of the results is limited to the system GMM model introduced above. All
specification tests, as well as the number of instruments, are reported beyond the regression
output in Table 4.5. The test results do not reveal a general problem with instrument validity
although some test statistics are not sufficient to conclude on this for a single regression.
On a general note, there are numerous possibilities to choose the number of instruments and
regression options. It is preferable to estimate all models with equal options and assumptions
with regard to endogeneity and predetermination of explanatory variables in order to make
results comparable. The details are also noted at the end of the regression outputs.
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In Table 4.5 four different specifications of the model are presented. The reason is twofold.
First, some explanatory variables reduce the sample size substantially. And second, institu-
tional quality is highly correlated with other explanatory variables which may distort test
statistics with regard to these variables. The correlation among all explanatory variables
can also be found in Table 4.4.
Throughout all specifications, significant variables exhibit the sign predicted by the theory.
International food price volatility, measured as the weighted average of most prominent
export prices, exhibits a strong significant impact on domestic volatility in each specification.
Due to the log-log nature, the coefficient represents an elasticity. Thus, in the short run,
around 30 percent of international price volatility is transmitted to domestic markets. This
estimate is of similar size as in Pierre et al. [2014], but larger than in Lee and Park [2013]. A
comparison with findings from price transmission analysis based on vector error correction
models is not reasonable as they measure transmission of price levels instead of volatility
spill-overs.
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Table 4.4: Correlation of variables in model
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vol dom price 1
L.vol dom price 0.6158 1
vol int price 0.2576 0.1945 1
production 0.0361 0.0377 0.0315 1
stocks -0.0927 -0.0643 0.0464 -0.0578 1
insulation -0.0464 -0.017 -0.0545 -0.0119 -0.0843 1
int export res. 0.1499 0.1443 0.1771 0.0413 0.0061 -0.0142 1
reg trade -0.1097 -0.0973 -0.0502 -0.0067 -0.0832 -0.0315 -0.0385 1
M1 0.167 0.1634 0.0509 0.0428 -0.0202 0.0109 0.0579 -0.0665 1
vol exchange rate 0.0482 0.0646 0.1396 0.0294 -0.0663 -0.0013 0.0616 -0.0085 -0.038 1
market institutions -0.2968 -0.2692 0.0276 0.0075 0.2107 -0.0406 -0.1725 0.1086 -0.037 0.0519 1
WGI -0.2259 -0.1819 -0.0553 0.0185 0.0957 0.0937 -0.1408 0.2308 -0.077 0.0965 0.3969 1
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Fundamental supply factors are significant when excluding institutional quality from the
regression.16 Specifically, volatility reduces by 2.5 percent given an increase in the stock-
to-use of one percentage point. This coefficient is much larger as compared to estimates on
the impact of stocks on international price volatility. Similarly, when national production
rises by 10 percentage points, the impact on domestic volatility is between 1.8 and two
percent. This effect is of similar size as the one for yield found by Pierre et al. [2014]. In
contrast, the evidence on impacts of production and yield on international price volatility
is mixed [Balcombe, 2009; Ott, 2014a]. Considering the stochasticity of production shocks,
10 percent is not much. Production shocks are also not under control of policy makers and
a policy driven enhancement of production by 10 percent is not likely to be accomplished
in the short run.
Furthermore, institutional quality and money growth rate are found to significantly impact
on price volatility. Institutional quality is measured by a ratio that lies between zero and
one. Thus, an increase of 10 percentage points would lead to a reduction of price volatility of
around 10 percent. Money growth rate is also given as a ratio and to be interpreted the same
way as institutional quality. Thus, an increase in money supply by 10 percentage points
induces price volatility to rise by only three percent. On the contrary to money supply
and institutional quality, governance is not significant in any specification. Exchange rate
volatility is also not found to be an important driver of domestic price dynamics.
In particular interest of this analysis is the impact of trade policies on domestic price dy-
namics. The regional share of total trade is significantly negatively associated with price
volatility. Hence, higher regional market integration and trade liberalization successfully
stabilizes market prices. These results are robust across all specifications. Conversely, price
insulation through export restrictions is found to have a dampening effect on price volatil-
ity, however, to a smaller extent. An enlargement of regional trade and a restriction of
exports by 10 percentage points lead to a reduction of volatility by eight and four percent,
respectively. Export restrictions by the five largest trading partners are significant in spec-
ification (2) and (3) of Table 4.4 only, but hardly in any other specification tested.17 So,
there is limited evidence for direct negative externalities of export policies. However, this
is no contradictions to [Martin and Anderson, 2012] who find international prices to be
significantly driven by export policies. Supply shortages at international markets are likely
16This can be explained by relatively high correlation between stock-to-use and institutions, but also by
the increment in degrees of freedom.
17This also holds when excluding international price volatility.
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Table 4.5: System GMM results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.vol dom price 0.262∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗∗ 0.355∗∗∗ 0.328∗∗∗
(5.17) (6.35) (6.19) (6.30)
vol int price 0.291∗∗∗ 0.280∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.354∗∗∗
(6.18) (5.93) (5.84) (6.83)
production -0.0757 -0.202∗∗ -0.176∗ -0.0867
(-1.03) (-2.20) (-1.89) (-1.00)
stocks -1.200 -2.544∗∗∗ -2.575∗∗∗ -1.326∗
(-1.65) (-3.66) (-3.56) (-1.92)
insulation -0.417∗∗ -0.402∗ -0.409∗
(-2.10) (-1.66) (-1.81)
int export res. 0.0566 0.240∗ 0.238∗
(0.41) (1.70) (1.70)
reg trade -0.858∗∗∗ -0.880∗∗∗ -0.926∗∗∗
(-3.94) (-3.66) (-3.66)
M1 0.141 0.327∗ 0.302∗ 0.305
(0.61) (1.78) (1.88) (1.55)
vol exchange rate 0.0169 0.0301 0.0380 0.0397
(0.54) (1.14) (1.59) (1.23)
market institutions -0.956∗∗∗ -1.23∗∗∗
(-2.77) (-3.74)
WGI 0.115 0.0617 -0.0104
(1.18) (0.61) (-0.14)
N 996 1270 1323 1020
N groups 140 155 157 144
N instruments 67 72 72 46
AR(2) 0.397 0.994 0.828 0.736
Sargan Test 0.171 0.015 0.388 0.000
Hansen Test 0.664 0.428 0.570 0.022
Diff.Sargan(gmm) 0.792 0.601 0.124 0.164
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Note: stocks,
reg trade, and insulation are treated as endogenous, production is considered
to be predetermined. Regressions use orthogonal deviations instead of first
differences as instruments. Years are included as exogenous instruments.
to have an impact on international prices and volatility, but domestic policies of importers
can compensate for this effect. On this account it is possible to conclude that national food
crises in 2007/2008 and 2011 were driven by the transmission of international food prices
into national markets, instead of absent availability at international markets.
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Lastly, the impact of the lagged dependent variable is positively significant at the one per-
cent level with a magnitude between 0.25 and 0.35 across specifications. This implies high
persistence of domestic food price volatility. Due to the inclusion of the lagged dependent
variable, long run effects of other explanatory variables are obtained by dividing the re-
spective estimated coefficient by one minus the autoregressive parameter.18 Hence, long
term effects exceed short term effects by approximately 45 percent. A detailed overview
on short and long run impacts is given in Table 4.6. Significance of variables alone is not
much enlightening with respect to their relevance on food price volatility. Therefore, and
to improve readability, explanatory variables are shocked by one standard deviation. This
is equivalent to normalizing a variable by diving it by its standard deviation. In doing so,
the relative importance of each explanatory variable can be assessed. The procedure is very
similar to standardized coefficients but yields a more intuitively interpetable number.
The percentages given in Table 4.6 are to be interpreted as the change in domestic price
volatility if the explanatory variable of interest changes by one standard deviation. Accord-
ingly, marginal effects of stocks and share of regional trade are considerably higher than
for all other explanatory variables, while the effect of regional trade is more stable across
specifications. Impacts of international prices, market institutions, and insulation policies
are of medium magnitude, but robust across specifications. Changes in national production,
money supply, and export restriction of trading partners have relatively little consequences
on domestic volatility. Worth to note, an increase (decrease) of explanatory variables by
standard deviation may not be equally realistic. On the other hand, it is difficult to a pri-
ori determine a realistic variation in explanatory variables. Thus, the estimated marginal
effects should be interpreted with the usual caution.
Table 4.6: Relative importance of explanatory variables
short term long term
min max min max
vol int price 17% 22% 25% 32%
production -2% -7% -4% -10%
stocks -22% -48% -33% -70%
insulation -14% -15% -21% -22%
Continued on next page...
18γ/(1− β).
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... Table 4.6 continued
short term long term
min max min max
int export res. 1% 4% 1% 5%
reg trade -35% -38% -51% -55%
M1 2% 5% 3% 7%
market institutions -17% -22% -25% -32%
Note: The autoregressive term is averaged across the four spec-
ifications which yields β = 0.3135. Min and max represent min-
imum and maxium value of specifications shown in Table 4.5.
4.6.3 Heterogeneity across countries
The impacts of some explanatory variables are suspected to be highly non-linear. Therefore,
the regressions are performed for subsets of the full data set to test for differences resulting
from trade status and public market intervention through price stabilization programs.
Specifications chosen are synonymous to (1) and (2) from Table 4.5, but exclude insulation
and international export restrictions for importers and non-importers, respectively. The
results with respect to trade status are presented in Table 4.7. Table 4.8 concentrates on
differences in results of public intervention through price stabilization programs.
First, results with regard to trade status are discussed. Lagged domestic price volatility
is positive and significant in all specification in Table 4.7 with no notable difference in
the size of the effect. Similarly, international price volatility remains strongly significant
at the one percent for all types of countries. Yet the coefficient for importers is almost
twice the size of the one for non-importers. Hence, the rise of international price volatility
hits importers particularly hard, since almost 50 percent of the volatility is transmitted to
domestic markets. Heterogeneity in the magnitude of volatility spill-overs is also evident in
Rapsomanikis and Mugera [2011] who use BEKK conditional variance models for several
countries. Besides, market institutions remain highly significant with a greater impact in
countries with limited integration in international markets.
The segmentation of the data set yields to the insignificance of production shocks for all
countries. This is in line with the literature on international price volatility which finds
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Table 4.7: Regression results by trade status
importer non-importer trade switcher
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
L.vol dom price 0.244∗∗ 0.340∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 0.352∗∗∗ 0.232∗∗∗ 0.386∗∗∗
(2.47) (3.00) (3.60) (4.97) (3.54) (5.59)
vol int price 0.437∗∗∗ 0.420∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 0.271∗∗∗ 0.261∗∗∗ 0.270∗∗∗
(4.43) (4.91) (6.72) (5.50) (4.45) (4.81)
production -0.0817 -0.113 0.0529 -0.0805 0.0203 -0.0269
(-1.00) (-1.27) (0.43) (-0.65) (0.11) (-0.20)
stocks -2.091 -3.497∗∗ -0.623∗ -1.530∗∗∗ -0.832 -1.599∗∗
(-1.38) (-2.49) (-1.78) (-3.31) (-0.76) (-2.61)
insulation -0.413∗∗ -0.370∗ -0.393∗ -0.459∗
(-2.24) (-1.97) (-1.70) (-1.95)
int expo res. -0.213 -0.0286 -0.105 0.0475
(-0.37) (-0.06) (-0.83) (0.29)
reg trade -0.763∗∗∗ -0.713∗ -0.797∗∗∗ -0.631∗∗∗ -0.503∗∗∗ -0.737∗∗∗
(-3.09) (-1.87) (-4.41) (-2.68) (-2.86) (-3.08)
M1 0.421 0.504 -0.249 0.0367 0.108 0.145
(1.10) (1.46) (-1.11) (0.19) (0.35) (0.77)
vol exchange r. 0.000890 0.0129 0.0571∗ 0.0504 0.0588 0.0340
(0.02) (0.38) (1.95) (1.50) (1.52) (1.17)
market instit. -0.844∗ -0.978∗∗∗ -1.44∗∗∗
(-1.75) (-3.42) (-3.30)
WGI -0.0973 -0.297 0.224∗∗ 0.183∗ 0.0833 0.104
(-0.47) (-1.43) (2.17) (1.75) (0.70) (0.84)
N 429 561 567 709 420 533
N groups 65 73 75 82 55 81
N instruments 57 61 66 71 67 72
AR (2) 0.346 0.061 0.091 0.178 0.149 0.224
Sargan Test 0.139 0.091 0.082 0.003 0.364 0.001
Hansen Test 0.364 0.201 0.724 0.428 0.894 0.837
Diff.Sargan(gmm) 0.797 0.610 0.939 0.746 0.979 0.990
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Note: stocks, reg trade, and insulation
are treated as endogenous, production is considered to be predetermined. Regressions use orthogonal
deviations instead of first differences as instruments. Years are included as exogenous instruments.
production to be a driver of inter-annual rather than intra-annual volatility [Ott, 2014b]. On
the contrary, the stock-to-use ratio remains significant in the specification without market
institutions. Interestingly, the price stabilizing effect of stocks is much higher in importing
countries, while the effect for exporters and trade-switchers has the same magnitude. The
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gap between importers and non-importers may be caused by the inability of importers to
effectively manage price stability through trade because imports are indispensable to satisfy
consumption needs.
With respect to regional trade integration, no difference between different types of countries
can be observed, while the effects remain significant and at similar relevance as compared to
the full model. Export restriction of trading partners are not significant, possibly due to the
reduction in the number of observations. Lastly, exporters and trade-switchers successfully
stabilize domestic prices through export regulations. This is in line with the state of research
regarding insulation policies. While Martin and Anderson [2012] base their conclusions on
theoretical consideration on the formation of prices and transmission mechanisms as well
as changes in nominal assistance coefficients, here the impact on price volatility is directly
observed. Hence, the findings provide empirical evidence for the predictions with regard
to welfare impacts of importing and exporting countries made by Martin and Anderson
[2012]. Moreover, price stabilizing effects are also found for trade-switching countries which
contradictsPorteous [2012] who finds no positive effect of insulation policies for regional
exporters in Africa.
Variability in the USD exchange rate and growth rate of money supply are both insignificant
in all but one specification. WGI is significantly positively associated with price volatility for
non-importers only. Counter-intuitively, the sign implies that better governance increases
volatility. Since the coefficient is positive and significant only in the specifications for non-
importers, this should not be attached with great importance.
Among countries with high public market intervention, the coefficient of lagged domestic
volatility is roughly 0.1 greater than in any other specification. It implies higher persistence
of volatility with public storage. This is theoretically convincing because additional stor-
age enhances autocorrelation of commodity prices. The impact of international volatility
remains at similar size.
Stocks are more important in determining domestic price dynamics for low intervention
countries than for high intervention countries. Production is insignificant for both types of
countries, albeit the effect of production changes is close to reach significance for low inter-
vention countries. Regional market integration is significant across all specifications, but the
effect is considerably larger for low intervention countries. Furthermore, export restrictions
of main trading partners and money growth rate are significant with the expected sign in
specification (2) of Table 4.8. Lastly, the coefficient for market institutions is significantly
88
Chapter 4. Determinants of food price volatility in developing countries
Table 4.8: Regression results by level of public intervention
low intervention high intervention
(1) (2) (3) (4)
L.vol dom price 0.228∗∗∗ 0.370∗∗∗ 0.356∗∗∗ 0.439∗∗∗
(3.29) (4.97) (3.35) (4.17)
vol int price 0.351∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.281∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗
(4.78) (4.12) (6.95) (3.88)
production -0.0712 -0.137 0.0144 0.0159
(-1.16) (-1.43) (0.08) (0.09)
stocks -0.781 -1.982∗∗ -0.556 -1.252∗
(-1.31) (-2.42) (-0.84) (-1.68)
insulation -0.620∗∗∗ -0.526∗ -0.217 -0.266
(-2.66) (-1.88) (-1.41) (-1.16)
int exp res 0.146 0.338∗ -0.235 -0.00492
(0.74) (1.95) (-0.86) (-0.01)
reg trade -0.741∗∗∗ -1.049∗∗∗ -0.639∗∗ -0.607∗∗
(-3.18) (-5.04) (-2.03) (-2.30)
M1 0.354 0.449∗∗ -1.14∗ -0.224
(1.39) (2.15) (-1.72) (-0.71)
vol exchange rate 0.0257 0.0309 0.00479 0.0124
(0.59) (0.80) (0.16) (0.26)
market institutions -1.19∗∗∗ -0.723∗∗
(-3.04) (-2.64)
WGI 0.00500 -0.0178 0.210 0.224
(0.04) (-0.17) (1.32) (0.89)
N 673 876 323 394
N groups 75 82 55 61
N instruments 66 71 67 72
AR(2) 0.091 0.178 0.149 0.224
Sargan Test 0.082 0.003 0.364 0.001
Hansen Test 0.724 0.428 0.894 0.897
Diff.Sargan(gmm) 0.939 0.746 0.977 0.990
t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Note: stocks, reg
trade, and insulation are treated as endogenous, production is considered to be
predetermined. Regressions use orthogonal deviations instead of first differences
as instruments. Years are included as exogenous instruments.
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greater in the specification for low intervention countries. All these differences take the
same line. Market forces, such as supply and demand, market integration, and institutional
quality are of less importance in a system in which governmental institutions dominate and
affect private sector decision making.
Furthermore, export regulations are significant for low intervention countries only. A pos-
sible explanation is that countries with public storage generally control exports in order to
prevent the outflow of subsidized stock releases. Conversely, high intervention countries like
India, Thailand, and Vietnam restricted exports to successfully accomplish isolation from
international markets. Exchange rate volatility and governance are not significant in any
specification.
In the last part of the empirical analysis, it is aimed at testing whether a portion of the
country-crop fixed effect can be attributed to time-invariant country characteristics. Again,
the focus lies on trade status and public intervention. Table 4.9 depicts a priori differences
in volatility without controlling for further explanatory variables and differences in residuals
after controlling for explanatory variables. The residuals of the system GMM estimation are
obtained by subtracting the fitted values from the actual volatility values. From this, high
intervention countries have lower volatility than countries without intervention only before
controlling for observable counterfactuals. With regard to trade status, importers seem to
exhibit lower volatility as compared to exporters and trade-switchers. This does not change
after controlling for other explanatory variables.
Yet mean comparison alone is not sufficient to conclude on these differences. Causality is
established only when the effect is properly identified. Following the two-step estimation
procedure described above, estimation errors are regressed on the time-invariant dummy
variables by 2SLS. Importantly, the estimation requires relevant instruments that are not
correlated with the country-crop fixed effects. As possible instruments geographical vari-
ables are discussed in the literature [Cinyabuguma and Putterman, 2011]. On the other
hand, it is also possible that geographical characteristics implicitly determine parts of the
fixed effect through agro-ecological country characteristics.
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Table 4.9: Volatility by country characteristics
sd return eijt
yes no yes no
mean median mean median median median mean median
high interv. 6.0% 4.1% 8.9% 6.0% -0.022 -0.007 -0.050 -0.029
importer 8.3% 4.6% 7.9% 6.4% -0.189 -0.180 0.071 0.058
exporter 8.5% 6.6% 8.1% 5.4% 0.167 0.138 -0.077 -0.067
trade-swit. 7.7% 6.2% 8.3% 4.9% 0.037 0.029 -0.098 -0.085
Note: The standard deviation of returns was logarithmized for the regression.
Three external instruments for high intervention are identified: per capita gdp, financial
freedom, and the share of rural population.19 It is assumed that they are not correlated
with the country-crop fixed effect, but strongly correlated with the endogenous variable.20
The relevance of the instruments is revealed by the first stage of the 2SLS regression in
which the endogenous variable is regressed on its instruments. The results are presented in
Table 4.10.
Table 4.11 shows the results of the second stage. Geographical variables are included and
treated as exogenous in specifications (3)-(5). But results change when they are also in-
strumentalized by the available instruments as in specifications (6)-(8). For the sake of
comparison, specification (1) presents a simple OLS regression. A conclusive assessment of
the impact of geographical variables is not feasible. The coefficient for high intervention is
positive in each specification with values between 0.1 to 0.6 which is equivalent to a marginal
effect between 10 and 80 percent.21 Significance at usual levels of significance is only found
in specifications with an exogenous treatment of geographical dummies.22
More importantly, no evidence can be found that intervention is associated with lower
price volatility. Does this mean public intervention should stop immediately? No. But
19Per capita gdp and share of rural population are part of the WDI. Financial freedom is an indicator
generated by the Fraser Institute.
20An instrument is always disputable. The correlation between residuals and instruments was tested
and found to be -0.0066, -0.0495, and 0.0143, for gdp financial freedom, and share of rural population,
respectively. Nevertheless, the instruments can be correlated with the fixed effects. One can only argue
that inherent or natural volatility is independent from the instruments, instead it is rather correlated with
geographical and climate conditions.
21In a semi-log functional for the marginal effect of a dummy variable is equal to eβ − 1.
22But estimates are significant at 15 percent in specification (1)(7)(8).
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Table 4.10: First stage regression results for IV estimation
(1)
high intervention
per capita gdp 0.0000503∗∗∗
(8.49)
financial freedom -0.00498∗∗∗
(-6.48)
share of rural population 0.00872∗∗∗
(11.13)
_cons -0.0770
(-1.05)
N 1664
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
it gives indication that stocks decrease volatility, not intervention. This is consistent with
empirical evidence that market liberalization, implying the absence of public storage or
similar intervention tools, reduces price volatility [Shively, 1996; Chavas and Kim, 2006].
This is attributed to the unpredictability of interventionist policy actions [Maitre d’Hotel
et al., 2015; Gouel, 2013c]. On the other hand, positive effects on the level of stocks through
public storage need to be considered and weighed against against the costs of intervention.
A possibility could be to implement market friendly policies that encourage private storage
without creating additional risk for private businesses.
External instruments could be found only for high intervention. GDP, financial freedom,
and share of rural population are not relevant for importers, exporters, or trade-switchers.
Thus, the discussion needs to be based on Table 4.9. But differences are also conclusive.
Importers exhibit lower intra-year price volatility since supply is less concentrated within
the year due to constant imports. In contrast, exporters and trade-switchers mostly rely on
seasonal supply which leads to strong intra-year price variation.
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Table 4.11: Results for two step IV estimation on residuals for high market intervention
OLS 2SLS - IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
africa 0.129∗ 0.0706 -0.0870
(1.78) (1.06) (-0.31)
landlocked -0.0536 -0.148∗∗ -0.0818 -0.0545 -0.0277 -0.0410 -0.0456
(-0.90) (-2.01) (-1.31) (-0.93) (-0.07) (-0.11) (-0.13)
latin 0.141 0.156 0.104
(1.62) (1.62) (0.31)
high_intervention 0.0902 0.208 0.602∗ 0.191 0.516∗ 0.0373 0.382 0.453
(1.54) (1.30) (1.93) (1.27) (1.96) (0.03) (1.57) (1.49)
asia -0.435∗∗ 0.490
(-2.32) (0.31)
_cons -0.149∗∗ -0.105∗ -0.0892 -0.104 -0.209∗∗ -0.124 -0.0859 -0.181
(-2.14) (-1.83) (-1.40) (-1.35) (-2.02) (-1.29) (-0.92) (-0.71)
N 892 991 888 888 888 888 888 888
N instruments - 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Underidentification Test - 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1359 0.0000 0.0000
Sargan Test - 0.9672 0.5113 0.3863 0.8035 - - -
t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01; Note: (3),(4), and (5) treat geographical variables as
exogenous to the fixed effect. (6),(7), and (8) treat them as endogenous. All regressions apply robust standard errors.
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4.7 Conclusion
This chapter discusses the determinants of food price volatility and fills a gap in the literature
with respect to the empirical evidence from developing countries. The study employs a
comprehensive data set with great country coverage across Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
The empirical model chosen is a dynamic panel estimated by system GMM. The signifi-
cant coefficient of lagged price volatility confirms the choice of the model to account for
persistence of volatility. A great number of instruments can lead to overidentification of
endogenous variables and distort common test statistics. For this reason, the number of
instruments was limited and the exclusion restriction was successfully accepted.
The regression results support evidence that international price volatility strongly influence
domestic volatility. The estimate is in line with existing studies using a similar approach [Lee
and Park, 2013; Pierre et al., 2014], but do not account for heterogeneity across countries.
Furthermore, institutional quality of agricultural markets positively affects price stability.
Among internal drivers, stocks and change in production significantly impact on volatility.
An increase in the stocks-to-use ratio by one percent reduces price variability by 2.5 percent.
The effect of production is weak and appears to be less robust across specifications.
Most insightful are the findings with respect to trade policies and regional integration. Using
a unique data set on bilateral trade agreements, regional trade appears to have a dominant
role in stabilizing national food prices across all types of countries. This contributes to the
literature that emphasizes the positive effect of regional integration on trade flows and trade
policy volatility [Cadot et al., 2009; Sun and Reed, 2010; Mujahid and Kalkuhl, 2014]. From
this, a clear policy recommendation towards regional market integration can be deduced.
Distinguishing by types of country provides striking results in multiple ways. First, volatility
spillovers from international to domestic markets are almost twice as large for importers as
compared to exporters and trade-switchers. Second, insulation policies are found to be a
successful price stabilization tool not only for large exporting countries, but also for regional
traders. Third, quality of market institution is particularly important in countries that are
little involved in international trade. The price stabilizing effect of stocks is notably high in
importing countries. Last, market forces, such as supply and demand, exhibit less impact
on price volatility in countries that are characterized by public price stabilization programs.
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Using a two-step estimation procedure to properly identify the effect of high public inter-
vention, no positive effect on market stability is established. Considering the strong positive
impact of stocks, a recommendation towards complete market liberalization should not be
deduced. In many developing countries stock levels are below their social optimal level. In
this instance, public storage is desirable. Alternatively, policies may be more effective when
promoting private storage and trade without extensive interference in markets.
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Chapter 5
Grain storage and trade - evidence
from Ghana
5.1 Introduction
Grain markets in many African countries exhibit large price volatility which is driven by
strong seasonality. Seasonal production and limited storage are identified as major causes for
intra-annual price variation [Jones, 1972; Sahn and Delgado, 1989]. Price spikes often occur
in consequence of stock-outs at the end of the marketing season [Shively, 2001; Osborne,
2004; Tadesse and Guttormsen, 2011]. The adverse consequences of seasonal hunger and
poverty are well accepted and functioning of markets is recognized as a prerequisite to their
resolution [Payne, 1989; Vaitla et al., 2009; Maxwell, 2013].
Structures and efficiency of markets improved since the liberalization process in the 1980s.
But, the price surges and international food crisis in 2007/2008 brought grain marketing
and public intervention back on the agenda of policy makers around the world [Vaitla
et al., 2009; Kaminski et al., 2014]. This is partly driven by the lack of confidence in free
markets and competitive behavior of traders [Osborne, 2005; Sitko and Jayne, 2014] and a
growing fear for the political economy of food prices [Arezki and Brückner, 2011; Brückner
and Ciccone, 2011]. Governmental intervention in form of price stabilization programs and
trade policies are often made without profound knowledge of the marketing system. “Under
these circumstances, interventions [are likely] to impair the functioning of the system more
than” they improve it [Jones, 1972, p.4]. Thus, evidence based research is indispensable to
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endow policy makers with adequate information in order to design agricultural policies to
successfully enhance food security.
In this study, Ghana is chosen as a case country as it is a typical developing country in many
respects. It has made considerable progress in poverty alleviation and the fight against
hunger over the past 20 years. Regardless, price volatility remains among the highest in
the world and seasonal food insecurity is prevailing in large parts of the country, especially
the north [Quaye, 2009]. On the other hand, markets are at the crossroads. Wheat and
rice imports gain importance with a growing free-spending middle class. Poultry and fish
farming as well as increasing demand for processed food items shift market shares towards
the industrialized food sector. These changes will undoubtably impact on the traditional
marketing system.
The empirical literature on grain markets in Ghana is segmented. On the one hand, time
series econometrics approaches are used to explain dynamics and variability of wholesale
market prices [Alderman and Shively, 1996; Shively, 1996, 2001] and spatial market inte-
gration [Badiane and Shively, 1998; Abdulai, 2000]. All studies focus on maize, the most
important domestic crop. And on the other hand, survey-data-based market analyses stress-
ing the role of the various actors of the value chain. Much of these studies are of qualitative
nature and give insights on marketing channels, spatial trade patterns, and transaction costs
[Alderman, 1992a; Armah and Asante, 2006].
None of the existing studies examines storage behavior of large wholesale traders and na-
tional seasonal stocking trends, which is the main objective of this chapter. This is of
particular importance since wholesale traders play the key role to guarantee sufficient sup-
ply throughout the whole year. The present work fills this gap in the literature based
on primary data collected from July to November 2013. This contains quantitative data
from a survey among wholesale traders with significant storage capacity on their operation
in spatial trade and inter-temporal storage. Qualitative interviews were conducted with
processing companies, market experts, and further relevant stakeholders. The analysis is
enriched by wholesale prices from major trading centers, information from a literature re-
view of governmental and scientific publications, and secondary data from the Ghana Living
Standard Survey (GLSS). The information is put into context and policy implications are
deduced.
The analysis is structured as follows. First, section two provides a brief introduction on the
case country Ghana and its agricultural sector. This includes a description of the present
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policy environment and of the agricultural value chain and its most important actors. Then,
grain price trends are outlined and reviewed by reference to the existing literature. Section
four starts by describing the primary data collection and the sample. Subsequently, motives
for stockholding are discussed and theoretically underpinned with reference to the empirical
literature and the data. Furthermore, the survey data is exploited by differentiating between
aggregated results and individual trading strategies. Section five concludes.
5.2 Background on Ghana
Ghana is a West African country with a coastal line on the Atlantic Ocean. As a former
British colony, it became Africa’s first country gain independence in 1957. After a period
of several military coups in the 1960s and 1970s, Ghana became politically stable and
is nowadays considered as one of Africa’s lighthouse examples for good governance and
democracy.
With a population of approximately 25 million, Ghana is the second largest country of
the regional political and economic zone: Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). The economy is largely based on agriculture and services with a small industrial
sector. Major export goods are gold, timber, cocoa, and recently oil and gas. The southern
part of Ghana is characterized by coastal savanna, forest, and forest-savanna transition
agroecological zones where high agricultural productivity is utilized to cultivate high value
cash crops.1
In Ghana, agriculture is a main determinant of people’s livelihood and an important source
of income for a large share of the population [ISSER, 2013]. Ghana relies on foodgrain im-
ports (rice and wheat) to satisfy domestic consumption. Agricultural markets are organized
similarly and perform alike markets in many other African countries. This includes that
only a small portion of total production is actually marketed or formally traded. Moreover,
the Ghanaian government responded to the 2007/2008 food crisis by changing trade regula-
tions and the establishment of the National Food Buffer Stock Company (NAFCO) which
involves in purchasing and selling of staple foods. For these reasons, Ghana is considered to
be a good case to be studied and many aspects analyzed are transferable to other African
countries.
1http://www.apipnm.org/swlwpnr/reports/u_g/g.htm.
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5.2.1 Demand and supply patterns
Different to many other developing countries, in particular in eastern and southern Africa,
the staple diet in Ghana is diverse. Despite high consumption of roots and tubers, grains
represent an important source of caloric intake (26.6 percent) especially in urban centers.
Looking at the change over time (Table 5.1), most notably, rice and wheat consumption
have increased over the past 20 years. Both are not traditionally grown in West Africa.
Table 5.1: Per capita consumption of selected food groups
kg/capita/year kcal/capita/day
commodity 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2010
Roots and tubers 245.3 247.5 249.7 234.8 242.0 1143(38%)
Cassava 148.0 149.7 151.4 152.9 154.0 639
Yam 43.3 42.8 42.3 41.9 50.0 401
Cocoyam 54.0 55.0 56.0 40.0 38.0
Plantain 83.0 83.5 84.0 84.8 85.0 320(10.1%)
Cereals 68.0 78.6 88.8 83.4 92 791(26.6%)
Maize 40.3 41.4 42.5 43.8 45.0 250
Rice(milled) 13.3 13.9 14.5 15.1 24.0 292
Millet 5.1 12.6 9.0 6.4 5.0 54
Sorghum 9.3 21.7 14.8 10.1 5.0 71
Wheat - - 8.0 8.0 13.0 124
Fish 23.6 24.2 27.0 30.2 31.0 51(1.7%)
Meat 8.0 6.3 6.7 7.1 11.8 49(1.6%)
Source: MoFA [2013]; FAO [2014].
Consumption patterns vary across income groups, regions, and between urban and rural set-
ting. So, rice and wheat are mostly consumed by well-off households. Conversely, sorghum
and millet are a more important part of the diet in the three northern regions which are
characterized by lower income levels [Minot and Dewina, 2013]. Maize is the only grain
consumed by all income groups and across the whole country at fairly similar levels [Cudjoe
et al., 2010].
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Table 5.2: Grain production in Ghana by region
maize rice sorghum millet
2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012 2011 2012
Western 71.3 82.8 23.1 25.5 - - - -
Central 202.4 192.1 5.4 3.2 - - - -
Eastern 364.4 405.4 22.3 24.6 - - - -
Greater Accra 4.5 4.7 18.8 0.8 - - - -
Volta 97.9 84.9 75.4 82.5 - - 5.3 5.4
Ashanti 173.7 205.4 27.6 27.7 - - - -
Brong-Ahafo 434.7 570.3 6.2 6.3 - - 0.7 0.8
Northern 192.6 209.4 171.3 165.3 79.3 80.5 130.6 126.4
Upper East 75.3 65.8 109.5 120.2 50.5 51.3 69.5 58.6
Upper West 82.7 129.1 6.5 7.0 54.3 47.9 80.8 88.7
Total 1699.5 1949.9 466.1 463.1 184.1 179.7 286.9 279.9
Source: MoFA [2013].
Note: In 1000 mt.
Agriculture production has kept the pace with increasing food demand, the result of high
population growth. This was achieved by both increasing agricultural productivity and
expansion of area under cultivation [FAO, 2014].
Maize
Maize is grown by 35 up to almost 50 percent of Ghanaian farmers [Chapoto et al., 2014].
Production is rainfed, and therefore varies largely between years. The main production
area is the middle belt with Brong-Ahafo and Ashanti (see Table 5.2). In the coastal and
forestry zones the climate enables two harvests per year, the major in July/August and
the minor in November/December. In contrast, in the Guinea Savannah Zone in the north
the only harvest takes place in October/November. Post harvest losses are reported to be
as high as 40 percent in the south during the first harvest when the dry season has not
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started [ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey, 2013]. The reason is that storage is advisable only if
the moisture content is below 13 percent [WABS Consulting Ltd., 2008].
Overall, Ghana is almost self-sufficient in maize with time-varying imports depending on
the quantity of the annual crop. In addition to that, yellow maize is imported for feed
use. Official inter-regional trade is generally low [Keyser, 2013], however, traders report
substantial trade flows with other Sahel countries on an irregular base [ZEF-ISSER Trader
Survey, 2013].2
Consumption of maize is relatively stable, although production is increasing over-propor-
tionally. The reason is that maize is the primary fodder for poultry whose population has
almost doubled since 2000 [MoFA, 2013]. Apart from direct human consumption and feed
use, maize is increasingly processed and sold as final consumer good with two big players
in the market: Premium Foods Limited and Nestle Ghana Limited.
Data on annual carry-over stocks is limited and difficult to verify since it is constructed from
annual food balance sheets based on supply and demand estimates. USDA has reported zero
stocks until 2003, while FAO CBS states very low stocks before 2003. The trend for stocks
for FAO CBS is increasing as depicted in Figure 5.1. Unlike FAO CBS, USDA assumes
maize stocks until 2007 to be substantially higher, while the estimates converge in recent
years.
Figure 5.1: Stock-to-use ratio of maize by source
Source: USDA [2014]; FAO CBS [2014].
2Traders reported that Malian, Burkinabe, and Nigerien traders purchase when crops in their countries
are insufficient.
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Sorghum/Millet
In total, less than 10 percent of Ghanaian farmers grow sorghum or millet [Chapoto et al.,
2014]. With rare exemptions, they are located in the three northern regions (Northern
Region, Upper East, and Upper West). The only harvest takes place from September
to December. Production and overall importance for food security has decreased within
recent year. Both, sorghum and millet are not extensively traded internationally and sub-
regionally.
Consumption of sorghum and millet is mainly in form of tuo zaafi, a pulp-like dough ball, in
the northern parts of Ghana. Furthermore, they are extensively used for brewery and less
frequent for animal fodder. So, Guinness Ghana Breweries established relationships with
out-growers to facilitate sufficient domestic supply [Angelucci, 2013].
Figure 5.2: Stock-to-use ratio of sorghum and millet
Source: FAO CBS [2014]
Annual stock levels have been stable until 2007, and decreased afterwards (Figure 5.2).
Stock-to-use ratios for sorghum and millet below 15 percent are not surprising considering
the low share of production marketed.
Rice
According to Chapoto et al. [2014], rice is grown by about eight percent of small and
medium scale farmers, but 15 percent of large scale farmers. Production is mostly rainfed
with a few irrigation schemes in the Volta Region and northern Ghana. Consequently,
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these regions constitute the largest share to national production. Rainfed rice has similar
harvesting patterns as millet and sorghum. With irrigation, two or three harvests per year
are possible.
The contribution of national production to domestic consumption is roughly 30 percent
[FAO CBS, 2014]. Most imports originate from Thailand followed by Vietnam and the
United States [EAT, 2012]. Regional rice trade is limited since all countries of the region
are net-importers. There have been several attempts to increase national rice production
in order to achieve self sufficiency. The 2009 National Rice Development Strategy of MoFA
aims at doubling domestic rice production by 2018. This shall be achieved through private
sector investments and an expansion of irrigated areas. The quality of domestically grown
varieties is reported to improve and local rice is considered to be able to compete with
imports [ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey, 2013]. Larger companies see the potential and invest
in milling factories.3
Rice consumption is estimated to continue growing at high levels [EAT, 2012]. International
imports arrive in ready for sale bags at any available sizes. In contrast, local rice needs
to be cleaned and milled before packaging. Therefore, formal traders prefer international
products. Generally, the rice sector appears to be more formal than trading in maize,
sorghum, and millet. It is dominated by large importing firms and wholesale companies
that engage in a variety of products. This fact seems to be driven by the high demand for
rice in the country.
Figure 5.3: Stock-to-use ratio of rice by source
Source: USDA [2014]; FAO CBS [2014].
3For instance, Prairie Volta Limited and Avnash Industries Ghana Limited.
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Stock-to-use ratios for rice according to FAO CBS [2014] and USDA [2014] are given in
Figure 5.3. Stock data for rice should be substantially better than for other crops due to
the formality the sector. The stock-to-use ratio of rice is only around five to 10 percent for
most of the observation period looking at the data by FAO CBS [2014]. Estimates from
USDA suggest stocks to be substantially higher with a stock-to-use ratio of averagely 15
percent. Both sources suggest very similar trends over the course of the last 15 years.
5.2.2 Macroeconomic and policy environment
As outlined above, the political situation in Ghana is very stable as compared to many
African countries. Due to the membership in the regional free trade zone ECOWAS, com-
modity trade with neighboring countries is free of duties on paper. However, in reality,
intra-regional trade is still associated with large transaction costs [Annequin and Eshun,
2010; Bromley and Foltz, 2011]. The common external tariff regime is not yet implemented
causing large price differentials for imported rice between countries which promote cross
border smuggeling. In Ghana, food commodities are charged with 20 percent import tax
(10 percent for wheat), while the duty was suspended for rice in 2008 and 2009. In addition
to that, port charges further increase the price of imports. Importation at required quanti-
ties is secured through sufficiently stable foreign reserves due to exports of oil, gold, timber,
and cocoa.
Historically, Ghana’s agricultural sector has been characterized by large state involvement.4
The Ghana Food Distribution Corporation (GFDC) and Grain Warehousing Company
(GWC) were established in 1971 and 1975 respectively [Sijm, 1997]. The main objective
was to enhance storage and overcome deficiencies in the distribution system. The structural
adjustment program, launched in 1983, involved liberalization of trade policies and foreign
exchange, as well as a massive reduction of public market distortions. Thereby, the oper-
ations of GFDC were not touched on and its budget even increased [Coulter and Poulton,
2000]. However, GFDC has never substantially impacted on market prices due to its low
market shares [Alderman, 1992a; Onumah and Coulter, 2000] and went essentially bankrupt
in the early 2000s.
After a short period of market liberalization, NAFCO was founded in 2010 to manage the
country’s emergency and buffer stock. Before the beginning of the marketing year, NAFCO
4See Sijm [1997] for a comprehensive overview.
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announces minimum prices for farmers and sets prices at which it buys from traders con-
sidering a specified margin. In case of interventions, purchases can be made at government
storage facilities at subsidized prices. At the moment NAFCO reports following targets
which cannot be verified by actual data:
Table 5.3: NAFCO stock levels
crop intervention stocks emergency stocks
maize 30,000 mt 10,000 mt
rice 15,000 mt 10,000 mt
soyabeans 1,000 mt 1,000 mt
Source: MoFA [2014].
Benin et al. [2012] review the operations of NAFCO without being able to assess its impacts
on price dynamics. The main problem is the non-transparency of operational decisions by
NAFCO. However, target stock levels represent a small portion of annual production, and
thus NAFCO’s purchase and release decisions are unlikely to influence markets. Unlike, the
determination of the minimum guaranteed price has an impact on markets. So, farmers
refused to sell early in the 2011/2012 marketing year since minimum prices exceeded the
prevailing market prices [ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey, 2013]. Yet NAFCO warehouses were
filled by that time and no purchases were undertaken. For this reason, farmers sat on their
stocks refusing to sell them for lower prices to traders.
National policy interventions are specified in the strategic governmental document Food
and Agricultural Sector Development Policy (FASDEP) and its revised version FASDEP II.
The document serves to harmonize objectives and policy instruments and emphasizes the
value chain approach to agricultural development. Besides the implementation of NAFCO,
this includes a huge fertilizer program, mechanization of agriculture, and publicly owned
block farms that cultivate food crops to satisfy public demand in prisons, schools, hospitals,
and for the army. Both mechanization and fertilizer program are designed to improve
agricultural productivity. Therefore, the impacts on trade and storage are limited.
In 2010, the Ghana Grains Council (GGC) was initiated by the private sector and donor
organizations. Its aim is to improve the functioning of grain markets by granting market
access to small scale farmers and implementing quality standards to foster industrialization
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of the food sector. Apart from poor physical infrastructure, both remain major obstacles
to agricultural market development.
5.2.3 Trade patterns - the role of the traders
An extensive literature exists that comprehensively analyzes trade patterns and value chains
in developing country grain markets (also in Ghana) including conceptualizing relationships
between market actors in framework diagrams [Ruijs, 2002; Boone et al., 2008; EAT, 2012].
In brief, producers often face the challenge to access markets in order to sell their produce.
From a recently conducted survey by IFPRI, it is evident that between 80 and 90 percent of
all farmers sell to traders (Table 5.4). For small and medium size farmers, rural assemblers
act as collectors who aggregate surpluses and sell on those to wholesalers in larger towns.
Then, wholesale traders sell to processors, millers, retail traders, but also directly to con-
sumers. In contrast, larger farmers tend to sell directly to wholesale traders. Since no value
is added to the commodity in having multiple agents involved in the value chain, farmers
earn higher profits when selling to wholesale trader directly [Sitko and Jayne, 2014].
Table 5.4: Total sales by buyer type (in %)
Farmer category
small medium large
maize rice maize rice maize rice
Small-scale trader 39.2 33.9 52.9 35.9 15.1 19.2
Large-scale trader/wholesaler 16.5 6.4 19.3 35.6 35.4 41.5
Retailer/marketer 36.4 44.9 22.3 22.7 26.9 31.7
Other households for consumption 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 1.4
Direct sale to NAFCO 1.7 1.1 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.0
Sale to NAFCO through an agent 0.3 0.0 0.2 0.1 4.9 0.0
Out grower 4.7 4.1 3.1 0.0 11.3 0.0
Processors 0.1 9.2 0.1 4.4 4.8 5.6
All other buyers 1.0 0.0 1.9 1.3 1.0 0.5
Source: Chapoto et al. [2014].
The literature acknowledges the role traders play to the functioning of markets in providing
inputs and credits [Antons, 2010; Sitko and Jayne, 2014]. There is also little evidence
for uncompetitive market structure in domestic grain trading in Ghana and other African
countries [Alderman, 1992a; Abdulai, 2000; Swinnen et al., 2010; ACET, 2014]. It is to
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note that retailers in urban centers usually organize themselves into associations. In doing
so market queens, the elected heads of this female retail trader groups, have manifested an
influential contra-part to wholesale traders [Langyintuo, 2010].
The major challenge for long distance traders is to ship commodities from surplus regions
in the middle belt and northern part of the country to consumption and industrial centers.
High transportation costs have been identified as a major barrier to market integration
[Badiane and Shively, 1998; Abdulai, 2000]. Table 5.5 summarizes distance between major
wholesale markets, which are also discussed in Box 3, in terms of road distance and trans-
portation time. Bad road infrastructure is indicated by long travel time for relatively short
distance.
Table 5.5: Distance between wholesale markets in Ghana:
km/time Accra Kumasi Mankesim Techiman Ejura Tamale Wa
Accra - 4h14min 2h8min 6h38min 7h10min 11h58h 18h15min
Kumasi 248 - 5h9min 2h27min 3h35min 7h46min 13h57min
Mankesim 103 249 - 7h36min 8h44min 12h55min 19h6min
Techiman 365 118 367 - 1h34min 5h19min 11h30min
Ejura 322 91 340 81 - 6h54min 13h4min
Tamale 621 375 623 256 337 - n.a.
Wa 648 439 687 321 402 n.a. -
Source: Author’s illustration using http://www.viamichelin.de/web/Routenplaner.
Against the well understood structure of the value chain, it is less researched how marketing
and trade flows change in the course of the year. In other words, it is clear how grain finds
its way from producers to consumers, however, little is known on how the grain gets from
harvest to lean season. Precisely, who stores what amount at which time is unknown. Fur-
thermore, the heterogeneity among wholesale traders is not well considered. For instance,
Boone et al. [2008] classifies them into semi-wholesalers, wholesalers, and large-scale whole-
salers. Instead, a classification according to their type of business activity into spatial and
inter-temporal arbitragers appears to be more consistent. Thus, in this work it is preferred
to use the terms aggregator, distributor, and speculator.
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Box 3: Important wholesale markets in Ghana:
• Accra is the capital and the main consumption center in Ghana. It is located in the
south close to the sea harbor in Tema.
• Kumasi is the second largest city in the country and capital of the most populous
region Ashanti. Kumasi is just in the center of Ghana and accommodates milling
industry. Most big trading companies own warehouses or run outlets in Kumasi.
• Mankesim lies on the important Accra-Cape Coast road in the Central Region. It is
more or less a wholesale market for the surrounding high yield areas.
• Techiman is the main wholesale market for maize. It is located in Brong-Ahafo that
produces most cereals and food crops. The main south-north road also passes Techi-
man.
• Ejura is the most important assembly market in the Ashanti Region and also close to
Techiman.
• Tamale is the third largest city in the country and the economic center of the north. It
is an important market for maize and the most important wholesale market for local
rice, sorghum, and millet.
• Wa is the capital of the Upper West region. The roads towards Wa are bad and
traveling time is immense. Therefore, the whole region is isolated from main trading
activities.
To understand both spatial distribution and seasonal patterns of storage behavior, it is cru-
cial to also examine the marketing behavior of farmers. The Ghana Living Standard Survey
(GLSS) reveals valuable information on this. Without giving exact figures with regard to
proportions, Figure 5.4 presents seasonality of farmers’ maize sales according to the main
sales month. From this, seasonality of sales is a prevailing pattern for all crops being small-
est for maize. Knowing the time of harvest from Figure 5.5-5.7 (lower panel), the months
after harvest are the time when most surpluses enter the market. From previous surveys
[Armah and Asante, 2006; GSS, 2007; EAT, 2012] it is well known that only a portion of
production is formally traded. Interestingly, the estimate that 50 percent of maize produce
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is formally traded by Alderman [1992b] from 1992 is still a reasonable figure in contem-
poraneous grain marketing [ACET, 2014]. Therefore, the share of stocks actually held by
traders is presumed to be low [Jones, 1972; Alderman, 1992a]. In contrast, the increment of
market purchase of farmers (upper panel: Figure 5.5-5.7) indicates that commodities must
be stored somewhere to be sold back to farmers at the end of the marketing year.
Figure 5.4: Main sales month of farmers (% of respondents)
Source: GSS [2007].
Figure 5.5: Seasonality of maize production and consumption (# of respondents)
Source: GSS [2007].
The distribution of imported rice differs substantially from marketing of locally produced
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Figure 5.6: Seasonality of rice production and consumption (# of respondents)
Source: GSS [2007].
Figure 5.7: Seasonality of sorghum/millet production and consumption (# of respon-
dents)
Source: GSS [2007].
crops. There are a few large importing companies who divide the majority of the market
among themselves [Kula and Dormon, 2009]. They sell to wholesale traders and supermar-
kets around the country, but also run own outlet stores. Wholesalers in turn have a wide
local distribution network.
Albeit the high relevance and great significance of research works from the beginning of
the 1990s [Alderman and Shively, 1991; Alderman, 1992b,a], there are also massive changes
happening. On the one hand, the introduction of modern telecommunication technologies
strongly reduces transaction costs [Overa, 2006; Tack and Aker, 2014] and eases market
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access for farmers and small traders. On the other hand, food markets in Africa are becoming
more and more industrialized. Supermarkets start to rise and request supply of processed
final consumer goods. For this reason, processing companies increase their volume and
take larger shares of marketed production. This has wide-ranging consequences for grain
marketing. First, the industrialized sector prefers to realize purchases in large quantities in
order to reduce transaction costs. Second, quality standards gain importance which presents
challenges to proper handling by value chain actors. The trading sector is compelled to
adjust to these developments.
5.3 Staple food price trends
Inflation is considered to be the major challenge to macroeconomic stability. After a short
period of single-digit inflation, the growth rate of the consumer price index has returned
to a level of above 10. In accordance with this, the Ghana Cedi (GHS) has depreciated
greatly since 2013. The exchange rate is free-floating since 2006, while a redenomination
was implemented in 2007 by canceling four digits (1 GHS = 10,000 Cedis). For this reason,
the analysis of staple food price trends employs real prices deflated by the national consumer
price index (CPI)(base year 2000). Due to data availability, wholesale prices from 2000 to
2014 are considered.
Maize
Figure 5.8 depicts relative wholesale prices of four major markets since 2000. Prices in all
markets follow similar trends, while they are lowest in production areas and highest in the
consumption centers Accra and Kumasi. Interestingly, only prices in Accra and Kumasi
seem to follow an upward trend since the middle of the decade. Wholesale prices exhibit at
least three major price spikes during the 14 year period (2005, 2008, and 2012). However,
all spikes are only of transitory nature and persist for only one or two months. This hints
at stock-outs at the end of the marketing year [Shively, 2001]. Furthermore, volatility
decomposition by UCM as described in chapter two reveals strong seasonality with a range
up to 60 per cent as illustrated in Figure 5.9. Strong seasonal price increases indicate
insufficient storage to satisfy demand at the end of the marketing year.
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Figure 5.8: Deflated maize wholesale prices across markets (1kg)
Source: SRID [2014]; GSS [2014].
Apart from seasonality, prices are driven by annual domestic production levels and the
prospect of speculative exports to neighboring countries [Shively, 1996]. Shively [1996] and
Alderman and Shively [1996] analyze the impact of economic reforms on wholesale price
levels and variability. Accordingly, price levels and volatility decreased after market reform
in accordance with the structural adjustment programs in the 1980s.
The correlation between markets is above 0.8 with the exemption of Wa (0.6). Similar to
this, regional market integration is considered to be quite high, but not complete [Abdulai,
2000; Cudjoe et al., 2010; Ankamah-Yeboah, 2012]. Abdulai [2000] extents conventional co-
integration analysis by accounting for asymmetric price adjustment and finds evidence for
faster price adjustment following price increases in the central market. Market integration
also affects price variability with less integrated markets experiencing higher price variability
[Badiane and Shively, 1998].
Less evidence exists on the relationship between international and domestic maize prices.
Conforti [2004] finds no co-integration with the national wholesale price within the period
from 1967 to 2001. In contrast, threshold co-integration results by Cudjoe et al. [2010]
suggest transmission of world prices to domestic maize prices at small margins.
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Figure 5.9: Seasonality of maize wholesale prices
Source: Author’s computation based on SRID [2014].
Rice
Deflated wholesale prices of imported and local rice are illustrated in Figure 5.10. Per
kilogram rice prices are substantially higher than for maize, sorghum, and millet. With rare
exemptions, imported rice is more expensive than locally produced rice. The gap is smallest
for the Accra market that is closest to the sea harbor in Tema, and thus exhibits the lowest
share of transportation costs. Generally, the price of imported rice was stable until mid 2011
and has sharply increased afterwards. Conversely, local rice prices follow this trend only in
Accra. The reason for the price surge is not a priori clear.5 A couple of market conditions
may have fueled the price development. First, increasing demand for both imported and
domestic rice may have created under-supply in the market. Furthermore, an unexpected
bad harvest at the end of 2010 and an increase of national petroleum prices in the course
of 2011 [WFP, 2014] combined with a rapid depreciation of the Ghana Cedi. Alternatively,
it is possible that the reinstatement of the import duty, which was abolished in 2008 and
2009, was only implemented in 2011. This, together with high market concentration among
importing firms, may allow wholesale companies to pass price increases 1:1 to consumers
[ACET, 2014].
Both prices of local and imported rice offers little indication for seasonal price patterns. This
is caused by the dominating influence of imported rice prices on local rice price dynamics
[Amanor-Boadu, 2012; Amikuzuno et al., 2013]. In this way, no annual price cycles, due to
limited storage, are observable. Amikuzuno et al. [2013] argue that is not driven by direct
transmission of price signals but by indirect effects on production decisions of farmers.
5Alternatively, Fearon [2013] argues that the 2012 general election may be responsible for misreporting
of national inflation figures. So, nominal rather than relative prices raised.
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Figure 5.10: Deflated rice wholesale prices across markets (1kg)
Source: SRID [2014]; GSS [2014].
WFP [2014] finds correlation of local rice prices across markets to be less than for maize
and cassava. Alderman and Shively [1991] argue that the reason is the high concentration of
production areas. Against this, prices of imported rice are highly connected between markets
ensuing from the south. Due to the high import dependency in rice, domestic markets are
likely to be well integrated into world markets. Nevertheless, Minot [2011] establishes co-
integration only for one out of seven market pairs, the only one being even local rice.
Using threshold co-integration models, Cudjoe et al. [2010] find evidence for transmission
of international prices. The mismatch of the result may be explained by a difference in the
period of examination. Looking at the 2007/2008 food crisis, Ghana successfully protected
domestic consumers through the suspension of the import duty.
Millet/Sorghum
Sorghum and millet prices follow very similar price patterns in all wholesale markets (see
Figure 5.12). Real prices also show a positive trend throughout all markets, in particular
after 2008. The reason could be increasing demand by the brewery industries within recent
years. During the observation period, several price spikes can be identified, yet none of
them being as sharp as spikes observed in maize prices. In addition, wholesale prices are
at similar size in all markets. Interestingly, volatility decomposition for both sorghum and
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millet yields strong seasonal pattern only for Tamale, the market in the production area. In
contrast, the seasonal range in the remaining markets varies between five and 10 percent.
Although the harvesting season starts only in September, prices tend to increase in June
already. Alderman [1993] finds this to be caused by cross commodity transmission. In this
way, seasonality in rice and maize prices spill-over to sorghum and millet.
Empirical research on integration in millet and sorghum markets is limited. Simple correla-
tion of prices shows very large coefficients across markets for millet (0.85-0.92) and slightly
lower coefficients for sorghum (0.62-0.82). Strong market integration for sorghum is also
confirmed by the analysis of Quaye and Ameleke [2008]. Due to limited international trade
of sorghum and millet, price transmission from international markets is not likely.
Figure 5.11: Deflated sorghum and millet wholesale prices across markets (1kg)
Source: SRID [2014]; GSS [2014].
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Figure 5.12: Seasonality of sorghum wholesale prices
Source: Author’s computation based on SRID [2014].
Figure 5.13: Seasonality of millet wholesale prices
Source: Author’s computation based on SRID [2014].
5.4 Storage behavior
5.4.1 Description of the data
The analysis of storage behavior in Ghana is largely based on a trader survey which provides
quantitative data on grain storage and trade. The survey was undertaken as a joint research
between the Center for Development Research (ZEF) and the Institute for Statistical, Social
and Economic Research (ISSER) at University of Ghana, Legon and was held at major
market sites in Ghana between August and November 2013. Subsequent to the survey,
follow up telephone interviews were conducted in April and May 2014.
Prior to the main data collection, a qualitative survey was carried out at selected market
sites in Ghana and Burkina Faso in November 2012. This survey provided important input
to the design of the questionnaire. In addition to that, qualitative information from the first
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survey in 2012 and from expert consultations during August and November 2013 enrich and
underpin the quantitative data.
There is no such thing as a business directory for traders in Ghana. Lists of traders that
have been identified during the research stay contain entries with invalid phone numbers or
no longer existing companies. Therefore, a sampling technique based on randomization is
obsolete. Secondly, the total population of inter-temporal arbitrageurs is not large and the
sample is to be considered the larger the better. For this reason, the sampling is purposive
with the intention to create a sample that is representative with respect to the size of
enterprise and type of business.6 Traders are identified through two unofficial lists. The
first is a list of contractors of NAFCO published on their webpage. And second, the business
directory of GhanaWeb an online news platform.7 Contact information of traders was also
found in governmental publications and other publicly available documents. Furthermore,
snowball sampling was used in order to increase the number of respondents. Generally,
traders were contacted by phone and asked about their willingness to participate in the
survey. In this way, the response rate was close to 100 percent. For the follow-up telephone
interviews, respondents of the first survey were contacted.
The interviews were structured as follows. At the beginning, general information on the
enterprise was collected. Then, part two aimed at obtaining a general overview about grain
trading activities. The heart of the questionnaire is the section on storage activities. Here,
respondents were asked to state purchases and stock levels during the last marketing year
that is 2012/2013. Further, perceptions on risk associated with storage were deduced by
asking for the assessment of specific statements. The interview closes with expectations for
future price changes and an assessment of traders’ market knowledge on tariff rate, rainfall,
and geographical production patterns. The telephone interview demanded the evaluation of
specific factors that influence price dynamics and induce market risk. In addition to that,
it was attempted to obtain information on different cost components. The questionnaires
can be found in Appendix D and Appendix E.
In total, 36 traders were surveyed in the first round. Only 20 traders replied to the tele-
phone questionnaire. In addition to that, several qualitative interviews were accomplished.
Most notably are interviews with processing companies and practitioners. Since substantial
amounts of stocks are held by farmers, it is essential to incorporate this into the analysis.
6The representativity of the sample cannot be perfect since information on respondents is not given prior
to the interview.
7Available at http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/telephone_directory/.
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The Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLSS) contains an exhaustive section on agriculture.
Nevertheless, a couple of qualitative interviews with farmers and farmer associations were
conducted.
The ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey is different to most existing traders surveys in two respects.
First, the focus is to interview traders that engage in inter-temporal rather than spatial arbi-
trage. Second, and related to this, inter-temporal arbitrageurs who own or rent warehouses
are large companies who sometimes also involve in other businesses.
Qualitative and quantitative data collected can be analyzed in two respects, in aggrega-
tion and separately. Aggregation of results give insights on trends in national storage and
aggregated market behavior. Separated analysis allows the analysis of individual storage
behavior. Both are important to understand price dynamics and to design adequate and
efficient food policies. Therefore, the discussion and interpretation of the data will be in
two parts.
5.4.2 Motives for storage
In the course of the field study it became apparent that stocking commodities is subject
to multiple motives. Therefore, this section discusses the most common rationales behind
stock building in the context of Ghana which is likely to be applicable to other sub-Saharan
African countries. Naturally, these motives also differ across different market actors in the
value chain. This is of particular relevance for agrarian-oriented economies with a large
share of subsistence farmers and low share of production that is formally traded.
5.4.2.1 Speculative storage
The most prominent motive for storage predicted by economic theory is speculation for an
increase in future prices. Speculation is defined as the engagement in risky transactions
to benefit from fluctuation in market values. The model is thoroughly described in the
theory of storage in chapter three. In brief, storers choose to provide additional storage as
long as the marginal costs of storage do not exceed the expected return from storage in the
subsequent period. Generally, it is possible to hedge any risk associated with storage at
futures exchanges or likewise through informal forward contracting. In this way, the price
risk is transferred to another institution. Yet commodity exchanges and forward contracting
are uncommon in most developing countries.
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A special variant of speculative stocks are anticipated stocks. They are not held speculating
for higher prices, but in anticipation of changes in demand [Minner, 2000]. Anticipated
stocks are reported by rice traders in Ghana who increase their stocks before Christmas and
Easter to satisfy the increment in demand [ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey, 2013].
Speculative storage must not be confused with hoarding for what food traders are often
accused in times of scarcity in the market. The literature defines it as excessive specula-
tion. By theory hoarding can only arise from imperfect competition [Osborne, 2005] or
overestimation of price changes [Ravallion, 1985].
By the inter-temporal arbitrage condition (3.6) provided in chapter three, major determi-
nants for the quantity stored are price expectations and storage costs. Storage costs are
large in many developing countries due to high interest rates. Ghana is no exemption in
this respect [Armah and Asante, 2006]. Therefore, the amount of stocks is likely to be
substantially lower than in industrialized countries. Commodity prices in Ghana remain
to be largely driven by seasonality (with exemption of rice) as discussed in the previous
section. For this reason, speculative returns are unlikely to be realized from inter-annual
storage. Based on the intra-annual storage model by Peterson and Tomek [2005], uncer-
tainty about the timing of the harvest may be the only justification for speculative stocks
at the end of the marketing year. In contrast, high seasonal variation in prices generates a
great opportunity for benefit from intra-annual price changes.
In general, everyone who possesses stocks can speculate. In reality, speculations bind capital
for a longer period, and thus mostly larger and highly liquid enterprises are capable of
speculative storage. Indeed, the survey revealed that traders who speculate also diversify
their risks by involving in spatial trading to realize low risk profits. Respondents also noted
the need to deplete stocks before the end of the marketing year in anticipation of a decline
in market prices [ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey, 2013]. Likewise traders, producers may also
store in expectation of higher prices.
As a result of the discussion, speculative stocks are expected to be close to zero at the
end of the marketing year for maize, sorghum, and millet which show strong seasonality.
Furthermore, in a typical marketing year, one expects speculative stocks to be highest when
prices are lowest. However, traders prefer to store at lower levels of moisture. For this
reason, maize harvested in August/September in the southern parts is usually not kept for
long and existing stocks are depleted again before the next harvest comes in.
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5.4.2.2 Safety stocks
Safety stocks are mainly known from the logistic and supply chain management literature.
They describe extra stocks that are carried to moderate the risk of stockouts and associated
incapability to satisfy demand. The need for safety stocks arises from uncertainty in demand
and supply [Guide and Srivastava, 2000]. Since inventory holding is costly, safety stocks
should be kept at a minimum. Optimal safety stocks are chosen dependent on uncertainty in
demand, supply, and processing time [Minner, 2000]. In contrast to speculative stocks, they
are not related to expected future prices, but to the quantity demanded from the enterprise.
In the context of Ghana, two types of market participants are likely carry safety stocks:
on the one hand, processors and animal feed manufacturers; on the other hand, traders
especially retailers. A trader survey conducted by WFP during October 2013 found replen-
ishment time of retailers and wholesale traders to be below one week for the vast majority
of respondents [WFP, 2014].8 This indicates the attempt to possess sufficient stocks at all
times. The explanation may be the high importance of continuous business relationships
to foster confidence in short term deliveries. Similarly, 19 out of 36 respondents ranked
“the risk of losing business partners when stopping to supply for three month” as a high
risk (28/36 as medium or high risk) in the ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey, in particular those
traders who are less likely to hold speculative stocks. Retailers hold safety stocks to foster
long-term relationship with costumers. Consumers who find retail shops empty will pre-
sumably seek their fortune elsewhere and may not return to the shop in expectation to be
confronted with empty shelves again.
Fafchamps [2004] emphasizes contractual risk in many African countries as the cause of
large inventories. The risk of late delivery and deficient quality demands firms to hold more
than double the stocks of firms that do not encounter late deliveries. Processing firms in
Ghana stated their inventories to make up for the production of one to two months [ZEF-
ISSER Trader Survey, 2013]. The rise of supermarkets in many African countries within
the past years has changed the agrofood system dramatically towards a greater variety of
products. In consequence, van Donk [2001] projects safety stocks to increase in order to
satisfy demand of multiple food products at the same time.
By their nature, safety stocks are roughly constant throughout the whole year and never
fall to zero. Yet, when incorporating uncertainty in supply and demand into the optimal
8In detail, 89.2 percent (retailers) and 95.5 percent (wholesalers).
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amount of safety stocks carried, stocks are likely to increase by the end of the marketing
year.
5.4.2.3 Aggregation stocks
The literature on grain marketing in developing countries emphasizes the importance of
small scale traders at village and town level. They have an important role when access to
markets for many farmers is not given or costs of traveling to the market are prohibitively
high [Sitko and Jayne, 2014].
As described above, these assembly traders sell to larger wholesale traders who ship com-
modities across the country. Wholesale traders are likely to collect only larger quantities
from village and town level markets. Thus, assembly traders aggregate in order to ensure
an efficient transaction process with their trading partners. Therefore, aggregation stocks
are an artefact of the characteristics of the value chain. They can also appear at central
markets when wholesale traders are asked to collect large quantities (several 1,000 mt) for
industrial consumption or purchases from NAFCO and WFP as reported in the survey.9
These stocks are usually built only when their purchase is guaranteed or even pre-financed.
By nature, stocks will be totally depleted when the target quantity is reached and delivered
to the contractee. There is no reason to not repeat the procedure several times in the course
of the marketing year, yet traders make sure to deplete before the next harvest comes in.
5.4.2.4 Consumption smoothing and precautionary savings
As briefly outlined in chapter two, households are producers and consumers at the same time
and their decision making with respect to production, consumption, labor, and storage is
likely to be non-separable. For this reason, on-farm storage is considered as the outcome of
an optimization process within the household [Saha, 1994; Park, 2006]. Taking into account
future consumption needs, it can be optimal to store food items to smooth consumption
across the whole year [Saha and Stroud, 1994; Michler and Balagtas, 2013].
The reason for this is clear. Due to seasonality prices steadily increase towards the end of
the marketing year. If households sell after harvest, they will be required to purchase at
higher prices during the lean season [Stephens and Barrett, 2011]. So risk averse households
choose to prevent this from happening by stocking sufficient quantities on farm.
9NAFCO and WFP hold auctions for the delivery of a certain quantity.
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5.4.3 Operational costs
The profitability of storage, and thus the level of stocks, depends on the margins farmers
and traders realize as well as the costs of storage up to the time the sale is undertaken.
For farmers, after the harvest costs arise from handling and storing of the commodity. In
contrast, the costs which affect traders directly are marketing, transport, and storage costs
[Angelucci, 2012]. Eventually, these costs are a main determinant for the seasonal variation
in prices [Peterson and Tomek, 2005].
Handling costs usually comprise post-harvest losses and expenditures that are necessary to
properly store or sell the farm produce. This often involves cleaning, drying, and packaging.
The main challenge of proper handling is to reduce the moisture content of fresh maize
for storage to decrease the incident of discoloration [Armah and Asante, 2006]. In some
instances, traders support farmers in this process by providing drying facilities or bags for
adequate storage [Antons, 2010]. In total, estimate of post-harvest losses occurring through
pests and insect infestation in sub-Saharan Africa largely deviate between 10-40 percent and
50–70 percent [Affognon et al., 2015]. In Ghana, experts assume total losses to be around
20 percent for maize and half of this for rice, millet, and sorghum.10
Post-harvest losses of traders are substantially lower as compared to losses in on-farm stor-
age since traders usually dispose of proper storage facilities and have information about
appropriate handling. On the other hand, storage in warehouses and the treatment of
stored commodities are costly. In addition, opportunity costs emerge. They are classified
as storage costs since other investment opportunities could be seized with the same capital
that is used to purchase commodities. Last, traders usually bear the costs of transportation
to their storage facilities and after storage to their customers. This includes the loading at
point of departure. Exact estimates for transport and storage costs are difficult to obtain
and also depend on quantity and quality of the grain. The additional costs are eventually
passed on to consumers.
Table 5.6 presents surveyed transport costs for frequently used destinations in Ghana from
2011. Accordingly, short distances are relatively expensive as compared to standard trade
routes between Tamale, Kumasi, and Accra. Generally, transport costs are sizeable mea-
sured against the price of a mini bag (50 kg; 30-35 GHS) and maxi bag (130 kg; 50 GHS) at
harvest time. During the field survey loading costs were reported to be 1 GHS for a maxi
10http://www.aphlis.net/?form=losses_estimates.
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Table 5.6: Transport costs on selected roads in May-June 2011
route bag in kg price/bag price/mt distance cost mt/km
Kumasi-Accra 50 2.31 46.28 272 0.17
Kumasi-Tamale 50 2.90 57.83 382 0.16
Kumasi-Ejura 50 3.00 60.16 98 0.61
Kumasi-Nkoranza 50 3.00 60.16 150 0.40
Kumasi-Wenchi 50 2.31 46.28 155 0.29
Accra-Tamale 50 4.04 80.98 654 0.12
Wenchi-Sunyani 130 6.94 53.39 97 0.56
Wenchi-Techiman 130 4.63 35.59 29 1.23
Wenchi-Accra 130 11.57 88.98 427 0.21
Source: World Bank [2012].
Note: Prices converted to GHS with the market exchange rate of 1.74 GHS/USD.
bag. Storage costs are more difficult to obtain. In the interview, traders were asked how
much they need to add to the purchase price in order to not make any loses if they buy
and immediately sell as well as if they buy and store for three months and sell (Q.4a and
Q.4b in Appendix E.). The amount reported for the latter case should yield the sole costs
of storage without trader mark-up, while the first captures mainly transport costs but also
fixed costs of administration and marketing. The results are reported in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7: Transportation and storage costs in March 2014
description reported cost
large firms in urban centers storage costs: 12-18 GHS per ton
transport & admin costs: 25-30 GHS per ton
traders Brong-Ahafo storage costs: 1-1.5 GHS per 50 kg
transport & admin costs: 1-2 GHS per 50 kg
traders Northern Region storage costs: 2-8 GHS per 100 kg
transport & admin costs: 5-12 GHS per 100 kg
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
Note: Differences across crops could not be observed, but the sample size for rice and
soybeans was small; Traders choose their preferred unit to report the costs.
Two main observation can be made. On the one hand, large firms in Accra and Kumasi
reported the smallest amount of storage costs. Second, with the exemption of the Brong-
Ahafo region, transport and admin costs are much higher than the costs for three months
of storage. The figures should be interpreted cautiously with respect to the total size of the
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cost reported. More importantly, they can be analyzed relative to each other. Nevertheless,
transport and administrative costs reported are in gross accordance with the costs estimated
by World Bank [2012]. A comparable proportional relationship between transport and
storage costs can also be found in other studies [e.g. Angelucci, 2012; Angelucci et al.,
2013]. From this, a total of operational costs between five and 50 percent of the purchase
price can be deduced.
It is a general observation in Ghana and elsewhere that storage facilities are built to exploit
economies of scale [Monterosso et al., 1985] or the proximity to processing companies in
urban centers [EAT, 2012]. Benirschka and Binkley [1995] explain this phenomena by the
presence of opportunity costs that decrease with distance to the producing market. In
consequence, market supply takes place in a sequential manner. Thus, firms far from the
market supply only after those firms that reside closer to market have fully released their
stocks. This implies, as soon as supply at producing regions is exhausted, grains are shipped
back from urban centers to rural markets. In this way, transport costs are incurred twice;
when grain is shipped from rural to urban ares after harvest and reverse in the hunger season
[Barrett, 1996]. Taking into account the high costs of transport, traders need to increase
the sales price in order to break even. In this light, seasonal price changes of around 50
percent in selected years appear quite reasonable. Conversely, costs of storage alone without
transportation cannot account for the strong seasonality in prices.
5.4.4 Aggregated results - seasonality in storage and trade
The objective of this section is to discuss aggregated national storage behavior deduced from
the trader survey, producer data from the GLSS V, and qualitative interviews conducted.
On-farm stocks
Before turning to results of the trader survey, lets reconsider Figure 5.4-5.7 from the section
above and its implication for on-farm storage. Purchases from the market and sales seem
to be good indicators to derive some seasonal variation of these stocks. When farmers are
forced to buy at the market, it is likely, their stocks are exhausted. Similarly, as long as
they are able to sell to the market, on-farm stocks still prevail. Looking at the GLSS V
data, local rice, sorghum, and millet sales reduce strongly at the end of the marketing year.
Market purchases of farmers spike during this time. This gives indication that on-farm
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stocks are usually exhausted several months before the next harvest comes in. As opposed
to this, both maize sales and consumption are less exposed to seasonality. This could imply
that maize is stored longer on-farm than other grains. High levels of market purchases of
maize around and shortly after the harvest could be motivated by speculative storage since
prices are lower during this period. So, farmer could choose to store in order to wait for the
price to increase. Conversely, storage could be caused by the risk of food insecurity.
Figure 5.14: Share of farmers selling by month in 2012/2013 (in %)
Source: Chapoto et al. [2014].
In contrast to the GLSS, the Ghana Agriculture Production Survey (GAPS) by IFPRI
compiled data on the share of farm sales by month. The numbers indicate that most of the
sales of rice and maize take place between March and June (Figure 5.14). This would hint at
relative high levels of on-farm storage up to the end of the marketing year. However, data for
the 2012/2013 crop year needs to be interpreted cautiously due to the extraordinary market
situation as a result of the bumper harvest. Net sellers may be more likely to speculate since
a portion of their total produce satisfies their consumption demands. Yet the breakdown of
farmers’ sales by size of the farm in Figure 5.14 reveals no significant difference in marketing
behavior. In summary, it is hard to say whether stocks are carried for speculative purposes
or to smooth consumption without more in-depth research.
In earlier studies, farmers were under suspicion to hold the majority of stocks [Jones, 1972;
Alderman, 1992a]. This cannot be assessed without better information on their marketing
behavior and storage motives. A shift of storage activities from farmers to traders can have
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the potential to raise total availability as on-farm storage is still associated with highest
losses from deterioration in consequence of insufficient handling and inadequate storage.
Trader stocks
The results from the trader survey are more enlightening since stock levels at a particular
time of the year are explicitly inquired. The survey can be considered as representative for
rice and maize as the aggregated turnover of the respondents represents a significant portion
of the total quantity marketed.
Table 5.8 summarizes stylized facts of markets for maize, rice, sorghum/millet, and soya.
The estimates for the number of traders rest on experiences during the survey which include
requests for references to other wholesalers at the end of the interview. By doing so, most of
the large wholesale traders should be known to the author. This may not hold for imported
rice which is a newly emerging business with several trading companies that keep rice as
only one of their products.
Table 5.8: Stylized facts of grain markets
Maize Rice Sorghum/ Soya
Millet
National consumption 1,700,000 950,000 450,000 130,000
in 2013 (mt)
No. traders in sample 29(+2) 14(+8) 3 11
fraction marketed (%) 50 >80 <20 >90
Industrial use (%)∗ 20 n.a. n.a. n.a.
No. traders whole population (est.)
Wholesalers 10-15 10 5-7 3-5
Large companies 2 4-6 1 1
Turnover
of survey (mt) 94,000 377,000 - 7,400
Note: ∗ Animal feed use 150,000 + 200,000 food processing (Premium
Foods, Nestle, Yedent Agro Food Processing); () indicate number of
yellow maize and imported rice traders.
Respondents of the survey purchase and sell commodities to different market actors. A
large majority buys from farmers or aggregators (Figure 5.15).11 However, still half of
11Multiple responses are possible.
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the respondents also buy from other wholesale traders. With respect to sales, only seven
respondents sell to consumers directly. In contrast, the large majority interacts with other
wholesalers, processing companies, and retail traders (Figure 5.15).
Figure 5.15: Sources of commodities traded (# of respondents)
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
Figure 5.16: Buyers of commodities traded (# of respondents)
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
Besides, the average storage capacity is more than 10,000 metric tons with a percentage
distribution as shown in Table 5.9. From this, it can be concluded that the sample differs
from usual traders surveys, such as WFP [2014], and therefore allows to draw inferences
about national storage behavior.
A first indication on seasonal variability of stocks is provided by Figure 5.17 and Figure 5.18
that illustrate the best time to stock-in and release stocks as specified by the respondents of
the survey. For maize, stocking-in takes mostly place in August/September and November
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Table 5.9: Share of traders’ storage capacity
Quantity of stocks (in tons)
x ≥ 15,000 15.15
15,000 > x ≥ 5,000 15.15
5,000 > x ≥ 500 27.27
x < 500 42.42
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey
[2013].
to January. This largely corresponds with harvesting time, and thus with the time of the
year with lowest prices. Interestingly, some traders continue to build stocks in the course
of the whole year. In line with this, stock releases also occur throughout the whole year.
Albeit, most traders prefer to sell in April to June in order to benefit from increasing prices.
Results for rice are different. Stocks of imported rice exhibit less intra-annual variation
apart from the fact that stocks are built before Christmas to satisfy increasing demand. In
contrast, stockbuilding of local rice takes place from November to January with the intention
to sell it from March to June which displays the seasonality of prices.
Figure 5.17: Best time to stock-in and stock-out maize (# of respondents)
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
Seasonal variation of actual stocks can be deduced from the survey in the following way.
First, stock levels of respondents are interpolated in order to fill gaps in the questionnaire.
Second, estimated stock levels are aggregated by commodity. Surely, in doing so, large
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Figure 5.18: Best time to stock-in and stock-out rice (# of respondents)
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
wholesale traders carry over-proportional weight and stocks of smaller traders hardly change
aggregated stock level.
Figure 5.19: Aggregated trader stock trends (in 1,000 mt)
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
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Figure 5.19 shows the seasonality of observed stocks within the period surveyed. The
estimates are in accordance with the preferred time of stocking-in and stocking-out. This
is an increasing function until February/March. So, maize stocks are accumulated in the
course of a year and distributed toward the new harvest season. It seems evident that on-
farm stocks dominate at the beginning of a marketing year and trader stocks take over only
within the last few months before the next harvest. Stocks for imported rice are built up
before Christmas and Easter and decline as a result of releases during festival time. Local
rice stocks do not exhibit similar peaks around Christmas and Easter. On the contrary, the
bottom level is reached in June, before they are constantly accumulated. Over the survey
period, maize stocks vary significantly from 10,000 to 45,000 tons. Unlike, rice stocks do not
show a similar strong pattern. It is to note, that a more precise estimate can be achieved by
weighing traders in the survey according to their weight in the survey. So, smaller traders, of
which many exits, are under-represented in the survey. Conversely, most of larger wholesale
traders are covered.
Taking these figures allow to make projections for total national stocks. This is achieved by
dividing the total turnover of respondents of the survey by portion of annual trade volume
covered by the survey (Table 5.10).12 From qualitative interviews, safety stocks of maize
processing companies are around 1-2 months of total production. In the knowledge that 20
percent of total national consumption is used for industrial use, the level of stocks can be
projected. The estimates are summarized in Table 5.10 including estimates by USDA, FAO
CBS, and the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MoFA).
Table 5.10: Estimated opening stocks 2013/2014
Maize Rice Sorghum Millet
USDA 247,000 172,000 0 0
FAO GIEWS 250,000 50,000 5,000 10,000
MoFA 161,000 82,000 25,000 16,000
Survey 30,000 85,000 - -
Proj. trader stocks 270,000 220,000 - -
Industrial stocks 40,000 - - -
Total estimate 310,000 220,000 - -
Source: USDA [2014]; FAO CBS [2014]; MoFA [2014].
Note: Industrial stocks are computed as 1.5 months of
industrial produce.
12The shares are: 11 percent maize, 50 percent imported rice, 25 percent local rice.
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Accordingly, estimates from the survey are well in the range of what is provided by other
sources. Generally, safety stocks are a very important component of the annual carry-over
stocks of maize. Due to the bumper maize crop in 2012, the level of speculative stocks carried
at the end of the marketing year was much higher than in previous years. Therefore, historic
carry-over stocks by USDA may have overestimated actual stocks. Figures provided by FAO
CBS appear more reasonable. For rice, the estimates by FAO CBS seem to underestimate
actual stocks. As elaborated above, USDA is likely to be well informed about the market
situation of importing countries, and thus their estimates can be considered to be close to
reality.
Apart from aggregated storage patterns, it is interesting to see what respondents consider
to be drivers of market prices in Ghana and whether changes of market conditions represent
a risk for their business activity. Figure 5.20 presents the average score for each possible
driver of market prices given by the respondents. Demand and supply patterns stand out
with average scores above three which is associated with a medium risk. On the other side,
international and sub-regional price changes as well as market intervention by NAFCO are
rated to have the lowest impact on market prices. All other factors are assessed to have a
medium impact on prices. Surely, there is heterogeneity among respondents. Most notably,
international prices are rated high among rice traders.
Figure 5.20: Factors that influence market prices (mean of respondents)
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
With respect to risk for stockholding, Figure 5.21 presents average scores. Again, market
activity of NAFCO is rated lowest equivalent to low risk associated with market activity
of NAFCO. In contrast, trade policy changes are the major source of business risk, while
changes in import duties are substantially worse than export regulations. This is in line with
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the finding from chapter four that trade policy unpredictability enhances market volatility.
Thereby, adverse effects of policy unpredictability on investment could be the explanation
for the rise in price instability. Furthermore, an increment of fuel and energy prices that
boost transportation and storage costs is also characterized as high risk. Notably, a bad
harvest is considered to be a medium to high risk for profits, while bumper harvests are
only small to medium risk.
Figure 5.21: Risk for profits from stockholding (mean of respondents)
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
In summary, the responses of the traders are in line with the observed storage behavior.
Respondents attempt to deplete their stocks before the next harvest in anticipation of a price
decline after harvesting. For this reason, bad harvests are riskier than bumper harvests. In
addition to that, an increase in storage costs and uncertainty about policy changes endanger
profits from stockholding.13
5.4.5 Micro results
Aggregated seasonal patterns of storage are quite distinct. On the other hand, the hetero-
geneity among traders with regard to storage motives and strategy is hypothesized in the
literature, but also earlier in this Chapter. Tables 5.22-5.24 depict seasonal variation in
individual stock levels by traders interviewed in the survey.
In contrast to aggregated results, common patterns amongst all traders are difficult to
identify for individual maize stocks. With respect to imported rice, more similarities can
be observed. So, none of the traders for imported rice has depleted stocks entirely in the
13Generally, policy changes are motivated to stabilize/reduce market prices.
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course of the observation period. Furthermore, all traders increased their stocks toward the
end of 2013. Alike maize, for local rice similar patterns are hardly observable, apart from
an increase of stocks in the time between September and December 2013.
From the discussion on storage motives, two distinct types of traders can be identified. First,
distributors and aggregators who hold stocks only to accumulate predetermined quantities to
deliver at predetermined dates. Second, speculators who hold stocks to benefit from seasonal
variation in prices. However, it is difficult to extrapolate on the strategy by looking at the
seasonal variation of stocks only. Besides, a strategy is difficult to deduce from the stocking
trends. A simple approach is to distinguish stock trends into U-shape and reverse U-shape.
For maize and local rice, the reserve U-shape represents the holding of stocks until mid of
2013 which hints at a speculative strategy. A U-shape of stock trend implies purchases in
late 2012 including more or less immediate sales and re-stocking in late 2013. This is a more
likely stocking pattern of an aggregator.
Figure 5.22: Stocks by respondent (white maize)
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
In particular two variables of the questionnaire seem capable of helping to identify the
storage motive. First, the question regarding the best time of stock release. Speculative
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Figure 5.23: Stocks by respondent (imported rice)
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
storage is more likely in case fewer months are considered to be best for releasing. Second,
two related questions that ask the respondents to rate risk and advantages of storage for
more than three months (see Q22a and Q22b in Appendix D). From the difference of Q22b
and Q22a, a respondent’s relative risk-chance ratio from long-term storage can be obtained.
A positive difference indicates respondents see a greater advantage than risk in holding
stocks for a longer period. Table 5.11 summarizes these variables. However, the indicators
do not seem to be related to the shape of the stocking trend.
What drives the difference in stocking strategies? More precisely, what makes a trader a
speculator and what makes him/her an aggregator or long-distance trader. The speculative
storage model presented in chapter three gives some indications what variables influence
the decision to keep stocks for some time. First, the costs to carry commodities from t to
t+ 1. Second, the expected price spread between two points in time. Last, the extension of
the model to risk averse stockholders relates the level of stocks to risk attitudes.
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Figure 5.24: Stocks by respondent (local rice)
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
Table 5.11: Indicators of stocking strategy
U-shape
yes no
U-shape (maize) 9 15
U-shape (rice) 5 3
U-shape (soya) 8 1
chance/risk (mean) 1.58 1.49
% best release months (mean) 0.22 0.20
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
Lets look at the costs of storage first. Most notable are costs of physical storage and dete-
rioration whilst stocking.14 The first is much related to the rent paid for storage facilities.
With respect to costs, the interviews did not provide much information.15 Total cost of
operation can be divided into transportation and storage costs. Then, one would expect
aggregators to have a comparative advantage regarding loading and transportation costs.
14Electricity costs should not deviate much across traders.
15Questions on cost components were included in the questionnaire and removed after pre-testing the
questionnaire in order to cut the time of the interview.
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On the other hand, speculators should face lesser costs in storage activities including cap-
ital. The telephone interview included questions on relative costs as compared to close
competitors in the market (Q3 in Appendix E). However, there is no significant correlation
observable with one of the three strategy variables from above.
Most definitely, risk attitude also plays a prominent role. Stocking commodities over a
longer time period with uncertainty about future prices is more risky than spatial trading
and risk aversion will reduce the level of storage. Conversely, risk lovers are more likely to
take the risk of storage without having full certainty about future prices. Risk attitudes
of wholesale traders have not been subject to extensive discussions in the literature which
mainly focuses on farmers and small-scale traders. An argument against the presence of
risk aversion may be the registration of most trading businesses as Limited Liabilities which
prevents obligees to demand private property of the company owner or manager.
Lastly, price expectations and expected profits influence the decision whether and how much
to store. The competitive storage model is built on the rational expectation hypothesis
[Gustafson, 1958; Muth, 1961]. It implies that market actors utilize all available informa-
tion that are relevant for price formation. All associated errors in prediction are therefore
random. This also means all traders have homogeneous expectations. If this is valid, price
expectations do not cause heterogeneity of storage decisions among traders.
Some studies stress the reaction of traders to new information [Ravallion, 1985; Osborne,
2004]. Ravallion [1985] finds price expectation of traders in Bangladesh to be correlated with
forecasting errors. This implies a systematic under- and overestimation of price changes.
The bias explains suboptimal storage. And heterogeneity in the forecasting bias could
explain different storage strategies.
Alternatively, the forecasting bias can emerge from difficulties to access information on
supply and demand which is often not easily available in developing countries. Therefore,
searching for market information is costly [Aker, 2010]. These costs are most likely to be
subject to variation across traders in compliance with their individual ability to process
information and a trader’s inter-connectivity and inter-linkage with the marketing system.
In his seminal work, Stigler [1961] relates market information gained from search with
price dispersion. He predicts consumers with better information to have a more favorable
distribution of minimum prices which makes them better off. The model has been also
applied to traders in the context of developing countries [Jensen, 2007; Aker, 2010; Tack
and Aker, 2014]. Additional market information through search across markets guarantees
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traders higher revenues. In the model by Tack and Aker [2014], the reservation price is the
threshold value for which additional search is not anymore profitable.16 The model predicts
lower search costs to increase a trader’s investment in search. This lifts the reservation
price, and thus increases profits.
It is possible to transfer this model to a situation in which traders search for prices in
future periods, instead of across markets. In this instance, better market information offers
higher expected prices in t + 1, and thus returns from storage, vis-à-vis baseline market
information. Since inter-temporal arbitrage requires positive returns from storage, a higher
expected price in t + 1 makes storage profitable even for higher price levels in t. Hence,
price information can make a difference in whether arbitrage is profitable or not.17 In this
way, heterogeneous cost of information cause differences in storage patterns across agents.
If the search-costs-hypothesis explains differences in the storage strategy, we would expect
to observe heterogeneity in the knowledgeability or information status across traders. This
was indeed encountered during the survey. About 70 percent of the traders receive price
information from business partners. Less than half of the traders mentioned multiple sources
for price information.18 Yet several traders could not name the main production area of
the products they are trading (see Table 5.12). Similarly, the NAFCO minimum price was
not known to more than half of the traders. The results are surprising as one would a
priori believe traders should possess this information. Certainly, it is also possible that
the information asked for is rather unimportant. More predictive power could be realized
through the evaluation of long term price forecasting.
Table 5.12: Correctness of survey answers
correct wrong or don’t know
main production area: maize 15 10
main production area: soya 8 1
main production area: rice 10 3
NAFCO minimum price: maize 10 13
Source: ZEF-ISSER Trader Survey [2013].
Note: Small deviations are accepted for the NAFCO minimum price.
16Diminishing returns from information search commonly accepted by the literature.
17Again, the level of market information is a function of price information and unobservable search costs.
18Other important sources of information are agricultural information system (22.8 percent) and other
traders and cooperatives (31.4 percent).
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5.5 Discussion and policy implications
Frequent price spikes in consequence of stock-outs are not unusual to many developing
countries. Transitory food insecurity adversely impacts on welfare and can cause income
related health shocks. National food security policies often involve expensive and distortive
price stabilization programs with direct market intervention through purchase and sales
of staple food items. This is not different in Ghana where prices of maize, sorghum, and
millet exhibit large seasonal fluctuations. In contrast, the rice market is more formalized
and dominated by imports and prices are stable throughout the year.
In this chapter, inter-temporal storage behavior of wholesale traders is the subject-matter.
Unlike earlier studies, traders are found to hold the substantial amount grain stocks, es-
pecially towards the end of the marketing year. For all crops but imported rice, most of
these stocks are carried to speculate for the seasonal increase in prices. Other wholesalers
accumulate stocks for sale in large quantities to industrial clients. Due to the likely de-
cline in prices with the incoming harvest in July/August, traders attempt to deplete their
stocks before prices drop. In a bumper crop year this is often not possible, then taking
stocks to the next marketing year is usually associated with losses. Thus, annual carry-over
stocks are kept at minimal. On the contrary to maize and local rice, stocks for imported
rice exhibit less variation throughout the year. These stocks are built up in anticipation of
demand peaks. Apart from trader storage, safety stocks are carried by industrial producers
to guarantee the maintenance of their production even under delivery problems.
An additional finding of the survey is the heterogeneity among traders with regard to their
storage strategy. In other words, individual stocking trends do not show a uniform pattern
across respondents. Several explanations are discussed based on the theory of storage. First,
differences in costs of storage and transportation. Second, the importance of a trader’s
risk attitude implying that risk averse traders prefer not to speculate. Last, the possible
relevance of heterogeneous price information and search costs. Improved price information
may increase purchase prices at which traders still profit from inter-temporal arbitrage [Tack
and Aker, 2014]. The relevance of the explanations given cannot be assessed by the survey
data. However, future research could combine these findings with existing methods that
address and estimate heterogeneity in price expectations [e.g. Chavas, 1999; Frechette and
Weaver, 2001].
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It is not within the scope of the study to give a definite answer why price dynamics are
characterized by strong seasonal variation and occasional price spikes. According to the
narratives of the traders this is much related to the quantity in the system. The price spikes
at the end of the marketing year may be attributed to trader stock-outs induced by the risk
to lose when carrying stocks into the next year. High seasonal price increases often reflect
large real transactions costs that are related to the physical infrastructure and explain price
dispersion across space and time. In particular, storage locations distant to production
markets induce the transport of commodities when filling as well as when releasing stocks
[Barrett, 1996].
Public storage by NAFCO is not likely to significantly impact on market prices which is
also supported by low relevance of their market activities for wholesale trading. Against
this, trade policy regulations negatively affect business activities creating disincentives for
investment [EAT, 2012]. Furthermore, in the past the announcement of minimum farm gate
prices has created wrong incentives for farmers to keep their produce.
This does not imply that there is no room for governmental intervention. But unlike direct
interference in the bargaining process between farmers and traders, methods exist to raise
farm gate prices in a market friendly way. For instance, by providing improved knowledge
about prevailing market prices to strengthen the position of farmers in negotiations with
aggregators and wholesale traders [Svensson and Yanagizawa, 2009; Courtois and Subervie,
2014; Mitra et al., 2015]. Another options is to facilitate direct market access for farmers
in form of physical linkage to assembly markets [Mitra et al., 2015] via infrastructural
investment or the provision of warehouse receipt systems that enable farmers to wait for
seasonal price increases instead of immediate post-harvest sales to realize badly needed
earnings. The relevance of agricultural market institutions to contribute to market stability
is also identified in the cross-country panel regression in the previous chapter.
It appears challenging to effectively mitigate seasonal price variability. In particular, it is
important to bear in mind that seasonal price increases are also necessary to make storage
profitable. Thus, removing seasonality is hardly the solution, given the high costs of storage
and transportation, inter-temporal arbitrage would become unprofitable. More importantly,
public intervention should address price spikes. This could be done by a strategic reserve
without permanent market intervention, a task NAFCO could take up. However, for this
purpose stock levels of the strategic reserve should be increased from the current equivalent
of seven days of consumption to 28 days which is the duration of overseas shipping. The
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possibility and feasibility of regional cooperation in storage is discussed in the next chapter.
Apart from public storage, there may be other ways to create incentives for traders to carry
stocks in the next marketing year and to prevent stock-outs. For instance, the government
could invest in infrastructure and storage facilities close to production areas. By providing a
warehouse receipt system, traders and farmers could store relatively small quantities without
the risk of deterioration. Furthermore, better access to market information and possibility
to hedge trading risk potentially incentivize investments commodity storage. The question
to what extent additional storage, better price information and infrastructure in production
areas could help to reduce price variability is substantive and should be addressed by future
research. Last, models that explicitly account for trader heterogeneity and interaction, like
Grosche and Heckelei [2014], could be extended to integrate possible market intervention
in order to simulate the reaction of the market. This would allow to deduce more specific
policy recommendations.
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Chapter 6
Regional storage cooperation to
enhance food security
6.1 Introduction
Despite widespread skepticism towards public intervention in food markets, many govern-
ments in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere responded to the 2007/2008 global food crisis by
implementing or enhancing public stockholding. These interventions are criticized due to
their distortive effects on private trading and high cost of operation [Newbery and Stiglitz,
1981; Miranda and Helmberger, 1988; Tschirley and Jayne, 2010]. On the other hand,
the crisis also showed that international trade is incapable of dampening supply and price
shocks when exporters insulate their domestic markets from international price development
[Martin and Anderson, 2012; Porteous, 2012].
Child mortality and general food insecurity in West Africa are among the highest in the
world [FAO et al., 2013; von Grebmer et al., 2013]. The region is a major rice importer and
is dependent on these imports to meet food consumption targets. International food aid has
been an important factor to offset fluctuations in national production, but has decreased
rapidly since the middle of the last decade [FAO, 2014]. For these reasons, the ECOWAS
community decided to make plans for a regional emergency reserve.
Regional food reserves are a viable and comparably cheap means, as an alternative to
national reserves [FAO et al., 2011; Wright and Cafiero, 2011]. This is not a new idea.
International risk sharing and multinational insurance schemes were heavily discussed in the
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1970s [Johnson, 1976; Konandreas et al., 1978; Reutlinger et al., 1976]. By the concept of any
insurance, pooling national supplies stabilizes regional food availability due to the imperfect
correlation of national production shocks [Koester, 1986]. However, potential benefits from
cooperation can only be realized when countries agree on a common understanding on
contributions and release policies. This requires all countries to benefit from cooperation
vis-à-vis without cooperation.
Academic literature on regional storage cooperation is scant. Existing studies underline the
potential of risk sharing without explicitly conceptualizing the link to storage. This study
aims at closing the gap by providing a methodology to evaluate potential benefits from
regional storage cooperation. The main objective is to examine whether storage cooperation
could enhance food security in West Africa. Specifically, various possible storage policies
are tested and an efficient load distribution among participating countries is discussed.
Generally, the methodology is applicable to any group of countries and not limited to West
Africa.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. First, section two discusses food
security and storage as well as trade as means to increase food availability and introduces
the concept of regional cooperation. Then, section three makes the reader familiar with
the political and economic environment in West Africa and briefly talks about the proposed
regional emergency reserve. Section four derives optimal levels of storage in the presence
of stochastic supply in order to stabilize national consumption. It also sketches on a way
to assess costs and benefits from cooperation. Results of the study, including sensitivity
analysis, are presented in section five. Section six concludes and discuses policy implications.
6.2 Agricultural intervention and food security
6.2.1 The concept of national food security
Food security is a major driver of development and poverty alleviation and is therefore in
great focus of national and international politics and organizations. There are numerous
definitions of the term food security in the literature. One of the most widely accepted
resulted from the World Food Summit in 1996:
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“Food security [is reached] when all people, at all times, have physical and
economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs
and food preferences for an active and healthy life” [FAO, 1996]
Generally, it is consensus to examine food security with respect to four dimensions: avail-
ability, accessibility, utilization, and stability [e.g. FAO et al., 2013]. In this way, food
security involves not only supply and demand patterns, but also the ability for all people
to access food distribution channels as well as the persistence of an adequate food security
status. In addition, utilization goes beyond food security in form of total caloric quantity
and extends it to all micro-nutrients.
National food security in developing countries focuses mainly on availability and acces-
sibility at moderate prices [Dorosh, 2001; Pinstrup-Anderson, 2009]. Badiane [1988, p.1]
specifies national food security as the “ability of food deficient countries, [...], to meet target
consumption levels on a year-to-year basis”. Similarly, von Braun et al. [1992] argue that
effective food security policy should be designed to ensure sufficient food consumption of
all households without excessive risks. This asks governments to guarantee sufficient food
supply beyond the market demand at prevailing prices.
In the past, food security was often used synonymously to self-sufficiency. This is only
partially correct. Due to climatic and economic conditions and diverse endowment of arable
land, some countries have comparative advantages in producing food as in a classical Ri-
cardian sense. Therefore, imports can be economic and efficient to reach food supply goals.
At national level, food security is measured by total availability vis-à-vis needs [von Braun
et al., 1992; Sijm, 1997]. Total availability is given by production, imports, and carryover
stocks from the previous periods. Against this, demand arises not only from consumption
but also from exports and demand for carryover stocks to the next year. Annual production
is subject to great fluctuation and consequently not sufficient to meet stable consumption
needs in non-exporting economies. Food imports and stocks can offset these fluctuations.
National food security policies must aim at controlling trade flows and incentivizing stock
building.
Several food deficient countries considerably rely on food aid shipment to reach their min-
imum consumption needs. In particular, severe political and economic crises increase the
need of assistance. However, there is serious doubt that food aid can stabilize availability
in an effective manner [Barrett, 2001; del Ninno et al., 2007].
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Adequate food supply is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for accessibility. Ideally,
national agricultural policies involve management of market prices or social safety net pro-
grams that support the most vulnerable when prices are too high. However, agriculture
price policies are distortive and can involve disincentives for producers and traders. Flexi-
ble import duties are an effective measure to control imported quantities and to manipulate
market prices.
6.2.2 Trade integration versus food reserves
In a market economy, private storage is hardly to ban and market forces will always create
an incentive for stock building. So, policy makers are left with the decision to further
enhance consumption stability by trade integration or additional storage through public
reserves. Yet there are reasons to believe that free market stock levels in many developing
countries are not sufficiently high or optimal [Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981; Gilbert, 2011a].
The empirical literature emphasizes the interchangeability of trade and storage to offset
unstable production [Williams and Wright, 1991; Makki et al., 1996, 2001]. Gouel and Jean
[2015] solve the standard rational expectation storage model for a small open economy.
Welfare is highest when governments use an optimal mix of storage and trade, while trade
is particularly effective in mitigating price spikes. Gilbert [2011a] suggests considering a
country’s specific characteristics to determine the right policy. So, exporters can easily
regulate domestic food availability by flexible export quantities. Trade is also advantageous
if supply shocks between countries are independent or negatively correlated [Koester, 1984].
In contrast, importers and countries that switch between net-importer and net-exporter
can successfully insure themselves against high international prices through security stocks.
Lastly, high transportation costs (e.g. for landlocked countries) and/or long periods of
shipment make public reserves favorable to trade.
In reality, countries use both reserves and trade with varying degree of success. Broadly, two
types of reserves can be distinguished: first, emergency and strategic reserves, and second,
buffer stocks. The former is established to overcome food supply shortfalls as consequence
of weather related shocks such as droughts or floods, pests, and political instability. In
the event of a crisis, additional food is brought into the system via targeted food subsidies
(e.g. food stamps, food-for-work, school feeding programs etc.) [Lynton-Evans, 1997]. In
contrast, buffer stocks operate to generally stabilize commodity prices at both ends of the
distribution. In doing so, public institutions buy and sell in order to increase market supply
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or demand. The objective of the buffer stock is to keep prices within a band of predetermined
floor and ceiling prices [Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981]. Purchases and sales can be realized
in the open market, but also through contract farming and subsidized sales to public and
private entities. The main danger persists in the need to operate permanently which implies
to intervene in markets permanently. Intervention levels of existing national reserves and
buffer stocks do vary significantly.1
Similarly to public storage, trade is extensively used to stabilize food supply and commodity
prices. In fact, worldwide countries heavily rely on food imports to meet national consump-
tion demand. Indeed, these countries would be plunged into deep hunger crises without
trade. Trade policies are effectively used by many countries, in particular in Asia, to buffer
price volatility [Thomas, 2006; Dorosh, 2008]. Bezuneh and Yiheyis [2009] provide empirical
evidence on the positive impact of trade liberalization on food security for developing coun-
tries. This is in line with the findings from chapter four. Notably, purchases at international
markets require sufficient foreign reserves by importers to settle the food import bill.
Yet trade can also transmit market instability from partner countries into domestic markets
[Makki et al., 2001]. Reliance on imports to manage food availability can be problematic
when partner countries are non-cooperative and restrict exports at times [Gouel and Jean,
2015]. This was observed during the price surges in 2007/2008 [Martin and Anderson, 2012;
Porteous, 2012]. Public storage also involves major shortcomings. First, stockholding is
expensive and buffer operation tie up fiscal resources that could be used for other policies.
Second, and more importantly, public interventions cause market distortions provoking re-
sponses by private market participants [Miranda and Helmberger, 1988; Tschirley and Jayne,
2010].
6.2.3 Aims and scope of a multinational reserve
The idea of a regional response to increasing international market volatility rests on the
possibility of cost sharing and capability of timely intervention [Wright and Cafiero, 2011;
FAO et al., 2011]. Wright and Cafiero [2011] discuss the role of regional reserve to increase
a country’s commitment to refrain from export regulation in times of a food crisis. These
1Agricultural markets in India, Zambia, and Indonesia are dominated by stated owned enterprises that
buy, stock, and sell a very large share of marketed grains. As opposed to this, several countries maintain
public stockholding that is unlikely to affect market prices due to its small size. In an ideal world, buffer
stocks should be large enough to influence prices, but small enough to not crowd out private investment
and to distort markets.
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commitments seem unfeasible under the common WTO discipline. At the same time, gov-
ernments dispose of ways to impede exportation through over-bureaucratizing of the legal
process. Hence, it is more conceivable to combine storage and trade cooperation. In doing
so, participating countries provide a share of their production to be exported (if harvests are
sufficiently high) and receive the entitlement to receive stock releases at periods of crisis in
return. Furthermore, an independent multinational institution is granted higher reputation
than national food agencies in pursuing its goals.
The main function of the reserve is to provide additional supply in an emergency or abnormal
market situation. The emergency situation is to be defined by the member countries or the
respective body that is leading the operations of the reserve. Storage cooperation requires
an agreement on strict rules with respect to a country’s contribution and entitlement to
receive releases from the stock. The trigger will play a key role to the success of the reserve.
In buffer stock regimes, stock releases occur when prices exceed a threshold level. In line
with this, stock building is undertaken when market prices fall below the floor price. Unlike
buffer rules, rules for interventions are less obvious for security stocks. Generally, it is also
possible to link release policy to market prices. Alternatively, scholars and policy makers
propose to use a mix between international and local triggers. At the international level, the
excessive food price variability early warning system by IFPRI detects periods of excessive
volatility in the US futures markets [Martins-Filho et al., 2012].2. At the local level, early
warning systems like the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), WFP’s Humanitarian
Early Warning Service, and FAO’s Global Famine Early Warning System (GIEWS) collect
more in depth information from the field such as rainfall and temperature patterns, local
supply and demand, and commodity prices.3
A multinational reserve involving a buffer stock scheme, with market purchase and release,
seems very challenging to realize. If the regional reserve operates at national levels sep-
arately, trade between countries undermines the principles of operation and can lead to
complete inefficacy. On the contrary, if the region is considered as one market, intervention
prices are extremely difficult to determine since price levels naturally differ among mem-
ber countries, especially without a common currency. Therefore, strategic humanitarian
reserves should be preferred. Their optimal level is often targeted on the basis of con-
sumption requirements of the (vulnerable) population. Accordingly, most commonly used
2http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/policy-analysis-tools/excessive-food-price-variability
-early-warning-system
3http://www.fao.org/giews/food-prices/en/, http://www.hewsweb.org/hp/, and http://www.fews.n
et/.
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are figures between 17-18 percent of annual consumption needs (FAO benchmark) and 25
percent (equivalent to 90 days) [Lynton-Evans, 1997].4 In response to the world food crisis
in 2007/2008, von Braun and Torero [2009] advocate a small physical reserve (e.g. 30 days
of consumption requirements) in combination with a virtual reserve that holds options to
purchase grains at predetermined prices. Alternatively, Briones [2011] proposes to adjust
stock levels to historic food gaps (peak deficit minus usual import requirement). In this way,
a regional approach to food reserves would benefit from risk pooling in case national supply
levels are not perfectly correlated. In consequence, reserves carried could be significantly
lower.
From a functional perspective, it seems also plausible to concentrate on few major com-
modities in order to limit operational costs and to make use of stabilizing effects of cross
price transmission [Alderman, 1993]. Moreover, common food stocks need to be located at
strategic points that are easily accessible for all member countries. At first, the location
of stocks will be dictated by main production areas and existing available storage facilities
[Lynton-Evans, 1997]. Furthermore, new reserve locations should be set up in accordance
with existing road and railway networks that minimize transportation costs to food deficit
regions.
6.2.4 Experience from existing regional reserves
The idea of international risk sharing and multilateral commodity agreements is far from
new. As early as in 1933 and again in the post-war period, major exporting countries agreed
on cooperation to ensure stable supply in the International Wheat Agreement (IWA). After
the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
negotiations became increasingly political and the focus moved to tropical commodities
(coffee, tin, rubber) [Gilbert, 2011b]. After the global food crisis in the 1970s, the idea of
regional and international grain reserves was widely discussed [Johnson, 1976; Konandreas
et al., 1978; Reutlinger et al., 1976]. In the wake of the 1974 World Food Conference, WFP
was endowed with 500,000 metric tons of grain to distribute in food crises situations [Shaw,
2007]. Over the last decades, the role of WFP has been enlarged.
4For more details, see Briones [2011].
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Enhanced regional trade and market integration in the following decades benefited attempts
to regional food policy cooperation. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) is the most prominent and successful model for regional integration.5
Economic and political integration was always less advanced in Africa and Asia including
some notable exemptions. Since 1988 the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) has maintained an emergency reserve that has been expanded from 200,000 to
480,000 metric tons of rice in 2012 [Prasad Pant, 2014].6 In addition, member countries
made efforts to enhance harmonization of trade and taxation policies.7
The ASEAN Emergency Rice Reserve (AERR) was established by Southeast Asian countries
in 1979.8 The objective is to hold regional stocks complementary to national buffer stocks
and reserves. In 2011, China, Japan, and Republic of Korea joined the initiative that
morphed into the ASEAN Plus Three Emergency Rice Reserve (APTERR). Total earmarked
stocks are enlarged to 787,000 metric tons, while the bulk of contributions comes from
China, Japan, and Korea. Earmarked reserves maintain under national control but are
legally owned by the community [APTERR, 2014]. Decisions on stock releases are made by
the APTERR Council. In an emergency situation, national governments request the release
of stocks which needs to be cleared by the Council [Briones, 2011]. Before 2011, the AERR
reserve has not been in operation as countries preferred to seek at help from international
donors directly [Lines, 2011].
Nevertheless, several countries operate their own national stabilization programs including
the maintenance of large stocks (China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, In-
donesia). In fact, China and India are unlikely to participate in regional arrangements with
the intention to benefit from releases. The regional stock level is just too small to have
any impact on these enormous economies. Instead, they rather provide assistance to their
smaller neighbors [Torero and von Braun, 2010]. Therefore, regional reserves in Asia are a
promising attempt to multilateral food assistance and south-south cooperation, but do not
serve as an example for regional risk sharing.
In contrast to Asian countries, regional policy initiatives with respect to food security in
Africa have not yielded into a common food reserve. Among these regional organizations the
5Food security has been achieved through rigorous production subsidization, market liberalization, and
risk sharing through welfare transfers [Koester, 1986]. However, a common food reserve was never created.
6SAARC members are India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldive Islands, and
Afghanistan.
7http://www.saarc-sec.org/Agreements/69/.
8AERR members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
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Southern African Development Community (SADC) is the most advanced one. The imple-
mentation of a regional grain reserve was planned multiple times, but never realized [Maun-
der, 2013]. At the same time, agricultural products can move freely, a common external tariff
was implemented, and a regional food security early warning system established.9 Against
this, attempts towards a regional reserve of the Intergovernmental Authority on Drought
and Development (IGADD), Inter-State Committee on Drought in the Sahel (CILSS), and
in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region never advanced from a planning stage
and are limited to scientific cooperation.
6.3 Institutional environment and the PREPARE initiative
The methodology applied in this work is indeed applicable to any group of countries. Here,
West Africa is selected as a case since the proposal for policy cooperation is part of the
current political agenda. The region also accommodates a number of severely food insecure
countries, namely Liberia, Sierra Leone, Niger, and in particular Chad [von Grebmer et al.,
2013]. Moreover, West Africa as a region is the largest importer of rice and has been
particularly affected by transmission of international price levels and volatility to domestic
markets [Aker et al., 2011; Kornher and Kalkuhl, 2013; Kalkuhl, 2014]. This section serves
to introduce the current institutional environment and the PREPARE initiative for common
regional stockholding to the reader.
Regional economic and political integration in Africa is puzzling, but more distinct in West
Africa as compared to other regions [Keane et al., 2010].10 It is dominated by two major po-
litical and economic communities. On the one hand, ECOWAS which is the most populous
economic zone in Africa and was founded in 1975 to promote economic and political inte-
gration in “all fields”. On the other hand, the West African Economic and Monetary Union
(UMEAO) originally formed for former French colonies.11 The ECOWAS treaty is the heart
of agreement between the member states. It specifies the ECOWAS Trade Liberalisation
Scheme (ETLS) that guarantees movement of goods and services between member coun-
tries free of duties. This includes both import and export duties as well as non-tariff trade
9http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/.
10In Central Africa several competing communities exist without strong economic integration. Cameroon
and Chad are geographically in West Africa but not part of ECOWAS. Mauritania left ECOWAS in 2011.
Here, they are counted as potential member countries of a regional reserve.
11UMEAO members are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo.
Chad and Cameroon are not part of the UMEAO but of the Economic Community of Central African
States (CEMAC). Both CEMAC and UMEAO shares the CFA that is pegged to the Euro.
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barriers (NTB). In addition to that, all ECOWAS countries joined the UEMOA Common
External Tariff (CET) in 2006 which is not implemented in all countries, yet.
Table 6.1: Share of intra-regional grain trade in West Africa
share of regional trade in total grain trade
imports exports imports+exports
Benin 0.87% 100% 55.88%
Burkina Faso 1.14% 100% 8.32%
Cameroon 0.00% 51.09% 0.11%
Cape Verde 5.09% 100% 5.12%
Chad n.a. n.a. n.a.
Cote d’Ivoire 0.03% 100% 8.32%
Gambia, the 0.09% 100% 1.14%
Ghana 0.64% 97.5% 1.56%
Guinea n.a. n.a. n.a.
Guinea-Bissau n.a. n.a. n.a.
Liberia n.a. n.a. n.a.
Mali 4.28% 94.74% 6.25%
Mauritania 3.19% n.a. n.a.
Niger 12.29% 1.09% 11.17%
Nigeria 0.0% n.a. n.a.
Senegal 0.02% 82.73% 5.52%
Sierra Leone n.a. n.a. n.a.
Togo 1.08% 100% 9.5%
Source: Author’s calculation based on UN Comtrade [2014]
Note: Average of 2010-2013 is used when available. Benin’s
large share of exports is likely to be explained by re-exports to
Nigeria.
In official statistics the reality in West Africa indeed is different and intra-regional trade
seems limited (see Table 6.1). Column one presents the share of grain imports originated
from the region. So, only 0.64 percent of Ghana’s grain imports come from other West
African countries. In contrast, grain exports go predominantly to the region (except for
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Niger and Cameroon that share border with non West African countries). It also becomes
apparent that imports account for the majority of trade and regional trade alone cannot
compensate for supply shocks.12 However, there are serious doubts in the precision of official
statistics. A survey on intra-regional grain trade from 2012 finds a significant understate-
ment of regional cross-border trade.13 Informal trade is encouraged through high informal
costs at border crossing [Josserand, 2013].14 Chambers et al. [2012] list within-ECOWAS
NTBs by member countries in recent years. NTBs span from seasonal trade restrictions to
unofficial ad hoc violations of the ETLS by customs officers. Furthermore, they note un-
awareness of private traders about the actual scope of the free trade arrangement. Similarly,
the USAID Agricultural Trade Promotion (ATP) project is concerned with high unofficial
costs of cross border (but also within country) transportation [e.g. Annequin and Eshun,
2010]. External tariffs for rice remain divergent being highest in Ghana and Nigeria and
lowest in UMEAO countries and Gambia [de Roquefeuil et al., 2014]. This results into cross
border smuggling via Cote d’Ivoire and Benin.
Traditionally, West Africa is a main recipient of international food aid. However, the amount
has been significantly reduced after 2006 [FAO, 2014]. In the wake of the global food crisis
in 2007/2008, the idea of a regional food reserve in West Africa was pushed on with by
ECOWAS, which sees regional food security as one of its primary objectives. The RESO-
GEST approach intends to strengthen cooperation and solidarity among member countries
to mitigate food crisis effectively.15 In 2011, the G20 decided to support this initiative finan-
cially as a pilot program with the aim to replicate a successful project to other food deficient
regions.16 The idea of the G20 contains an independent multinational body (e.g. WFP)
that manages the reserves and releases stocks according to monitored triggers. In contrast,
the regional food security strategy is built upon a triad of local, national, and regional
stocks and aims at embedding regional stocks into national organizations and structures
that manage national reserves. According to the proposal [ECOWAS Commission et al.,
2012], only 33 percent of the required stocks are covered by the regional reserve of which
only 33 percent are physical stocks. The level of required stocks is computed as a portion of
a country’s total annual needs. Stocks shall cover enough to compensate affected people nt
12This can be seen by the small share of total trade (imports+exports) with the region which is closer to
the share of imports than to the share of exports to the region.
13Arbitrage opportunities through different currencies and flexible exchange rate are a major driver of
cross-border trade.
14Formerly, informal trade was stimulated by the inconvertibility of several currencies in the region which
were traded in parallel markets [e.g. Azam, 1991; Shively, 1996].
15http://www.westafricagateway.org/topic/regional-food-reserve.
16http://www.foodsecurityportal.org/g20-lends-support-international-emergency-food-reserve
-system?print.
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for shocks arising from natural disaster or international food price hikes over the period from
2000 to 2012.17 Regional stock needs are derived from the sum of affected people in each
country i. Finally, the number of affected people is multiplied by their annual requirement
as of WFP norm (12× 15kg per month). Expressed in an equation:
annual needs = (
I∑
i=1
(max
t
[nti], t ∈ [2000, 2012])× 15kg× 12 (months) (6.1)
It yields total regional stocks between 20 and 26 percent of total annual needs over all
member countries.18 In general, estimating reserve needs on the basis of the vulnerable
population is plausible. However, targeted distribution of grains out of the reserve requires
readiness for policy responses [Grosh et al., 2011; Tiba, 2011]. Grosh et al. [2011] list
important criteria for timely national crisis responses including existing safety net programs,
administrative capacity, and a viable targeting mechanism. There is legitimate doubt in the
capacity of West African countries to satisfy these requirements. During the 2007/2008 food
crisis, only Burkina Faso and Liberia were able to mitigate adverse impacts through safety
net intervention [Demeke et al., 2009]. Besides, the existing national reserve programs do
not have sufficient coverage.
All in all, West Africa is politically well integrated with structures in place that could
facilitate regional cooperation. Intra-regional trade flows appear to be too low to let trade
alone equilibrate national production shocks. Moreover, international food aid is decreasing
and stockholding enhances regional autonomy. The PREPARE proposal includes reserve
levels based on short-term needs of the vulnerable population. Thereby, stocks are carried
for an emergency situation in which a shock hits all member countries at the same time.
Thus, stock levels would be precisely the same for individual countries without regional
storage cooperation. In fact, supply shocks are unlikely to be perfectly correlated. On this
account, storage cooperation can reduce the costs of operation. Given the current policy
proposal, an assessment of costs and benefits from cooperation contributes significantly to
the political debate.
17For most countries the 2008 or 2012 food crisis was the most drastic shock.
18The percentage of annual needs is derived from the expected duration for intervention of the international
community or requested imports. This is 1.5 months to two months for coastal countries and three to four
months for landlocked countries.
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6.4 Assessment of costs and benefits from cooperation
6.4.1 Optimal stocks and stocking rule
The crunch question is: What is the optimal level of stocks? Gardner [1979] argues that
there is no such thing as an optimal stock level. This means, in the retrospect, there was
always a better choice for the level of stocks carried from one year to the next.19 On
the other hand, stocks can be chosen optimally conditional on the uncertain distribution
of future prices. Thus, an optimal storage rule defines the optimal carry-over from year
to year given storage is profitable. First and foremost, the optimal stock level depends
on the criterion of desirability (e.g. maximize social welfare function) or directly on the
outcome variable to stabilize [e.g. Goletti et al., 1991]. There are two obvious choices:
consumption and prices. The first is easier to derive without the conjecture of specific
functional relationships of the variables. Limiting food security issues to consumption risk
may be too short-sighted. Cereal consumption could remain stable at higher price levels at
the costs of reducing consumption of other foodstuffs, medical services, investments, and
alike [von Braun and Tadesse, 2012].
Most of the literature on optimal price stability evaluates different levels of stability with
respect to the sum of Marshallian surplus of producers and consumers [e.g. Gouel and
Jean, 2015]. A major simplification can be achieved if storage costs and the probability
distribution of output are assumed to be constant in all years. In this instance, the optimal
storage is identical in each year [Gustafson, 1958] and equals:20
St = θ(St−1, Qt) (6.2)
where St−1 and St are beginning and ending stocks in t and Qt production in t; θ is a function that describes
the storage rule.
19Example: two subsequent bumper crops. Ideally, nothing should have been stocked after the first
bumper crop in order to stabilize prices over the two periods. However, in expectation of a normal crop in
the second period, it was optimal to stock the excess supply leading to medium prices in the first year and
very low prices in the subsequent year.
20A mathematical illustration of problem and solution is lengthy and complicated and can be found in
Gustafson [1958]; Newbery and Stiglitz [1981]; Williams and Wright [1991].
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Accordingly, the storage rule is a function that relates ending stocks to total supply in a
given period (t). There is no closed form solution for (6.2) with rational expectations and
the model can be solved numerically only using iterative approximations. As shown by
Gustafson [1958], the exact storage rule can be well approximated by a piecewise linear
function. The resulting optimal stock level depends on the shape of the demand function
and the costs of storage. Furthermore, social optimal stocks are increasing in total output
levels and production variability. In other words, for a country with higher production
variability, the optimal carry-over level is higher than for a country with lower production
variability. This will be of great significance to the realization of benefits from cooperation.
Modeling of storage in the standard rational expectations framework becomes increasingly
complicated the more countries are involved. In order to conceptualize costs and benefits
under storage cooperation, standard identity equations are sufficient without including price
responses. For this reason, here it is preferred to stay with a simpler approach and to
concentrate on consumption stabilization as welfare criterion.
6.4.2 Conceptualizing costs and benefits of cooperation
Conceptualizing costs and benefits from cooperation is crucial to illustrate the incentives for
countries to join a common regional reserve. Countries will only join the reserve if benefits
from cooperation exceed the costs.
The gains from cooperation rest on the concept of risk pooling. Risk pooling or diversifi-
cation originates from the insurance and finance literature and is the business concept of
every insurance company. Pooling uncertain outcomes of multiple individuals reduces the
volatility of their joint outcome. Expected losses remain the same, but insurance compa-
nies can reduce accrued liabilities if (and only if) losses of policyholders are not perfectly
correlated. On the same account, risk sharing among countries can reduce the likelihood of
joint losses. Table 6.2 provides a simple example. Assuming that countries A and B insure
themselves against a shortfall from their expected profits (E[pi]), they will be required to
put a total of 20 aside. In case they share the risk, their joint expected shortfall is 10 and
the countries together would need to put only 10 aside because individual shortfalls are
independent. Storage cooperation works exactly in this manner.
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Table 6.2: Risk pooling and insurance
state 1 state 2 state 3 E[pi] shortfall
Country A 110 100 90 100 10
Country B 60 40 50 50 10
Combined 170 140 140 150 10
Source: Adapted from Koester [1984].
Expressed in statistical terms, the key issue is the co-variance of risks among countries. If
shocks are idiosyncratic, then risk sharing is feasible. On the contrary, if shocks are highly
correlated, benefits from risk sharing will be small [Townsend, 1995]. In his pioneering con-
tribution Koester [1986] analyzes benefits from cooperation for southern African countries.
Following his approach, the variance of production in a region is given by:
VAR(
n∑
1
QT ) =
n∑
1
VAR(Qi) + 2
n∑
i
n∑
i+1
COV(Qi, Qi+1) (6.3)
VAR(
n∑
1
QT ) =
n∑
1
VAR(Qi) + 2
n∑
i
n∑
i+1
ri,i+1
√
VAR(Qi)VAR(Qi+1) (6.4)
where VAR(
∑n
1 Q
T ) is the variance of production in the region that is formed with i=1,...,n countries,
VAR(Qi)) variance in production in country i, COV(Qi, Qi+1) the covariance between country i and j, and
ri,i+1 the coefficient of correlation between deviations from trend production of country i and i+ 1.
Then, the coefficient of variation of production can be written as:
CV2(
n∑
1
Qi) =
n∑
1
s2iCV(Qi) + 2
n∑
i
n∑
i+1
sisi+1ri,i+1CV(Qi)CV(Qi+1) (6.5)
where si, is a country’s share in regional production.
From this, it is possible to conclude that production instability in the region is lower if na-
tional production in cooperating countries is independent or negatively correlated [Koester,
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1984]. Since production variability is the reason why stocks are required, smaller production
variability implies lower stocks. In consequence, the costs of public intervention diminish.
Against this, heterogeneity between countries explains disagreements about common re-
gional policies. In regional integration, states hand over voluntarily decision making power
to supernational entities and create a political power that overrules national policies [Heinonen,
2006]. Countries with similar economic structure lose less in comparison with countries with
deviant structures [Alesina et al., 2005]. For instance, only those countries with a common
business cycle profit from common counter cyclical policies.
Let public storage be rationalized by a social welfare function that values consumption
stability, but negatively accounts for the cost of carrying stocks. Without losing generality,
utility is given by:
U = H(VAR(C(α)))−G(α) (6.6)
where H is a function decreasing in consumption variability (Var(C)) and G, the costs of interventions that
increase with the stock-to-use ratio α; α ∈ (0, 1) reduces consumption variability, and thus increases H in
the following manner H ′(α) > 0 and H ′′(α) < 0.
A government chooses the optimal policy involvement (α) in order to maximize social welfare
given by (6.6). Accordingly, there is a clear trade-off when increasing the level of intervention
(α). On the one hand, higher consumption stability will increase welfare. On the other hand,
budgetary costs reduce welfare. This framework is necessary to evaluate net benefits from
joining regional storage cooperation for each member country.
The optimal α maximizes welfare in autarky. In contrast, in case of storage cooperation,
the level of consumption variability is not anymore determined by the individual country
through welfare optimization, but a common decision among all member countries. Ap-
plying a game theoretical approach, the median voter decides on the level of consumption
stability for all members countries [Alesina et al., 2005].
In order to assess costs and benefits from regional cooperation, consumption variability and
reserve levels are compared under regional cooperation vis-à-vis without cooperation. In
other words, a hypothetical food reserve is simulated for each individual country and for
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specific groups of countries. Under cooperation, countries benefit from risk sharing, and thus
reduced costs of intervention for a given level of consumption variability. On the other hand,
the level of consumption stabilization which determines the actual costs of intervention, is
set by the union and may be different from the optimal level for the individual country. The
net benefits (Ni) for each country are given by:
Ni = Hi(VAR(Cˆi))−Hi(VAR(C∗i )) +Gi(α∗i )−Gi(αˆi) (6.7)
where VAR(C∗i ) is consumption variability resulting from an optimal α∗i for an individual country without
cooperation or the optimal level of target consumption chosen by the country. Analog, VAR(Cˆi) is con-
sumption variability under cooperation determined by αi which is jointly selected by the member countries.
So it is to note, that αi are the same for all member countries. In the stabilization reserve, VAR(Cˆi) is also
the same for each member country.
There are four possible outcomes as a result of storage cooperation (summarized in the Box
2. Without specifying the functions H and G, in two instances the welfare impact is certain.
Yet in the two remaining cases a specific functional form of H and G is required to assess
costs and benefits.
Box 2: Possible welfare effects of cooperation:
1. VARC∗i > VARCˆi & α
∗
i > αˆi +
2. VARC∗i > VARCˆi & α
∗
i < αˆi ?
3. VARC∗i < VARCˆi & α
∗
i > αˆi -
4. VARC∗i < VARCˆi & α
∗
i < αˆi ?
In words, if consumption variability and costs of intervention are both lower under coop-
eration, then countries unambiguously gain from cooperation. In contrast, if consumption
variability is larger and costs of intervention are higher, then cooperation is associated with
losses.
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6.4.3 Stocking norms
The cost-benefit framework introduced requires the definition of optimal stocking norms or
stock-to-use ratios that are applied by each country. This implies stocks need to be suf-
ficiently high to cover stock releases to achieve the desired level of consumption stability.
At the same, the release policy from the reserve must be strictly defined. Within regional
storage cooperation, the member countries must endow the regional reserve through contri-
butions. These contributions could be proportionally equal. In this case, all countries have
identical stock-to-use ratios. Alternatively, Koester [1986] proposes to organize contribu-
tions according to a country’s individual stock needs. In doing so, countries with greater
supply instability are asked to contribute relatively more than countries with stable supply.
Again, the releases from the reserve must make sure that the desired consumption stability
is given for each member country. This means, whenever supply falls short of its target
level (specified in the rules of the reserve), countries receive stocks from the regional reserve
to guarantee national consumption. As opposed to this, if domestic supply is sufficiently
high in a particular year, countries do not receive anything from the regional reserve. In
this analysis, two possible reserves are considered. First, an emergency reserve that releases
stocks whenever supply falls short of a predetermined level. And second, a buffer stock
which stabilizes supply in both directions.21
6.4.3.1 Emergency reserve
In line with the existing literature, the optimal reserve level shall absorb historic production
shocks by a predetermined probability or margin [Johnson, 1976; Konandreas et al., 1978;
Koester, 1986]. Let the market identity for country be given by:
Ct = Qt + IMt − EXt (6.8)
Ct = Xt (6.9)
where total consumption (Ct) equals production (Qt) plus imports (IMt) minus exports (EXt). Imports and
exports are assumed to be from international markets only. National production and net imports constitute
total national supply (Xt).
21This implies stocks are built up when supply is over high and released when supply is low.
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In case production falls short of a desired level of minimum consumption can be achieved
through additional imports. However, the experience, not only from West Africa, shows
availability varies drastically from year to year despite food imports. There may be multiple
explanations, some of them are noted above. Furthermore, international prices fluctuate
and make the food import bill unpredictable [Sarris et al., 2011]. In such a situation, the
emergency reserve steps in to lift consumption to the desired minimum level. Following
Konandreas et al. [1978], the desired minimum level is referred to as target consumption
level c∗ (e.g. 95 percent of long-term trend). Then, consumption in a given year is:
Ct = max[Xt, c
∗E[Ct]] (6.10)
where Xt, is actual supply in t and c∗E[Ct] is the target consumption based on expected supply that is
calculated from historical values. By definition c∗ ∈ [0, 1].
In words, when national supply is higher than the target level, consumption just equals
total supply. In contrast, whenever supply is lower than the target level, the reserve releases
whatever is necessary to close the gap to satisfy at least c∗× 100 percent of the expected
consumption. In expectation, consumption always equals supply. In order to satisfy (6.10),
stocks need to compensate for supply shortfalls of more than (1− c)× 100 percent. This is
defined as the stocking norms for each country. Subsequently, the ratio of consumption to
be stored (α) is defined as the ratio between stocks and expected consumption:
S∗tn = maxt [0, c
∗E[Xt]− (Xt)] for t = t1, .., tn (6.11)
α∗tn =
S∗tn
E[Ctn ]
(6.12)
where maxt[c∗E[Xt] − (Xt)] is the largest historic shortfall in supply over the period t1 to tn. If supply
never falls below c∗E[Xt], no stocks shall be carried. α∗ is the optimal stock-to-use ratio at present time.
Accordingly, the individual national reserves carry total regional stocks which are the sum
of national stocks:
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SR,tn =
∑
i
S∗i,tn =
I∑
i
max
t
[0, c∗E[Xt]− (Xt)] for t = t1, .., tn (6.13)
where SR are regional stocks and all other parameters are described as above.
In regional cooperation, the reserve must carry sufficiently large stocks to satisfy the sum
of supply shortfalls in all member countries, so that regional consumption is given by:
CˆR,t =
I∑
i
Ci,t (6.14)
where Cˆt is regional consumption which is the sum of the consumption in each of the I member country
given by (6.10).
If national supply shortfalls are not perfectly correlated, then the common regional reserve
must carry only:
SˆR,tn = max
t
[
I∑
i
max[0, (cˆE[Xi,t]− (Xi,t))] for t = t1, .., tn (6.15)
where maxt[
∑I
i (cˆE[Xi,t]− (Xi,t))] is the largest historic shortfall in the region within the period from t1 to
tn. cˆ is the consumption target under regional cooperation which does not vary across country i. If supply
never falls below cˆE[Xt], no stocks shall be carried.
The regional reserve shall be endowed with stocks by contributions from its member coun-
tries. Then, the regional stocking norm is:
Sˆi,t = si,tSˆR,t = αˆE[Xi,t] (6.16)
with αˆ =
SˆR
E[CR,t]
(6.17)
S˜i,t =
S∗i,t∑I
i S
∗
i,t
SˆR,t (6.18)
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where si is a country’s share in regional consumption; Sˆi and S˜i are national contributions to the regional
reserve under equal and relative contributions. Under equal contributions all countries have the same stock-
to-use ratio αˆ. Under relative contributions α˜i varies across countries by the extent to which national stocks
vary across countries without regional cooperation. Be reminded: E[CR,t] =
∑I
i E[Xi,t]; SˆR,t and S˜R,t are
the same.
However, it is also possible to combine regional storage cooperation with intra-regional trade
cooperation. For instance, it is conceivable to assume that supply surpluses are exported to
the region. Hence, supply shortfalls in neighboring countries can be balances through trade
first, before the regional reserve releases stocks. Storage cooperation could also increase the
commitment to such arrangements [Wright and Cafiero, 2011].
A reasonable assumption may be to approve a country’s excess surplus (ESit = Xit−E[Xit])
for export. Thus, intra-regional trade and regional stocking norms are given by:
TR,t =
I∑
i
max[0, Xit − E[Xit]] (6.19)
SR,tn = max
t
[
I∑
i
(cˆE[Xi, t]− (Xi, t))− TR,t] for t = t1, .., tn (6.20)
where TR,t is the total quantity traded within the region in a particular year which is computed as the sum
of excess surpluses over all member countries. Regional trade reduces regional stocks which are necessary to
balance supply shocks. Therefore, historic shortfalls to be balanced diminish by the amount of intra-regional
trade. Contributions of member countries and stock-to-use ratios can be computed analogous to the case
without intra-regional trade which are presented in (6.16) to (6.18).
6.4.3.2 Stabilization reserve
As opposed to the emergency reserve described in the previous section, the stabilization
reserve is derived from the classical storage literature [Gustafson, 1958]. This implies that
stocks are part of national supply and demand. In each year a constant portion (γ) of total
available supply is stocked in, which is a linear approximation of Gustafson’s pioneering
stocking rule. In this way, stocks change over time. After years with good harvests, stocks
are higher and lower after bad harvests. In doing so, the market identity from above (6.9),
changes to:22
22This model has been developed with Matthias Kalkuhl.
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Ct = Xt −∆St (6.21)
∆St = St+1 − St (6.22)
St+1 = γ(St +Xt) (6.23)
where all parameters are the same as above. St are the opening stocks available for consumption in t and
St+1 are the stocks carried to the next period. ∆St is the change in ending stocks from t− 1 to t. γ is the
constant portion of total available supply that is carried to the next period.
Inserting (6.23) in (6.22) allows to write consumption as:23
Ct = (1− γ)(Xt) + (1− γ)St (6.24)
Since supply naturally fluctuates, we want to know the expected level of stocks. This can
be easily derived since E[St] = E[St+1].24 Thus,
S∗t =
γE[Xt]
(1− γ) (6.25)
α∗ =
γ
(1− γ) (6.26)
where S∗t is the optimal stock level and α∗ the corresponding optimal stock-to-use ratio.
The objective of the stabilization reserve is to stabilize consumption. Hence, eventually
the interest is to see how consumption variability depends on the stocking parameter (γ).
Taking the variance of (6.24) yields:
VAR C =
(1− γ)
(1 + γ)
VAR (X) (6.27)
23For an analytical derivation: see Appendix F.
24This requires supply to be stationary.
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CV C =
√
(1− γ)
(1 + γ)
CV (X) (6.28)
where VAR (C) and VAR (X) are variance of consumption and supply; CV (C) and CV (X) are the re-
spective coefficients of variation.
Consequently, consumption variability is a function of variability in supply (production plus
international imports) and the stocking parameter (γ). The larger the supply variability, the
larger is consumption variability. On the contrary, increasing γ stabilizes consumption. It is
important to note, the stabilization reserve under regional storage cooperation works only
if markets are fully integrated and demand and supply adjust perfectly between countries.
In this case, regional supply and consumption variability is equal to national supply and
consumption variability for each individual member country.
6.5 Results for West Africa
6.5.1 Supply patterns
Table 6.3 provides economic and agricultural statistics on West African countries involved in
this analysis. Heterogeneity between countries exists with respect to income level and food
security status. While Ghana and Cape Verde have relatively low prevalence of hunger and
malnutrition, still 12 percent of the total population are undernourished with alarmingly
high figures in the Sahel zone. With the exemption of Mali and to some extent Burkina
Faso, all countries depend on imports to guarantee sufficient supply of grain. In general, it is
observed that coastal countries have larger import-to-production ratios with a ratio above
one in Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Senegal, and Mauritania. Overall Nigeria’s
prominent role in the region is to note. Due to its population, more than 40 percent of
regional production originates from Nigeria, and thus the country would take a leading role
in any regional cooperation agreement.
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Table 6.3: Key statistics: ECOWAS
population
(in 100,000)
GDP per
capita PPP
% of under-
nourished+
total
production
(in 1,000 mt)
import/pro-
duction (in
%)
Benin 10,323 1,791 8.1 1,667 21
Burkina Faso 16,934 1,634 25.9 4,949 9
Cape Verde 498 6,412 - 7 2.86
Cote d’Ivoire 20,316 3,012 21.4 1,276 116
Gambia, The 1,849 1,666 14.4 214 58
Ghana 25,904 3,974 3.4 2,645 44
Guinea 11,745 1,255 17.3 2,292 21
Guinea-Bissau 1,704 1,242 8.7 175 74
Liberia 4,294 878 31.4 150 227
Mali 15,301 1,641 7.9 5,032 3
Niger 17,831 913 12.6 4,308 13
Nigeria 173,615 5,863 8.5 22,042 32
Senegal 14,133 2,269 20.5 1,182 150
Sierra Leone 6,092 1,927 28.8 897 28
Togo 6,816 1,390 16.5 1,142 23
Total ECOWAS 327,355 4,123 12 47,978 30
Cameroon 22,253 2,711 15.7 3,047 37
Chad 12,825 2,081 33.4 1,647 18
Mauritania 3,889 3,042 9.3 222 207
Source: AFDB [2013]; +von Grebmer et al. [2013] (http://www.ifpri.org/ghi/2013), USDA [2014].
Note: Mauritania withdrew from ECOWAS in 2000; CFA countries are: Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal; all other
countries use their own free floating currency.
The analysis is based on fluctuations of food production and supply. So, stocking norms are
computed for shortfalls in production as well as supply. Supply is calculated as production
plus imports. In this way, extreme fluctuations in production of many import dependent
countries are extenuated. All imports are considered to be from international markets. In
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the analysis with intra-regional trade, these international imports are considered to be part
of the national supply.
Since production increases with agricultural productivity and population growth, unad-
justed measures of variability as variance and coefficient of variation become inappropriate
measures of variability [Cuddy and Della Valle, 1978]. One possibility is to correct coefficient
of variation and variance by the fitness of a trend function [Koester, 1984]. Alternatively,
variability can be measured after de-trending the time series. Thus, variability in produc-
tion and supply is given as the variation around a trend. A linear trend clearly does not
fit to production and supply data of several countries in the region, therefore it is opted for
de-trending by the Hodrick-Prescott-filter (HP-filter).25
An example is given in Figure 6.1 for Ghana. Actual production quantities are depicted by
the blue line, while the red line indicates HP-filter trend values for a smoothing parameter
of 6.25. The deviation of actual production from trend production becomes stationary and
variability can be computed by (6.29). Figures G.1-G.35 in Appendix G show cereal supply
and production for the remaining countries (including supply for Ghana). Clearly, produc-
tion and supply trends are very diverse across countries. Further, with few exemptions, a
linear trend is inappropriate to capture fluctuations in production and supply, and thus the
use of the HP-filter is validated.
The validity of the calculations for the stabilization reserve requires data to be stationary.
More precisely, expected values need to be constant over time. This is achieved by dividing
production and supply by their HP-trend value. Hence, the coefficient of variation is given
by:26
CV =
√
1/n
∑
(µ−Qt/Qt)2
µ
(6.29)
where Qt is production in t and Qt the trend value of production determined by the HP-filter. By definition
µ equals 1.
25The HP-filter is widely used to de-trend macroeconomic time series data that exhibits cyclical fluctua-
tions. The estimated trend value is given by the minimization of quadratic deviations in due consideration
of a smooth trend. As recommended for annual data, the smoothing parameter is chosen to be 6.25 [Gabler
Wirtschatfslexikon, 2014].
26Alternatively, the coefficient of variation could be calculated as the variance of residuals divided by the
mean trend value. The results only deviate marginally.
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Figure 6.1: Grain production in Ghana 1980-2014.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA PSD.
Table 6.4 displays each country’s contribution to total regional grain production and grain
supply in 2014 as well as the coefficient of variation over the period from 1980 to 2014.
In brief, there are two general observations. First, supply variability is substantially lower
than production variability, in particular for countries with high import-production ratio.
Second, no country exhibits production and supply variability that is lower than the figure
for the region as a whole. Therefore, the basic grounds for benefits from cooperation, as
illustrated in the previous section, seem factual.
In more detail, production variability is highest for Cape Verde, Mauritania, Senegal, the
Gambia, and Chad. All countries largely depend on import. However, for all of these
countries supply variability is significantly lower. This implies, imports are successfully
utilized to stabilize domestic consumption, but still higher than in countries with greater
self-sufficiency. In general, coastal countries show higher production and supply stability
which can be explained by more favorable climatic conditions in the humid and semi-humid
tropical zone compared to the Sahel zone [HarvestChoice, 2014]. Interestingly, these findings
with regard to instability are quite similar to the ones of Koester [1984] who looks at the
period from 1960 to 1980. According to his analysis of UEMOA countries, Burkina Faso,
Cote d’Ivoire, and Mali have more stable production than Senegal, Mauritania, and Niger.
It seems that this pattern is very persistent over time.
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Table 6.4: Production and supply instability across West Africa
Production Supply
si CV si CV
Benin 2.9 7.6 2.7 7.6
Burkina Faso 8.9 10.3 7.5 9.1
Cameroon 5.7 7.2 6.0 6.0
Cape Verde 0.0 43.8 0.0 30.3
Chad 3.4 15.7 3.0 13.3
Cote d’Ivoire 2.4 5.5 4.0 5.7
Gambia, the 0.4 16.1 0.5 14.4
Ghana 5.0 14.0 5.6 10.2
Guinea 4.2 5.5 3.9 5.6
Guinea-Bissau 0.3 9.8 0.4 10.3
Liberia 0.3 16.1 0.7 14.8
Mali 10.4 9.7 8.1 9.4
Mauritania 0.4 27.6 1.0 9.6
Niger 8.7 13.5 7.4 12.0
Nigeria 40.6 5.8 41.2 5.4
Senegal 2.4 18.0 4.3 8.3
Sierra Leone 1.5 13.8 1.6 11.1
Togo 2.1 10.2 2.0 8.1
Region 100.0 4.5 100.0 3.4
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA
[2014].
6.5.2 Emergency reserve
This subsection discusses optimal stocking norms for an emergency reserve as defined ear-
lier. The critical parameter to choose is the target consumption level. A target consumption
level of j percent can be represented by j percent of annual production (red line in Fig-
ure 6.1).27 The green line in Figure 6.2 illustrates this for a target consumption level of 95
percent. Then, the deviation of actual supply from target consumption is computed and
27Recall that production/supply = consumption.
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Figure 6.2: Grain production and 95 % target consumption in Ghana 1980-2014.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
the maximum historic shortfall identified. In the instance of Ghana, the maximum shortfall
happened in 1983. The size of the shortfall depends on the target consumption chosen.
Target consumption levels of individual countries are hypothetical and cannot be observed.
A possible way to determine target consumption levels is to assume that each country uses
the reserve to mitigate the x percent largest supply shocks. From the standard deviation
of supply shocks of each country, the target consumption level with respect to any quantile
can be computed. Normalized standard deviations are equal to the coefficient of variation
displayed in Table 6.3. Assuming a normal distribution of supply shocks, target consumption
levels across countries for the one, five, and 10 percent quantile are illustrated in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Target consumption levels based on extreme supply shocks
1 percent 5 percent 10 percent
Benin 82% 88% 90%
Burkina Faso 78% 85% 88%
Cameroon 86% 90% 92%
Cape Verde 29% 51% 62%
Chad 69% 78% 83%
Cote d’Ivoire 87% 91% 93%
Continued on next page...
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... Table 6.5 continued
1 percent 5 percent 10 percent
Gambia, the 66% 76% 82%
Ghana 77% 83% 87%
Guinea 87% 91% 93%
Guinea-Bissau 76% 83% 87%
Liberia 65% 76% 81%
Mali 78% 84% 88%
Mauritania 78% 84% 88%
Niger 72% 80% 84%
Nigeria 88% 91% 93%
Senegal 80% 86% 89%
Sierra Leone 75% 82% 86%
Togo 81% 87% 90%
Median 78% 84% 88%
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014].
Table 6.5 contains important information. Intuitively, the larger the tail of the distribution
(the greater the quintile), the lower target consumption will be. As elaborated above, higher
target consumption levels also require larger stocking norms. Second, target consumption
levels vary significantly across countries being highest for Nigeria, Cote d’Ivoire, and Guinea
and lowest for Cape Verde. Third, the lower national supply variability, the higher are
target consumption levels given a particular quintile. This is also intuitive, the more stable
national supply is, the higher target consumption must be to balance relatively moderate
supply shocks. In the following, median values will serve as possible target consumption
levels for the region. In addition, reserve levels for a target consumption of 99 percent, 97
percent, 95 percent, and 90 percent are considered in the simulation.
6.5.2.1 Emergency reserve without intra-regional trade
The stocking norm is defined as the maximum historic shortfall from target consumption
over the past 35 years. The respective stocking norms for all countries and various levels of
target consumption are summarized in Table 6.6. Intuitively, optimal stocking norms are
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highest for large countries. The corresponding stock-to-use ratios show the relative level of
the stocking norms. All countries that are characterized by high supply variability also have
the largest optimal stocking norms within an emergency reserve. Generally, total regional
stocks according to the maximum historic shortfall rule (target consumption 95 and 99
percent) are between 1.7 million and 6.2 million tons and well in the range of actual stock
levels according to USDA and FAO CBS. Yet optimal emergency stocks are expected to be
smaller than actual stocks since total stocks also include speculative and working stocks. In
this respect, lower levels of target consumption seem to be more reasonable.
On the other hand, several countries with low supply variability hardly stock anything
at target consumption levels below 95 percent. Table 6.7 presents stock levels for target
consumption levels of 78 percent, 84 percent, and 88 percent. Column two, five, and eight
contain stocking norms without cooperation, whereas the remaining columns show stocking
norms under equal and relative contributions to the reserve. In most of the cases, stocking
norms under regional cooperation are lower than without cooperation. In contrast, Nigeria
and Guinea would not store anything, and thus would not benefit from regional storage
under all stocking norms in Table 6.7. With a target consumption level of 84 percent,
Cote d’Ivoire and Senegal would also quit the regional reserve, followed by Benin, Burkina
Faso, Cameroon, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, and Togo. Hence, target consumption needs to be
chosen sufficiently high in order to enable benefits from cooperation for all West African
countries. For this reason, the subsequent presentation of simulation results in the text is
limited to target consumption of 95 percent, the remaining results are presented in tables in
Appendix G (Table G.1-G.3). The difference in stock levels between USDA and FAO CBS is
explained by the issues with regard to USDA data and small countries as well as less-traded
crops as sorghum and millet that comprise a significant share of total grain consumption in
the region.
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Table 6.6: Optimal stocking norms vs. actual stocks in 2014
Optimal reserve levels: supply Actual stocks
99% 97% 95% 90% 88% 84% 78% USDA FAO CBS
S∗i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i S
∗
i
BEN 152,677 8% 127.936 7% 103,195 5% 42.379 2% 32,037 2% 11.354 1% - - 107,000 162,000
BFA 593,667 11% 500,825 9% 407,983 8% 203,667 4% 140,506 3% 55,756 1% - - 364,000 495,000
CMR 203,148 5% 170,363 4% 148,788 4% 94,852 2% 73,277 2% 30,128 1% - - 148,000 866,000
CPV 15,455 57% 14,800 54% 14,144 52% 12,505 46% 11,849 44% 10,538 39% 8,571 32% 0 7,000
TCD 357,082 17% 317,808 15% 278,533 13% 180,347 9% 141,073 7% 80,930 4% 34,576 2% 106,000 564,000
CIV 181,273 6% 139,631 5% 99,615 4% 35,635 1% 10,043 0% - - - - 301,000 467,000
GMB 48,382 14% 41,486 12% 34,589 10% 22,209 6% 19,160 6% 13,061 4% 3,914 1% 29,000 48,000
GHA 477,451 12% 422,149 11% 366,847 9% 228,592 6% 173,290 4% 129,889 3% 83,183 2% 476,000 325,000
GIN 124,296 4% 87,947 3% 51,597 2% 10,864 0% - - - - - - 201,000 511,000
GNB 26,092 8% 23,423 7% 20,755 7% 14,084 4% 11,415 4% 6,078 2% - - 24,000 69,500
LBR 53,601 10% 48,902 9% 44,203 8% 32,455 6% 27,756 5% 20,446 4% 12,343 2% 53,000 56,000
MLI 417,047 7% 303,936 5% 223,631 4% 78,210 1% 49,735 1% 2,156 0% - - 764,000 855,000
MRT 111,038 15% 101,159 14% 91,279 12% 66,580 9% 56,701 8% 36,942 5% 7,303 1% 59,000 95,500
NER 681,052 13% 585,455 11% 503,972 10% 345,241 7% 289,035 6% 176,625 3% 72,619 1% 225,000 522,000
NGA 2167,705 7% 1572,822 5% 977,939 3% 128,646 0% - - - - - - 1539,000 85,0000
SEN 308,029 10% 258,230 8% 208,432 7% 83,935 3% 34,137 1% - - - - 197,000 492,000
Continued on next page...
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... Table 6.6 continued
Optimal reserve levels: supply Actual stocks
99% 97% 95% 90% 88% 84% 78% USDA FAO CBS
S∗i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i α
∗
i S
∗
i S
∗
i
SLE 149,723 13% 134,597 12% 119,471 11% 81,657 7% 66,531 6% 36,280 3% 8,628 1% 0 87,000
TGO 117,762 8% 105,888 7% 94,014 7% 64,329 5% 52,455 4% 28,707 2% - - 95,000 171,000
ALL 6,185,480 9% 4,957,354 7% 3,788,989 5% 1,726,187 2% 1,189,001 2% 638,891 1% 231,137 0 % 4,688,000 6643,000
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014].
Note: Stocks in mt; S∗i , Sˆi, and S˜i are stocks without cooperation, with equal, and relative contributions.
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Table 6.7: Optimal stocking norms in 2014 for various levels of target consumption
c = 0.88 c = 0.84 c = 0.78
Si Sˆi S˜i Si Sˆi S˜i Si Sˆi S˜i
BEN 32,037 13,494 13,168 11,354 7,469 4,807 - 2,960 -
BFA 140,506 37,424 57,752 55,756 20,713 23,606 - 8,209 -
CMR 73,277 29,325 30,119 30,128 16,231 12,756 - 6,432 -
CPV 11,849 188 4,870 10,538 104 4,461 8,571 41 3,975
TCD 141,073 14,535 57,985 80,930 8,045 34,264 34,576 3,188 16,035
CIV 10,043 19,555 4,128 - 10,823 - - 4,289 -
GMB 19,160 2,383 7,875 13,061 1,319 5,530 3,914 0,523 1,815
GHA 173,290 27,258 71,226 129,889 15,087 54,992 83,183 5,979 38,578
GIN - 19,684 - - 10,895 - - 4,318 -
GNB 11,415 2,163 4,692 6,078 1,197 2,573 - 474 -
LBR 27,756 3,699 11,408 20,446 2,047 8,657 12,343 0,811 5,724
MLI 49,735 39,181 20,443 2,156 21,686 0,913 - 8,594 -
MRT 56,701 5,101 23,305 36,942 2,824 15,640 7,303 1,119 3,387
NER 289,035 35,880 118,801 176,625 19,859 74,779 72,619 7,870 33,679
NGA - 199,916 - - 110,650 - - 43,850 -
SEN 34,137 21,349 14,031 - 11,816 - - 4,683 -
SLE 66,531 7,815 27,346 36,280 4,326 15,360 8,628 1,714 4,001
TGO 52,455 9,762 21,561 28,707 5,403 12,154 - 2,141 -∑
1,189,001 488,710 488,710 638,891 270,492 270,492 231,137 107,195 107,195
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014].
Note: Stocks in mt; S∗i , Sˆi, and S˜i are stocks without cooperation, with equal, and
relative contributions..
Under storage cooperation, optimal stocking norms can be significantly lower if shortfalls
from target consumption levels are independent or not perfectly positively correlated. Set-
ting the shortfall to zero if target consumption is reached, Table 6.8-6.9 yields the correlation
matrix of production and supply shortfalls. Clearly, production and supply shortfalls among
countries are not perfectly correlated. The highest country-to-country correlation is around
0.8. Notably, Burkina Faso shares relatively high positive shock correlation with six coun-
tries. Likewise, Mali, Sierra Leone, and Senegal exhibit positive correlation with a vast
majority of countries in the region. As opposed to this, Ghana, Togo, Niger, Benin, and
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Cote d’Ivoire show predominantly negative correlation coefficients. These findings underline
again potential benefits from storage cooperation.
Finally, results for the region are provided in Table 6.10. The first column reveals the
probability of shortfalls in production and supply, respectively.28 For both production and
supply the remaining columns contain the optimal level of stocks for three distinct scenarios.
First, optimal stocks without storage cooperation under autarky. Second, stocks for the case
of equal contributions to the regional reserve.29 Lastly, stocks with relative contributions
to the regional reserve required under autarky.
The last row contains the total level of stocks for the whole region if countries operate
individual reserves, and if they cooperate. Total stocks for individual storage amount to
3,989,905 mt for production only and 3,788,989 mt for supply, respectively. In contrast,
under cooperation, regional stocks only need to be 2,342,642 and 2,452,834 mt. This equals
a reduction by 41 and 35 percent compared to the initial amount. The effect for individ-
ual countries is equally positive regardless of the rule according to which contributions are
shared. Benefits from cooperation are relatively lower for higher levels of target consump-
tion. With 99 percent and 97 percent target consumption, regional stocks under cooperation
are around 25 percent, respectively 30 percent, lower than without cooperation. Against
this, benefits from cooperation are relatively greater with target consumption of 90 per-
cent. Accordingly, regional stocks could be 62 percent lower with regional cooperation
vis-à-vis without cooperation. With few exemption (Guinea and Nigeria), countries benefit
from cooperation under both equal and relative contributions to the reserve. With relative
contributions to the regional reserve, all countries always need to store less than without
regional cooperation.
28The probability of shortfall is computed from historic shortfalls.
29Equal contributions imply, proportionally equal to a country’s share in regional consumption.
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Table 6.8: Correlation of production shortfalls from 95 % target consumption
BEN BFA CIV CPV TCD SEN GHA MLI GIN GMB GNB NER NGA CMR LBR SLE MRT TGO
BEN 1.00
BFA -0.18 1.00
CIV -0.11 -0.15 1.00
CPV -0.13 -0.04 -0.10 1.00
TCD 0.39 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00
SEN 0.01 0.47 -0.09 -0.04 0.05 1.00
GHA -0.10 0.04 -0.03 0.26 -0.11 -0.13 1.00
MLI 0.14 0.40 -0.03 0.02 0.18 0.45 -0.01 1.00
GIN -0.14 -0.00 0.17 0.30 -0.11 0.39 -0.01 0.25 1.00
GMB 0.08 0.04 0.30 0.11 0.10 0.12 -0.20 -0.04 0.19 1.00
GNB -0.13 0.42 -0.16 -0.04 -0.10 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.05 1.00
NER 0.47 -0.21 0.36 -0.13 0.13 -0.09 -0.16 0.08 -0.07 -0.01 -0.15 1.00
NGA -0.13 0.71 -0.16 0.08 -0.10 -0.02 0.30 0.05 -0.20 -0.17 0.20 -0.21 1.00
CMR 0.16 0.23 -0.09 -0.10 -0.19 0.60 -0.14 0.20 0.26 0.03 0.27 -0.15 -0.04 1.00
LBR 0.04 0.33 -0.11 0.15 -0.07 0.68 -0.06 0.26 0.28 0.20 0.36 -0.11 -0.05 0.58 1.00
SLE -0.12 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.12 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.20 -0.13 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.13 0.14 1.00
MRT -0.18 0.77 -0.14 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.32 0.25 -0.09 -0.05 0.25 -0.18 0.80 -0.04 0.06 -0.04 1.00
TGO -0.11 -0.19 -0.04 0.25 -0.02 -0.15 0.03 -0.03 -0.19 0.18 -0.20 -0.04 -0.19 -0.11 0.22 0.06 -0.17 1.00
# + 7 10 3 8 7 11 7 13 9 10 10 4 6 9 12 10 9 5
# - 10 6 14 9 10 6 10 4 7 7 7 13 11 8 5 7 8 12
Source: Author’s computation based on [USDA, 2014].
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Table 6.9: Correlation of supply shortfalls from 95 % target consumption
BEN BFA CIV CPV TCD SEN GHA MLI GIN GMB GNB NER NGA CMR LBR SLE MRT TGO
BEN 1.00
BFA -0.18 1.00
CIV -0.11 -0.15 1.00
CPV -0.13 -0.04 -0.10 1.00
TCD 0.39 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00
SEN 0.01 0.47 -0.09 -0.04 0.05 1.00
GHA -0.10 0.04 -0.03 0.26 -0.11 -0.13 1.00
MLI 0.14 0.40 -0.03 0.02 0.18 0.45 -0.01 1.00
GIN -0.14 -0.00 0.17 0.30 -0.11 0.39 -0.01 0.25 1.00
GMB 0.08 0.04 0.30 0.11 0.10 0.12 -0.20 -0.04 0.19 1.00
GNB -0.13 0.42 -0.16 -0.04 -0.10 0.37 0.02 0.01 0.07 -0.05 1.00
NER 0.47 -0.21 0.36 -0.13 0.13 -0.09 -0.16 0.08 -0.07 -0.01 -0.15 1.00
NGA -0.13 0.71 -0.16 0.08 -0.10 -0.02 0.30 0.05 -0.20 -0.17 0.20 -0.21 1.00
CMR 0.16 0.23 -0.09 -0.10 -0.19 0.60 -0.14 0.20 0.26 0.03 0.27 -0.15 -0.04 1.00
LBR 0.04 0.33 -0.11 0.15 -0.07 0.68 -0.06 0.26 0.28 0.20 0.36 -0.11 -0.05 0.58 1.00
SLE -0.12 0.07 -0.03 -0.02 0.12 0.17 0.04 0.05 0.20 -0.13 0.03 -0.05 -0.06 0.13 0.14 1.00
MRT -0.18 0.77 -0.14 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.32 0.25 -0.09 -0.05 0.25 -0.18 0.80 -0.04 0.06 -0.04 1.00
TGO -0.11 -0.19 -0.04 0.25 -0.02 -0.15 0.03 -0.03 -0.19 0.18 -0.20 -0.04 -0.19 -0.11 0.22 0.06 -0.17 1.00
# + 7 10 3 8 7 11 7 13 9 10 10 4 6 9 12 10 9 5
# - 10 7 14 9 10 6 10 4 8 7 7 13 11 8 5 7 8 12
Source: Author’s computation based on [USDA, 2014].
178
Chapter 6. Regional storage cooperation to enhance food security
Noteworthy, a regional reserve without integration of markets or transfers between coun-
tries is required to act significantly more often than national reserves as the probability of
shortfalls increases. Hence, the total quantity needed to compensate for production and
supply shortfalls is equal with or without storage cooperation. Benefits from cooperation
emerge from the lower levels of stocks carried only. However, these benefits are substantial
as countries also require to renew their reserve stocks on a regular base, even if they are not
used to offset supply shocks.
Table 6.10: Optimal stock levels in 2014 for target consumption of 95 %
Production Supply
Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i
Benin 26% 98,832 68,249 58,004 29% 103,195 66,181 66,804
Burkina Faso 26% 461,771 209,158 271,009 29% 407,983 182,765 264,111
Cameroon 11% 163,986 134,570 96,242 14% 148,788 146,499 96,319
Cape Verde 43% 7,572 298 4,444 40% 14,144 885 9,156
Chad 37% 301,534 79,510 176,968 31% 278,533 73,389 180,311
Cote d’Ivoire 14% 84,520 55,554 49,604 20% 99,615 97,416 64,487
Gambia, the 34% 70,230 9,566 41,217 43% 34,589 12,069 22,391
Ghana 17% 287,853 118,080 168,939 26% 366,847 136,789 237,481
Guinea 17% 57,988 99,377 34,033 14% 51,597 96,782 33,402
Guinea-Bissau 29% 21,528 7,566 12,635 31% 20,755 10,768 13,436
Liberia 31% 20,306 7,941 11,918 31% 44,203 18,083 28,615
Mali 37% 216,774 243,921 127,223 31% 223,631 199,491 144,770
Mauritania 46% 49,666 9552 29,149 29% 91,279 25,604 59,090
Niger 29% 607,626 204,524 356,610 31% 503,972 182,173 326,251
Nigeria 17% 928,445 951,527 544,897 14% 977,939 1,010,583 633,077
Senegal 40% 429,613 56,908 252,136 26% 208,432 106,131 134,930
Sierra Leone 31% 105,992 35,788 62,206 31% 119,471 38,301 77,341
Togo 23% 75,671 49,553 44,411 20% 94,014 48,925 60,861
Region 97% 3,989,905 2,342,642 2,342,642 97% 3,788,989 2,452,834 2,452,834
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014].
Note: Stocks in mt. Pi is the probability of intervention when production and supply are
below the target consumption (95%). S∗i , Sˆi, and S˜i are stocks without cooperation, with
equal, and relative contributions.
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Last, what are the welfare implication from the simulation results above? First and most
importantly, with reasonably high levels of target consumption optimal stocking norms can
be selected so that all countries benefit. However, preferences are not homogeneous and
low levels of target consumption discriminate countries with low supply variability. Since
preferences of countries cannot be observed, net benefits with heterogeneous preferences are
possible to judge only in two instances. Firstly, in the case target consumption chosen by
the region is lower than for a country without cooperation, while stocking norms are lower
in cooperation. Then, a country benefits from cooperation. As opposed to this, net benefits
from cooperation are unambiguously negative if target consumption under cooperation is
higher than under regional cooperation and stocking norms are higher than without coop-
eration. Indeed, the latter can be excluded by choosing target consumption levels above 90
percent. Intuitively, countries with large supply variability prefer equal contribution to the
regional reserve. Yet it is important to create incentives for all countries to join the reserve
in order to utilize full benefits from cooperation.
6.5.2.2 Emergency reserve with intra-regional trade
When allowing intra-regional trade, the analysis is analogous to the scenario without trade.
So, maximum historic shortfalls and associated stocking norms in autarky remain un-
changed. The only difference is that supply shortfalls in neighboring countries are balanced
through trade first, before the reserve releases stocks. Participating countries are committed
to export only when actual supply exceeds estimated supply as computed by the HP-filter.
Table 6.11: Regional stocks for an emergency reserve with intra-regional trade
Production Supply
99% 97% 95% 90% 99% 97% 95% 90%
stocks w/o trade 4,122 3,193 2,342 1,074 4,717 3,561 2,453 642
P(shortfall) 100% 100% 97% 89% 100% 97% 97% 89%
stocks w/ trade 4,011 3,082 2,231 963 4,615 3,460 2,352 465
P(shortfall) 43% 34% 26% 17% 37% 26% 20% 6%
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014].
Note: In 1,000 mt.
Table 6.11 presents required stocks with intra-regional trade in comparison to the scenario
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without intra-regional trade. Apparently, trade hardly reduces the level of required stocks.
Most notably are gains when stocks are based on a consumption shortfall of 10 percent.
The results of the simulation are explained by the choice of the criterion to determine
reserve levels according to historic consumption shortfalls. The historically largest shortfall
occurred in 2007, while only very few countries would have been able to export in this year.
These exports are not high enough to offset supply shortfalls of other countries.
On the contrary, regional trade would reduce the frequency of stock-outs significantly. So,
the probability of shortfall is maximum 43 percent as compared to between 89 and 100
percent across all levels of target consumption for the emergency reserve without intra-
regional trade. Allowing for five percent shortfall in consumption, with intra-regional trade
the probability of shortfall is only between 20 and 26 percent for supply and production,
respectively.
Table 6.12: Annual average intra-regional exports by country
production supply
Ti
Ti
C2014
Ti
Ti
C2014
Benin 24,352 1.32% 26,835 1.46%
Burkina Faso 113,461 2.15% 112,928 2.14%
Cameroon 31,839 0.76% 31,904 0.76%
Cape Verde 1,240 4.59% 2,139 7.92%
Chad 59,531 2.92% 56,633 2.78%
Cote d’Ivoire 20,767 0.73% 39,873 1.41%
Gambia, the 9,195 2.55% 11,897 3.30%
Ghana 57,546 1.50% 65,885 1.72%
Guinea 20,894 0.74% 23,943 0.85%
Guinea-Bissau 4,949 1.60% 6,145 1.98%
Liberia 5,814 1.10% 11,604 2.19%
Mali 103,132 1.83% 101,559 1.80%
Mauritania 13,147 1.81% 16,164 2.23%
Niger 145,487 2.80% 141,980 2.74%
Nigeria 405,876 1.38% 414,309 1.41%
Senegal 71,668 2.29% 56,365 1.80%
Sierra Leone 20,098 1.85% 23,255 2.14%
Continued on next page...
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... Table 6.12 continued
production supply
Ti
Ti
C2014
Ti
Ti
C2014
Togo 19,467 1.43% 20,299 1.49%
Total 1,128,463 1.60% 1,163,716 1.65%
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014].
These advantages come from annual exports as presented in Table 6.12. Average annual
exports range between 0.7 to 0.9 percent of total supply in 2014 for Guinea and Cameroon
and 4.59 and 7.9 percent for Cape Verde. By the formula according to which exports are
calculated, countries with higher production and supply fluctuations automatically export
more than countries with less variation. This occurs since these countries exhibit greater
negative and positive deviations from the trend. Generally, exports are at a realistic mag-
nitude. Net welfare benefits can be computed analogous to the case without intra-regional
trade.
6.5.2.3 Transportation costs
It may by naïve to assume costless transportation of grains from surplus to deficiency
countries. For this reason, a sensitivity analysis is undertaken by penalizing regional storage
cooperation and regional trade in the following way. On the one hand, regional storage
cooperation requires coordination among member countries. Thus, it may convincing to
assume higher administrative costs to operate the reserve. Therefore, contributed stock
levels multiplied by a factor to raise the costs of cooperation. On the other hand, a regional
reserve may demand higher transportation costs to ship stocks from ports to the location
of the reserve, between the different warehouses of the reserve, and from warehouses to
deficient regions.
Lets consider a regional reserve with relative contributions S˜i which are proportional to
the stocking norms without cooperation. Since stocks under cooperation are 65 percent of
regional stocks without cooperation, additional transportation under cooperation costs are
allowed to be up to 35 percent in order to make cooperation still beneficial. The problem
of high probability of intervention still does not change.
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Table 6.13: Optimal regional stock levels with costly trade and contributions
Production Supply
Trade costs 99% 97% 95% 90% 99% 97% 95% 90%
0% stocks 4,011 3,082 2,231 963 4,615 3,460 2,352 465
stocks & trade 5,139 4,210 3,359 2,091 5,779 4,624 3,516 1,629
P stock-outs 43% 34% 26% 17% 37% 26% 20% 6%
10% stocks 4,022 3,093 2,242 974 4,626 3,470 2,361 474
stocks & trade 5,150 4,221 3,370 2,102 5,790 4,634 3,525 1,638
P stock-outs 43% 34% 29% 17% 46% 26% 20% 9%
20% stocks 4,033 3,104 2,253 985 4,636 3,480 2,371 485
stocks & trade 5,161 4,232 3,381 2,113 5,800 4,644 3,535 1,649
P stock-outs 46% 34% 34% 20% 54% 29% 23% 9%
Costly contribution 10%
0% stocks 4,412 3,390 2,454 1,059 5,077 3,806 2,587 512
stocks & trade 5,540 4,518 3,582 2,187 6,241 4,970 3,751 1,676
P stock-outs 43% 34% 26% 17% 37% 26% 20% 6%
10% stocks 4,424 3,402 2,466 1,071 5,089 3,817 2,597 521
stocks & trade 5,553 4,531 3,595 2,200 6,252 4,981 3,761 1,685
P stock-outs 43% 34% 29% 17% 46% 26% 20% 9%
20% stocks 4,436 3,414 2,478 1,084 5,100 3,828 2,608 534
stocks & trade 5,565 4,543 3,607 2,212 6,263 4,992 3,772 1,697
P stock-outs 46% 34% 34% 20% 54% 29% 23% 9%
Without cooperation 5,816 4,818 3,990 2,582 6,185 4,957 3,789 1,726
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014]
Note: In 1,000 mt; Trade is always 1,128 mt (production only) and 1,164 mt (supply);
P is the probability of stock-out given the respective level of target consumption.
Table 6.13 contains stock levels and probabilities of intervention for coordination costs
and additional transportation costs. As expected, assuming higher transport costs has little
influence on regional reserves. Besides, the probability of intervention increases substantially
for a regional reserve that guarantees target consumption levels of 99 percent. For all
remaining levels of target consumption, stock-outs do not change significantly.
Notably, this exercise underlines the benefits from cooperation even if regional storage co-
operation is associated with additional costs from coordination and transportation. In fact,
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transportation costs also arise without regional cooperation. Similarly, it is also reasonable
to assume that storage cooperation could be characterized through lower administrative
costs using economies of scale. Furthermore, reciprocal monitoring could also impede rent
seeking behavior of bureaucrats and general leakage in the system.
6.5.3 Stabilization reserve
The optimal stocking rule under national stockholding can be estimated using actual stock
data. For reasons discussed previously, the stock data from FAO GIEWS is preferred and
utilized in this analysis. The stocking parameter can be obtained by estimating following
equation with OLS:
Sit = γi(St−1 +Qt−1 + IMt−1 + EXt−1) + it (6.30)
where all variables are as described above.
Notably, the constant is omitted in the estimation. First, storage is non-negative and
negative values for stocks are not possible. Second, stocks need to increase with supply
starting from zero if supply is zero. The estimation is associated with several problems (non-
stationarity, number of observations) and results have to be interpreted with caution. Albeit,
the objective is not to establish causality or to compute confidence intervals. Instead, it is
attempted to obtain country preferences without storage cooperation. Regression tables are
not discussed in the text but appear in the Appendix G (Table G.4). Results are presented
in Figure 6.3 which depicts the stocking parameter γ conditional on the level of supply
variability estimated by the coefficient of variation around a trend as described above.
The red line represents the overall positive correlation between supply variability and the
stocking rule. A slope parameter of 0.30 implies that on average the stocking parameter
increases by three percentage points when supply variability is 10 percentage points higher.30
Yet there are notable exemption of the relationship.31 Niger, Sierra Leone, and Nigeria store
only six percent of its total available supply although supply variability is relatively high.
In contrast, the Gambia and Chad experience similar supply variability as Niger, but store
30When Cape Verde is excluded the slope parameter changes only marginally.
31Be reminded that an increase of 0.1 is quite substantial regarding the range of γ between zero and one.
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Figure 6.3: Stocking parameter and supply variability across study countries.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014] and FAO CBS [2014].
24 and 19 percent respectively. All other countries in the region store roughly between eight
and 17 percent. Taking the sum of individual stocks as optimal choice for the region, it
averagely stores around nine percent of its annual supply due to the low value for Nigeria.
Using the policy parameter, it is possible to compute resulting consumption variability as
chosen by each country. Figure 6.4 draws consumption and supply variability by country.32
The red line represents parity of consumption and supply variability, where countries with-
out storage lie. Storage reduces consumption variability, and thus all countries are below
the red line. Two observations can be made. Firstly, the larger the stocking parameter
γ, the farther away from the parity line are countries. Secondly, with lower supply vari-
ability it is less efficient to decrease consumption variability by increasing storage by one
unit. Accordingly, Cameroon requires to store 18 percent of its total available supply to
reduce consumption variability by one percent. In contrast, Ghana achieves a reduction in
consumption instability of 0.8 percent by only storing nine percent of its available supply.
The costs of stabilization are already described by the stocking parameter γ. The full
dimension of the costs become more visible when looking at the amount of stocks required
to reach a desired level of consumption stability. Table 6.14 presents optimal stocks levels
and stock-to-use ratios for γ given by the country-level stock data and compares them to
32Due to scaling issues Cape Verde is excluded from the graph. A representation including Cape Verde
can be found in the Figure G.36 in Appendix G.
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Figure 6.4: Consumption and supply variability across study countries.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014] and FAO CBS [2014].
Figure 6.5: Relationship between stocking parameter and stock-to-use ratio.
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actual levels. The resulting stock-to-use ratio is α = γ1−γ , and thus just correspond to γ in
an exponentially positive way.33 The relationship is pictured in Figure 6.5. With γ > 0.5,
stocks already amount to expected consumption levels with a stock-to-use ratio greater
than one. Generally, the linear stocking predicts actual stocks and stock-to-use ratios quite
precisely.
Table 6.14: Actual and optimal stock under linear stocking rule
γ∗ CVC S∗ S2013 α∗ α2013
Benin 0.105 6.8 220,802 162,000 11.8 12.8
Burkina Faso 0.083 8.4 466,615 495,000 9.0 8.5
Cameroon 0.178 5.0 899,228 866,000 21.7 16.0
Cape Verde 0.169 25.5 5,089 7,000 20.3 20.3
Chad 0.193 10.9 496,928 564,000 23.9 22.3
Cote d’Ivoire 0.095 5.2 290,463 467,000 10.5 9.3
Gambia, the 0.239 11.2 107,609 48,000 31.5 30.4
Ghana 0.089 9.4 379,520 325,000 9.8 9.2
Guinea 0.138 4.9 438,248 511,000 16.0 14.3
Guinea-Bissau 0.164 8.7 59,828 69,500 19.6 17.3
Liberia 0.144 12.8 86,482 56,000 16.9 14.7
Mali 0.117 8.4 746,375 855,000 13.2 10.1
Mauritania 0.159 8.2 137,177 95,500 18.9 20.7
Niger 0.057 11.4 314,910 522,000 6.1 5.4
Nigeria 0.063 5.1 1,915,352 850,000 6.7 7.0
Senegal 0.140 7.2 491,235 492,000 16.3 16.2
Sierra Leone 0.063 10.4 72,532 87,000 6.7 5.3
Togo 0.132 7.1 211,342 171,000 15.2 14.9∑
Region - 3.1 7,063,305 6,643,000 - 10.3
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014]. Stock data from
FAO CBS [2014].
Note: γ is obtained by the regression (6.30); CV consumption is com-
puted as CVC =
√
(1−γ)
(1+γ)
CV(Q+IM) (see equation 6.28); the regional
γ is unknown.
33See Appendix F for a detailed derivation.
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Figure 6.6: Regional consumption variability at different stock levels.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014] and FAO CBS [2014].
The last row of Table 6.14 provides stock figures for the region as a whole. Given the current
stock level of around 7 million tons, the regional stocking rule would be nine percent which is
associated with a consumption variability of 3.4 percent without storage to 3.1 percent. It is
also possible to illustrate the initial optimization problem of the government directly as the
trade-off between costs and benefits. More concretely, the trade-off between consumption
stability and operational costs. Figure 6.6 pictures the trade-off for the region as a whole.
The red line indicates the status quo of roughly seven million tons of stocks associated with
a coefficient of variation for consumption of 3.1 percent. The green line represents a stock
level of 11.1 million tons resulting from a stocking parameter of 0.135, which is the median
parameter across all member countries.
The amount of stocks required increases over-proportionally in the reduction of consumption
instability. So, in order to reach consumption stability up to only 2.7 percent, the region
would require roughly 20 million tons of stocks. On the other hand, without any stocks
required consumption variability through market integration or transfers between countries
is only 3.4 percent, two percent less than for Nigeria which has the lowest supply variability.
As a result, most gains origin from trade integration and not from storage cooperation. In
other words, under regional trade integration consumption stability is massively enhanced,
but increasing stocks have only little impact on the level of consumption variability. Benefits
from regional trade cooperation are massive. Indeed, individual stabilization reserves by all
188
Chapter 6. Regional storage cooperation to enhance food security
Figure 6.7: Regional consumption under trade integration without storage 1980-2014.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
countries would need an unrealistically large amount of stocks to achieve a consumption
variability of 3.4 percent.34
Costs and benefits of cooperation can be evaluated for a particular level of consumption
variability the region desires. Net benefits and costs can be assessed as discussed in the
theoretical part. Thus, net benefits are strictly positive for all countries upto a stock-to-use
ratio of 6.1 percent for Niger, 6.7 for Nigeria and Sierra Leone, 9.0 for Burkina Faso, 9.8 for
Ghana, continuing in the same manner according to α∗i in Table 6.14.
Lastly, it is possible to test how a linear stocking rule would have performed over the course
of the last 35 years. This is illustrated in Figure 6.7 and 6.8 with associated target con-
sumption levels. Despite regional trade integration, target consumption levels of 99 percent,
97 percent, and 95 percent are undershot multiple times.35 Thus, regional trade integration
reduces consumption variability significantly, but is unable to combat severe supply short-
falls. Conversely, a linear stocking rule that guarantees net benefits from cooperation for
all countries (α=6.1 percent) would have guaranteed target consumption of 97 percent over
the whole period (Figure 6.8).
34Table G.5 in Appendix G presents stocking parameters and stock-to-use ratios for all countries if they
would attempt to achieve consumption stability as regional trade integration, with and without storage
cooperation, does.
35To be exact, shortfalls are accordingly: 99 percent - 11 times ,97 percent - 7 times, and 95 percent - 3
times.
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Figure 6.8: Regional consumption under a linear stocking rule 1980-2014.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure 6.9: Regional consumption under different stocking rules 2000-2014.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Clearly, a linear stocking rule is effective in buffering positive and negative supply shock as
pictured in Figure 6.9 for various stocking parameters. However, the effects are rather small
as compared to benefits from trade integration within the whole region. This may change
if the number of participating countries reduces.
6.6 Conclusion
In this chapter a methodology for the assessment of costs and benefits from regional stor-
age cooperation is outlined and exercised for the West African region. Building on the
influential works by Johnson [1976] and Koester [1986], the methodology links supply and
consumption variability and accounts for potential benefits from cooperation through im-
perfect correlation of production and supply shocks among neighboring countries. In doing
so, the work complements previous studies by conceptualizing the link to storage.
The principles of risk pooling allow to reduce carry-over stocks, to guarantee at least 95
percent of the expected trend consumption, within West Africa by 35 to 41 percent without
welfare transfers or trade between countries. For other levels of minimum consumption, the
benefits are between 25 to 60 percent. However, in this way releases from the reserve occur
frequently and stocks need to be re-filled on a regular basis. If limited intra-regional trade
takes place between surplus and deficiency areas, optimal regional stocks under cooperation
hardly change. However, the probability of intervention reduces significantly. So, trade is
very effective to smooth consumption when supply fluctuations are moderate. In contrast,
reserves are required to dampen large supply shortfalls. These benefits hold when assuming
additional costs of transportation for trade and storage. Lastly, complete market integration
in West Africa would greatly benefit countries with high supply variability. Without any
storage undertaken, regional supply variability is 3.4 percent which is higher for each country
included in the analysis. Storage cooperation with perfect market integration would reduce
consumption variability only marginally. Furthermore, trade integration without storage is
incapable of dampening severe supply shortfalls as an emergency reserve does.
It is also important to discuss incentives for countries to join a regional reserve. Under
relative low levels of target consumption in an emergency reserve, countries with low supply
variability do not benefit. Yet these countries are of particular importance to utilize the
full benefits from regional cooperation. The advantages of cooperation diminish rapidly
when countries with limited supply variability or counter-cyclical shock patterns refuse to
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participate in the alliance. However it should be noted, an regional emergency reserve
guaranteeing relative high levels of target consumption needs to carry large amounts of
stocks which are associated with high operational costs.
These findings are of great relevance for the ongoing debate on public food storage, trade
integration, and regional reserves. Trade liberalization is widely considered as an effec-
tive instrument to balance supply variability and production shortfalls. In contrast, public
storage is associated with substantial market distortions and comes at high fiscal costs. Nev-
ertheless, a number of developing countries responded to the global food crisis in 2007/2008
by implementing and enhancing public storage to increase food security. This is also driven
by the unpredictability of food availability at international markets as exporters attempt to
insulate domestic markets. Regional storage cooperation was brought up for discussion as
a viable and comparably cheap means and as an alternative to national reserves. Moreover,
storage cooperation could enhance commitment of exporters to regional trade agreements
[Wright and Cafiero, 2011].
West Africa has taken a pioneering role with the intention to implement a region-wide
emergency reserve. Political and economic integration in West Africa is among the most
advanced in Africa. However, at present, intra-regional trade is limited partly caused by bad
infrastructure and bureaucratic hindrances at national boundaries. The results from this
study should be understood as encouragement to regional storage cooperation in the region.
Three message can be taken away. First, production and supply patterns in the region
facilitate massive benefits from cooperation. Second, trade integration is more effective
than storage to smooth supply effectively, but storage is required to dampen extreme supply
shortfalls. Last, there is great potential for storage cooperation with regard to an emergency
reserve and less with regard to a stabilization reserve. Yet clear rules with regard to national
contributions and releases and, if needed, to regional trade management are essential to
organize storage with mutual benefits. Therefore, future research should attempt to evaluate
costs and benefits for a subset of countries with the attempt to identify countries that are
particularly feasible to form a coalition.
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Conclusion
The conclusion completes this dissertation. It has a special function insofar as each ana-
lytical chapter already closes with a summary and discussion of its finding. Therefore, the
main objective of this last chapter is to draw results together and to take them as a whole
further into policy implications. The conclusion concentrates on the chapters four to six
which answer the research questions raised in the introduction.
7.1 Summary of the findings
Price volatility and the recent price spikes in agri-food markets have been a prominent sub-
ject among scholars and policy makers. Research has focused a lot on causes of international
price spikes and volatility as well as the micro-consequences of food crises on the poor. The
contribution of this study is to look at markets in developing countries and to examine which
factors cause price fluctuations and which factors can contribute to price stabilization and
food security. In doing so, the dissertation contributes to the current political debate on
food price volatility and possible government responses to reduce market volatility. Thereby,
the study makes use of econometric techniques as well as the construction of a theoretical
model in which national consumption is stabilized through storage. Furthermore, primary
data collection is used in order to gain insights in the trading business in Ghana.
In detail, the dissertation was set out to explore the causes of food price instability in
developing countries, the role of stocks and trade to stabilize commodity prices, the storage
behavior of private traders in Ghana as well as its implication for policy design, and last to
theoretically discuss costs and benefits from regional storage cooperation and to apply the
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model to West Africa. First, an econometric panel analysis is employed to determine drivers
of food price volatility in developing and emerging economies in the period from 2000 to
2013. Then, storage patterns and stockholding strategies of traders in Ghana are analyzed
combining existing research and secondary data with primary data collection. Finally, costs
and benefits from storage cooperation are examined based on a theoretical model in which
countries stabilize national consumption through storage.
Following the introduction, which describes the context and motivation of the dissertation,
chapter two and three introduce the reader to volatility modeling and the competitive stor-
age model which is the workhorse to explain price formation of storable commodities. The
analysis in chapter two supports the general notion that food price volatility has increased
during 2007/2008 but decreased afterwards. Furthermore, volatility deviates across coun-
tries and crops. Markets in southern and eastern Africa exhibit the highest price volatil-
ity, while markets in Latin America and Asia are more stable. Last, unconditional and
conditional food price volatility yield to very similar research results, whereby conditional
volatility models are associated with estimation problems in some rare cases. The results
of this exercise can be used for vulnerability mapping and extensive cross country analysis.
In chapter three, the competitive storage is introduced. Notably, the literature acknowledges
shortcoming of the classical model with respect to the heterogeneity of stockholders in their
strategies and risk preferences. However, they have not been sufficiently accounted for in
empirical research. Additionally, this part of the dissertation also discusses availability and
quality of fundamental agricultural data. In particular stock data is likely to be imprecise
due to limited financial resources for data collection. The newly established Agricultural
Market Information System (AMIS) aims improving data quality and market information
by consolidating existing data.
Chapter four employs a cross-country-cross-commodity panel to investigate the impact of
a wide range of explanatory variables on food price volatility in developing countries. The
econometric model successfully accounts for persistence of volatility, dynamic panel bias,
and takes care of the endogeneity of some of the explanatory variables. Different to many
other studies, a strong spillover of international volatility into domestic food markets is
identified. The effects are particularly strong for importing countries. Furthermore, stocks
are found to be an effective instrument to stabilize prices. Likewise, regional trade in-
tegration is associated with fewer volatility. Institutional quality also strongly stabilizes
commodity prices. With respect to policies the evidence is mixed. Export restrictions, so
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called insulation policies, significantly reduce volatility. In contrast, no evidence is found
that countries with high market intervention through storage are characterized by lower
food price volatility.
The country case study in chapter five sheds light on storage behavior of traders in Ghana.
This is of great relevance to policy makers who are concerned with the private sector’s
reactions to public market interventions. The findings are largely drawn from a survey
among 36 wholesale traders conducted by the author at major market sites. The large
seasonality in prices of locally produced foodstuffs is often attributed to limited storage.
Data on storage and transport costs suggests that storage costs alone can be responsible for
existing seasonal price increases. Instead, high transportation costs to the storage facility
inflate commodity prices. In contrast to earlier studies, stock data collected from wholesale
traders hint at significant stocks held by wholesale traders, in particular towards the end of
the marketing year. The risk of price declines in the sequel of the incoming harvest induces
traders to deplete their stocks timely. This may cause early stock-outs followed by short
and sharp price spikes.
Furthermore, the trader survey revealed significant heterogeneity across traders. On the
one hand, several traders act as aggregator and distributor and take limited risk from inter-
temporal arbitrage. Instead, they stock exclusively to sell their products in bulk. On the
other hand, several traders speculate for an inter-seasonal price increase. By the nature
of distinct strategies, seasonal variation in stocks varies significantly across traders. At
the same time, traders with resembling seasonal storage pattern can be grouped together.
Aggregation stocks increase after harvest and abruptly fall to zero when a deal is settled.
Theoretically, afterwards stocks can be built up again. Speculative stocks seem to increase
towards the end of the marketing year and drop before the incoming harvest. In contrast,
working stocks are constant throughout the year. The drivers of the underlying decision
making process cannot definitely be clarified by the data from this survey.
The study on regional storage cooperation in chapter six starts by providing a theoretical
model to determine optimal stocking norms for an emergency reserve as well as a stabiliza-
tion reserve. The former addresses supply shortfalls only, while the latter smoothes both
positive and negative deviation from the expected trend in supply. The model conceptu-
alizes the link between supply variability and consumption and explains the possibility to
stabilize consumption through stocks. In West Africa, storage cooperation without intra-
regional trade reduces required stocks for a common emergency reserve by 25 to 60 percent
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vis-à-vis without cooperation conditional on the level of target consumption chosen. In
case limited intra-regional trade is possible, countries ship excess supply from surplus to
deficiency countries, required stocks will hardly change, but the probability of intervention
diminishes significantly. Different to an emergency reserve, a regional stabilization reserve
requires complete market integration. In this case, regional trade integration alone, without
storage, reduces regional consumption variability to 3.4 percent, which is lower than for
any individual country in West Africa. Yet trade is incapable of dampening severe supply
shortfalls. A regional stabilization reserve in addition to trade has only limited power to
further reduce consumption instability.
7.2 Policy implications, limitations, and further research
The results of the cross-country panel provide empirical evidence on a number of explana-
tory variables. Strikingly, there is clear evidence for volatility transmission from interna-
tional to domestic food prices. This contradicts conventional wisdom and research findings
from price transmission analysis using co-integration and vector-error-correction model tech-
niques. The weaknesses of these models are extensively discussed in the literature [Lütke-
pohl, 1982; Stern, 2011; Grosche, 2014]. Most importantly, it is difficult to establish true
causality due to the omission of relevant variables. Secondly, findings from co-integration
based price transmission models in existing studies like Minot [2011], Robles [2011], and
Baquedano and Liefert [2014] are greatly inconsistent.
The evidence for the existence of volatility spill-overs from international markets is striking
for two reasons; first, they result from a structural model that controls for counterfactu-
als; and second, they are at a considerable range between 30 to 50 percent. Therefore,
they should encourage policy makers to re-direct the interest to control variability of in-
ternational prices. Unlike multivariate conditional volatility models used by Rapsomanikis
and Mugera [2011] and others, the panel model is not able to capture asymmetric behav-
ior. Accounting for heterogeneity of countries as well as trade and storage policies gives
indication on the relevance of state dependent models. Thus, future research should focus
on possible asymmetries in the transmission mechanism and with respect to public market
interventions.
Findings from chapter four are based on a cross-country analysis and estimates represent on
average effects. However, the results support economic theory and have strong implications
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for policy makers. First, the stock-to-use ratio is the major driver of price dynamics as
postulated by the competitive storage model. With few exemptions, this relationship has
not been identified empirically with actual stock data as explanatory variable in the regres-
sion model. Second, institutional quality, compromising infrastructure, economic freedom,
mobile penetration, and the presence of a commodity exchange, reduces price instability
strongly. Third, regional trade integration has great potential to stabilize markets. Fourth,
extensive public storage is not associated with lower price volatility. All of these results go
into the same direction. Generally speaking, markets are found to have a strong price sta-
bilizing effect. This should be understood as a main argument against public intervention
and for the liberalization of markets.
On the other hand, restrictive trade policies seem to isolate domestic from international
markets. Furthermore, storage in many developing countries is not sufficiently high and
governments are asked to use public means to increase the overall level of stocks to protect
consumers. Yet public storage cannot be introduced at a short notice and for a short time
period. Instead, storage structures need to be in place and effectively managed to have the
capacity to intervene when needed.
As a limitation of the analysis, the effect of agricultural policies on price volatility may not
be adequately measured as restrictive generalization are necessary to incorporate variables
into the model. The differences between general price volatility, irregular price changes,
and abrupt prices spikes are also not sufficiently explored. Moreover, it should be aimed at
gathering short term stock data to test the model in a particular country.
The case study on private trade and storage provides detailed insights on how grain markets
in Ghana, and possibly in other comparably countries, actually work. A number of issues
seem to be of particular relevance. First, stock-outs of traders at the end of the market-
ing year are likely responsible for occasional price spikes as hypothesized by the existing
literature. However, there may be ways to counteract. On the one hand, creating an in-
centive for traders to hold on stocks by hedging their risk from losses after price declines
in consequence of the incoming harvest. This could be achieved by a commodity exchange
or by providing access to international exchanges. On the other hand, public storage to
offset absent private stocks at the later time of the marketing year. Currently, the National
Food Buffer Company (NAFCO) maintains a total of intervention and emergency stocks of
about 40,000 and 25,000 metric tons for maize and rice, respectively. This corresponds to
national consumption of approximately one week. By the way of comparison, imports from
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the United States or Asia require a minimum of three to four weeks of time. Therefore,
stocks would need be expanded to at least bridge the time until imports arrive. More signif-
icant public intervention will also lead to private sector responses. To avoid a crowding-out
of private investment, the government should solely rely on emergency stocks which are not
held with the intention to regulate prices unless a severe food crisis is evident.
Then, the cost component of storage and trade should be taken into account. The survey
yielded relative low costs of storage as compared to the price of the commodity. Hence, sole
costs of storage cannot be responsible for an intra-annual price spread of up to 60 percent.
In contrast, transport costs constitute for a relatively large proportion of commodity prices.
Storage facilities are often located at urban centers due to the proximity to processing
companies and in order to exploit economies of scale. Therefore, costs of storage also
involve the transport to the storage facility and from the storage facility to the wholesale
market where the commodities are sold. This inflates the cost of storage. The government
could reduce these costs by providing storage facilities closer to production areas. This
could be in the form of a warehouse receipt system. Thereby, both traders and farmers
could store relatively small amounts at relatively low prices. As a side effect, this would
also reduce post-harvest losses significantly.
In line with the literature on heterogeneous traders, the data suggests that wholesale traders
in Ghana follow distinct stockholding strategies. Roughly three strategies can be identified:
firstly, an aggregating strategy which is used to accumulate stocks to sell them in bulk to
large wholesale traders, NAFCO, or processing companies; secondly, traditional speculation
with the goal to benefit from a seasonal increase in prices; lastly, working stocks in order
to be in the position to constantly supply to other traders or retailers. This has important
implications for policy making since the reaction to policy intervention varies within the
group of traders. At the same time, the heterogeneity can be exploited by encouraging a
particular business model.
The country case study is accompanied by several limitations. In particular three aspects
are of great relevance. First, on-farm storage is still not well understood. For instance, it
is not clear to what extent and for which purposes farmers hold stocks. Shifting storage
from farmers to trader would reduce post-harvest loss significantly. Second, what are the
underlying motives of traders to follow different stockholding strategies and what role do
price expectations and access to market information play? Third, what are the implication of
these research findings on the observed price dynamics? If possible all information collected
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could be utilized within an intra-annual simulation model that acknowledges heterogeneous
stockholders. In this way, a set of policies could be tested and evaluated under realistic
market conditions.
The simulation conducted in chapter six contains several important implications for regional
storage cooperation. First and foremost, it is shown theoretically and empirically that there
is a great potential for regional storage cooperation within an emergency reserve in West
Africa. Intra-regional trade of excess supply, at realistic margins, from surplus to deficient
countries reduces the probability of stock releases, but does not alter the regional stocking
norms significantly. A regional stabilization reserve requires full market integration among
member countries. In this instance, intra-regional trade stabilizes consumption variability
massively. Yet this is very unlikely, given the present economic reality with large differences
in price levels and multiple regional currencies.
Thus, it seems politically feasible to initiate regional storage cooperation within an emer-
gency reserve, albeit disagreements could also arise in an emergency reserve setting. Coun-
tries with relative stable national supply advocate for an emergency reserve that guarantees
high levels of minimum consumption. This is costly for countries characterized by great
supply variability which are satisfied with moderately low levels of minimum consumption.
Generally, it holds that: the larger the region, the larger the benefits from cooperation.
On the other hand, it must be ensured that countries, who carry most of the benefits from
cooperation, can be convinced. These countries exhibit a large share in regional supply and
low supply variability. As a matter of fact, larger countries are usually also characterized
with relatively stable supply patterns. Apart from this, cooperation within an emergency
reserve would allow member countries to continue using agricultural policies. Admittedly,
countries would have limited reasons to implement price stabilization programs or the en-
hance international trade if the reserve covers supply shortfalls [Johnson, 1976]. Likely, a
multi-national body would be needed to monitor national policy efforts for food security
in order to rule out free-riding of member countries who do under-report national supply
levels [Konandreas et al., 1978]. On the other hand, storage cooperation may enhance the
commitment to regional trade agreements since they are made partly accountable in case
of supply shortage in neighboring countries [Wright and Cafiero, 2011].
The concentration of the model on consumption variability, instead of price volatility, is
a simplification. In fact, many of the findings are still similar to those of more advanced
partial equilibrium modeling which include commodity prices [Larson et al., 2013; Gouel
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and Jean, 2015]. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to extend the analysis in this respect.
Secondly, incentives for countries to participate in regional storage cooperation should be
explored more thoroughly also by including the cost of coordination that limits the ideal
number of member countries. This exercise should include a grouping of countries according
to their reciprocal suitability with regards to supply patterns.
All recommendations made need to be also seen in light of the political economy in a given
country. Liberalization of markets was often proposed by economists, yet governments
did not have the strength to enforce reforms against the public and influential civil society
organizations. Even if this work emphasizes the role of private storage and trade to stabilize
prices, it also identifies room for public interventions and policies. For instance, strategic
reserves that do not directly impact on market prices, but represent a viable tool to overcome
short term supply shortages. At the same time, it is to note that many African countries
have used public storage in the past, however with limited success. Therefore, reserves
should be set up with highest possible transparency and a clear mandate of operation. On
the other side, governments can overcome market imperfections by investing in hard and
soft infrastructure. So, national stock levels can also be enhanced by providing incentives
for the private sector to invest in warehouses and a better distribution system.
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chapter 2
Table A.1: Wheat price volatility by market
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2.3 Bengkulu IDN 0.093 3 0.441 1 0.233 1
2.8 Harare ZWE 0.146 1 0.382 5 0.192 4 0.311 1
6.0 Khujand TJK 0.094 14 0.292 8 0.209 2 0.232 2 0.233 14
6.3 Bandar Lampung IDN 0.075 16 0.396 3 0.170 7 0.389 4
6.3 Semarang IDN 0.078 4 0.416 2 0.161 8
7.8 Khujand TJK 0.089 22 0.278 10 0.201 3 0.217 3 0.221 16
9.0 Bandung IDN 0.072 11 0.388 4 0.157 9
9.3 Aden YEM 0.107 6 0.237 15 0.151 13 0.207 6
10.0 Surabaya IDN 0.073 12 0.363 6 0.154 11
10.0 Gharm TJK 0.061 15 0.293 7 0.190 5 0.187 11 0.302 6
10.8 Gharm TJK 0.060 17 0.288 9 0.187 6 0.183 12 0.311 5
11.0 Al Hudaydah YEM 0.114 2 0.234 17 0.145 17 0.270 8
15.2 Gharm TJK 0.075 13 0.236 16 0.148 16 0.176 14 0.188 20
16.6 Khorog TJK 0.064 36 0.225 18 0.144 18 0.199 7 0.184 23
17.2 Khujand TJK 0.064 28 0.214 21 0.136 21 0.153 16 0.249 10
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18.4 Gharm TJK 0.052 72 0.240 13 0.155 10 0.198 8 0.189 19
18.6 Gharm TJK 0.068 21 0.224 19 0.142 19 0.162 15 0.174 25
19.4 Khorog TJK 0.060 43 0.217 20 0.139 20 0.187 10 0.175 24
20.0 Khujand TJK 0.059 34 0.211 22 0.135 22 0.145 20 0.246 12
20.6 Gharm TJK 0.049 80 0.238 14 0.154 12 0.195 9 0.187 21
20.8 Bahirdar ETH 0.091 9 0.187 27 0.106 31 0.179 13 0.161 27
20.8 Khujand TJK 0.061 31 0.208 23 0.131 25 0.149 18 0.193 18
21.0 Port Sudan SDN 0.085 7 0.193 25 0.113 30
21.8 Khorog TJK 0.057 46 0.189 26 0.122 28 0.454 3
22.8 Gharm TJK 0.039 114 0.244 11 0.150 14 0.214 4 0.250 9
24.4 Khujand TJK 0.057 37 0.205 24 0.129 26 0.143 21 0.185 22
25.2 Gharm TJK 0.036 130 0.241 12 0.149 15 0.212 5 0.248 11
26.6 Jijiga ETH 0.066 38 0.152 34 0.090 35 0.151 17 0.147 31
26.8 Khujand TJK 0.054 41 0.187 28 0.135 23 0.146 19 0.157 28
29.8 Khujand TJK 0.051 51 0.185 29 0.134 24 0.143 22 0.157 29
32.4 Khorog TJK 0.042 113 0.178 30 0.122 27 0.132 25 0.235 13
33.2 Jijiga ETH 0.058 63 0.138 36 0.083 39 0.129 27 0.130 39
34.0 Dire Dawa ETH 0.074 8 0.143 35 0.065 64 0.141 23 0.139 36
34.6 Khorog TJK 0.041 92 0.170 31 0.117 29 0.130 26 0.224 15
36.0 Kinshasa COD 0.057 44 0.161 32 0.089 36 0.108 45
37.4 Kadugli SDN 0.054 35 0.136 40 0.071 56 0.141 24 0.154 30
40.0 Mota ETH 0.055 29 0.132 43 0.079 43 0.128 40
40.8 Dushanbe TJK 0.046 98 0.136 39 0.081 41 0.125 32 0.131 38
42.6 Jaffna LKA 0.056 33 0.130 46 0.063 72 0.128 29 0.142 34
42.6 Sodo ETH 0.046 26 0.128 49 0.080 42 0.126 30 0.126 41
43.0 Kano NGA 0.050 96 0.135 41 0.079 44 0.122 35 0.120 49
43.4 Wekro ETH 0.054 20 0.130 45 0.079 45 0.119 38 0.120 50
43.6 Khorog TJK 0.042 97 0.158 33 0.103 32 0.124 33 0.119 52
44.6 Dire Dawa ETH 0.061 10 0.129 48 0.058 86 0.129 28 0.125 42
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46.0 Cayes HTI 0.041 65 0.127 50 0.094 33 0.125 31 0.124 43
46.6 Wekro ETH 0.052 25 0.132 42 0.083 40 0.106 49 0.110 58
47.0 Dhankuta NPL 0.044 56 0.137 37 0.091 34 0.099 57
47.2 Sodo ETH 0.046 23 0.124 55 0.077 47 0.122 36 0.122 45
48.4 Mota ETH 0.057 24 0.118 59 0.068 60 0.114 41 0.114 54
49.3 Ajeber ETH 0.058 5 0.113 65 0.064 66 0.115 40
50.0 Khujand TJK 0.052 30 0.126 52 0.072 54 0.119 51
51.0 Ajeber ETH 0.055 18 0.117 60 0.065 65 0.118 39 0.111 56
51.8 Jeremie HTI 0.052 45 0.126 51 0.064 71 0.122 44
52.2 Yabelo ETH 0.044 50 0.124 54 0.064 69 0.124 34 0.122 46
52.3 Mbandaka COD 0.045 87 0.130 47 0.071 55
54.4 Yabelo ETH 0.042 48 0.123 56 0.064 68 0.122 37 0.121 47
55.4 Sana’a YEM 0.049 91 0.115 61 0.064 67 0.107 47 0.117 53
55.8 Ampara LKA 0.041 53 0.137 38 0.076 48 0.085 85 0.133 37
56.5 Dushanbe TJK 0.043 106 0.131 44 0.078 46 0.098 74
59.4 Achham NPL 0.043 61 0.099 91 0.084 37 0.087 80 0.164 26
60.8 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.032 81 0.121 57 0.074 50 0.109 43 0.108 60
61.3 Nouakchott MRT 0.041 121 0.115 62 0.073 52
62.6 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.032 88 0.120 58 0.073 53 0.108 44 0.107 61
62.8 Mekele ETH 0.055 19 0.109 71 0.051 101 0.108 46
63.3 Gaza Strip PSE 0.041 99 0.125 53 0.059 83 0.121 48
65.8 Kersa ETH 0.047 32 0.112 67 0.058 87 0.108 59
66.4 Dushanbe TJK 0.033 205 0.111 69 0.070 57 0.105 50 0.104 66
67.2 Libreville GAB 0.054 68 0.100 88 0.059 82 0.100 55 0.099 73
67.3 Surkhet NPL 0.034 89 0.113 64 0.075 49
68.2 Kosti SDN 0.049 39 0.103 85 0.059 84 0.104 52 0.101 72
68.7 Adel Bagrou MRT 0.053 54 0.100 87 0.061 79
69.2 Dushanbe TJK 0.031 211 0.110 70 0.070 58 0.104 51 0.104 68
70.3 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.036 149 0.109 74 0.062 75 0.106 48
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73.3 Kersa ETH 0.045 40 0.107 75 0.056 93 0.103 69
73.7 Chisinau MDA 0.058 42 0.105 80 0.046 114
74.8 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.032 159 0.104 82 0.060 81 0.100 54 0.107 62
75.8 Bandim GNB 0.038 94 0.104 83 0.066 63 0.095 78
77.4 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.029 103 0.106 76 0.061 78 0.098 59 0.104 65
78.4 Cayes HTI 0.044 64 0.112 66 0.031 172 0.111 42 0.113 55
79.0 Kathmandu NPL 0.036 85 0.097 94 0.062 74 0.098 60 0.094 82
79.4 Abi Adi ETH 0.046 27 0.098 93 0.048 108 0.095 64 0.094 80
81.4 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.028 112 0.105 79 0.061 80 0.095 63 0.104 67
82.4 Jacmel HTI 0.033 137 0.105 81 0.044 122 0.103 53 0.107 63
82.5 Dhanusha NPL 0.037 156 0.105 78 0.083 38 0.065 133
84.4 Maymana AFG 0.026 148 0.109 72 0.062 76 0.092 70 0.101 71
84.8 Jumla NPL 0.024 165 0.106 77 0.073 51 0.098 58 0.094 81
85.0 Kabul AFG 0.026 139 0.109 73 0.062 77 0.089 75 0.107 64
87.8 Mazar e Serif AFG 0.030 175 0.097 95 0.051 98 0.094 65 0.095 79
89.3 Dese ETH 0.037 57 0.096 98 0.045 117 0.095 62
89.4 Parsa NPL 0.040 104 0.097 96 0.057 88 0.083 92 0.085 97
89.4 Jalalabad AFG 0.030 203 0.100 89 0.045 118 0.096 61 0.096 75
90.6 Harari ETH 0.038 60 0.092 106 0.048 106 0.090 74 0.089 89
92.2 Kandahar AFG 0.025 179 0.112 68 0.063 73 0.089 78 0.086 95
92.6 Kandahar AFG 0.025 201 0.115 63 0.067 61 0.085 86 0.082 103
92.6 Illam NPL 0.043 71 0.102 86 0.070 59 0.071 108 0.057 149
95.8 Abi Adi ETH 0.044 49 0.093 103 0.036 154 0.091 73 0.089 90
96.8 Hirat AFG 0.029 62 0.094 101 0.044 123 0.093 67 0.092 83
97.2 Kabul AFG 0.029 147 0.097 97 0.051 99 0.086 84 0.087 93
100.4 Jimma ETH 0.033 66 0.090 112 0.043 130 0.086 83 0.092 86
100.4 Kabul AFG 0.023 151 0.098 92 0.053 95 0.092 71 0.092 85
101.8 Quetta PAK 0.030 182 0.088 117 0.066 62 0.068 113 0.073 116
103.4 Hinche HTI 0.039 52 0.092 107 0.043 131 0.084 90 0.074 112
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105.2 Jalalabad AFG 0.025 176 0.091 108 0.048 107 0.092 69 0.088 91
105.2 Kassala SDN 0.034 127 0.086 119 0.041 138 0.087 81 0.084 101
105.4 Quetta PAK 0.034 157 0.084 122 0.064 70 0.063 121 0.069 126
105.8 Jalalabad AFG 0.023 192 0.094 100 0.047 111 0.091 72 0.091 88
105.8 Kabul AFG 0.026 133 0.089 114 0.051 100 0.089 76 0.085 99
107.4 Faizabad AFG 0.021 212 0.094 102 0.052 97 0.093 66 0.091 87
107.6 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.025 128 0.092 105 0.057 89 0.078 97 0.082 102
108.2 Hirat AFG 0.028 74 0.091 110 0.039 142 0.089 77 0.088 92
108.4 Kandahar AFG 0.018 238 0.099 90 0.058 85 0.086 82 0.096 76
108.8 Awasa ETH 0.042 67 0.081 125 0.034 159 0.083 91 0.081 104
109.7 Ibadan NGA 0.039 93 0.087 118 0.041 136
111.4 Fayzabad AFG 0.020 193 0.092 104 0.050 102 0.092 68 0.086 94
112.0 Herat AFG 0.021 191 0.085 121 0.036 152 0.076 100 0.275 7
112.4 Maimana AFG 0.022 124 0.090 113 0.045 119 0.085 87 0.096 77
112.6 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.024 140 0.091 111 0.057 91 0.076 99 0.080 106
114.4 Batticaloa LKA 0.030 109 0.084 123 0.033 162 0.077 98 0.092 84
114.6 Dushanbe TJK 0.026 194 0.078 127 0.047 110 0.080 94 0.078 108
115.6 Peshawar PAK 0.031 125 0.074 136 0.050 103 0.069 109 0.065 132
117.5 Bhopal IND 0.042 59 0.073 142 0.035 157 0.071 105
117.8 Addis Ababa ETH 0.030 79 0.078 126 0.036 153 0.079 95 0.077 109
118.4 Dushanbe TJK 0.025 190 0.077 130 0.046 113 0.079 96 0.077 110
120.4 Diredawa ETH 0.037 77 0.073 140 0.034 161 0.073 101 0.073 118
120.6 Mazar AFG 0.020 223 0.091 109 0.047 109 0.084 89 0.081 105
120.8 Herat AFG 0.020 245 0.094 99 0.044 125 0.082 93 0.084 100
121.0 Jalalabad AFG 0.025 161 0.088 116 0.043 132 0.084 88
121.5 Addis Ababa ETH 0.029 105 0.077 129 0.042 133 0.073 117
123.2 Dushanbe TJK 0.027 196 0.074 135 0.040 139 0.072 104 0.074 113
123.2 Dushanbe TJK 0.028 187 0.074 137 0.040 140 0.071 106 0.073 114
123.6 Minsk BLR 0.033 75 0.072 145 0.040 141 0.072 103 0.061 137
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123.6 Herat AFG 0.026 144 0.103 84 0.010 278 0.099 56 0.101 70
124.3 Jalalabad AFG 0.021 188 0.089 115 0.043 127 0.088 79
125.3 Kaski NPL 0.028 180 0.073 141 0.045 120 0.062 123
131.3 Trincomalee LKA 0.029 142 0.076 131 0.031 171 0.069 111
131.8 Mumbai IND 0.027 101 0.069 154 0.038 146 0.069 110 0.069 125
132.2 Cap Haitien HTI 0.025 118 0.068 157 0.023 206 0.066 117 0.140 35
132.3 Rolpa NPL 0.018 195 0.085 120 0.056 92 0.080 107
133.3 San Salvador SLV 0.026 229 0.082 124 0.039 145
133.8 Kandahar AFG 0.027 164 0.075 132 0.035 158 0.070 122
135.6 Lahore PAK 0.027 225 0.063 176 0.049 105 0.059 129 0.060 142
135.8 Ouanaminthe HTI 0.029 70 0.071 146 0.033 165 0.070 124
136.6 Morang NPL 0.030 123 0.066 165 0.039 144 0.061 125 0.057 146
137.5 Port-au-Prince HTI 0.027 111 0.075 134 0.032 167 0.071 121
138.2 Banke NPL 0.016 251 0.074 139 0.053 94 0.071 107 0.072 120
138.2 Peshawar PAK 0.029 115 0.066 161 0.044 124 0.057 132 0.054 159
138.5 Ouanaminthe HTI 0.027 83 0.068 156 0.029 181 0.086 96
139.4 Naryn KGZ 0.023 132 0.069 155 0.019 228 0.065 120 0.147 32
139.8 Gaza Strip PSE 0.026 237 0.070 149 0.031 173 0.069 112 0.068 127
140.5 Lahore PAK 0.025 185 0.063 174 0.047 112 0.056 134
142.0 Quetta PAK 0.020 244 0.074 138 0.057 90 0.056 154
144.0 Bhopal IND 0.025 143 0.070 151 0.038 148 0.062 136
145.8 Kandahar AFG 0.023 171 0.071 147 0.031 175 0.067 115 0.066 131
147.0 Karachi PAK 0.017 170 0.072 144 0.052 96 0.068 128
147.6 Yaundé CMR 0.023 210 0.062 180 0.046 115 0.056 135 0.058 145
148.8 Boghé MRT 0.025 110 0.073 143 0.025 201 0.072 102
149.6 Batken KGZ 0.029 76 0.066 163 0.023 208 0.062 124 0.060 139
150.6 Batken KGZ 0.019 122 0.057 192 0.022 210 0.057 133 0.205 17
150.8 Cap-Haitien HTI 0.026 107 0.070 150 0.023 205 0.066 116
150.8 Vavuniya LKA 0.025 126 0.068 158 0.020 224 0.063 122 0.085 98
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151.3 National Average URY 0.036 47 0.078 128 0.028 240
151.5 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.029 119 0.066 162 0.024 204 0.068 129
151.6 Nili AFG 0.029 73 0.070 153 0.017 245 0.068 114 0.066 130
153.0 Kailali NPL 0.019 200 0.064 171 0.043 129 0.061 127 0.060 141
153.8 Rupandehi NPL 0.020 197 0.063 178 0.045 121 0.057 130 0.057 147
154.2 Jhapa NPL 0.018 146 0.061 183 0.045 116 0.061 126 0.061 138
154.6 Karachi PAK 0.022 141 0.065 168 0.041 135 0.055 136 0.054 160
156.4 National Average CRI 0.021 160 0.063 177 0.036 156 0.061 128 0.058 143
157.5 Benguluru IND 0.017 204 0.066 164 0.049 104 0.060 140
157.8 Peshawar PAK 0.023 135 0.059 185 0.041 137 0.051 146 0.053 161
159.6 Nili AFG 0.026 86 0.070 152 0.015 254 0.065 119 0.065 134
162.0 Barisal BGD 0.027 145 0.066 166 0.019 234 0.073 119
163.0 Bujumbura BDI 0.025 213 0.066 167 0.030 178
163.2 Bangui CAF 0.019 189 0.058 187 0.044 126 0.055 139 0.052 166
165.0 Kabul AFG 0.021 172 0.075 133 0.028 183
165.3 Sughd TJK 0.032 55 0.059 186 0.020 226 0.056 153
166.0 Multan PAK 0.020 173 0.056 196 0.039 143 0.054 140 0.053 163
166.6 Jalal-Abad KGZ 0.024 102 0.065 169 0.012 268 0.065 118 0.070 123
169.8 Yogyakarta IDN 0.016 234 0.067 159 0.032 168 0.052 143 0.057 152
170.8 Medan IDN 0.010 253 0.054 207 0.020 222 0.048 157 0.857 1
171.3 Montevideo URY 0.027 78 0.070 148 0.029 239
171.8 Peshawar PAK 0.024 69 0.055 204 0.032 170 0.048 159
172.0 Gharm TJK 0.022 202 0.056 198 0.026 192 0.055 137 0.053 165
174.4 Multan PAK 0.023 154 0.052 221 0.038 147 0.051 145 0.045 194
175.5 Jaipur IND 0.022 158 0.053 214 0.036 151 0.052 167
175.8 Karachi PAK 0.013 241 0.062 181 0.043 128 0.057 148
176.5 Mannar LKA 0.022 136 0.067 160 0.020 225 0.049 152
176.6 Lahore PAK 0.019 240 0.053 211 0.042 134 0.048 161 0.049 175
176.8 Gonaives HTI 0.018 227 0.063 179 0.030 179 0.062 135
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177.8 Osh KGZ 0.026 84 0.064 173 0.007 288 0.073 115
178.8 Kupang IDN 0.013 255 0.064 172 0.026 190 0.057 131 0.056 157
179.7 Dhaka BGD 0.031 90 0.063 175 0.013 264
180.0 Sao Paulo BRA 0.017 235 0.056 200 0.033 163 0.050 148 0.050 171
182.3 Peshawar PAK 0.027 58 0.058 189 0.018 236
182.4 Multan PAK 0.022 95 0.048 235 0.032 169 0.048 160 0.048 181
182.4 Abuja NGA 0.019 178 0.051 226 0.038 149 0.048 155 0.048 179
182.6 Patna IND 0.021 152 0.050 227 0.027 187 0.050 149 0.050 173
183.0 National Average TJK 0.020 138 0.047 239 0.008 283 0.047 166 0.143 33
183.3 Rajshahi BGD 0.021 131 0.053 216 0.050 151
183.8 West Bank PSE 0.013 226 0.055 203 0.031 177 0.055 138 0.055 158
184.2 Port-de-Paix HTI 0.014 228 0.045 248 0.016 251 0.037 183 0.784 2
184.3 Dushanbe TJK 0.021 163 0.065 170 0.025 199
186.7 Gonaives HTI 0.019 209 0.062 182 0.031 174
187.3 Delhi IND 0.018 215 0.054 206 0.037 150 0.048 180
187.4 Bishkek KGZ 0.019 162 0.060 184 0.018 242 0.044 171 0.058 144
188.8 Hyderabad IND 0.015 248 0.053 212 0.036 155 0.048 162 0.047 182
190.4 Aceh IDN 0.006 295 0.058 190 0.023 207 0.050 150 0.074 111
191.4 Manado IDN 0.012 274 0.057 191 0.022 211 0.051 147 0.057 151
191.5 Chennai IND 0.017 242 0.053 217 0.033 164 0.052 168
191.6 West Bank PSE 0.023 214 0.047 241 0.025 196 0.046 170 0.046 187
191.6 Multan PAK 0.021 100 0.046 246 0.029 180 0.046 168 0.046 183
192.0 Patna IND 0.020 166 0.053 215 0.033 166
192.0 Samarinda IDN 0.010 272 0.057 195 0.025 198 0.054 141 0.056 156
192.7 Sylhet BGD 0.024 134 0.058 188 0.018 237
194.0 Kathmandu NPL 0.021 198 0.049 230 0.031 176 0.045 188
195.6 Banjarmasin IDN 0.009 290 0.056 197 0.027 189 0.047 165 0.057 150
195.6 Lucknow IND 0.020 155 0.046 245 0.024 203 0.049 154 0.046 186
197.3 Dhaka BGD 0.026 116 0.055 202 0.007 286 0.053 164
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197.8 Khulna BGD 0.018 177 0.052 220 0.017 244 0.052 142 0.050 172
197.8 National Average KGZ 0.019 153 0.057 194 0.013 263 0.039 178 0.056 155
198.4 Lahore PAK 0.022 117 0.042 255 0.028 185 0.041 175 0.041 204
198.6 Palembang IDN 0.012 283 0.057 193 0.022 209 0.048 158 0.049 177
199.8 Port-de-Paix HTI 0.014 233 0.045 250 0.015 253 0.111 57
200.0 Colombo City LKA 0.019 183 0.049 229 0.025 195 0.050 169
202.0 Panama City PAN 0.019 216 0.044 252 0.027 188 0.044 172 0.043 198
202.5 Multan PAK 0.017 184 0.047 237 0.034 160 0.045 189
205.6 Jayapura IDN 0.011 250 0.054 208 0.022 215 0.046 169 0.050 174
205.8 Gaza Strip PSE 0.018 207 0.048 233 0.026 193 0.046 185
206.4 Kendari IDN 0.007 300 0.053 218 0.021 220 0.051 144 0.053 162
207.0 Causeni MDA 0.017 230 0.055 205 0.025 200
208.0 National Average NIC 0.022 206 0.045 249 0.022 213 0.045 195
208.4 Palangkaraya IDN 0.011 268 0.054 210 0.019 227 0.047 164 0.049 178
209.0 Minsk BLR 0.022 82 0.042 254 0.010 275 0.042 174 0.050 170
210.6 Chittagong BGD 0.016 169 0.051 225 0.012 270 0.049 153 0.049 176
211.0 Ambon IDN 0.010 267 0.052 219 0.022 212 0.047 167 0.046 184
211.5 Ahmedabad IND 0.014 264 0.047 236 0.028 184 0.045 190
212.0 Palpa NPL 0.014 218 0.050 228 0.028 182 0.041 203
212.8 National Average TJK 0.016 217 0.047 240 0.026 191 0.045 192
214.3 Jambi IDN 0.011 285 0.056 199 0.026 194 0.043 199
214.3 Mumbai IND 0.014 243 0.047 238 0.028 186 0.045 193
216.0 Khatlon TJK 0.022 108 0.041 261 0.036 216
217.0 Jalal-Abad KGZ 0.016 181 0.054 209 0.005 294 0.048 156 0.044 196
217.3 Pekanbaru IDN 0.012 256 0.052 222 0.021 221 0.042 173
217.6 Dhaka BGD 0.019 150 0.049 231 0.003 297 0.047 163 0.045 191
218.4 S.Antao CPV 0.016 232 0.039 265 0.021 217 0.040 177 0.040 207
219.3 S.Vincente CPV 0.014 261 0.047 242 0.025 197 0.043 200
220.6 Padang IDN 0.010 265 0.052 223 0.019 233 0.038 181 0.044 197
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220.8 Ulaanbaatar MNG 0.017 208 0.048 232 0.010 274 0.037 182 0.042 201
221.7 Palu IDN 0.012 269 0.055 201 0.022 214
221.8 National Average URY 0.017 167 0.041 257 0.019 231 0.041 176
223.2 Dushanbe TJK 0.020 129 0.041 256 0.010 277 0.039 179 0.038 212
225.3 Naryn KGZ 0.017 199 0.046 244 0.016 249 0.034 187
228.0 Ujung Pandang IDN 0.009 266 0.053 213 0.021 219 0.040 206
229.8 Bishkek KGZ 0.013 222 0.046 247 0.018 238 0.032 191 0.034 224
230.0 Montevideo URY 0.016 174 0.019 235
232.2 West Bank PSE 0.012 254 0.041 262 0.018 241 0.036 185 0.037 214
233.3 Trivandrum IND 0.013 219 0.044 253 0.024 202
234.3 Nairobi KEN 0.013 257 0.041 259 0.020 223 0.039 208
234.8 Jakarta IDN 0.011 263 0.048 234 0.019 230 0.036 215
236.5 Colombo LKA 0.014 231 0.041 260 0.016 247 0.041 205
237.8 Sao Paulo BRA 0.009 284 0.040 264 0.014 259 0.038 180 0.038 211
238.0 Pontianak IDN 0.010 273 0.052 224 0.018 240 0.036 217
238.2 Mumbai IND 0.013 249 0.033 277 0.014 258 0.034 186 0.034 222
238.4 National Average GEO 0.011 247 0.035 271 0.018 239 0.033 189 0.033 227
238.6 Douala CMR 0.012 246 0.032 281 0.019 232 0.032 190 0.031 232
238.8 National Average BLR 0.017 168 0.035 272 0.006 292 0.034 188 0.034 223
240.0 Gaza Strip PSE 0.012 270 0.039 268 0.019 229 0.039 209
241.8 Kampala UGA 0.013 259 0.033 278 0.021 218 0.032 229
243.0 Bhubaneshwar IND 0.009 271 0.034 275 0.021 216 0.042 202
245.2 Chennai IND 0.012 224 0.031 286 0.013 262 0.031 192 0.031 235
247.0 Osh KGZ 0.008 278 0.035 273 0.008 282 0.037 184 0.037 213
248.4 Nairobi KEN 0.008 288 0.031 284 0.013 261 0.029 194 0.036 218
248.8 National Average BLR 0.019 120 0.036 269 0.003 300 0.035 221
248.8 Chennai IND 0.013 236 0.033 276 0.016 250 0.032 228
251.3 National Average AZE 0.007 301 0.039 266 0.017 243 0.038 210
252.5 Karachi PAK 0.010 252 0.039 267 0.015 252 0.036 219
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253.5 Shillong IND 0.009 260 0.032 280 0.013 265 0.029 193
254.0 Denpasar IDN 0.006 289 0.047 243 0.014 256 0.035 220
254.3 National Average KGZ 0.012 221 0.040 263 0.011 273 0.033 226
254.5 New Delhi IND 0.015 186 0.032 282 0.011 271 0.031 233
256.0 Karachi PAK 0.011 239 0.041 258 0.016 246
256.3 Nouakchott MRT 0.011 258 0.035 270 0.012 269 0.033 225
258.8 Mataram IDN 0.008 292 0.045 251 0.011 272 0.031 231
259.7 Santiago CPV 0.012 220 0.033 279 0.016 248
264.8 West Bank PSE 0.009 277 0.030 287 0.014 255 0.030 237
265.5 National Average ARM 0.009 287 0.031 283 0.012 267 0.031 234
267.5 National Average GTM 0.008 275 0.027 288 0.014 257 0.026 241
269.0 National Average ARM 0.010 286 0.031 285 0.007 287 0.031 236
270.0 National Average GTM 0.007 281 0.026 289 0.014 260 0.024 242
271.0 National Average AZE 0.008 282 0.034 274 0.003 298 0.032 230
275.8 National Average GEO 0.007 262 0.024 290 0.009 280 0.021 243
276.0 National Average IDN 0.007 276 0.019 294 0.014 247
281.3 National Average ARM 0.006 280 0.019 295 0.007 291 0.019 244
281.5 National Average RUS 0.006 296 0.019 296 0.007 289 0.019 245
282.5 Lima PER 0.004 298 0.017 297 0.006 293 0.029 238
282.5 National Average ARM 0.005 297 0.017 299 0.008 285 0.016 246
284.0 National Average CHN 0.007 293 0.012 302 0.003 295 0.012 248
287.3 Niamey NER 0.004 302 0.021 293 0.012 266
288.3 Santiago CHL 0.007 303 0.022 291 0.008 281
288.7 National Average TUN 0.007 279 0.017 298 0.010 276
288.8 Lima PER 0.002 305 0.009 304 0.003 296 0.008 250
288.8 Lima PER 0.002 304 0.011 303 0.003 299 0.009 249
292.3 National Average TUN 0.006 291 0.016 300 0.009 279
293.7 National Average RUS 0.006 299 0.021 292 0.007 290
295.3 National Average TUN 0.005 294 0.014 301 0.008 284
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304.0 Maputo MOZ 0.000 306 0.000 305 0.000 301
Source: Author’s computation based on ZEF [2014].
Table A.2: Maize price volatility by market
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4.4 Man CIV 0.160 5 0.306 5 0.162 7 0.282 2 0.281 3
8.3 Mtakataka MWI 0.148 12 0.275 7 0.153 9 0.261 5
12.8 Bugarama RWA 0.131 19 0.246 13 0.178 6 0.231 13
13.8 Rwagitima RWA 0.152 8 0.257 9 0.123 31 0.241 7 0.234 14
14.5 Mitundu MWI 0.150 11 0.252 11 0.135 21 0.234 15
16.0 Harare ZWE 0.102 74 0.357 2 0.214 1 0.312 1 0.300 2
19.3 Nanjiri MWI 0.138 13 0.233 23 0.124 29 0.233 12
20.8 Rukomo RWA 0.165 4 0.255 10 0.107 60 0.241 8 0.218 22
21.8 Salima MWI 0.110 53 0.249 12 0.143 14 0.245 8
23.3 Milange MOZ 0.171 3 0.237 18 0.116 45 0.212 27
23.3 Congo - Nil RWA 0.128 22 0.232 24 0.142 15 0.209 32
24.4 Buale SOM 0.092 100 0.324 3 0.198 3 0.250 5 0.238 11
24.6 Lunzu MWI 0.153 6 0.226 27 0.111 54 0.226 16 0.220 20
25.4 Thete MWI 0.178 1 0.235 21 0.098 75 0.234 11 0.224 19
25.6 Buale SOM 0.094 97 0.321 4 0.194 4 0.246 6 0.231 17
28.8 Mukarange RWA 0.153 7 0.230 25 0.097 82 0.224 17 0.235 13
30.0 Harare ZWE 0.099 87 0.370 1 0.202 2
31.0 Mitundu MWI 0.122 29 0.220 31 0.119 39 0.206 25
31.3 Baidao SOM 0.103 71 0.244 14 0.124 30 0.241 10
32.0 Baidoa SOM 0.102 75 0.237 17 0.116 47 0.236 9 0.235 12
34.0 Bouake CIV 0.090 108 0.234 22 0.154 8 0.231 14 0.226 18
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34.8 Salima MWI 0.099 86 0.221 30 0.129 24 0.219 18 0.234 16
35.0 Afgoi SOM 0.116 42 0.219 32 0.117 43 0.209 23 0.207 35
35.6 Lunzu MWI 0.137 14 0.210 38 0.100 71 0.210 22 0.208 33
38.3 Kasempa ZMB 0.118 33 0.214 36 0.110 55 0.212 29
38.6 Afmadow SOM 0.076 169 0.260 8 0.188 5 0.261 4 0.251 7
39.0 Kawambwa ZMB 0.117 40 0.200 49 0.121 36 0.209 31
39.0 Mwinilunga ZMB 0.109 60 0.219 33 0.118 42 0.206 26 0.208 34
39.4 Delo ETH 0.078 152 0.243 16 0.150 10 0.236 10 0.242 9
41.4 Bushenge RWA 0.106 66 0.207 43 0.129 25 0.205 27 0.191 46
42.0 Anie TGO 0.118 37 0.199 53 0.113 49 0.198 32 0.197 39
46.4 Mbandaka COD 0.113 49 0.197 56 0.113 50 0.198 33 0.192 44
48.3 Mzimba MWI 0.128 21 0.190 71 0.000 0.187 47 0.188 54
49.3 Nyakarambi RWA 0.135 16 0.243 15 0.081 151 0.231 15
50.0 Karonga MWI 0.152 9 0.198 55 0.090 102 0.198 34
50.6 Delo ETH 0.076 168 0.222 28 0.139 17 0.216 19 0.219 21
51.0 Rumphi MWI 0.132 18 0.201 48 0.093 98 0.189 46 0.192 45
51.8 Bouake CIV 0.102 77 0.192 62 0.128 27 0.190 44 0.189 49
51.8 Chiradzulu MWI 0.136 15 0.207 42 0.084 130 0.201 30 0.193 42
52.0 Rukomo RWA 0.094 98 0.207 41 0.138 18 0.189 51
52.8 Namwera MWI 0.113 48 0.209 39 0.084 128 0.209 24 0.213 25
54.0 Mongu ZMB 0.104 68 0.205 45 0.118 41 0.181 53 0.184 63
54.2 Nsanje MWI 0.134 17 0.199 52 0.095 88 0.182 52 0.184 62
55.2 Amegnran TGO 0.070 186 0.226 26 0.148 13 0.213 21 0.211 30
55.4 Ntaja MWI 0.172 2 0.218 34 0.072 195 0.215 20 0.213 26
59.6 Nchalo MWI 0.125 27 0.200 50 0.097 81 0.180 54 0.173 86
61.6 Kisangani COD 0.097 92 0.196 57 0.108 57 0.190 42 0.186 60
62.4 Wolenchiti ETH 0.108 63 0.186 75 0.098 80 0.191 41 0.188 53
63.0 Balaka MWI 0.127 24 0.193 61 0.086 121 0.186 50 0.186 59
63.2 Juba SSD 0.080 138 0.190 73 0.122 33 0.186 49 0.216 23
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65.8 Lugh SOM 0.060 232 0.222 29 0.140 16 0.202 28 0.216 24
67.0 Karonga MWI 0.127 25 0.183 83 0.094 92 0.180 68
67.6 Yabelo ETH 0.080 139 0.193 60 0.101 67 0.194 35 0.204 37
68.2 Borama SOM 0.065 203 0.212 37 0.128 26 0.193 37 0.201 38
69.6 Yabelo ETH 0.082 128 0.192 66 0.099 74 0.191 40 0.196 40
70.8 Lilongwe MWI 0.110 56 0.184 80 0.100 72 0.177 75
71.0 Mandera KEN 0.052 296 0.282 6 0.117 44 0.279 3 0.253 6
71.6 Mwanza MWI 0.130 20 0.192 63 0.076 174 0.194 36 0.183 65
72.0 Ngabu MWI 0.128 23 0.191 70 0.085 124 0.178 58 0.173 85
73.6 Serenje ZMB 0.110 55 0.180 90 0.097 85 0.180 56 0.175 82
73.8 Nsanje MWI 0.119 31 0.181 89 0.090 106 0.180 69
75.8 Bangula MWI 0.124 28 0.195 59 0.075 177 0.192 39
76.5 Kasama ZMB 0.103 69 0.185 77 0.094 96 0.183 64
78.0 Nkhotakota MWI 0.127 26 0.192 67 0.079 158 0.185 61
78.5 Angonia MOZ 0.119 32 0.196 58 0.075 181 0.193 43
79.5 Nsundwe MWI 0.104 67 0.190 72 0.083 131 0.186 48
80.0 Bangui CAF 0.083 123 0.183 82 0.121 35
81.8 Mzimba MWI 0.078 149 0.175 106 0.122 32 0.174 66 0.186 56
83.0 Kabwe Rural ZMB 0.087 114 0.180 95 0.118 40 0.175 83
83.8 Nsanje MWI 0.117 39 0.184 78 0.078 163 0.177 61 0.176 78
84.5 Qorioley SOM 0.113 50 0.192 65 0.076 173 0.189 50
86.0 Ntcheu MWI 0.114 44 0.180 91 0.083 134 0.173 68 0.170 93
87.3 Mpika ZMB 0.111 51 0.176 103 0.090 108
88.6 Gharm TJK 0.045 356 0.237 19 0.150 11 0.201 29 0.212 28
88.7 Kitui KEN 0.080 143 0.203 46 0.098 77
89.4 Korbongou TGO 0.071 181 0.184 81 0.114 48 0.176 64 0.178 73
90.6 Mogadishu SOM 0.083 126 0.175 105 0.100 73 0.175 65 0.174 84
91.0 Nkhata Bay MWI 0.118 34 0.185 76 0.067 223 0.184 51 0.178 71
91.0 Luwingu ZMB 0.086 119 0.174 111 0.100 70 0.177 63 0.170 92
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91.8 Gharm TJK 0.044 360 0.236 20 0.149 12 0.199 31 0.206 36
92.3 Muloza MWI 0.118 36 0.180 92 0.081 147 0.169 94
92.6 Jamame SOM 0.062 227 0.205 44 0.107 59 0.168 78 0.187 55
93.6 Gorongosa MOZ 0.106 65 0.182 86 0.081 145 0.170 74 0.168 98
93.6 Nikki BEN 0.092 101 0.170 122 0.102 66 0.168 79 0.166 100
95.8 Khujand TJK 0.057 253 0.202 47 0.137 19 0.161 93 0.180 67
99.3 Katako NER 0.076 167 0.209 40 0.113 51 0.154 139
100.6 Wolenchiti ETH 0.101 78 0.172 118 0.086 122 0.168 77 0.164 108
101.6 Ribaue MOZ 0.114 45 0.180 94 0.063 238 0.179 57 0.178 74
101.8 Chitipa MWI 0.151 10 0.198 54 0.058 267 0.177 76
102.7 Esteli NIC 0.073 176 0.178 98 0.121 34
104.8 Khujand TJK 0.054 278 0.200 51 0.136 20 0.157 103 0.178 72
104.8 Lizulu MWI 0.110 54 0.180 93 0.063 239 0.178 59 0.176 79
106.0 Mponela MWI 0.116 41 0.192 64 0.048 322 0.190 45 0.186 58
106.8 Sodo ETH 0.098 88 0.176 102 0.081 150 0.173 87
107.4 Senanga ZMB 0.077 156 0.173 116 0.105 62 0.157 104 0.166 99
108.2 Ntchisi MWI 0.103 70 0.191 68 0.052 299 0.193 38 0.182 66
110.0 Sare Bojo GMB 0.076 163 0.165 131 0.107 58 0.165 82 0.161 116
110.3 Chimbiya MWI 0.091 102 0.173 112 0.080 157 0.172 70
110.6 Merka SOM 0.111 52 0.175 109 0.062 249 0.177 62 0.176 81
111.8 Barra GMB 0.061 229 0.184 79 0.112 52 0.180 55 0.153 144
112.8 Nyagatare RWA 0.109 58 0.175 107 0.065 231 0.170 73 0.169 95
113.6 Doblei SOM 0.059 238 0.178 99 0.116 46 0.165 84 0.166 101
114.4 Kismayo SOM 0.044 362 0.214 35 0.094 91 0.190 43 0.195 41
114.5 Samfya ZMB 0.108 61 0.174 110 0.071 196 0.171 91
116.0 Petauke ZMB 0.073 173 0.163 137 0.103 63 0.165 86 0.161 121
117.5 Jeremie HTI 0.070 187 0.180 96 0.086 117 0.179 70
120.0 Kitui KEN 0.058 247 0.177 100 0.106 61 0.172 69 0.160 123
121.4 Mogadishu SOM 0.098 89 0.171 121 0.067 218 0.169 75 0.165 104
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121.8 Basse Santa su GMB 0.066 201 0.161 148 0.120 37 0.159 98 0.159 125
122.6 Manica MOZ 0.120 30 0.165 132 0.062 245 0.163 88 0.161 118
123.8 Ngabu MWI 0.100 81 0.167 126 0.075 179 0.160 95 0.155 138
123.8 Gode ETH 0.062 223 0.173 115 0.098 78 0.153 114 0.171 89
124.6 Dwangwa MWI 0.113 47 0.175 104 0.054 286 0.167 80 0.164 106
124.6 Mzuzu MWI 0.101 79 0.163 143 0.076 170 0.158 101 0.157 130
125.3 Sodo ETH 0.099 84 0.166 127 0.077 165
125.6 Kismayo SOM 0.054 284 0.182 88 0.102 64 0.165 85 0.164 107
125.8 Dushanbe TJK 0.050 304 0.188 74 0.130 23 0.166 102
126.2 Kaoma ZMB 0.086 118 0.166 128 0.081 149 0.159 99 0.155 137
127.5 Jilib SOM 0.062 224 0.183 85 0.081 144 0.186 57
128.2 Kasama ZMB 0.090 107 0.156 162 0.088 113 0.155 107 0.151 152
128.3 Nchelenge ZMB 0.102 76 0.167 125 0.074 185 0.159 127
129.0 Manica MOZ 0.118 38 0.173 117 0.051 309 0.170 72 0.164 109
129.2 Ruhuha RWA 0.087 117 0.157 157 0.085 125 0.156 105 0.154 142
129.8 Mzuzu MWI 0.091 103 0.164 136 0.073 191 0.161 91 0.159 128
130.0 Dushanbe TJK 0.048 333 0.191 69 0.131 22 0.169 96
130.8 Kabwe ZMB 0.082 129 0.163 142 0.098 76 0.146 130 0.143 177
131.4 Luchenza MWI 0.098 90 0.165 130 0.069 211 0.160 94 0.156 132
131.5 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.062 226 0.175 108 0.088 115 0.177 77
132.0 Marka SOM 0.107 64 0.172 119 0.056 278 0.173 67
132.3 Rundu NAM 0.061 230 0.162 146 0.108 56 0.159 97
132.4 Bakau GMB 0.049 321 0.173 113 0.125 28 0.166 81 0.161 119
133.4 Mumbwa ZMB 0.078 148 0.154 169 0.094 94 0.152 121 0.155 135
135.0 Sikela ETH 0.082 132 0.178 97 0.051 306 0.177 60 0.176 80
135.4 Jowhar SOM 0.095 93 0.166 129 0.059 263 0.164 87 0.165 105
135.5 Luanshya ZMB 0.080 141 0.161 150 0.086 120 0.156 131
136.0 Lomé TGO 0.076 166 0.162 144 0.089 112 0.153 112 0.152 146
137.0 Parakou BEN 0.069 188 0.171 120 0.069 216 0.170 71 0.171 90
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138.0 Liwonde MWI 0.110 57 0.163 138 0.051 310 0.191 47
138.5 Mbala ZMB 0.095 95 0.150 183 0.086 119 0.150 157
138.8 Mangochi MWI 0.118 35 0.168 123 0.049 319 0.165 83 0.155 134
139.0 Chikwawa MWI 0.114 46 0.162 145 0.059 261 0.157 102 0.154 141
139.5 Mchinji MWI 0.089 112 0.173 114 0.065 229 0.165 103
139.8 Ketou BEN 0.091 104 0.158 154 0.076 169 0.156 106 0.147 166
140.6 Robit ETH 0.052 298 0.165 133 0.101 69 0.162 89 0.162 114
141.8 Mzuzu MWI 0.081 137 0.154 164 0.080 154 0.153 111 0.153 143
141.8 Kara TGO 0.062 220 0.163 141 0.082 136 0.161 92 0.161 120
142.0 Shoa Robit ETH 0.059 241 0.167 124 0.094 93 0.163 110
142.5 Masindi UGA 0.090 106 0.162 147 0.079 159 0.150 158
142.8 Dar es Salaam TZA 0.059 245 0.157 159 0.098 79 0.143 143 0.172 88
143.3 Diéma MLI 0.078 153 0.183 84 0.055 284 0.188 52
143.8 Moussoro TCD 0.081 136 0.154 166 0.090 103 0.146 170
143.8 Solwezi ZMB 0.097 91 0.158 156 0.069 212 0.153 115 0.153 145
145.2 Abomsa ETH 0.077 162 0.152 175 0.087 116 0.152 118 0.151 155
145.3 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.062 225 0.176 101 0.089 110
145.4 Abomey BEN 0.095 94 0.151 182 0.077 166 0.150 124 0.148 161
147.8 Lamin GMB 0.053 285 0.159 153 0.112 53 0.158 100
148.6 National Average MWI 0.103 72 0.154 168 0.067 222 0.150 122 0.149 159
148.8 Nampula MOZ 0.108 62 0.161 149 0.051 308 0.159 96 0.157 129
148.8 Lilongwe MWI 0.082 133 0.142 210 0.082 141 0.141 145 0.162 115
149.4 Malanville BEN 0.077 158 0.153 171 0.082 138 0.152 120 0.149 160
152.6 Congo - Nil RWA 0.079 146 0.146 195 0.097 83 0.140 146 0.137 193
152.8 Chontales NIC 0.072 180 0.152 177 0.094 90 0.147 164
154.0 Isoka ZMB 0.083 127 0.149 186 0.078 161 0.148 127 0.146 169
154.6 Mkushi ZMB 0.081 134 0.155 163 0.071 202 0.150 123 0.151 151
156.3 Monze ZMB 0.083 125 0.154 167 0.076 168 0.147 165
156.8 Galkayo SOM 0.050 310 0.163 139 0.090 105 0.155 108 0.160 122
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158.4 Bunia COD 0.073 174 0.153 173 0.075 180 0.152 117 0.152 148
158.8 Galkayo SOM 0.050 311 0.163 140 0.090 107 0.155 110 0.159 126
159.0 Mwense ZMB 0.095 96 0.153 172 0.060 258 0.152 116 0.151 153
162.8 Abomsa ETH 0.073 177 0.147 193 0.081 152 0.146 129
163.4 Gode ETH 0.055 270 0.157 158 0.092 99 0.134 157 0.156 133
164.8 Malanville BEN 0.074 171 0.145 201 0.089 111 0.143 176
165.0 Castors SEN 0.042 381 0.144 206 0.102 65 0.129 172 0.302 1
166.4 Nkhoma MWI 0.082 131 0.157 160 0.053 296 0.155 109 0.155 136
166.6 Kasungu MWI 0.115 43 0.182 87 0.011 530 0.169 76 0.169 97
167.0 Mazabuka ZMB 0.071 184 0.152 176 0.074 184 0.143 137 0.151 154
167.8 Nampula MOZ 0.109 59 0.151 181 0.053 293 0.145 132 0.144 174
170.6 Hudur SOM 0.059 237 0.165 134 0.057 275 0.162 90 0.161 117
172.3 Katete ZMB 0.065 209 0.149 187 0.085 127 0.132 166
172.3 Byumba RWA 0.067 194 0.140 214 0.096 86 0.136 195
173.4 Djougou BEN 0.077 155 0.145 199 0.074 188 0.143 142 0.142 183
174.5 Fada N’Gourma BFA 0.065 202 0.150 184 0.086 123 0.138 189
174.8 Lizulu MWI 0.100 82 0.148 188 0.062 244 0.140 185
176.0 Gaya NER 0.082 130 0.141 213 0.075 175 0.139 186
176.2 Nyagatare RWA 0.065 207 0.141 212 0.091 100 0.123 200 0.148 162
176.6 Kita MLI 0.102 73 0.146 196 0.051 313 0.147 128 0.145 173
178.2 Chikhwawa MWI 0.085 120 0.151 180 0.051 302 0.149 126 0.147 163
178.8 Liwonde MWI 0.099 85 0.156 161 0.045 345 0.159 124
178.8 Mongu ZMB 0.077 157 0.144 207 0.076 171 0.143 139 0.130 220
179.8 Jeremie HTI 0.068 190 0.164 135 0.055 282 0.163 112
181.0 Kindia GIN 0.058 248 0.133 246 0.090 104 0.134 158 0.152 149
183.5 S.Antao CPV 0.051 301 0.158 155 0.096 87 0.137 191
183.6 Awassa zuriya ETH 0.068 189 0.147 192 0.070 204 0.143 141 0.137 192
184.2 Natitingou BEN 0.072 179 0.136 228 0.080 156 0.136 156 0.134 202
186.2 Lilongwe MWI 0.057 255 0.139 220 0.082 140 0.130 169 0.152 147
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186.4 Bla MLI 0.088 113 0.130 257 0.042 363 0.137 151 0.190 48
186.5 Mukarange RWA 0.050 309 0.154 165 0.119 38 0.125 234
187.8 Koumantou MLI 0.093 99 0.141 211 0.053 291 0.132 163 0.144 175
188.8 Hargeisa SOM 0.053 287 0.160 151 0.070 206 0.163 111
190.2 Moussoro TCD 0.063 218 0.138 221 0.083 132 0.133 161 0.130 219
191.8 Hargeisa SOM 0.053 295 0.160 152 0.070 207 0.162 113
193.0 Saminaka NGA 0.057 257 0.127 268 0.094 95 0.124 195 0.152 150
193.5 Kalulushi ZMB 0.081 135 0.140 216 0.066 226 0.134 197
196.6 Kita MLI 0.089 110 0.124 281 0.074 187 0.125 192 0.132 213
197.2 Mansa ZMB 0.100 83 0.146 198 0.039 384 0.144 134 0.139 187
197.6 Bohicon BEN 0.080 140 0.140 215 0.053 290 0.139 147 0.135 196
197.6 Rwagitima RWA 0.076 164 0.138 223 0.064 237 0.138 148 0.132 216
197.8 Bedessa ETH 0.057 258 0.151 179 0.061 251 0.152 119 0.142 182
198.5 Base RWA 0.079 147 0.144 208 0.062 250 0.125 189
199.8 Malanville BEN 0.076 165 0.125 273 0.089 109 0.121 252
200.5 Chokwe MOZ 0.060 233 0.145 202 0.066 227 0.143 140
202.0 Dantokpa BEN 0.077 160 0.134 236 0.061 252 0.133 160
202.8 Kitwe ZMB 0.077 154 0.136 227 0.067 224 0.133 206
203.2 Montepuez MOZ 0.078 151 0.139 217 0.053 294 0.137 150 0.134 204
204.0 Mansa ZMB 0.100 80 0.146 197 0.034 411 0.142 144 0.138 188
205.2 Jijiga ETH 0.043 370 0.147 190 0.077 164 0.145 131 0.145 171
206.5 Choma ZMB 0.084 121 0.131 251 0.061 254 0.134 200
206.5 Maxixe MOZ 0.083 124 0.147 194 0.048 324 0.141 184
208.0 Nouakchott MRT 0.050 316 0.139 218 0.101 68 0.125 191 0.121 247
208.6 National Average GHA 0.091 105 0.130 254 0.054 288 0.129 174 0.129 222
208.8 Bedessa ETH 0.053 289 0.150 185 0.064 236 0.150 125
209.3 Cinkassé TGO 0.059 242 0.136 226 0.069 215 0.136 154
209.3 Bol TCD 0.074 172 0.147 189 0.051 304 0.145 172
210.0 Musha RWA 0.057 254 0.147 191 0.095 89 0.111 233 0.110 283
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210.6 Bol TCD 0.063 215 0.145 204 0.049 320 0.144 135 0.142 179
210.8 Ibadan NGA 0.067 197 0.135 232 0.071 203 0.133 211
211.6 Dire Dawa ETH 0.054 283 0.134 241 0.082 137 0.126 187 0.133 210
211.8 Jeremie HTI 0.053 294 0.153 174 0.047 338 0.153 113 0.154 140
212.0 Labé GIN 0.046 348 0.134 240 0.090 101 0.122 203 0.146 168
212.3 Bangula MWI 0.084 122 0.151 178 0.038 393 0.150 156
212.8 Bol TCD 0.067 196 0.144 205 0.045 347 0.144 136 0.142 180
213.5 Awassa Zuriya ETH 0.065 210 0.143 209 0.065 228 0.133 207
213.6 Ruyigi BDI 0.064 211 0.125 274 0.083 135 0.125 193 0.120 255
213.8 Mchinji MWI 0.087 116 0.154 170 0.039 379 0.137 190
214.3 Gisenyi RWA 0.059 243 0.126 271 0.084 129
214.7 Tamale GHA 0.065 205 0.134 242 0.071 197
217.6 Kabwe Urban ZMB 0.087 115 0.130 259 0.051 303 0.127 182 0.126 229
217.6 Ndola Rural ZMB 0.058 252 0.131 253 0.072 193 0.129 173 0.131 217
218.0 Latri kunda GMB 0.046 351 0.137 225 0.093 97 0.134 199
218.3 Wajir KEN 0.049 323 0.133 247 0.082 139 0.132 164
218.4 Babile ETH 0.050 308 0.139 219 0.069 213 0.137 149 0.134 203
218.8 Jijiga ETH 0.037 413 0.145 203 0.078 162 0.143 138 0.142 178
220.0 Loulouni MLI 0.077 161 0.128 266 0.063 240 0.125 194 0.123 239
220.4 Alamata ETH 0.057 256 0.134 244 0.067 225 0.132 165 0.132 212
220.8 Alamata ETH 0.056 260 0.134 238 0.064 235 0.133 162 0.133 209
220.8 Kobo ETH 0.064 213 0.133 245 0.061 253 0.132 167 0.128 226
221.3 Hinche HTI 0.053 292 0.136 230 0.082 142
221.6 Managua NIC 0.066 199 0.127 269 0.071 199 0.123 197 0.122 244
221.6 Dioïla MLI 0.089 111 0.130 255 0.044 351 0.130 168 0.129 223
221.8 Kitwe ZMB 0.079 144 0.130 260 0.058 265 0.130 218
223.0 Kalomo ZMB 0.072 178 0.129 261 0.058 264 0.127 181 0.126 231
223.8 Musanze RWA 0.080 142 0.133 249 0.043 361 0.137 152 0.132 215
224.0 Hinche HTI 0.048 334 0.135 234 0.081 146 0.128 176 0.126 230
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224.2 Babile ETH 0.047 336 0.138 222 0.070 205 0.137 153 0.134 205
226.0 Gitega BDI 0.049 322 0.134 239 0.069 209 0.134 159 0.134 201
226.2 Diebougou BFA 0.068 191 0.136 229 0.045 348 0.136 155 0.133 208
227.5 Dire Dawa ETH 0.054 281 0.134 243 0.081 148 0.123 238
228.0 Base RWA 0.079 145 0.127 267 0.047 330 0.129 171 0.127 227
228.0 Hinche HTI 0.051 300 0.132 250 0.078 160 0.126 184 0.121 246
229.0 Brikama GMB 0.043 372 0.135 231 0.097 84 0.118 213 0.122 245
229.6 Chisinau MDA 0.056 262 0.137 224 0.063 242 0.127 180 0.123 240
230.3 Gaya NER 0.063 216 0.125 278 0.073 190 0.124 237
231.3 Cotonou BEN 0.055 267 0.130 258 0.075 176 0.129 224
232.4 Chokwe MOZ 0.042 376 0.145 200 0.057 272 0.145 133 0.142 181
235.8 Mahoko RWA 0.039 394 0.134 237 0.080 155 0.127 179 0.132 214
236.6 Mufulira ZMB 0.047 341 0.129 262 0.074 182 0.129 170 0.126 228
238.5 Banfora BFA 0.075 170 0.125 275 0.058 268 0.122 241
239.2 Garoua CMR 0.055 269 0.122 291 0.081 143 0.108 243 0.121 250
239.4 Diffa Commune NER 0.060 234 0.121 293 0.071 198 0.118 210 0.116 262
240.3 Cotonou BEN 0.071 182 0.125 277 0.058 266 0.124 236
241.6 N’Djamena TCD 0.058 249 0.124 284 0.072 194 0.118 211 0.114 270
243.2 Beddenno ETH 0.055 268 0.124 282 0.065 230 0.126 185 0.121 251
246.0 Gonaives HTI 0.044 364 0.133 248 0.075 178 0.137 194
246.8 Mbandaka COD 0.059 240 0.119 301 0.073 189 0.119 257
248.2 Choma ZMB 0.065 206 0.119 302 0.057 277 0.122 202 0.120 254
248.3 Gonaives HTI 0.046 347 0.130 256 0.072 192 0.134 198
248.3 Belet Weyne SOM 0.055 266 0.128 265 0.055 285 0.128 177
249.6 Soma GMB 0.056 265 0.118 309 0.076 167 0.117 216 0.107 291
252.6 Thiodaye SEN 0.060 235 0.121 295 0.067 219 0.111 232 0.110 282
253.8 Rugarama RWA 0.049 319 0.118 311 0.088 114 0.107 245 0.112 280
254.2 Managua NIC 0.065 208 0.118 307 0.057 274 0.117 215 0.115 267
254.6 Maxixe MOZ 0.062 222 0.126 270 0.046 344 0.126 188 0.121 249
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254.8 Ndago RWA 0.048 330 0.120 297 0.083 133 0.108 241 0.114 273
255.4 Banjul GMB 0.041 384 0.121 294 0.086 118 0.119 209 0.114 272
256.2 Xai-Xai MOZ 0.056 264 0.135 233 0.041 369 0.127 183 0.126 232
257.3 Dapaong TGO 0.066 200 0.134 235 0.037 398 0.124 196
257.4 Chingola ZMB 0.053 290 0.129 264 0.051 312 0.126 186 0.125 235
257.6 Lusaka Rural ZMB 0.089 109 0.123 289 0.036 404 0.116 218 0.115 268
258.0 Kibirizi RWA 0.048 329 0.117 314 0.076 172 0.116 217
259.3 Beddenno ETH 0.054 277 0.124 280 0.067 221
259.6 Kibirizi RWA 0.045 354 0.125 276 0.071 201 0.119 208 0.117 259
260.0 Lundazi ZMB 0.056 263 0.131 252 0.038 385 0.129 175 0.128 225
262.0 Serrekunda GMB 0.038 404 0.125 279 0.085 126 0.109 239
263.4 Mahoko RWA 0.043 371 0.119 304 0.080 153 0.107 246 0.122 243
264.8 Bati ETH 0.048 326 0.129 263 0.053 292 0.128 178
266.7 Wonago ETH 0.051 303 0.123 287 0.069 210
269.3 Fana MLI 0.078 150 0.119 306 0.038 388 0.125 233
270.0 Iringa TZA 0.048 331 0.120 298 0.060 259 0.120 206 0.119 256
270.8 Kicukiro RWA 0.047 343 0.117 313 0.074 183 0.112 228 0.108 287
272.6 Jacmel HTI 0.057 259 0.113 324 0.057 276 0.113 227 0.112 277
272.8 Jacmel HTI 0.064 212 0.114 322 0.056 281 0.113 276
273.0 Solwezi ZMB 0.065 204 0.117 312 0.042 364 0.115 219 0.115 266
274.8 Ndjamena TCD 0.062 221 0.110 336 0.055 283 0.108 240 0.106 294
275.3 Abi Adi ETH 0.050 313 0.124 283 0.060 257 0.121 248
275.4 Jacmel HTI 0.062 228 0.110 332 0.053 289 0.110 238 0.108 290
275.5 Rugarama RWA 0.073 175 0.118 310 0.037 396 0.130 221
276.0 Livingstone ZMB 0.054 276 0.112 328 0.051 311 0.118 212 0.120 253
276.4 Chipata ZMB 0.055 273 0.109 340 0.069 217 0.103 253 0.104 299
278.8 Cayes HTI 0.059 239 0.118 308 0.040 375 0.117 214 0.117 258
281.8 Kaura NGA 0.046 346 0.109 338 0.074 186 0.103 257
282.8 Garissa KEN 0.041 386 0.119 305 0.061 255 0.119 207 0.117 261
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284.3 Abi Adi ETH 0.050 305 0.123 288 0.060 260
284.8 Koutiala MLI 0.071 183 0.111 331 0.036 401 0.114 221 0.108 288
285.4 Nyanza RWA 0.047 345 0.120 300 0.051 307 0.120 204 0.114 271
285.6 Moyale KEN 0.039 395 0.117 315 0.069 214 0.113 226 0.112 278
286.0 Luangwa ZMB 0.060 231 0.112 329 0.043 358 0.111 237 0.113 275
286.5 Kabaya RWA 0.071 185 0.120 299 0.036 402 0.117 260
287.0 Giwa NGA 0.050 307 0.115 320 0.054 287 0.111 234
287.0 Diffa NER 0.058 246 0.104 353 0.057 270 0.102 259 0.100 307
287.0 Kabaya RWA 0.051 302 0.111 330 0.062 247 0.098 267 0.108 289
287.4 León NIC 0.053 293 0.114 321 0.044 356 0.113 225 0.122 242
289.2 Nguigmi NER 0.043 368 0.116 316 0.057 273 0.115 220 0.114 269
289.4 Les Cayes HTI 0.056 261 0.115 319 0.040 371 0.114 222 0.113 274
291.0 Bati ETH 0.049 320 0.122 290 0.047 339 0.122 201 0.101 305
291.4 Hossana ETH 0.064 214 0.107 346 0.044 353 0.106 249 0.105 295
293.4 Hossana ETH 0.063 217 0.105 351 0.044 354 0.107 248 0.104 297
294.6 Ségou Château MLI 0.059 236 0.112 326 0.038 389 0.111 236 0.108 286
294.8 Ségou Centre MLI 0.058 250 0.112 327 0.039 382 0.112 231 0.109 284
295.2 Byumba RWA 0.050 306 0.115 318 0.045 346 0.108 242 0.115 264
295.6 Deder ETH 0.050 314 0.109 339 0.050 316 0.113 224 0.109 285
296.3 Ouanaminthe HTI 0.050 315 0.125 272 0.035 408 0.125 190
296.6 Ouanaminthe HTI 0.048 327 0.124 285 0.035 410 0.123 198 0.116 263
296.8 Cayes HTI 0.048 332 0.116 317 0.047 340 0.112 230 0.115 265
297.6 Deder ETH 0.048 325 0.110 333 0.050 315 0.114 223 0.107 292
301.8 Muyinga BDI 0.043 373 0.112 325 0.053 295 0.111 235 0.110 281
302.0 Ndindy SEN 0.035 436 0.119 303 0.071 200 0.103 255 0.096 316
303.8 Kirundo BDI 0.039 397 0.121 296 0.049 317 0.120 205
308.5 Bamenda CMR 0.047 340 0.110 334 0.052 297 0.100 263
309.8 N’Djamena TCD 0.054 279 0.101 364 0.047 335 0.101 261 0.099 310
311.0 Ourossogui SEN 0.044 359 0.102 361 0.061 256 0.098 268
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311.0 Koury MLI 0.067 198 0.103 357 0.029 444 0.103 254 0.102 302
312.4 Douala CMR 0.036 418 0.105 350 0.062 246 0.105 250 0.104 298
313.3 Ouanaminthe HTI 0.045 353 0.124 286 0.034 415 0.123 199
313.3 Lodwar
(Turkana)
KEN 0.028 481 0.114 323 0.067 220 0.112 229
314.0 Ndiagne SEN 0.043 374 0.106 348 0.070 208 0.092 326
315.7 Bandim GNB 0.044 361 0.107 345 0.063 241
317.8 Gaseke RWA 0.046 352 0.108 342 0.047 333 0.100 262 0.103 300
320.0 S.Vincente CPV 0.045 355 0.098 373 0.065 232
320.2 Kampala UGA 0.040 393 0.110 337 0.047 334 0.108 244 0.107 293
321.4 Niono MLI 0.052 297 0.102 363 0.039 378 0.101 260 0.100 309
321.5 Lusaka Urban ZMB 0.055 271 0.101 365 0.046 342 0.100 308
321.8 Lusaka ZMB 0.044 365 0.099 368 0.052 298 0.099 265 0.098 313
322.4 Maputo MOZ 0.048 335 0.108 343 0.038 386 0.107 247 0.103 301
324.0 Loulouni MLI 0.067 195 0.095 380 0.029 443 0.093 275 0.091 327
326.8 Mukamira RWA 0.038 402 0.099 369 0.062 243 0.090 281 0.087 339
328.0 Butare RWA 0.041 390 0.103 356 0.043 357 0.102 258 0.112 279
329.2 Jacmel HTI 0.033 453 0.099 370 0.064 234 0.097 269 0.095 320
330.8 Tonka MLI 0.026 487 0.103 359 0.062 248 0.103 256 0.101 304
331.4 National Average NIC 0.077 159 0.104 354 0.018 506 0.088 289 0.085 349
331.8 Sikasso Centre MLI 0.063 219 0.094 382 0.027 459 0.093 276 0.092 323
332.5 Dan Issa NER 0.053 291 0.102 362 0.041 366 0.098 311
333.0 Ansongo MLI 0.047 338 0.098 372 0.041 367 0.096 271 0.095 317
333.8 Koudougou BFA 0.045 357 0.108 341 0.034 413 0.104 252 0.101 306
337.8 Bambey SEN 0.044 363 0.098 374 0.058 269 0.086 345
340.0 Wekro ETH 0.027 483 0.103 358 0.056 279 0.090 284 0.104 296
340.5 Chipata ZMB 0.053 286 0.108 344 0.024 481 0.104 251
343.0 Mukamira RWA 0.054 275 0.106 349 0.036 405
343.8 Maputo MOZ 0.044 367 0.100 367 0.038 391 0.094 273 0.094 321
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344.2 Causeni MDA 0.048 328 0.104 355 0.030 431 0.093 274 0.089 333
345.4 Addis Ababa ETH 0.049 317 0.086 400 0.041 365 0.087 293 0.085 352
346.3 Wekro ETH 0.033 459 0.104 352 0.057 271 0.102 303
347.0 Tounfafi NER 0.049 324 0.089 394 0.048 323 0.086 347
349.0 Kayes N’Dy MLI 0.042 380 0.101 366 0.032 421 0.099 264 0.097 314
349.4 Kongoussi BFA 0.042 382 0.103 360 0.031 427 0.099 266 0.098 312
350.2 Mandera KEN 0.024 502 0.093 385 0.064 233 0.087 290 0.087 341
351.2 Tenkodogo BFA 0.047 337 0.093 383 0.031 426 0.091 280 0.090 330
351.8 Koutiala MLI 0.068 192 0.088 396 0.008 536 0.087 291 0.087 344
352.8 Ségou Château MLI 0.050 312 0.086 404 0.045 349 0.086 346
353.4 Badinko MLI 0.054 280 0.099 371 0.015 519 0.092 278 0.095 319
353.8 San Pedro Sula HND 0.046 350 0.088 395 0.038 390 0.087 292 0.087 342
353.8 Musanze RWA 0.035 440 0.098 375 0.043 360 0.097 270 0.092 324
355.0 Sikasso MLI 0.055 274 0.090 390 0.021 496 0.089 287 0.090 328
356.8 Kaolack SEN 0.042 383 0.081 422 0.052 300 0.080 309 0.077 370
357.8 Bafoussam CMR 0.042 377 0.090 389 0.036 407 0.090 282 0.089 334
362.0 Sikasso Médine MLI 0.059 244 0.090 388 0.025 473 0.087 343
363.6 Bujumbura BDI 0.035 427 0.086 405 0.048 326 0.085 296 0.081 364
363.6 Burao SOM 0.016 521 0.096 378 0.047 329 0.095 272 0.095 318
363.8 Korem ETH 0.038 403 0.091 387 0.035 409 0.090 283 0.088 337
364.3 Conakry GIN 0.033 454 0.097 377 0.059 262
364.4 National Average ZMB 0.068 193 0.082 421 0.016 515 0.079 311 0.075 382
364.7 Mexico City MEX 0.003 545 0.010 545 0.000 0.275 4
365.2 Koury MLI 0.058 251 0.087 399 0.012 528 0.087 295 0.085 353
365.4 Korem ETH 0.038 401 0.092 386 0.034 416 0.089 286 0.088 338
365.4 Jeremie HTI 0.025 495 0.088 398 0.048 325 0.087 294 0.096 315
367.0 Segou MLI 0.042 378 0.085 409 0.049 321 0.082 360
368.4 Maradi NER 0.043 375 0.085 410 0.037 399 0.083 302 0.083 356
369.4 Bougouni MLI 0.051 299 0.086 402 0.022 491 0.085 298 0.083 357
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370.2 Tegucigalpa HND 0.053 288 0.082 420 0.024 478 0.082 303 0.081 362
370.2 Kicukiro RWA 0.038 405 0.085 408 0.036 400 0.081 306 0.090 332
370.4 Niono MLI 0.055 272 0.078 433 0.027 457 0.077 316 0.077 374
370.5 Dosso NER 0.047 344 0.089 392 0.036 406 0.087 340
370.8 Djikoroni MLI 0.038 406 0.083 417 0.040 373 0.085 297 0.082 361
371.0 Marsabit KEN 0.027 485 0.093 384 0.047 336 0.092 279
372.0 Bla MLI 0.054 282 0.080 426 0.031 430 0.070 341 0.075 381
373.2 Ziguichor SEN 0.029 474 0.079 430 0.056 280 0.078 313 0.078 369
373.6 Diourbel SEN 0.034 442 0.076 441 0.049 318 0.077 317 0.085 350
374.2 Ouagadougou BFA 0.035 439 0.094 381 0.029 445 0.093 277 0.090 329
374.4 Kayes N’Dy MLI 0.038 400 0.081 425 0.039 376 0.082 304 0.080 367
374.8 Hinche HTI 0.024 497 0.084 413 0.051 305 0.084 300 0.082 359
375.6 Bujumbura BDI 0.035 431 0.083 418 0.044 355 0.084 301 0.077 373
376.8 Agadez Com-
mune
NER 0.034 447 0.084 416 0.045 350 0.081 305 0.080 366
377.4 Marsabit KEN 0.027 486 0.085 407 0.046 341 0.085 299 0.084 354
378.3 Tougan BFA 0.036 423 0.097 376 0.038 392 0.093 322
378.6 Lodwar
(Turkana)
KEN 0.040 391 0.081 424 0.037 394 0.081 307 0.076 377
378.8 Nyakarambi RWA 0.041 385 0.089 391 0.021 498 0.089 285 0.089 335
381.0 Tegucigalpa HND 0.047 342 0.081 423 0.026 467 0.081 308 0.080 365
381.3 S.Vincente CPV 0.038 408 0.089 393 0.046 343
381.7 Wanle Weyne SOM 0.049 318 0.122 292 0.009 535
383.2 San Pedro Sula HND 0.047 339 0.080 428 0.025 471 0.080 310 0.078 368
383.7 Ségou Centre MLI 0.038 410 0.084 414 0.048 327
384.3 Léré MLI 0.037 414 0.110 335 0.028 452 0.089 336
384.7 Ruhuha RWA 0.044 366 0.107 347 0.030 441
384.8 Nioro MLI 0.039 396 0.096 379 0.030 439 0.092 325
386.0 Touba SEN 0.031 465 0.084 415 0.052 301 0.081 363
388.8 Maradi NER 0.041 388 0.080 427 0.032 423 0.076 322 0.074 384
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389.8 San MLI 0.045 358 0.086 403 0.028 450 0.086 348
390.0 Saint-Louis SEN 0.036 422 0.086 401 0.022 488 0.088 288 0.085 351
392.5 Bugarama RWA 0.036 424 0.084 412 0.033 419 0.077 315
392.8 Fatick SEN 0.026 489 0.079 431 0.047 331 0.071 338 0.077 375
394.6 Sogoniko MLI 0.038 398 0.077 439 0.030 438 0.076 320 0.076 378
395.0 Lafiabougou MLI 0.037 415 0.077 436 0.030 433 0.077 319 0.077 372
395.5 Zinder NER 0.036 425 0.082 419 0.043 359 0.075 379
395.8 Mopti Digue MLI 0.033 451 0.088 397 0.039 380 0.083 355
396.6 Badalabougou MLI 0.036 420 0.078 434 0.029 446 0.079 312 0.077 371
398.2 Dori BFA 0.028 478 0.078 435 0.044 352 0.073 330 0.072 396
399.6 Gao MLI 0.035 428 0.077 437 0.031 429 0.076 321 0.075 383
400.3 Bushenge RWA 0.028 477 0.079 429 0.039 381 0.078 314
401.2 Gouille Mbeuth SEN 0.037 417 0.073 457 0.040 374 0.070 342 0.068 416
403.2 Port-de-Paix HTI 0.021 509 0.059 501 0.027 462 0.053 377 0.146 167
403.5 Abalak NER 0.042 379 0.072 464 0.040 370 0.070 401
404.0 Niamakoro MLI 0.035 441 0.076 444 0.030 432 0.075 323 0.075 380
404.5 Niamey NER 0.037 416 0.075 448 0.032 422 0.073 332
405.6 Faladié MLI 0.038 407 0.075 449 0.027 458 0.075 325 0.074 389
406.2 Sikasso Centre MLI 0.046 349 0.074 453 0.018 510 0.074 326 0.073 393
407.6 Niarela MLI 0.035 426 0.076 445 0.027 456 0.075 324 0.074 387
408.3 Sagatta SEN 0.027 482 0.070 471 0.047 337 0.070 343
408.6 Kamembe RWA 0.028 479 0.072 465 0.043 362 0.072 335 0.070 402
409.4 Tillaberi NER 0.028 476 0.074 452 0.039 383 0.072 337 0.071 399
409.4 Port-au-Prince HTI 0.030 470 0.076 440 0.032 420 0.074 327 0.074 390
410.4 Niamey NER 0.032 464 0.074 450 0.033 417 0.073 333 0.074 388
410.8 Magnambougou MLI 0.035 429 0.074 454 0.028 451 0.073 328 0.073 392
412.2 Thiaroye SEN 0.023 503 0.072 461 0.048 328 0.068 349 0.067 420
412.5 Djibo BFA 0.033 458 0.079 432 0.029 442 0.077 318
412.6 Nairobi KEN 0.023 504 0.074 451 0.041 368 0.072 336 0.070 404
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414.8 Agadez NER 0.038 399 0.072 460 0.028 453 0.067 357 0.069 405
415.0 Ouanaminthe HTI 0.017 517 0.077 438 0.051 314 0.073 391
415.3 Diré MLI 0.027 484 0.075 447 0.047 332 0.071 398
417.6 Dibida MLI 0.034 443 0.073 456 0.027 461 0.073 331 0.072 397
418.8 Santo Domingo DOM 0.033 456 0.085 406 0.027 455 0.083 358
421.4 Medine MLI 0.034 450 0.072 459 0.026 464 0.072 334 0.071 400
422.4 San Salvador SLV 0.034 446 0.068 481 0.030 435 0.067 356 0.072 394
422.8 Port-au-Prince HTI 0.030 467 0.075 446 0.024 477 0.073 329 0.072 395
423.3 Sogoniko MLI 0.041 389 0.069 478 0.034 414 0.068 412
424.6 Niarela MLI 0.034 444 0.064 486 0.029 449 0.065 359 0.074 385
424.8 Zinder NER 0.035 438 0.076 443 0.034 412 0.069 406
424.8 Koulikoro Gare MLI 0.032 462 0.070 469 0.030 440 0.069 344 0.069 409
425.2 Sikasso Médine MLI 0.043 369 0.068 480 0.020 500 0.068 354 0.066 423
426.0 Port-au-Prince HTI 0.020 512 0.071 466 0.037 395 0.069 347 0.068 410
427.0 Panama City PAN 0.028 480 0.070 473 0.036 403 0.068 355 0.066 424
428.4 Fadjiguila MLI 0.035 435 0.071 467 0.021 497 0.071 340 0.070 403
428.6 Faladié MLI 0.038 409 0.065 485 0.026 463 0.064 360 0.064 426
429.2 Koulikoro Ba MLI 0.032 461 0.069 475 0.029 448 0.069 348 0.068 414
429.6 Ouolofobougou MLI 0.038 411 0.070 468 0.017 512 0.069 346 0.068 411
430.4 Magnambougou MLI 0.036 419 0.064 489 0.027 454 0.063 362 0.063 428
434.2 Les Cayes HTI 0.019 515 0.066 484 0.038 387 0.065 358 0.064 427
434.8 Guatemala City GTM 0.040 392 0.061 495 0.022 490 0.062 363 0.059 434
435.3 Kayes Centre MLI 0.035 430 0.076 442 0.023 483 0.074 386
435.7 Niamakoro MLI 0.035 434 0.069 476 0.037 397
435.7 Maradi Com-
mune
NER 0.029 472 0.073 458 0.039 377
436.3 Kayes Plateau MLI 0.033 460 0.068 479 0.030 436 0.057 370
437.0 San Salvador SLV 0.035 437 0.064 488 0.026 469 0.064 361 0.061 430
438.6 Port-au-Prince HTI 0.030 469 0.072 462 0.019 504 0.069 345 0.068 413
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439.6 Cap Haitien HTI 0.024 499 0.069 474 0.026 468 0.068 350 0.069 407
443.0 Bamako MLI 0.033 457 0.068 482 0.019 503 0.068 351 0.066 422
444.2 Cap-Haitien HTI 0.024 501 0.069 477 0.025 472 0.068 353 0.067 418
444.6 Djenne MLI 0.028 475 0.072 463 0.007 538 0.071 339 0.069 408
445.0 Mbafaye SEN 0.026 488 0.058 504 0.033 418 0.055 373 0.055 442
445.3 Bossaso SOM 0.021 510 0.084 411 0.023 484 0.076 376
446.4 Fadjiguila MLI 0.035 432 0.058 502 0.021 493 0.059 367 0.057 438
447.0 Lafiabougou MLI 0.036 421 0.066 483 0.026 465 0.067 419
447.0 Badalabougou MLI 0.034 448 0.064 487 0.031 428 0.064 425
448.4 Tombouctou MLI 0.025 492 0.070 472 0.017 511 0.068 352 0.068 415
449.0 Louga SEN 0.023 505 0.063 490 0.040 372 0.062 429
450.3 San MLI 0.041 387 0.070 470 0.013 527 0.067 417
450.3 S.Antao CPV 0.019 516 0.048 520 0.030 434 0.090 331
452.4 Cebu PHL 0.034 449 0.061 494 0.016 518 0.059 364 0.058 437
456.3 Gao MLI 0.037 412 0.062 493 0.022 487 0.059 433
456.7 S.Vincente CPV 0.026 491 0.073 455 0.032 424
457.0 Cap Haitien HTI 0.021 511 0.059 500 0.026 466 0.059 365 0.054 443
457.2 Koulikoro Ba MLI 0.026 490 0.057 505 0.022 489 0.055 371 0.060 431
457.6 Kayes Centre MLI 0.031 466 0.060 497 0.013 523 0.059 366 0.059 436
458.0 Guatemala City GTM 0.033 452 0.053 513 0.020 501 0.053 376 0.053 448
458.3 Djikoroni MLI 0.035 433 0.063 491 0.026 470 0.057 439
458.4 Koulikoro Gare MLI 0.029 471 0.055 507 0.021 495 0.054 375 0.054 444
460.6 Gueule Tapee SEN 0.024 496 0.062 492 0.013 525 0.058 369 0.066 421
460.6 Goure NER 0.024 500 0.060 498 0.018 505 0.059 368 0.060 432
462.0 Davao City PHL 0.025 494 0.052 514 0.025 474 0.051 378 0.051 450
464.0 Thies SEN 0.020 513 0.049 516 0.027 460 0.048 379 0.047 452
466.2 National Average ZMB 0.032 463 0.054 511 0.009 534 0.054 374 0.052 449
467.3 Dibida MLI 0.033 455 0.060 499 0.024 480 0.059 435
469.5 Port-de-Paix HTI 0.019 514 0.055 508 0.024 476 0.047 380
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473.3 Ouolofobougou MLI 0.034 445 0.061 496 0.024 479
475.6 Santiago CPV 0.015 527 0.048 517 0.020 499 0.045 382 0.041 453
477.5 National Average SWZ 0.015 524 0.048 519 0.022 486 0.047 381
477.5 Yaundé CMR 0.022 508 0.054 510 0.029 447 0.054 445
480.0 Medine MLI 0.029 473 0.054 509 0.021 492 0.054 446
481.0 National Average CRI 0.022 507 0.054 512 0.009 533 0.055 372
482.0 National Average PHL 0.024 498 0.040 528 0.004 539 0.035 386 0.035 459
482.6 Cap Haitien HTI 0.015 525 0.041 527 0.015 521 0.039 385 0.038 455
483.8 Maputo MOZ 0.017 519 0.041 525 0.030 437 0.038 454
485.5 Tombouctou MLI 0.023 506 0.046 521 0.010 532 0.042 383
485.8 Davao City PHL 0.030 468 0.055 506 0.015 522 0.053 447
486.5 Mopti Digue MLI 0.025 493 0.058 503 0.018 509 0.055 441
487.0 Touba Toul SEN 0.017 518 0.048 518 0.032 425
489.3 National Average ZMB 0.015 526 0.038 530 0.016 517 0.040 384
490.0 Iloilo PHL 0.007 541 0.026 538 0.015 520 0.025 387 0.024 464
490.6 National Average PHL 0.010 535 0.025 539 0.013 526 0.024 388 0.024 465
491.0 Tilene SEN 0.015 523 0.051 515 0.025 475 0.050 451
497.8 Santiago CPV 0.016 520 0.038 529 0.023 485 0.038 457
500.8 Mopti Guangal MLI 0.014 528 0.044 522 0.017 513 0.056 440
503.0 Santiago CPV 0.013 530 0.042 524 0.019 502 0.038 456
505.0 Praia CPV 0.010 537 0.036 531 0.021 494 0.035 458
509.8 National Average GTM 0.012 531 0.033 533 0.017 514 0.033 461
511.3 National Average PHL 0.014 529 0.042 523 0.023 482
511.8 National Average GTM 0.011 533 0.031 535 0.016 516 0.031 463
515.0 Iloilo PHL 0.009 538 0.030 536 0.013 524 0.031 462
517.0 Lima PER 0.011 534 0.027 537 0.008 537 0.033 460
518.7 National Average NIC 0.016 522 0.041 526 0.018 508
520.0 S.Antao CPV 0.005 543 0.021 540 0.010 531 0.021 466
522.0 Lima PER 0.008 539 0.021 541 0.003 541 0.020 467
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522.5 National Average PHL 0.007 540 0.019 542 0.004 540 0.015 468
524.8 Luanda AGO 0.004 544 0.010 544 0.003 542 0.010 469
527.7 MetroManila PHL 0.007 542 0.032 534 0.018 507
532.3 South Cotabato PHL 0.010 536 0.036 532 0.012 529
539.3 National Average CHN 0.012 532 0.017 543 0.000 543
Source: Source: Author’s computation based on ZEF [2014].
Table A.3: Rice price volatility by market
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3.0 Ngozi BDI 0.141 5 0.347 2 0.238 2 0.194 1 0.204 5
3.8 Kankan GIN 0.112 10 0.416 1 0.372 1 0.228 3
10.2 Ngabu MWI 0.111 11 0.159 12 0.101 13 0.155 3 0.148 12
12.3 Gharm TJK 0.080 37 0.219 3 0.148 3 0.174 6
12.8 Khujand TJK 0.082 33 0.204 5 0.136 5 0.171 8
13.3 Karonga MWI 0.218 1 0.153 13 0.076 29 0.154 10
14.5 Gharm TJK 0.076 43 0.216 4 0.146 4 0.171 7
14.8 Mbandaka COD 0.139 6 0.142 16 0.085 19 0.134 18
15.4 Mzuzu MWI 0.128 9 0.133 25 0.099 14 0.127 9 0.127 20
15.8 Kalemie COD 0.209 2 0.137 19 0.070 36 0.137 5 0.141 17
17.0 Buale SOM 0.072 52 0.167 8 0.104 12 0.156 2 0.153 11
18.7 Khujand TJK 0.076 44 0.201 6 0.135 6
21.5 Jaffna LKA 0.152 4 0.178 7 0.061 59 0.119 16
22.6 Les Cayes HTI 0.062 76 0.143 15 0.126 7 0.130 6 0.156 9
23.2 Montepuez MOZ 0.061 78 0.162 9 0.115 9 0.144 4 0.144 16
23.4 Kalemie COD 0.182 3 0.125 30 0.064 52 0.124 11 0.124 21
27.0 Cayes HTI 0.060 85 0.138 18 0.122 8 0.125 10 0.146 14
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29.6 Ruyigi BDI 0.130 8 0.112 43 0.071 35 0.108 26 0.108 36
30.8 Mzuzu MWI 0.109 12 0.109 46 0.070 40 0.109 25
31.2 Baidoa SOM 0.068 62 0.126 29 0.077 27 0.124 12 0.119 26
31.2 Khorog TJK 0.052 115 0.161 10 0.113 10 0.118 17 0.211 4
32.0 Ker Pate Kore GMB 0.075 46 0.133 24 0.080 25 0.111 22 0.105 43
33.8 Ndjamena TCD 0.062 77 0.135 22 0.083 22 0.121 15 0.112 33
36.4 Sana’a YEM 0.071 53 0.118 39 0.075 31 0.113 21 0.107 38
41.5 Khorog TJK 0.050 125 0.159 11 0.111 11 0.115 19
41.7 Parsa NPL 0.073 50 0.128 27 0.066 48
42.8 Khulna BGD 0.051 120 0.136 21 0.076 30 0.122 14 0.116 29
43.4 Jalalabad AFG 0.106 14 0.120 33 0.043 121 0.117 18 0.115 31
43.4 Ker Pate Kore GMB 0.069 56 0.135 23 0.078 26 0.093 46 0.090 66
47.2 Marka SOM 0.081 35 0.109 47 0.051 82 0.108 27 0.104 45
48.5 Kathmandu NPL 0.084 29 0.093 77 0.069 43 0.093 45
49.0 Kaolack SEN 0.062 74 0.116 40 0.064 49 0.102 32 0.103 50
49.2 Ndjamena TCD 0.043 163 0.124 32 0.084 20 0.105 29 0.553 2
49.6 Batticaloa LKA 0.066 68 0.109 45 0.056 71 0.109 24 0.106 40
49.8 Ndindy SEN 0.057 94 0.125 31 0.072 33 0.105 41
49.8 Conakry GIN 0.096 21 0.100 60 0.064 50 0.092 49 0.089 69
51.6 Amegnran TGO 0.039 191 0.137 20 0.094 17 0.130 7 0.123 23
54.0 Kirundo BDI 0.079 39 0.098 62 0.062 56 0.093 48 0.091 65
54.6 Muyinga BDI 0.084 30 0.097 67 0.055 72 0.095 42 0.095 62
55.2 Lunzu MWI 0.098 20 0.095 74 0.053 74 0.095 44 0.092 64
56.8 Bandim GNB 0.059 86 0.104 54 0.063 53 0.101 34
57.5 Dar es Salaam TZA 0.041 172 0.132 26 0.081 24 0.128 8
58.8 Mitundu MWI 0.050 123 0.118 38 0.076 28 0.103 46
58.8 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.073 49 0.098 64 0.051 84 0.098 38 0.096 59
60.8 Trincomalee LKA 0.082 32 0.105 50 0.043 122 0.097 39
61.6 Borama SOM 0.042 167 0.120 34 0.062 55 0.106 28 0.121 24
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62.0 Chokwe MOZ 0.045 142 0.105 52 0.072 34 0.103 31 0.102 51
62.8 Mbafaye SEN 0.052 113 0.110 44 0.062 57 0.099 37
64.2 Ambon IDN 0.035 230 0.139 17 0.096 15 0.114 20 0.107 39
65.0 Tambacounda SEN 0.058 89 0.106 49 0.059 65 0.096 57
65.3 Kurgan-Tyube TJK 0.067 63 0.096 70 0.050 88 0.097 40
66.0 Bandim GNB 0.136 7 0.103 58 0.035 186 0.104 30 0.103 49
69.0 Dushanbe TJK 0.048 135 0.119 35 0.070 37
69.4 N’Djamena TCD 0.038 193 0.114 41 0.082 23 0.101 35 0.097 55
69.6 Kismayo SOM 0.066 67 0.104 55 0.043 119 0.093 47 0.096 60
69.8 N’Djamena TCD 0.055 104 0.097 65 0.061 58 0.091 52
70.6 Lomé TGO 0.031 288 0.144 14 0.094 16 0.123 13 0.123 22
70.8 Gorongosa MOZ 0.037 202 0.127 28 0.083 21 0.113 32
72.8 Katiola CIV 0.056 97 0.091 81 0.051 85 0.118 28
74.4 Hudur SOM 0.051 119 0.103 57 0.057 69 0.092 50 0.086 77
75.2 Nampula MOZ 0.037 206 0.107 48 0.074 32 0.101 36 0.101 54
76.0 Iringa TZA 0.107 13 0.085 99 0.043 120 0.085 64 0.083 84
76.0 Dushanbe TJK 0.045 150 0.118 37 0.069 41
77.6 Kisangani COD 0.095 22 0.083 112 0.049 94 0.082 70 0.081 90
78.0 Banke NPL 0.049 131 0.093 78 0.070 38 0.083 69 0.087 74
79.8 Milange MOZ 0.060 83 0.088 92 0.052 78 0.084 66
82.8 Mbandaka COD 0.043 165 0.098 63 0.060 61 0.088 57 0.089 68
84.0 Bangula MWI 0.094 23 0.084 107 0.034 194 0.085 62 0.109 34
84.0 Manica MOZ 0.036 220 0.105 51 0.085 18 0.103 47
84.2 BrikamaBa GMB 0.041 171 0.100 59 0.067 45 0.087 59 0.082 87
84.2 Anie TGO 0.037 204 0.096 71 0.069 42 0.095 43 0.095 61
84.4 Gonaives HTI 0.045 145 0.097 68 0.060 63 0.078 83 0.092 63
85.6 Kabul AFG 0.046 140 0.099 61 0.057 68 0.083 68 0.081 91
85.7 Lahore PAK 0.044 155 0.104 56 0.067 46
86.0 Bunia COD 0.073 48 0.081 121 0.051 83 0.080 76 0.077 102
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86.8 Korbongou TGO 0.038 194 0.095 73 0.067 47 0.090 53 0.090 67
87.3 Multan PAK 0.057 90 0.094 75 0.048 97
87.5 Belet Weyne SOM 0.067 66 0.092 79 0.040 134 0.088 71
87.8 Jacmel HTI 0.069 57 0.089 91 0.038 159 0.088 56 0.087 76
89.6 Gouille Mbeuth SEN 0.043 159 0.092 80 0.053 76 0.087 58 0.087 75
91.0 Kedougou SEN 0.057 92 0.089 90 0.049 91
91.6 Hargeisa SOM 0.031 276 0.118 36 0.060 60 0.102 33 0.102 53
91.8 Amboasary MDG 0.057 93 0.089 89 0.060 62 0.065 123
92.0 Quetta PAK 0.049 134 0.089 88 0.051 86 0.086 60
92.6 Jhapa NPL 0.075 45 0.080 128 0.046 107 0.079 80 0.077 103
94.0 Dhankuta NPL 0.069 55 0.078 133 0.052 77 0.076 89 0.072 116
96.3 Bignona SEN 0.062 75 0.086 95 0.042 123 0.081 92
96.5 Nzérékoré GIN 0.081 34 0.080 122 0.040 141 0.081 89
98.3 Kindia GIN 0.087 27 0.079 129 0.037 166 0.082 71
99.3 Mogadishu SOM 0.090 24 0.091 82 0.033 206 0.082 85
100.0 Faizabad AFG 0.048 136 0.085 100 0.044 112 0.102 52
101.4 Port-au-Prince HTI 0.045 146 0.090 85 0.038 155 0.091 51 0.089 70
102.6 Jumla NPL 0.023 374 0.112 42 0.070 39 0.109 23 0.109 35
104.0 Ouanaminthe HTI 0.069 54 0.085 98 0.031 220 0.084 65 0.083 83
104.2 Jeremie HTI 0.033 241 0.090 86 0.058 67 0.089 55 0.088 72
107.6 Moussoro TCD 0.034 239 0.096 72 0.059 66 0.081 73 0.082 88
107.6 Jalalabad AFG 0.089 25 0.096 69 0.019 345 0.097 41 0.096 58
110.2 Cap Haitien HTI 0.045 143 0.080 127 0.040 139 0.066 117 0.120 25
111.3 Bouake CIV 0.041 173 0.083 113 0.051 87 0.081 72
112.2 Nili AFG 0.053 108 0.084 105 0.034 200 0.084 67 0.084 81
114.2 Salima MWI 0.080 36 0.078 137 0.031 217 0.079 81 0.078 100
114.5 Rolpa NPL 0.042 166 0.080 123 0.048 95 0.080 74
114.8 Tubmanburg LBR 0.037 207 0.081 119 0.054 73 0.078 82 0.080 93
117.2 Sokolo MLI 0.102 17 0.073 154 0.033 204 0.073 99 0.074 112
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118.0 Lilongwe MWI 0.079 38 0.105 53 0.018 358 0.085 61 0.085 80
120.0 Antisiranana I MDG 0.046 141 0.084 108 0.056 70 0.066 118 0.063 163
121.5 Kankan GIN 0.103 16 0.080 125 0.029 247 0.079 98
121.5 Tilene SEN 0.028 314 0.097 66 0.060 64 0.105 42
122.0 Bakau GMB 0.035 227 0.081 116 0.049 93 0.080 75 0.078 99
123.5 Kathmandu NPL 0.066 69 0.069 178 0.000
123.8 Soma GMB 0.036 223 0.083 111 0.050 89 0.076 91 0.076 105
124.2 Galkayo SOM 0.051 117 0.082 115 0.032 214 0.080 78 0.079 97
125.3 Peshawar PAK 0.037 210 0.090 87 0.052 79
125.4 Soma GMB 0.036 216 0.083 110 0.048 98 0.075 93 0.074 110
125.4 Rupandehi NPL 0.050 127 0.071 166 0.045 108 0.071 106 0.070 120
125.8 Cap haitien HTI 0.043 164 0.091 84 0.031 218 0.107 37
126.5 Port-de-Paix HTI 0.044 153 0.081 117 0.041 130 0.076 106
128.4 Karachi PAK 0.049 133 0.083 114 0.036 178 0.057 173 0.105 44
128.7 Jacmel HTI 0.065 70 0.087 94 0.031 222
130.4 Illam NPL 0.060 82 0.066 186 0.043 115 0.065 125 0.066 144
130.5 Kindia GIN 0.032 259 0.083 109 0.046 106 0.103 48
130.8 Bunia COD 0.086 28 0.068 181 0.036 174 0.068 140
131.2 Lamin GMB 0.032 257 0.080 124 0.047 104 0.080 77 0.080 94
132.8 Bengkulu IDN 0.035 229 0.081 120 0.050 90 0.075 92
134.8 Quetta PAK 0.050 129 0.077 139 0.036 181 0.076 90
135.2 Cap-Haitien HTI 0.038 200 0.091 83 0.027 266 0.089 54 0.088 73
137.2 Kaur Wharf
Town
GMB 0.051 122 0.069 173 0.033 205 0.070 108 0.086 78
140.0 Bhopal IND 0.034 237 0.077 138 0.051 81 0.077 104
142.3 Nili AFG 0.056 100 0.078 132 0.028 252 0.078 85
143.0 National Average LAO 0.103 15 0.069 180 0.027 269 0.069 112 0.068 139
143.2 Passy SEN 0.036 221 0.075 145 0.040 142 0.074 97 0.074 111
143.2 Ndugu Kebbeh GMB 0.033 248 0.074 149 0.051 80 0.070 107 0.069 132
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143.3 Gueule Tapee SEN 0.032 264 0.085 103 0.046 105 0.077 101
144.8 Porokhane SEN 0.027 325 0.085 101 0.047 101 0.077 88 0.076 109
144.8 Dogofri MLI 0.084 31 0.066 189 0.029 237 0.067 115 0.065 152
145.6 Barra GMB 0.035 226 0.071 165 0.044 114 0.073 98 0.070 125
145.8 Mananjary MDG 0.036 215 0.078 136 0.067 44 0.060 188
146.6 Bouake CIV 0.033 252 0.075 147 0.047 99 0.071 104 0.069 131
147.2 Ribaue MOZ 0.025 351 0.086 96 0.044 110 0.060 160 0.129 19
148.8 Kandahar AFG 0.049 130 0.078 135 0.029 243 0.077 87
151.8 Labé GIN 0.061 79 0.065 206 0.024 295 0.118 27
151.8 Kara TGO 0.016 450 0.084 106 0.062 54 0.085 63 0.082 86
153.5 Fatick SEN 0.027 331 0.085 102 0.047 102 0.085 79
153.6 Conakry GIN 0.030 293 0.074 148 0.043 118 0.074 95 0.073 114
153.8 Bujumbura BDI 0.062 73 0.065 205 0.033 201 0.064 132 0.064 158
154.6 Toliara I MDG 0.055 103 0.065 208 0.036 180 0.064 126 0.065 156
154.8 Fayzabad AFG 0.041 174 0.071 167 0.029 248 0.115 30
155.0 Bujumbura BDI 0.068 59 0.065 203 0.037 173 0.061 185
155.2 Bansang GMB 0.031 286 0.075 146 0.053 75 0.070 109 0.064 160
156.8 Saint-Louis SEN 0.038 192 0.068 182 0.038 153 0.072 100
160.5 Morang NPL 0.045 148 0.066 191 0.040 144 0.064 159
162.4 Jeremie HTI 0.041 170 0.076 143 0.030 226 0.059 165 0.076 108
163.0 Man CIV 0.072 51 0.065 207 0.028 256 0.063 138
163.0 Kabul AFG 0.040 176 0.072 159 0.000 0.062 142 0.062 175
163.4 Gitega BDI 0.089 26 0.073 157 0.015 404 0.071 103 0.070 127
164.0 Kandahar AFG 0.045 147 0.077 141 0.028 261 0.076 107
165.5 Ndugu Kebbeh GMB 0.029 301 0.081 118 0.045 109 0.069 134
166.0 Ambovombe An-
droy
MDG 0.053 111 0.062 227 0.039 147 0.061 151 0.060 194
166.4 Bakau GMB 0.027 326 0.072 162 0.043 116 0.071 105 0.070 123
169.4 Surkhet NPL 0.050 124 0.059 256 0.037 168 0.063 135 0.063 164
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169.6 Kupang IDN 0.024 357 0.077 140 0.047 103 0.069 111 0.068 137
170.8 Serrekunda GMB 0.031 279 0.073 153 0.041 129 0.070 122
172.0 Ourossogui SEN 0.051 116 0.063 214 0.030 231 0.061 152 0.066 147
172.6 Toamasina I MDG 0.057 95 0.058 269 0.047 100 0.056 179 0.056 220
173.6 Nouakchott MRT 0.023 372 0.072 161 0.048 96 0.070 110 0.069 129
174.0 Bamenda CMR 0.029 310 0.073 155 0.044 111 0.066 120
175.4 Hinche HTI 0.026 342 0.078 134 0.035 183 0.074 94 0.070 124
175.7 Multan PAK 0.057 91 0.069 176 0.028 260
176.8 Benguluru IND 0.021 401 0.094 76 0.064 51 0.056 178 0.061 178
177.4 Colombo City LKA 0.067 64 0.061 239 0.029 250 0.062 143 0.060 191
177.6 Bangui CAF 0.038 196 0.062 230 0.044 113 0.062 144 0.059 205
178.2 Lilongwe MWI 0.039 182 0.069 172 0.025 286 0.068 113 0.068 138
178.2 Kailali NPL 0.046 139 0.059 259 0.041 127 0.057 171 0.059 195
178.6 Bambey SEN 0.033 250 0.072 160 0.038 161 0.056 176 0.066 146
178.8 Tombouctou MLI 0.034 238 0.055 295 0.038 156 0.054 192 0.148 13
179.7 Port-au-Prince HTI 0.039 186 0.062 225 0.041 128
180.0 Mazar e Serif AFG 0.037 205 0.067 183 0.035 187 0.062 145
180.3 Jeremie HTI 0.038 197 0.077 142 0.029 236 0.062 146
180.8 Hinche HTI 0.045 152 0.062 228 0.038 154 0.055 186 0.061 184
181.0 Jeremie HTI 0.028 324 0.084 104 0.023 309 0.078 86 0.084 82
181.0 Cayes HTI 0.036 222 0.076 144 0.020 330 0.074 96 0.074 113
181.6 Hinche HTI 0.039 188 0.060 245 0.037 165 0.057 174 0.068 136
183.3 Mpal SEN 0.034 235 0.066 194 0.039 149 0.061 155
184.0 Wellingara GMB 0.033 240 0.063 215 0.037 167 0.063 137 0.063 161
185.0 Wassu GMB 0.035 231 0.065 204 0.036 175 0.062 147 0.063 168
185.5 Mazar AFG 0.036 214 0.066 187 0.034 193 0.066 148
185.5 Dakar SEN 0.038 195 0.069 179 0.029 242 0.070 126
186.6 Sare Ngai GMB 0.054 106 0.060 253 0.031 216 0.059 162 0.059 196
187.0 Katiola CIV 0.033 243 0.065 201 0.039 150 0.065 154
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188.3 Angonia MOZ 0.029 304 0.067 185 0.049 92 0.062 172
190.8 Hinche HTI 0.023 371 0.074 150 0.032 211 0.072 101 0.070 121
191.0 Port-au-Prince HTI 0.039 190 0.059 257 0.041 126
192.3 Thies SEN 0.024 358 0.074 151 0.040 145 0.072 115
192.8 Basse Santa su GMB 0.025 349 0.072 164 0.042 125 0.069 133
192.8 Latri kunda GMB 0.029 309 0.065 198 0.035 188 0.065 124 0.066 145
195.3 Kerewan GMB 0.029 307 0.072 163 0.036 176 0.068 135
195.3 Thiaroye SEN 0.029 296 0.073 152 0.034 197 0.063 136
196.8 Barisal BGD 0.044 156 0.063 217 0.027 271 0.066 143
197.8 Soma GMB 0.029 311 0.064 210 0.036 177 0.062 150 0.067 141
198.7 Bafoussam CMR 0.030 290 0.070 169 0.040 137
198.8 Palpa NPL 0.036 219 0.061 238 0.043 117 0.056 221
199.8 Lasanod SOM 0.033 247 0.073 158 0.022 321 0.065 122 0.065 151
200.4 Kidal MLI 0.047 138 0.057 279 0.035 185 0.059 168 0.054 232
200.6 Serrekunda GMB 0.027 332 0.066 192 0.039 151 0.065 121 0.059 207
202.3 Vavuniya LKA 0.040 178 0.061 241 0.028 251 0.063 139
202.6 Kaolack SEN 0.019 416 0.070 170 0.035 182 0.064 127 0.072 118
202.8 Kaur Wharf
Town
GMB 0.024 355 0.065 202 0.038 157 0.064 131 0.063 169
203.0 Savannakhet LAO 0.038 201 0.064 212 0.023 306 0.063 134 0.063 162
203.5 Banjul GMB 0.034 234 0.064 211 0.033 202 0.063 167
203.7 Peshawar PAK 0.026 337 0.078 131 0.040 143
203.8 Latri kunda GMB 0.031 268 0.066 190 0.033 208 0.066 149
204.0 Ker Pate Kore GMB 0.038 198 0.059 260 0.034 195 0.059 166 0.059 201
204.0 Bossaso SOM 0.034 233 0.070 171 0.022 323 0.066 119 0.062 174
204.8 Monimpébougou MLI 0.056 96 0.058 268 0.026 273 0.057 172 0.057 215
205.2 Kuntaur GMB 0.024 361 0.065 199 0.038 162 0.063 133 0.062 171
205.6 Wassu GMB 0.020 412 0.069 175 0.040 135 0.064 129 0.061 177
205.8 Dhaka BGD 0.037 203 0.061 236 0.030 233 0.061 157 0.059 200
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206.8 Niono MLI 0.079 40 0.058 272 0.023 302 0.057 213
210.4 Serrekunda GMB 0.032 258 0.061 237 0.032 212 0.060 158 0.060 187
210.5 Loulouni MLI 0.076 42 0.054 302 0.028 262 0.054 236
212.0 Gbarnga LBR 0.028 317 0.061 243 0.040 133 0.065 155
212.7 Nzérékoré GIN 0.036 218 0.065 197 0.031 223
213.4 Cinkassé TGO 0.032 266 0.059 255 0.037 171 0.059 164 0.057 211
214.0 Maimana AFG 0.023 381 0.073 156 0.023 312 0.071 102 0.071 119
215.4 Kuntaur GMB 0.019 423 0.065 209 0.038 160 0.064 128 0.065 157
217.4 Lamin GMB 0.024 356 0.063 216 0.034 199 0.063 140 0.062 176
217.8 Thies SEN 0.035 224 0.060 248 0.028 259 0.060 161 0.059 197
219.5 Mataram IDN 0.056 99 0.057 277 0.023 315 0.054 187
219.6 Kuntaur GMB 0.021 398 0.065 200 0.037 169 0.062 141 0.060 190
220.6 Sibanor GMB 0.029 308 0.062 224 0.031 219 0.061 153 0.059 199
220.8 Tillaberi NER 0.021 400 0.063 222 0.041 131 0.064 130
221.0 Touba Toul SEN 0.031 282 0.062 231 0.028 263 0.062 149 0.061 180
221.5 Jacmel HTI 0.037 209 0.060 251 0.029 244 0.061 182
222.0 Sare Bojo GMB 0.031 273 0.061 240 0.032 209 0.063 166
222.3 Thilmakha SEN 0.033 244 0.063 219 0.027 272 0.061 154
222.5 Jacmel HTI 0.033 242 0.061 235 0.032 210 0.059 203
222.6 Cayes HTI 0.030 289 0.069 177 0.017 378 0.067 116 0.065 153
223.0 Dong Thap VNM 0.029 299 0.079 130 0.008 485 0.078 84 0.072 117
223.4 Karachi PAK 0.056 98 0.058 271 0.015 400 0.057 175 0.062 173
223.8 Kerewan GMB 0.026 341 0.061 233 0.034 191 0.061 156 0.059 198
224.0 Ujung Pandang IDN 0.025 348 0.070 168 0.040 140 0.051 210 0.051 254
225.3 Brikama GMB 0.027 327 0.063 213 0.034 196 0.063 165
225.8 Achham NPL 0.040 179 0.058 274 0.032 213 0.054 237
226.0 Dhanusha NPL 0.050 126 0.054 304 0.030 232 0.053 242
226.2 Maymana AFG 0.028 318 0.069 174 0.017 383 0.067 114 0.067 142
229.0 Zangasso MLI 0.036 212 0.055 297 0.030 229 0.054 189 0.056 218
Continued on next page...
239
Appendix A. Supplementary tables chapter 2
... Table A.3 continued
A
ve
ra
ge
ra
n
k
M
ar
ke
t
IS
O
3
S
D
S
ea
so
n
R
an
k
S
ea
so
n
S
D
lo
g
∆
R
an
k
lo
g
∆
S
D
Ir
re
g
R
an
k
Ir
re
g
S
D
G
A
R
C
H
R
an
k
G
A
R
C
H
S
D
E
G
A
R
C
H
R
an
k
E
G
A
R
C
H
230.2 Khammouane LAO 0.061 80 0.055 298 0.017 376 0.059 167 0.055 230
231.0 Labé GIN 0.031 267 0.061 234 0.021 328 0.080 95
233.0 Savannakhet LAO 0.039 185 0.062 226 0.020 335 0.061 186
235.4 National Average LAO 0.068 60 0.051 325 0.023 311 0.050 215 0.049 266
237.4 Diourbel SEN 0.038 199 0.058 275 0.025 282 0.054 191 0.054 240
237.4 Tambacounda SEN 0.029 297 0.058 270 0.029 240 0.057 170 0.057 210
238.0 Bunia COD 0.055 102 0.053 309 0.021 326 0.052 202 0.052 251
238.3 Dong Thap VNM 0.031 278 0.080 126 0.009 470 0.079 79
238.5 Kaski NPL 0.029 305 0.059 262 0.039 152 0.054 235
238.7 Barra GMB 0.033 249 0.063 221 0.029 246
239.4 BrikamaBa GMB 0.019 422 0.063 220 0.034 190 0.060 159 0.059 206
239.5 Abomey BEN 0.020 409 0.066 193 0.041 132 0.055 224
239.5 Bakau GMB 0.018 435 0.065 196 0.039 146 0.061 181
239.8 Sare Bojo GMB 0.025 346 0.062 229 0.034 192 0.060 192
240.5 Chittagong BGD 0.032 256 0.060 246 0.023 310 0.066 150
240.8 Basse Santa su GMB 0.019 417 0.063 218 0.038 158 0.062 170
241.2 Khammouane LAO 0.060 81 0.051 328 0.020 334 0.051 211 0.051 252
241.4 Touba SEN 0.025 352 0.061 244 0.030 225 0.058 169 0.056 217
242.2 BrikamaBa GMB 0.023 370 0.060 252 0.038 163 0.054 188 0.054 238
242.8 National Average MDG 0.098 19 0.056 286 0.006 504 0.052 201 0.059 204
243.0 National Average MDG 0.100 18 0.056 287 0.006 505 0.052 203 0.059 202
243.8 Padang IDN 0.039 184 0.053 308 0.025 285 0.053 198
244.0 Port-au-Prince HTI 0.028 321 0.066 188 0.017 380 0.062 148 0.061 183
244.4 Yogyakarta IDN 0.042 169 0.055 299 0.023 313 0.053 200 0.054 241
247.0 Wassu GMB 0.034 236 0.059 264 0.029 241
248.5 Sare Ngai GMB 0.024 367 0.060 249 0.035 189 0.060 189
250.3 Sikasso Centre MLI 0.063 72 0.049 336 0.022 319 0.048 274
250.3 Sare Ngai GMB 0.039 180 0.053 307 0.028 264 0.052 250
251.6 Pekanbaru IDN 0.031 277 0.057 278 0.029 239 0.051 209 0.051 255
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252.0 BrikamaBa GMB 0.018 428 0.056 285 0.029 238 0.055 181 0.070 128
252.3 Louga SEN 0.024 366 0.086 97 0.011 450 0.080 96
253.8 Lahore PAK 0.039 187 0.055 293 0.017 367 0.053 193 0.055 229
254.0 SaintLouis SEN 0.027 335 0.060 247 0.024 296 0.056 180 0.057 212
254.5 Ulaanbaatar MNG 0.031 285 0.061 232 0.023 316 0.055 185
255.8 Karachi PAK 0.043 162 0.065 195 0.010 458 0.043 250 0.057 214
256.8 S.Antao CPV 0.023 380 0.059 258 0.037 172 0.048 221 0.051 253
257.0 M’Pèssoba MLI 0.056 101 0.046 360 0.023 307 0.044 245 0.048 272
257.6 Sare Bojo GMB 0.023 384 0.057 283 0.031 221 0.056 177 0.056 223
257.8 S.Vincente CPV 0.018 433 0.062 223 0.026 277 0.059 163 0.060 193
258.0 Banjul GMB 0.035 228 0.060 254 0.024 292
259.3 Farafenni GMB 0.031 283 0.056 288 0.033 207
260.0 Patna IND 0.022 389 0.055 294 0.035 184 0.053 199 0.054 234
260.8 National Average CRI 0.020 406 0.057 276 0.040 136 0.055 225
261.4 National Average CRI 0.019 415 0.054 305 0.042 124 0.051 207 0.050 256
263.8 Thiodaye SEN 0.033 251 0.054 303 0.026 281 0.052 204 0.047 280
264.8 Mopti MLI 0.068 61 0.045 375 0.019 348 0.045 239 0.045 301
265.2 Ouanaminthe HTI 0.029 300 0.057 281 0.021 329 0.055 183 0.054 233
265.2 Kendari IDN 0.036 211 0.052 315 0.019 350 0.051 206 0.053 244
268.0 Chennai IND 0.051 121 0.048 350 0.017 375 0.047 226 0.048 268
268.3 Kwinella Nya
Kunda
GMB 0.027 329 0.061 242 0.029 234
268.4 Maxixe MOZ 0.017 443 0.055 296 0.040 138 0.051 208 0.050 257
270.5 Antananarivo MDG 0.067 65 0.046 362 0.017 364 0.046 291
270.7 Keur I. Yacine SEN 0.029 298 0.087 93 0.013 421
271.4 Gaza Strip PSE 0.020 413 0.052 317 0.037 164 0.053 196 0.049 267
271.8 Rajshahi BGD 0.029 302 0.053 312 0.020 332 0.053 194 0.056 219
272.0 Mopti Guangal MLI 0.053 109 0.044 386 0.024 297 0.043 251 0.042 317
273.8 Samarinda IDN 0.027 328 0.059 263 0.029 235 0.048 269
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274.8 Ambositra MDG 0.060 84 0.046 366 0.017 385 0.045 241 0.045 298
274.8 Palangkaraya IDN 0.019 420 0.056 284 0.030 227 0.053 195 0.052 248
275.5 Koulikoro Ba MLI 0.047 137 0.046 361 0.024 299 0.044 305
275.6 Dioro MLI 0.078 41 0.049 342 0.007 500 0.048 224 0.048 271
276.8 South Cotabato PHL 0.074 47 0.050 332 0.008 478 0.046 237 0.046 290
277.0 Ségou Centre MLI 0.059 88 0.047 352 0.013 420 0.047 233 0.046 292
277.0 Barra GMB 0.024 362 0.054 301 0.028 255 0.054 190
277.2 Kinshasa COD 0.037 208 0.049 341 0.020 339 0.048 222 0.048 276
278.0 Diourbel SEN 0.021 396 0.067 184 0.028 254
278.4 Ségou Château MLI 0.063 71 0.048 349 0.011 445 0.047 228 0.045 299
279.2 Bandar Lampung IDN 0.043 158 0.049 343 0.019 353 0.047 230 0.043 312
280.5 Mannar LKA 0.030 294 0.052 318 0.020 331 0.061 179
281.8 Jakarta IDN 0.039 181 0.049 338 0.018 360 0.047 234 0.045 296
283.0 Cotonou BEN 0.011 499 0.059 265 0.039 148 0.049 220
283.0 Brikama GMB 0.019 421 0.056 291 0.023 305 0.055 182 0.057 216
285.3 Brikama GMB 0.017 437 0.058 273 0.033 203 0.055 228
285.5 Panama City PAN 0.028 319 0.053 311 0.036 179 0.040 333
287.0 Kolda SEN 0.024 359 0.051 326 0.026 274 0.050 213 0.050 263
287.6 Peshawar PAK 0.029 303 0.044 379 0.017 372 0.042 254 0.069 130
288.8 Banjarmasin IDN 0.032 260 0.052 319 0.016 399 0.051 205 0.050 261
289.0 Gao MLI 0.032 262 0.052 322 0.018 355 0.049 217
289.0 Lahore PAK 0.031 274 0.051 324 0.017 365 0.049 218 0.050 264
289.3 Libreville GAB 0.024 369 0.057 282 0.026 275 0.055 231
290.2 Kaur Wharf
Town
GMB 0.024 365 0.054 306 0.019 344 0.053 197 0.054 239
290.8 Farafenni GMB 0.031 271 0.049 337 0.026 280 0.048 275
291.5 Bansang GMB 0.025 353 0.056 292 0.024 294 0.055 227
292.3 Colombo LKA 0.050 128 0.047 357 0.016 391 0.046 293
292.4 Bandung IDN 0.031 281 0.048 346 0.020 337 0.047 225 0.048 273
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292.5 Diaobe SEN 0.008 512 0.059 266 0.037 170 0.056 222
294.0 Zguinchor SEN 0.026 340 0.052 320 0.020 340 0.050 212 0.050 258
295.3 Wellingara GMB 0.027 333 0.055 300 0.028 253
297.6 Multan PAK 0.044 157 0.044 380 0.017 388 0.041 257 0.044 306
297.8 Djougou BEN 0.019 418 0.051 329 0.028 258 0.050 214 0.048 270
298.5 Davao City PHL 0.028 315 0.035 434 0.011 444 1.671 1
298.8 Peshawar PAK 0.043 160 0.047 358 0.016 389 0.046 288
300.8 Dantokpa BEN 0.018 430 0.047 359 0.034 198 0.046 236 0.047 281
302.2 Latri kunda GMB 0.015 457 0.051 330 0.029 249 0.049 216 0.050 259
302.8 Nara MLI 0.069 58 0.037 424 0.010 456 0.036 273
303.0 Karachi PAK 0.053 112 0.052 316 0.009 476 0.044 308
304.6 Patna IND 0.029 306 0.046 367 0.023 308 0.045 238 0.045 304
304.8 Banjul GMB 0.017 436 0.053 313 0.031 224 0.052 246
305.3 Sibanor GMB 0.024 363 0.053 310 0.025 283 0.049 265
305.5 Ouanaminthe HTI 0.028 316 0.059 261 0.010 461 0.055 184
305.8 South Cotabato PHL 0.059 87 0.044 378 0.008 484 0.041 256 0.041 324
308.8 Bansang GMB 0.013 480 0.047 351 0.026 276 0.047 229 0.058 208
310.8 Ouanaminthe HTI 0.030 291 0.060 250 0.011 453 0.052 249
310.8 Manado IDN 0.027 336 0.048 344 0.023 304 0.043 247 0.042 323
311.0 Mopti Digue MLI 0.054 107 0.042 397 0.014 418 0.042 322
311.6 Palu IDN 0.023 382 0.050 333 0.022 322 0.047 227 0.046 294
313.2 Quetta PAK 0.025 350 0.047 353 0.019 342 0.047 232 0.046 289
313.5 Gao MLI 0.036 213 0.042 399 0.023 303 0.039 339
313.6 Ahmedabad IND 0.016 447 0.050 334 0.024 291 0.049 219 0.048 277
314.2 Bhopal IND 0.016 453 0.048 348 0.027 268 0.048 223 0.047 279
314.8 Maputo MOZ 0.017 442 0.047 356 0.030 230 0.047 231
315.2 Koutiala MLI 0.053 110 0.038 417 0.014 416 0.036 274 0.034 359
315.2 Peshawar PAK 0.031 275 0.047 355 0.018 361 0.042 253 0.040 332
316.3 Lahore PAK 0.019 424 0.057 280 0.029 245
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317.8 Bansang GMB 0.016 449 0.053 314 0.028 265 0.053 243
320.3 Kolda SEN 0.033 253 0.043 390 0.021 325 0.043 313
321.0 Palembang IDN 0.031 284 0.047 354 0.014 412 0.041 258 0.045 297
321.0 Niarela MLI 0.040 175 0.035 437 0.016 393 0.035 279
321.5 Medine MLI 0.043 161 0.035 433 0.014 414 0.035 278
321.8 Hirat AFG 0.035 225 0.051 331 0.007 491 0.044 243 0.042 319
322.8 Davao City PHL 0.045 149 0.043 389 0.011 448 0.037 271 0.034 357
324.0 Karachi PAK 0.051 118 0.049 339 0.004 514 0.041 325
324.0 Kayes Centre MLI 0.042 168 0.039 412 0.000 0.028 392
325.0 Zwedru LBR 0.025 347 0.042 396 0.022 320 0.043 248 0.043 314
325.2 Jaipur IND 0.019 414 0.045 374 0.026 278 0.043 249 0.043 311
326.5 Gonaives HTI 0.017 440 0.059 267 0.017 373 0.055 226
327.7 Boghé MRT 0.024 368 0.042 400 0.031 215
328.0 Ouolofobougou MLI 0.045 144 0.037 422 0.017 386 0.034 360
329.3 Dibida MLI 0.040 177 0.035 438 0.017 374 0.041 328
331.0 San MLI 0.045 151 0.040 409 0.012 433 0.040 331
331.3 Davao City PHL 0.052 114 0.037 423 0.012 436 0.035 352
332.5 Man CIV 0.021 405 0.046 365 0.028 257 0.045 303
332.6 Sao Paulo BRA 0.019 425 0.045 376 0.024 300 0.044 246 0.043 316
332.7 National Average COL 0.017 439 0.026 503 0.000 0.097 56
333.4 Koury MLI 0.049 132 0.033 460 0.014 419 0.033 285 0.032 371
333.7 Kwinella Nya
Kunda
GMB 0.022 387 0.056 290 0.021 324
333.8 Mumbai IND 0.020 410 0.044 387 0.019 347 0.045 240 0.047 285
335.3 Farafenni GMB 0.023 376 0.046 364 0.023 314 0.046 287
335.5 Lamin GMB 0.015 459 0.050 335 0.027 270 0.048 278
337.8 Sare Yoba SEN 0.016 451 0.049 340 0.017 368 0.046 235 0.046 295
337.8 Lahore PAK 0.021 404 0.045 371 0.017 370 0.045 242 0.045 302
339.6 Multan PAK 0.028 322 0.042 395 0.012 443 0.043 252 0.047 286
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340.8 Hirat AFG 0.030 292 0.052 321 0.010 466 0.047 284
340.8 Aizwal IND 0.018 432 0.048 345 0.019 341 0.053 245
341.8 Nouakchott MRT 0.024 360 0.051 327 0.009 471 0.044 244 0.044 307
342.2 Bla MLI 0.032 255 0.036 428 0.017 387 0.035 277 0.034 364
342.3 Ouolofobougou MLI 0.015 462 0.033 464 0.013 428 0.144 15
342.3 Matam SEN 0.030 295 0.046 369 0.016 395 0.043 310
343.3 Sikasso Médine MLI 0.055 105 0.037 425 0.007 493 0.036 350
343.5 Semarang IDN 0.027 330 0.046 368 0.018 356 0.042 320
343.8 Gonaives HTI 0.018 431 0.056 289 0.015 408 0.052 247
345.0 Surabaya IDN 0.031 287 0.045 370 0.016 396 0.041 327
345.0 Hyderabad IND 0.013 475 0.040 403 0.024 293 0.058 209
345.5 Fadjiguila MLI 0.039 183 0.035 432 0.016 390 0.031 377
345.8 S.Antao CPV 0.022 385 0.045 372 0.024 290 0.040 336
346.6 Dougouolo MLI 0.034 232 0.036 430 0.012 441 0.037 269 0.034 361
346.8 Multan PAK 0.032 263 0.039 414 0.011 447 0.038 265 0.038 345
346.8 National Average ZAF 0.026 338 0.043 388 0.014 410 0.039 260 0.039 338
347.4 Denpasar IDN 0.021 393 0.045 377 0.016 397 0.041 255 0.043 315
347.5 National Average WSM 0.028 313 0.044 384 0.018 363 0.041 330
348.8 Djikoroni MLI 0.032 261 0.035 436 0.014 413 0.038 267 0.033 367
351.0 Santiago CPV 0.023 377 0.039 411 0.020 333 0.035 281 0.035 353
351.0 Niamey NER 0.015 458 0.040 405 0.025 284 0.039 264 0.038 344
351.0 San Salvador SLV 0.021 403 0.040 402 0.020 336 0.039 263
353.0 Kita MLI 0.027 334 0.045 373 0.019 352
354.5 Agadez Com-
mune
NER 0.021 397 0.042 394 0.024 298 0.041 329
356.0 Quetta PAK 0.020 408 0.046 363 0.017 371 0.047 282
356.8 Badalabougou MLI 0.036 217 0.034 454 0.013 430 0.041 326
359.0 Maradi NER 0.011 494 0.040 408 0.026 279 0.037 268 0.037 346
359.3 Quetta PAK 0.024 364 0.044 382 0.017 382 0.044 309
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360.5 Kolkata IND 0.012 484 0.043 391 0.027 267 0.045 300
361.4 Agartala IND 0.017 441 0.036 427 0.022 318 0.036 272 0.036 349
361.7 Garoua CMR 0.015 464 0.043 393 0.030 228
362.0 Jambi IDN 0.026 344 0.038 420 0.014 417 0.036 275 0.035 354
362.3 Sirakorola MLI 0.028 320 0.034 442 0.015 405 0.034 282
362.3 Lafiabougou MLI 0.033 246 0.035 439 0.014 409 0.035 355
363.5 S.Vincente CPV 0.026 343 0.041 401 0.011 449 0.039 261
363.5 Dosso NER 0.016 446 0.037 421 0.022 317 0.037 270
363.8 Touna MLI 0.026 339 0.040 407 0.017 366 0.038 343
366.3 National Average ZAF 0.013 476 0.051 323 0.015 406 0.050 260
366.3 Magnambougou MLI 0.031 269 0.034 456 0.013 422 0.042 318
369.0 Sogoniko MLI 0.033 254 0.034 450 0.015 403
370.4 Lucknow IND 0.008 511 0.038 418 0.025 287 0.035 280 0.034 356
370.7 Niamakoro MLI 0.033 245 0.034 452 0.014 415
370.8 Zamboanga City PHL 0.044 154 0.032 469 0.008 481 0.030 379
371.3 Iloilo PHL 0.039 189 0.033 459 0.010 465 0.032 372
372.0 Faladié MLI 0.031 272 0.034 447 0.013 427 0.039 342
372.4 Vientiane Capital LAO 0.022 390 0.044 383 0.007 496 0.040 259 0.040 334
374.6 Koulikoro Gare MLI 0.031 270 0.031 473 0.010 459 0.032 289 0.030 382
374.8 Pleebo LBR 0.022 388 0.042 398 0.019 351 0.034 362
380.7 Natitingou BEN 0.014 469 0.044 385 0.025 288
381.0 Gaza Strip PSE 0.015 463 0.039 416 0.017 379 0.038 266
386.2 Santiago CPV 0.015 460 0.036 426 0.014 411 0.035 276 0.034 358
386.3 Dhaka BGD 0.025 354 0.040 410 0.012 440 0.039 341
386.8 Santo Domingo DOM 0.013 478 0.034 448 0.020 338 0.034 283
388.3 Kayes Plateau MLI 0.018 434 0.048 347 0.017 384
388.6 Chennai IND 0.021 395 0.031 472 0.015 407 0.031 291 0.031 378
388.8 Bhubaneshwar IND 0.021 392 0.034 455 0.019 343 0.034 365
389.5 Guwahati IND 0.014 467 0.033 458 0.019 346 0.032 287
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390.0 Vientiane Capital LAO 0.016 452 0.043 392 0.006 507 0.039 262 0.039 337
390.4 Santo Domingo DOM 0.014 466 0.032 465 0.018 362 0.032 286 0.032 373
391.0 National Average MDG 0.031 280 0.040 404 0.005 512 0.033 368
391.3 Basse Santa su GMB 0.011 492 0.044 381 0.024 301
391.8 National Average URY 0.022 391 0.035 435 0.011 452 0.029 292 0.028 389
392.0 Agadez NER 0.007 517 0.033 457 0.021 327 0.034 284 0.032 375
392.8 Adel Bagrou MRT 0.021 399 0.036 429 0.016 392 0.036 351
393.4 Aceh IDN 0.018 427 0.035 440 0.013 431 0.032 288 0.030 381
398.0 Mumbai IND 0.006 522 0.034 446 0.025 289 0.040 335
398.8 National Average MDG 0.028 312 0.040 406 0.005 511 0.034 366
400.2 Montevideo URY 0.023 383 0.034 449 0.010 463 0.025 300 0.026 406
400.3 National Average IDN 0.032 265 0.021 516 0.000 0.021 420
401.5 Vientiane Capital LAO 0.017 445 0.038 419 0.016 394 0.036 348
402.0 Port-de-Paix HTI 0.012 485 0.039 415 0.011 446 0.050 262
402.6 Iloilo PHL 0.023 375 0.028 495 0.012 435 0.025 298 0.025 410
413.4 Douala CMR 0.011 500 0.027 502 0.017 369 0.026 296 0.026 400
415.0 Lafiabougou MLI 0.011 497 0.030 481 0.010 467 0.031 290 0.039 340
415.2 Shimla IND 0.010 503 0.029 489 0.015 401 0.029 293 0.028 390
417.4 National Average NIC 0.012 490 0.031 477 0.013 432 0.028 294 0.027 394
417.7 Sikasso Centre MLI 0.023 379 0.034 445 0.013 429
420.0 Cebu PHL 0.020 407 0.028 497 0.009 477 0.025 299
421.0 Badinko MLI 0.025 345 0.032 467 0.011 451
421.3 Kayes Centre MLI 0.023 378 0.033 461 0.013 425
423.7 Yaundé CMR 0.012 486 0.036 431 0.019 354
423.8 Managua NIC 0.007 518 0.034 444 0.018 357 0.031 376
425.5 Trivandrum IND 0.009 509 0.031 474 0.019 349 0.033 370
426.0 Pontianak IDN 0.011 496 0.039 413 0.013 426 0.033 369
427.0 Shillong IND 0.010 501 0.033 462 0.016 398 0.037 347
427.4 Nueva Ecija PHL 0.016 455 0.030 487 0.007 495 0.027 295 0.026 405
Continued on next page...
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429.3 Vientiane Capital LAO 0.012 487 0.034 443 0.013 424 0.034 363
431.3 Managua NIC 0.009 508 0.034 451 0.017 381 0.029 385
434.5 Chennai IND 0.011 493 0.030 485 0.017 377 0.030 383
436.3 Abalak NER 0.018 429 0.021 512 0.001 521 0.047 283
437.3 Zinder NER 0.012 488 0.027 498 0.018 359 0.026 404
440.0 Medine MLI 0.016 456 0.035 441 0.013 423
440.3 Medan IDN 0.019 426 0.032 470 0.010 457 0.026 408
440.3 Koury MLI 0.021 402 0.029 491 0.009 475 0.028 393
442.0 Managua NIC 0.007 515 0.031 471 0.015 402 0.030 380
443.0 National Average COL 0.023 373 0.029 493 0.004 515 0.028 391
443.3 Cebu PHL 0.021 394 0.030 484 0.007 492 0.026 403
443.3 National Average PHL 0.028 323 0.024 509 0.002 518 0.018 423
444.0 Diallassagou MLI 0.013 472 0.020 519 0.008 483 0.020 302
444.8 New Delhi IND 0.007 516 0.021 515 0.009 473 0.021 301 0.021 419
445.8 Sikasso Médine MLI 0.012 483 0.026 506 0.007 497 0.026 297
446.0 Niarela MLI 0.013 479 0.032 468 0.012 442 0.027 395
446.7 Koulikoro Ba MLI 0.019 419 0.032 466 0.011 455
447.0 Kita MLI 0.012 491 0.031 476 0.012 434 0.028 387
448.0 Dibida MLI 0.016 454 0.034 453 0.012 437
450.8 National Average RUS 0.009 507 0.019 520 0.006 503 0.019 303 0.019 421
452.8 National Average ZAF 0.010 502 0.033 463 0.010 460 0.029 386
453.5 Lima PER 0.014 468 0.026 504 0.010 468 0.032 374
455.3 Fadjiguila MLI 0.015 461 0.030 482 0.009 469 0.026 409
456.3 National Average MMR 0.020 411 0.027 500 0.005 513 0.026 401
457.5 Bankass MLI 0.017 444 0.024 510 0.011 454 0.019 422
457.5 Koulikoro Gare MLI 0.014 465 0.030 480 0.007 501 0.030 384
459.8 Magnambougou MLI 0.013 477 0.031 478 0.008 482 0.026 402
461.0 Sogoniko MLI 0.013 474 0.030 483 0.008 489 0.027 398
461.5 National Average PHL 0.022 386 0.021 518 0.003 517 0.015 425
Continued on next page...
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461.5 Badalabougou MLI 0.011 495 0.031 475 0.008 479 0.027 397
462.3 Koulogon MLI 0.012 489 0.024 508 0.012 438 0.023 414
462.3 MetroManila PHL 0.014 470 0.029 492 0.008 480 0.026 407
462.8 Djikoroni MLI 0.014 471 0.029 490 0.007 502 0.028 388
465.5 Jayapura IDN 0.008 513 0.030 479 0.009 474 0.027 396
465.8 Bankass MLI 0.010 505 0.021 517 0.002 520 0.042 321
466.0 Faladié MLI 0.013 473 0.030 486 0.007 494 0.025 411
466.8 Niamakoro MLI 0.013 481 0.030 488 0.008 486 0.025 412
471.8 Delhi IND 0.006 520 0.023 511 0.012 439 0.023 417
472.8 Mumbai IND 0.009 506 0.027 499 0.008 487 0.026 399
473.0 Nueva Ecija PHL 0.013 482 0.028 496 0.007 498 0.023 416
473.0 National Average TUN 0.009 510 0.026 505 0.010 462 0.023 415
475.7 Zangasso MLI 0.017 438 0.027 501 0.008 488
477.3 West Bank PSE 0.016 448 0.029 494 0.008 490
477.8 National Average NIC 0.007 519 0.026 507 0.009 472 0.024 413
478.3 West Bank PSE 0.010 504 0.017 521 0.010 464 0.016 424
482.0 Lima PER 0.011 498 0.021 513 0.007 499 0.022 418
494.8 Luanda AGO 0.006 521 0.013 525 0.006 506 0.013 427
496.3 National Average GTM 0.003 525 0.014 523 0.006 508 0.010 429
497.0 Lima PER 0.003 524 0.014 522 0.004 516 0.014 426
497.3 National Average GTM 0.003 526 0.014 524 0.006 509 0.010 430
499.0 National Average CHN 0.005 523 0.011 526 0.002 519 0.010 428
512.7 MetroManila PHL 0.008 514 0.021 514 0.006 510
Source: Source: Author’s computation based on ZEF [2014].
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Table B.1: List of countries and crops in sample
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Afghanistan
√ √
Lao, PDR
√
Argentina
√ √
Madagascar
√
Armenia
√
Malawi
√ √
Azerbaijan
√
Mali
√ √ √ √
Bangladesh
√ √
Mauritania
√ √ √ √
Benin
√ √ √
Mexico
√ √
Bhutan
√ √
Moldova
√ √
Bolivia
√ √ √
Mongolia
√ √
Brazil
√ √
Mozambique
√ √
Burkina Faso
√ √ √ √
Myanmar
√
Continued on next page...
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Burundi
√ √
Namibia
√
Cambodia
√
Nepal
√ √
Cameroon
√ √ √ √
Nicaragua
√ √
Cape Verde
√ √
Niger
√ √ √ √
Chad
√ √ √
Nigeria
√ √ √ √
China
√ √
Pakistan
√ √
Colombia
√ √
Panama
√ √
Congo (D.R.)
√ √ √
Peru
√ √ √
Costa Rica
√ √
Philippines
√ √
Cote d’Ivoire
√ √
Russian Federation
√ √
Djibouti
√ √
Rwanda
√ √
Dominican Republic
√ √
Senegal
√ √ √ √
Egypt
√ √
Somalia
√ √ √
El Salvador
√ √ √ √
South Africa
√ √ √
Equador
√
Sri Lanka
√
Ethiopia
√ √ √ √
Sudan
√ √ √
Gabon
√ √
Tajikistan
√ √ √
Gambia
√
Tanzania
√ √ √
Georgia
√ √
Thailand
√
Ghana
√ √ √
Togo
√ √ √
Guatemala
√ √ √
Tunisia
√ √
Guinea
√
Turkey
√ √
Haiti
√ √ √ √
Uganda
√ √ √
Honduras
√ √
Uruguay
√ √
India
√ √
Viet Nam
√
Continued on next page...
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... Table B.1 continued
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Indonesia
√ √
Zambia
√ √ √
Kenya
√ √ √
Zimbabwe
√ √
Kyrgyzstan
√
Source: Own illustration.
Table B.2: Country classification
countries N
importers
Afghanistanbd, Armeniad, Azerbaijand, Bangladeshd,
Beninb, Bhutanbd, Boliviad, Brazild, Burkina Fasob,
Burundiad, Cameroonbd, Cape Verdeab, Chadb, Colombiaa,
Congo, D.R.bd, Costa Ricaabd, Cote d’Ivoireb, Dem.
Republica, Djiboutibd, Dominican Republica, Equadora,
Egyptd, El Salvadorabd, Ethiopiad, Gambia, theb, Gabonab,
Georgiad, Ghanab, Guinea b, Guatemalaabd, Haitibd,
Hondurasab, Indonesiad, Kenyacd, Kyrgyzstanbd,
Mauritaniaab, Mexicoab, Malawib, Mauritaniaabd,
Mongoliabd, Mozambiqueb, Namibiaa, Nicaraguaab,
Nigerabd, Nigeriabd, Panamaab, Peruad, Russiab, Rwandaab,
Senegalb, Somaliaabc, Sudand, Sri Lankad, Togob,
Tajikistand, Tunisiabd, Turkeyb, South Africabd, Zambiab,
Zimbabwead
92
Continued on next page...
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... Table B.2 continued
countries N
trade-switchers
Burundibc, Beninc, Burkina Fasoce, Bangladeshb, Boliviaab,
Brazilb, Chinabd, Cote d’Ivoirea, Congo, D.Ra, Colombiab,
Dominican Republicb, Egyptb, Ethiopiaace, Ghanaace,
Haitiac, Indonesiab, Indiad, Kenyaae, Lao, PDRb, Sri
Lankab, Moldovaad, Madagascarb, Maliab, Mozambiquea,
Mauritaniac, Malawia, Namibiae, Nigerce, Nigeriaa,
Nepalbd, Pakistand, Perub, the Philippinesab, Sudance,
Senegalce, El Salvadorc, Chada, Togoc, Tajikistanab,
Turkeyd, Tanzaniaabc, Ugandace, South Africaa, Zambiaa
66
exporters
Argentinaad, Benina, Burkina Fasoa, Cameroona, Indiab,
Cambodiab, Malice, Myanmarb, Nigeriac, Pakistanb,
Russiad, Chade, Togoa, Thailandb, Ugandaa, Uruguaybd,
Vietnamb
21
high intervention
Burkina Faso, Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia,
India, Indonesia, Kenya, Cambodia, Mali, Myanmar,
Malawi, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Thailand,
Turkey, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe
47
Note:amaize,brice,csorghum,dwheat,emillet; non-importers are exporters plus trade-switchers.
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Figure B.1: Residuals from the GMM regression with logged price volatility
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Table C.1: Survey details
market date id 1st important 2nd important 3rd important
crop crop crop
Accra 2-Sep-13 3.01 Imported rice White maize
Accra 2-Sep-13 3.02 White maize Local rice
Accra 6-Sep-13 3.03 White maize Local rice Yellow maize
Accra 9-Sep-13 3.04 Imported rice Local rice
Accra 23-Sep-13 3.05 White maize Local rice Soyabeans
Tamale 7-Sep-13 4.01 Soyabeans Local rice White maize
Tamale 7-Sep-13 4.02 White maize Soyabeans
Tamale 7-Sep-13 4.03 Soyabeans Local rice White maize
Tamale 8-Sep-13 4.04 Soyabeans White maize Millet
Tamale 9-Sep-13 4.05 White maize Local rice Soyabeans
Tamale 10-Sep-13 4.06 White maize Local rice
Kumasi 7-Sep-13 5.01 Local rice
Kumasi 7-Sep-13 5.02 White maize
Accra 23-Oct-13 3.06 Imported rice
Kumasi 24-Oct-13 5.03 White maize
Continued on next page...
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... Table C.1 continued
market date id 1st important 2nd important 3rd important
crop crop crop
Accra 8-Oct-13 3.1 White maize Local rice
Accra 25-Oct-13 3.07 Imported rice
Accra 28-Oct-13 3.08 Imported rice
Accra 28-Oct-13 3.09 White maize Imported rice
Kumasi 29-Oct-13 5.04 Soyabeans Millet White maize
Kumasi 30-Oct-13 5.05 Imported rice
Kumasi 31-Oct-13 5.06 Local rice White maize
Techiman 1-Nov-13 6.01 Imported rice
Techiman 1-Nov-13 6.02 White maize
Techiman 2-Nov-13 6.04 White maize Soyabeans
Techiman 2-Nov-13 6.03 White maize Soyabeans
Wenchi 4-Nov-13 7.01 White maize
Wenchi 4-Nov-13 7.02 White maize
Wenchi 4-Nov-13 7.03 White maize
Ejura 7-Nov-13 8.01 White maize
Ejura 7-Nov-13 8.02 White maize
Wa 6-Nov-13 9.01 White maize Local rice
Accra 4-Dec-13 3.11 White maize Yellow maize
Tamale 9-Nov-13 4.07 White maize Local rice Soyabeans
Tamale 9-Nov-13 4.08 White maize Local rice
Tamale 18-Nov-13 4.09 White maize Soyabeans Sorghum
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Appendix: Trader survey
questionnaire
TRADER SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER),
University of Ghana (Legon)
Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn
To be completed by the interviewer.
Market name:
Respondent’s ID Code: _____
Interview Date: ____ -2013 (ddmm-2013)
Begin Interview: ____ (hhmm)
End interview: ____ (hhmm)
Gender of respondent: 2 Male 2 Female
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Good morning/afternoon. My name is . I am conducting this survey
on behalf of ISSER and ZEF on the structure of agricultural marketing in Ghana.
The information provided by you in this interview about your trading activities will con-
tribute to understand the causes and impacts of seasonal price dynamics in Ghana. Your
response to these questions will be anonymous and will be treated with the strictest confi-
dentiality. Your participation is voluntary and you can choose not to answer any or all of the
questions if you wish; however we hope you will participate since your views are important.
The research is aiming at improving the functioning of grain markets in Ghana.
Thank you in advance for your time to participate in this study.
Company profile
1. What is the full name of the company?
2. Is the company registered?
2 Yes 2 No 2 No answer
3. When was the company registered?
4. What is the legal status of this company?
1 Sole ownership 2 Subsidiary (or
branch) of
another
enterprise
3 Partnership 4 Cooperative
5 Shareholding
company
6 State-owned
enterprise
7 Others: .
No answer
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5. Is the company operating in any other businesses than grain trading
if any:
6. Where is the legal seat of the company?
7. Where is the company having branches?
if any:
8. What is the position of the respondent in the business?
1 Owner(CEO)/Manager
2 Manager only 3 Others:
.
No answer
General Information - wholesale business
9. What year did you/ this company start operating as a grain trading busi-
ness?
10. From which market actors are you buying?
2 Purchase from traders 2 Purchase from farmers
2 Purchase from NAFCO 2 Purchase from aggregators
2 Others:
11. To which market actors are you selling to?
2 Sell to traders 2 Sell to processors
2 Sell to NAFCO 2 Sell to retailers
2 Sell to consumers 2 Others:
12. Please indicate the three most important commodities you are trading?
1. for the most important commodity
2. for the second most important commodity
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3. for the third most important commodity
White maize
Yellow maize
Local rice/Paddy rice
Imported rice
Soy beans
Millet
Sorghum
if Q.5=yes:
13. What is the income share you obtain from your grain trading activities
(during the peak period of grain sales)?
%
14. Please describe your challenges when you started your grain trading busi-
ness, did you face any entry barriers caused by competitors?
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Stocking strategy
15. What is your maximum storage capacity?
unit:
16. During last production year (2012-2013), what was the total quantity you
purchased [for three most important commodities]?
Loc.
Rice
Millet Sorghum
White
Maize
Yellow
Maize
Imp.
Rice
Soya
Quantity
Unit
17. Please one [unit from above] is how much in kg?
most important unit:
2nd most imp. unit:
3rd most imp. unit:
18. Please indicate the best time to start stocking/ release stocks [for three most impor-
tant commodities]
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best time to start stocking best time to release stocks
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Jan 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Feb 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Mar 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Apr 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
May 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Jun 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Jul 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Aug 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Sep 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Oct 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Nov 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Dec 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
1:Local rice, 2:Millet, 3:Sorghum, 4:Y.Maize, 5:W.Maize, 6:Imp.Rice, 7:Soya
Explanation:
19. What is the risk of losing business partners if you stop supplying them for
3 months?
No risk Low risk Medium risk High risk
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20. How much stocks do you have?
Maize Soya
Time Quantity Unit Time Quantity Unit
Sep Sep
Oct Oct
Nov Nov
Dec Dec
Jan Jan
Feb Feb
Mar Mar
Apr Apr
May May
Jun Jun
Jul Jul
Aug Aug
right now right now
next Dec next Dec
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Sorghum Millet
Time Quantity Unit Time Quantity Unit
Sep Sep
Oct Oct
Nov Nov
Dec Dec
Jan Jan
Feb Feb
Mar Mar
Apr Apr
May May
Jun Jun
Jul Jul
Aug Aug
right now right now
next Dec next Dec
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Loc. Rice Imp. Rice
Time Quantity Unit Time Quantity Unit
Sep Sep
Oct Oct
Nov Nov
Dec Dec
Jan Jan
Feb Feb
Mar Mar
Apr Apr
May May
Jun Jun
Jul Jul
Aug Aug
right now right now
next Dec next Dec
21. What is the largest quantity [of your three most important commodities]
you ever had in stock within the last five years?
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Loc.
Rice
Millet Sorghum
White
Maize
Yellow
Maize
Imp.
Rice
Soya
Quantity
Unit
Stocking commodities over time involves uncertainty about future prices. You
can either lose or gain. Please evaluate the following statements:
No risk Low risk
Medium
risk
High risk
22a. Stocking commodities for
more than 3 months
involves
No advantage Low advantage
Medium
advantage
High
advantage
22b. Stocking commodities for
more than 3 months
involves
Do you agree with the following statement.
23. I am willing to take more risk with respect to stockholding than other
wholesale traders?
1 strongly agree 2 agree
3 disagree 4 strongly disagree
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24. How long do you averagely keep your stocks and how often do you deplete
them?
Market information
25. Did you ever experience a wholesale trader trying to push a competitor
out of business
2 Yes 2 No
2 No answer
26. Are food aid agencies affecting your business?
2 Yes 2 No 2 No answer
27. Please indicate your main purchase and sales markets for your two major
products (origin of business partners):
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Major agriculture product Main purchase market Main sales market
/region /region
28. How important are long term business relationships with clients for your
business?
No importance Low importance Medium importance High importance
29. Please explain your choice
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Price prospects
30. Where do you get price information from?
2
Radio
2
TV2
Newspaper
2
Other traders/cooperatives2
Business partners
2
Friends/relatives2
Agriculture information
system (Mobile)
2
NAFCO
2
Others:
2
No answer
31. How frequent do you update information about prices?:
1 several times a
day
2 daily
3 days 4 weekly
5 monthly .
No answer
Price prospects [most important commodity]:
32. How frequently do prices change?:
1 several times a day 2 daily
3 days 4 weekly
5 monthly 6
seasonally
.
No answer
33a. What is today’s sales price?[most important commodity]:
in GHC per unit
33b. What price do you expect in one month?: in GHC per unit
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33c. ... three months?: in GHC per unit
33d. ... six months?: in GHC per unit
34. How often do you experience a major drop in prices whilst you are stock-
ing?[three most important commodities]:
1 every week 2 every month
3 multiple times a year 4 once a year
5 every other year 6
never.
No answer
Loc.
Rice
Millet Sorghum
White
Maize
Yellow
Maize
Imp.
Rice
Soya
Quantity
Unit
Please indicate whether you agree or disagree on the following statement:
35. Compared to the last year, there was much rain in this year’s main rainy
season.
1 strongly agree 2 agree
3 disagree 4 strongly disagree
36. What is the NAFCO minimum guaranteed price for [the most important
com from above] this production year?
2 Dont know
Only if respondent trades imported rice:
37. What is the current import duty for perfumed rice from Non-ECOWAS
countries?
2 Dont know
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38. Which region in Ghana produces most in terms of quantity?[three most
important commodities]:
1 Greater Accra 2 Ashanti
3 Brong-Ahafo 4 Volta
5 Central 6
Eastern
7 Northern 8 Upper East
9 Upper West 10
Western.
No answer
Loc.
Rice
Millet Sorghum
White
Maize
Yellow
Maize
Imp.
Rice
Soya
Region
Transaction costs
39. Over the last 12 months, did you hire a transporter or did you transport
yourself?
2 Did not transport 2 Only with my own vehicle 2 Only with a transporter
2 Both
40. Over the last 12 months, did you use your own storage facilities or did you
rent them from someone?
2 Did not store 2 Only own facilities 2 Only rented facilities
2 Both
Secret market information
41. Who are the three largest trader in the market (other than you)?
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42. How much storage capacity do they have?
43. How much do you believe they have in stocks at the moment?
commodity:
commodity:
commodity:
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Appendix: Telephone interview
questionnaire
TRADER SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER),
University of Ghana (Legon)
Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn
To be filled by the contractee.
Name of the company:
Name of the respondent:
Telephone Number:
[Additional information on the respondent is provided here in order to establish
rapport; e.g. location of the first meeting, special incidents during the meeting]
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Commodities of the company
To be completed by the interviewer.
Interview Date: ____ -2014 (ddmm-2014)
Good morning/afternoon. My name is . I am conducting this survey
on behalf of ISSER and ZEF on the structure of agricultural marketing in Ghana.
The information provided by you in this interview about your trading activities will con-
tribute to understand the causes and impacts of seasonal price dynamics in Ghana. Your
response to these questions will be anonymous and will be treated with the strictest confi-
dentiality. Your participation is voluntary and you can choose not to answer any or all of the
questions if you wish; however we hope you will participate since your views are important.
The research is aiming at improving the functioning of grain markets in Ghana.
Thank you in advance for your time to participate in this study.
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1. Please evaluate the following factors according to their impact on price movements:
No impact Low impact
Medium
impact
High
impact
Quantity harvested
Timing of harvest
Change in market supply
Change in market demand
Trade policies Ghana
Market activity NAFCO
Trade policies in neighbouring countries
Price changes in neighbouring countries
International price changes
Others:
2. Please evaluate the following factors according to their risk for profits from your
stocks:
No risk Low risk Medium risk High risk
Bumper harvest
Bad harvest
Timing of harvest
Export prohibition
Change in import duties
Market activity of NAFCO
Export prohibition in neighbouring country
Import stop in neighbouring country
Price changes in neighbouring country
International price changes
Others:
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3. Please evaluate your competitiveness for the following cost components?
Lower costs Sames costs Higher costs
than other traders
Loading
Transportation
Capital/interest payment
Storage costs
Costs due to losses while storing
How much do you need to add to the purchase price to not make any
loses?: for most important crop
4a. if you buy and immediately sell: in GHC per unit
4b. if you buy and store for three months and sell: in GHC per
unit
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Appendix: Derivation of the optimal
linear stocking rule
Let supply be a random variable and  the deviation from its mean:
Qt + IMt = E[Q+ IM ] +  (F.1)
According to the market identity, consumption Ct equals total supply plus changes in stocks
∆St:
Ct = Qt + IMt + ∆St (F.2)
with ∆St = St−1 − St (F.3)
In each year a constant portion γ of total available supply Qt + IMt +St−1 is carried to the
next period. Thus,
St−1 = γ(St +Qt + IMt) (F.4)
Inserting (F.4) in (F.3) yields:
∆St = γ(St +Qt + IMt)− St (F.5)
= (γ − 1)St + γ(Qt + IMt) (F.6)
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Then, consumption can be written as:
Ct = Qt + IMt − γ(Qt + IMt) + (1− γ)St (F.7)
= (1− γ)Qt + (1− γ)St (F.8)
In steady state E[St] = E[St−1] = S∗, therefore in expectation (F.4) changes to:
E[St−1] = γ(E[St] + E[Q+ IM ]) (F.9)
S∗ =
γE[Q+ IM ]
(1− γ) (F.10)
The variance of consumption is given by:
Var(Ct) = (E[Ct]− Ct)2 (F.11)
= (1− γ)2[Var(St + (Qt + IMt))] (F.12)
= (1− γ)2[Var(St) + Var(Qt) + 2Cov(St, Qt + IMt)] (F.13)
Qt + IMt i.i.d. and St depends on Qt−1 + IMt−1 only → Cov(St, Qt + IMt) = 0
Var(Ct) can be expressed dependent on St and St−1. In both cases Var(Ct) is equal. There-
fore:
= (1− γ)2[γ2VAR(St−1) + (1 + γ2)VAR(Qt + IMt)] (F.14)
! = (1− γ)2[VAR(St) + VAR(Qt + IMt)] (F.15)
Solving for VAR(St) yields:
VAR(St) =
γ2
(1− γ2)VAR(Qt + IMt) (F.16)
Inserting (F.16) in (F.13) allows to write VAR(Ct) as a function of VAR(Qt + IMt):
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VAR(Ct) = (1− γ)2[ γ
2
(1− γ2)VAR(Qt + IMt) + VAR(Qt + IMt)] (F.17)
=
1− γ
(1 + γ)
VAR(Qt + IMt) (F.18)
or
CV(Ct) =
√
1− γ
(1 + γ)
CV(Qt + IMt) (F.19)
with
VAR(Qt + IMt) =
1
T
T∑
t
(E[Q+ IM ]− (Qt + IMt))2 (F.20)
E[Q+ IM ] : Trendvalue from HP-filter (F.21)
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Table G.1: Stock levels in 2014 for target consumption of 99 %
Production Supply
Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i
Benin 40% 141,604 120,137 100,356 37% 152,677 127,265 116,424
Burkina Faso 40% 631,234 368,174 447,361 40% 593,667 351,453 452,700
Cameroon 49% 214,049 236,879 151,698 26% 203,148 281,713 154,911
Cape Verde 49% 8,101 524 5,741 52% 15,455 1,701 11,785
Chad 49% 368,209 139,960 260,953 46% 357,082 141,125 272,293
Cote d’Ivoire 37% 127,531 97,789 90,382 43% 181,273 187,327 138,229
Gambia, the 43% 79,208 16,839 56,135 55% 48,382 23,208 36,894
Ghana 43% 357,196 207,853 253,148 43% 477,451 263,042 364,079
Guinea 43% 90,030 174,930 63,805 46% 124,296 186,109 94,782
Guinea-Bissau 43% 26,771 13,318 18,973 46% 26,092 20,706 19,896
Liberia 40% 27,477 13,978 19,473 49% 53,601 34,774 40,873
Mali 58% 419,760 429,367 297,487 55% 417,047 383,615 318,019
Mauritania 49% 56,683 16,814 40,172 46% 111,038 49,237 84,672
Niger 37% 779,525 360,017 552,456 37% 681,052 350,313 519,335
Nigeria 43% 1,786,527 1,674,944 1,266,127 43% 2,167,705 1,943,323 1,652,981
Senegal 49% 477,554 100,173 338,447 52% 308,029 204,087 234,887
Sierra Leone 37% 128,728 62,996 91,231 46% 149,723 73,652 114,171
Continued on next page...
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... Table G.1 continued
Production Supply
Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i
Togo 43% 95,910 87,226 67,972 40% 117,762 94,081 89,800
Region 100% 5,816,099 4,122,000 4,122,000 100% 6,185,480 4,716,730 4,716,730
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014].
Note: Stocks in mt. Pi is the probability of intervention when production and supply are
below the target consumption (99%). S∗i , Sˆi, and S˜i are stocks without cooperation, with
equal, and relative contributions.
Table G.2: Stock levels in 2014 for target consumption of 97 %
Production Supply
Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i
Benin 34% 120,218 93,057 79,668 37% 127,936 96,089 91,907
Burkina Faso 34% 546,502 285,182 362,163 37% 500,825 265,358 359,785
Cameroon 29% 189,018 183,483 125,260 17% 170,363 212,702 122,386
Cape Verde 49% 7,836 406 5,193 40% 14,800 1,285 10,632
Chad 43% 334,871 108,411 221,916 40% 317,808 106,554 228,308
Cote d’Ivoire 23% 106,025 75,746 70,262 31% 139,631 141,438 100,309
Gambia, the 37% 74,719 13,043 49,515 54% 41,486 17,523 29,803
Ghana 37% 317,677 161,000 210,522 34% 422,149 198,605 303,265
Guinea 34% 74,009 135,498 49,045 31% 87,947 140,519 63,179
Guinea-Bissau 34% 24,150 10,316 16,004 40% 23,423 15,634 16,827
Liberia 40% 23,892 10,827 15,833 37% 48,902 26,255 35,130
Mali 46% 309,623 332,581 205,185 49% 303,936 289,642 218,342
Mauritania 49% 53,175 13,024 35,238 37% 101,159 37,175 72,671
Niger 34% 693,576 278,864 459,627 34% 585455 264,498 420,581
Nigeria 34% 1,285,869 1,297,387 852,134 34% 1,572,822 1,467,271 1,129,890
Senegal 43% 453,584 77,593 300,586 43% 258,230 154,092 185,508
Sierra Leone 34% 117,360 48,796 77,773 40% 134,597 55,609 96,692
Continued on next page...
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... Table G.2 continued
Production Supply
Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i
Togo 31% 85,791 67,564 56,853 29% 105,888 71,035 76,069
Region 100% 4,817,894 3,193,000 3,193,000 97% 4,957,355 3,561,283 3,561,283
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014].
Note: Stocks in mt. Pi is the probability of intervention when production and supply are
below the target consumption (97%). S∗i , Sˆi, and S˜i are stocks without cooperation, with
equal, and relative contributions.
Table G.3: Stock levels in 2014 for target consumption of 90 %
Production Supply
Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i
Benin 11% 49,479 31,300 20,578 11% 42,379 17,315 15755
Burkina Faso 23% 271,876 95,923 113,071 20% 203,667 47,818 75,717
Cameroon 9% 101,408 61,716 42,175 9% 94,852 38,329 35,263
Cape Verde 34% 6,910 137 2,874 34% 12,505 231 4,649
Chad 23% 218,190 36,465 90,743 23% 180,347 19,201 67,048
Cote d’Ivoire 6% 30,755 25,478 12,791 3% 35,635 25,487 13,248
Gambia, the 29% 59,007 4,387 24,540 31% 22,209 3,158 8,257
Ghana 14% 257,176 54,153 106,957 11% 228,592 35,789 84,984
Guinea 6% 17,936 45,576 7,460 6% 10,864 25,322 4,039
Guinea-Bissau 17% 14,974 3,470 6,227 14% 14,084 2,817 5,236
Liberia 26% 15,564 3,642 6,473 23% 32,455 4,731 12,066
Mali 11% 110,280 111,866 45,864 14% 78,210 52,194 29,076
Mauritania 37% 40,894 4,381 17,007 17% 66,580 6,699 24,753
Niger 20% 392,751 93,798 163,341 20% 345,241 47,663 128,351
Nigeria 3% 497,369 436,384 206,851 9% 128,646 264,404 47,827
Senegal 29% 369,686 26,099 153,749 9% 83,935 27,768 31,205
Sierra Leone 23% 77,571 16,413 32,261 20% 81,657 10,021 30,358
Togo 14% 50,373 22,726 20,950 11% 64,329 12,800 23,916
Region 89% 2,582,200 1,074,000 1,074,000 89% 1,726,187 641,747 641,747
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014].
Continued on next page...
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... Table G.3 continued
Production Supply
Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i Pi S
∗
i Sˆi S˜i
Note: Stocks in mt. Pi is the probability of intervention when production and supply are
below the target consumption (90%). S∗i , Sˆi, and S˜i are stocks without cooperation, with
equal, and relative contributions.
Table G.4: Regression results: beginning stockst = γ l.supplyt + t
Coef. Std. Err. t P > |t| R2
Benin 0.1052916 0.0095475 11.03 0 91
Burkina Faso 0.0826153 0.0070421 11.73 0 92
Cameroon 0.177977 0.015548 11.45 0 92
Cape Verde 0.1686828 0.0196476 8.59 0 86
Chad 0.1927932 0.0120751 15.97 0 96
Cote d’Ivoire 0.0951646 0.0106122 8.97 0 87
Gambia, the 0.2392599 0.0254189 9.41 0 88
Ghana 0.0891409 0.0051898 17.18 0 96
Guinea 0.1377254 0.0091712 15.02 0 95
Guinea-Bissau 0.1638711 0.0088481 18.52 0 97
Liberia 0.144342 0.0145824 9.9 0 89
Mali 0.116585 0.0102389 11.39 0 92
Mauritania 0.1589412 0.0157148 10.11 0 90
Niger 0.0574701 0.0099975 5.75 0 73
Nigeria 0.0626637 0.0056854 11.02 0 91
Senegal 0.1403502 0.0075525 18.58 0 97
Sierra Leone 0.0626151 0.0062673 9.99 0 89
Togo 0.132223 0.0060911 21.71 0 98
Table G.5: Optimal stock-to-use ratio for various levels of consumption variability
CV Supply γ for γ for γ for α for α for α for
CVC=3.4 CVC=3.1 CVC=5.4 CVC=3.4 CVC=3.1 CVC=5.4
Benin 7.6 0.67 0.71 0.33 200% 251% 49%
Burkina Faso 9.1 0.76 0.79 0.48 308% 381% 92%
Continued on next page...
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... Table G.5 continued
CV Supply γ for γ for γ for α for α for α for
CVC=3.4 CVC=3.1 CVC=5.4 CVC=3.4 CVC=3.1 CVC=5.4
Cameroon 6 0.51 0.58 0.10 106% 137% 12%
Cape Verde 30.3 0.98 0.98 0.94 3921% 4727% 1524%
Chad 13.3 0.88 0.90 0.72 715% 870% 253%
Cote d’Ivoire 5.7 0.48 0.54 0.05 91% 119% 6%
Gambia, the 14.4 0.89 0.91 0.75 847% 1029% 306%
Ghana 10.2 0.80 0.83 0.56 400% 491% 128%
Guinea 5.6 0.46 0.53 0.04 86% 113% 4%
Guinea-Bissau 10.3 0.80 0.83 0.57 409% 502% 132%
Liberia 14.8 0.90 0.92 0.77 897% 1090% 326%
Mali 9.4 0.77 0.80 0.50 332% 410% 102%
Mauritania 9.6 0.78 0.81 0.52 349% 430% 108%
Niger 12 0.85 0.87 0.66 573% 699% 197%
Nigeria 5.4 0.43 0.50 0.00 76% 102% 0%
Senegal 8.3 0.71 0.76 0.41 248% 308% 68%
Sierra Leone 11.1 0.83 0.86 0.62 483% 591% 161%
Togo 8.1 0.70 0.74 0.38 234% 291% 63%
Region 3.4 0.00 0.09 0% 10%
Source: Author’s computation based on USDA [2014] and FAO CBS [2014].
Note: γ = CV
2
S−CV2C
CV2
S
+CV2
C
(which is derived from equation 6.28; α is computed by (see equation 6.26).
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Figure G.1: Grain production in Benin 1980-2014.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.2: Grain production in Burkina Faso 1980-2014.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.3: Grain production in Cameroon 1980-2014.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.4: Grain production in Cape Verde 1980-2014.
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.5: Grain production in Chad 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.6: Grain production in Cote d’Ivoire 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.7: Grain production in The Gambia 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.8: Grain production in Guinea 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.9: Grain production in Guinea-Bissau 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.10: Grain production in Liberia 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.11: Grain production in Mali 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.12: Grain production in Mauritania 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.13: Grain production in Niger 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.14: Grain production in Nigeria 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.15: Grain production in Senegal 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.16: Grain production in Sierra Leone 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.17: Grain production in Togo 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.18: Grain supply in Benin 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.19: Grain supply in Burkina Faso 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.20: Grain supply in Cameroon 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
297
Appendix G. Supplementary tables and figures chapter 6
Figure G.21: Grain supply in Cape Verde 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.22: Grain supply in Chad 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.23: Grain supply in Cote d’Ivoire 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.24: Grain supply in The Gambia 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.25: Grain supply in Ghana 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.26: Grain supply in Guinea 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.27: Grain supply in Guinea-Bissau 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.28: Grain supply in Liberia 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.29: Grain supply in Mali 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.30: Grain supply in Mauritania 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.31: Grain supply in Niger 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.32: Grain supply in Nigeria 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.33: Grain supply in Senegal 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.34: Grain supply in Sierra Leone 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
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Figure G.35: Grain supply in Togo 1980-2014
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014].
Figure G.36: Consumption and supply variability across study countries (log scale)
Source: Author’s illustration based on USDA [2014] and FAO CBS [2014].
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